WHAT DOES RESPECT FOR

NATURE MEAN?

Richard A. Watson
Washington University

A review of Paul W. Taylor's Respect

for Nature: A Theory of aylor develops a biocentric environ-
Environmental Ethics (Princeton: mental ethics based on moral
Princeton University Press, 1986). agents' respect for inherently
329 pages, hardcover $37.50, worthy moral subjects in nature.
Moral subjects consist of "the
paperback $12.50.
natural world ... the entire set of
natural ecosystems on our planet,
along with the populations of animals and plants
that make up the biotic communities of those
ecosystems" (3). Nature is thus the life-system
consisting of all living organisms.

REVIEW

Spring 1989 93 Between the Species

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

Both human and environmental ethics incor- them can be judged, from their standpoint, to be
porate the same notion of a moral agent as favorable or unfavorable to them" (63). The
validity of Taylor's environmental ethics depends
any being that ... can act morally or on whether or not an entity that lacks interests
immorally ... have duties and responsibil- and self-consciousness - a subjective (self-con-
ities ... be held accountable for what it does
scious) sense of itself - can logically be said to
... form judgments about right and wrong have a standpoint from which its own good can
... engage in moral deliberation ... consider
be imaginatively projected by a moral agent.
and weigh moral reasons for and against
Taylor says "it is possible for a human being
various courses of conduct open to choice
[moral agent] to take [any] animal's standpoint
... make decisions on the basis of those
and, without a trace of anthropomorphism,
reasons ... exercise the necessary resolve
make a factually informed and objective
and willpower to carry out those decisions
judgment regarding what is desirable or unde-
... hold [it] self answerable to others for
sirable from that standpoint" (67).
failing to carry them out. (14)
Taylor says every living organism has a-good-of-
Taylor's definition is in fact only of an agent. A its-own and thus has inherent worth, which
moral agent not only must have the capacities of means that each is a moral subject that is worthy
self-direction, but also must commit itself to a set of respect by and has claims on moral agents
of ultimate moral principles. (75). That an entity has a-good-of-its-own does
On Taylor's grounds, "not all humans are not logically imply that it has inherent worth, but
moral agents, and ... there may exist moral in taking the biocentric attitude a moral agent is
agents who are not human .... Perhaps dolphins, committed to "the principle that living things
whales, elephants, and the primates possess '" ought not to be harmed or interfered with in
sufficient understanding of their relationship to nature, other things being equal" (72).
other members of their social group that they Inherent worth is distinguished from "intrinsic
can see themselves as bearing responsibilities value," which pertains to "any activity ... carried
toward their fellows" (I E,). In sum, to be a moral on for its own sake or as an end in itself' (73),
agent an entity must be able to choose and act and from "inherent value," which pertains to any-
according to rules to which it has committed thing "held in high esteem and considered
itself with self-conscious intention. important because it is the kind of thing it is"
A moral subject is "any being that can be (73). Thus, a thing "has intrinsic value for those
treated rightly or wrongly and toward whom who find satisfaction in it" (73), and "the inherent
moral agents can have duties and responsibilities value of anything is relative to and dependent upon
[thus] it must be possible for such beings to have someone's valuing it" (74). Living organisms may
their conditions of exisltence be made better or have intrinsic and/or inherent value depending
worse by the actions of agents" (17). So "all on an agent's attitude toward them, but all have
moral agents are moral subjects" (16), but not inherent worth, which is not "relativized to the
"all moral subjects are moral agents" (17). To be subjective valuings of conscious beings" (74).
a moral subject, an entity need not be a moral "Inherent worth ... is to be attributed only to
agent, but "it is always possible for a moral agent entities that have a good of their own .... a living
to take a moral subject's standpoint and make judg- thing ... possesses such worth regardless of any
ments from its standpoint about how it ought to be instrumental or inherent value it may have with
treated.... [for] the furtherance or preservation of reference to the good of any other being" (75).
the well-being of the subject, not of the [moral Taylor says that just as for human ethics "the
agent] who does the judging" (17). idea that all persons are bearers of inherent
Crucially, being a moral subject depends on worth just in virtue of their being persons ... is
being an "en ti ty-having-a-good-of-i ts-own" (60), the ultimate ground of all duties in a moral com-
so that "it makes sense to speak of their being munity" (78), so also in environmental ethics all
benefitted or harmed. Things that happen to living organisms are bearers of inherent worth

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 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

just in virtue of their being organisms. He claims Ultimate moral principles cannot be deductively
that: derived from first principles, but only holistically
shown to be persuasive (14). Thus Taylor's
it is possible to establish the truth of the "sound arguments" run in circles:
claim that a person has inherent worth by
showing that only this way of regarding Now, in subscribing to or adopting that
persons is coherent with the conception of total structure of moral principles, we are
every person as a rational, valuing being- taking a certain ultimate moral attitude and
an autonomous center of conscious life. To committing ourselves to expressing that
see ourselves as such an entity and to assert attitude in our conduct and character. Our
our own inherent worth out of self-respect, belief that the total system of principles con-
while at the same time denying that worth stitutes a valid ethical system is identical
to others whom we conceive to be persons with, and not a ground for, our belief that
like ourselves, is incoherent. (79) the ultimate moral attitude embodied in
these principles is justified. Unlike the spe-
Taylor uses this apparently tautological argument
cific moral attitudes of approval and disap-
form to support his environmental ethics:
proval that we have toward human conduct
The same type of argument will also hold and that follow from the ultimate attitude,
for the claim that all animals and plants in the ultimate attitude itself does not follow
the natural world have inherent worth. We from any more basic commitment.. ..
can establish the truth of that claim by In order to justify the attitude, then, we
showing that only this way of regarding must show that the whole ethical system that
them is coherent with how we must under- embodies it is a valid one. How can this be
stand them when we accept the belief- done? The only way is to set forth the belief-
system of the biocentric outlook on system that underlies and supports the
nature .... The central tenet of the theory of attitude and show that it is acceptable to all
environmental ethics that I am defending is who are rational, factually informed, and
that actions are right and character traits have a developed capacity of reality-
are morally good in virtue of their awareness. (97-98)
expressing or embodying a certain ultimate
The "capacity of reality-awareness" is the ability
moral attitude, which I call respect for
to take the standpoint of a non-self-conscious
nature. (80)
entity that is not a moral agent. (164-165)
Taylor says that the only way to argue for Human ethics is based on the concept of a
adopting an ultimate moral attitude is to exhibit person that is wider than that of a moral agent:
what it would mean for moral agents to believe
A person ... is ... a center of autonomous
and act on it. Many such attitudes are possible:
choice and valuation. Persons are beings
[For example,] the exploitative attitude, no that give direction to their lives on the basis
less than the attitude of respect, can be of their own values. They ... not only have
viewed as a supreme moral commitment interests and purposes, but also have the
that takes priority over all other norms and capacity to set long-range and short-range
values, as far as the treatment of the natural goals for themselves in the light of those
world is concerned. The choice between interests and purposes. They have the power
the~e two ultimate, incompatible attitudes to decide for themselves what ends to seek
must then be based on whatever sound in life and they can make up their own
arguments can be given to show that minds about the best means to take toward
adopting one and not the other as an those ends. They have the ability to impose
ultimate moral attitude is justified on order on their various activities and pro-
rational grounds. (96) jects, determining what purposes are more

Spring 1989 95 Between the Species

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

important than others and choosing not to intentionally aiming at preserving its exis-
take steps to accomplish one purpose if that tence, that it is exerting efforts to avoid
will prevent them from achieving a more death, or that it even cares whether it lives
important purpose. Finally, persons are or dies .... organisms like trees and one-
beings who place value on things according celled protozoa do not have a conscious life.
to how they judge each thing's contribution They are not aware of the world around
to their overall well-being and happiness. them. They have no thoughts or feelings
(33-34) and hence no interest in anything that
[Persons must have] a sense of their own happens to them. Yet they have a good of
identity over time. For they must be able to their own around which their behavior is
conceive of themselves as having a future, organized. All organisms, whether conscious
and this means that they believe that they or not, are teleological centers of life in the
will be the same persons later in life as the sense that each is a unified, coherently
persons they are now, however different ordered system of goal-oriented activity that
may be their external circumstances. To has a constant tendency to protect and
have a vision of one's life as a unified whole maintain the organism's existence.
and to make judgements in the light of that Under this conception of individual living
vision requires a sense of personal identity. things, each is seen to have a single, unique
Only beings with that kind of self-awareness point of view. This point of view is deter-
can be persons. (35) mined by the organism's particular way of
responding to its environment, interacting
Persons are agents, but not necessarily moral
with other individual organisms, and under-
agents. Agents can follow nonmoral rules of "a
going the regular, lawlike transformations of
voluntary association, ... a contest or game, ...
the various stages of its species-specific life
how-to ... achieve a certain goal, ... society ... a
cycle. (121-122)
state" (29), but need not adhere to moral values.
Agents also must have self-consciousness through I now argue that it does not make sense to talk
time, which is necessary to intentional. action. To of a non-self-conscious entity's being a teleo-
intend to do something one must know one logical center having a-good-of-its-own. If having
intends to do it; only what an agent does inten- inherent worth leading to moral subjecthood
tionally counts as an action for the agent. depends on an entity's being a teleological
Taylor says only individual living organisms center that has a-good-of-its-own, then only self-
can be persons and agents (he modifies this con- conscious persons can be moral subjects. This
dition later), because only individual organisms conclusion is independent of whether or not
can be teleological centers of life in the sense those persons are humans. Thus on Taylor's own
that "the organism as a whole is the unit that terms, my argument is not anthropocentric.
responds to its environment and so accomplishes Taylor's environmental ethics fails because he
(or tends to accomplish) the end of sustaining its tries to prove that all living organisms are primary
life" (122). Being a person thus depends on moral subjects with an unsuccessful argument
being a teleological center of life, but Taylor says that all and only living organisms are teleological
a teleological center of life need not be a person: centers of life.
Contrary to Taylor, it is not "meaningful to
Understanding individual organisms as
speak about what is good or bad for [any living]
teleological centers of life does not mean
organism as seen from the standpoint of its own
that we are falsely anthropomorphizing. It
good" (67). It is impossible to "take the stand-
does not involve "reading into" them
point" of any non-self-conscious organism to
human characteristics. We need not, for
determine "its own" good because a non-self-con-
example, consider them to have con-
scious entity cannot be a teleological center and
sciousness. That a particular tree is a teleo-
thus cannot have "a-good-of-its-own."
logical center of life does not entail that it is

Between the Species 96 Spring 1989

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

Taylor always speaks as though we learn of the machine's own good that is being furthered by
objective conditions of an entity's survival or being kept well-oiled, but the good of certain
preservation by subjectively taking that entity's humans for whom the machine is a means to
standpoint or point of view. But we in fact learn their ends" (61):
what conditions facilitate or impede its survival
This mode of understanding a particular
by objective observation of its behavior, for which
individual is not possible with regard to
we do not have to pretend to be its con-
inanimate objects. Although no two stones
sciousness. Logically, we cannot pretend to be its
are exactly alike in their physical character-
consciousness because the entities in question
istics, stones do not have points of view. In
are not self-conscious, and thus have no minds or
pure fantasy, of course, we can play at per-
mental standpoint to take. But this does not
forming the imaginative act of taking a
vitiate our ability to understand such an entity's
objective interests in the sense of our knowi~g
stone's standpoint and looking at the world
from its perspective. But we are then
"the environmental conditions it needs to survive
moving away from reality, not getting closer
in a healthy state ... what is beneficial to it and
to it. The true reality of a stone's existence
what might be harmful to it" (66).
includes no point of view. This is not due to
Taylor goes from the fact that non-self-con-
the fact that it lacks consciousness. As we
scious entities have objective interests to the con-
have noted, plants and simple animal
clusion that we can take their subjective
organisms also lack consciousness, but have
standpoint to determine their subjective interests
points of view nonetheless. What makes our
(67) so they are moral subjects. Thus he goes
awareness of an individual stone fundamen-
from "is" to "ought" although he denies that it
tally different from our awareness of a plant
can be done (51). That is, he infers from the fact
or animal is that the stone is not a teleo-
that there are objective conditions that will harm
logical center of life, while the plant or
or benefit an entity that it has moral status
animal is. The stone has no good of its own.
(inherent worth).
We cannot benefit it by furthering its well-
Note that I am arguing explicitly that we
being or harm it by acting contrary to its
cannot imagine taking an imagined standpoint or
well-being, since the concept of well-being
point of view of an entity that does not actually
simply does not apply to it.
have one without entering the fantasy world of
This point holds even for those complex
children's stories. Taylor claims that h~ does not
mechanisms (such as self-monitoring space
base his environmental ethics on anthropomor-
satellites, chess-playing computers, and
phizing sentimentality, but his use of "moral
assembly-line "robots") that have been con-
subject" to refer to non-self-conscious entities
structed by humans to function in a quasi-
leads him to talk as though non-self-consciolls
autonomous, self-regulating manner in the
entities have subjective standpoints or points of
process of accomplishing certain purposes.
view which we can take. This is anthropomor-
Though such machines are understandable
phizing.
as teleological systems, they remain in actual
Taylor says explicitly about inanimate objects
fact inanimate objects [Taylor later modifies
what I argue is also true of non-self-conscious,
his claim that only living ~rganisms are tele-
non-agent, non-person living organisms. If we
ological systems as contrasted to animate
keep a sandpile dry, "it is not the sand's own
objects that are merely "understandable as"
good that would be furthered, but [our] purpose
such]. The ends they are programmed to
for which it is to be used .... The sand has no
accomplish are not purposes of their own ....
good of its own. It is not the sort of thing that
The g-oal-oriented operations of
can be included in the range of application of
machines are not inherent to them as the
the concept entity-that-has-a-good-of-its-own" (60-
goal-oriented behavior of organisms is
61). Likewise, Taylor says that "purpose is not
inherent to them. (123-124)
attributable to [a] machine .... It is not the

Spring 1989 97 Between the Species

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

Note that machines are said not to have pur- Now follows a key paragraph showing that
poses of "their own" but to accomplish purposes Taylor sees that the distinction between teleo-
of their human makers. Such purposeless logical and non-teleological entities is neither
machines are contrasted to non-self-conscious based upon nor coextensive with (as he says it is)
living organisms that are said to have purposes of the distinction between living organisms and
their own, but these purposes cannot be like the inanimate matter, but on the distinction
intentional purposes of the human beings that between entities that are self-conscious and
program machines, because non-self-conscious those that are not:
organisms do not have minds. I argue that
I should add as a parenthetical note that
entities that cannot self-consciously intend their
this difference between mechanism and
own purposes are not and cannot be (as con-
organism may no longer be maintainable
trasted to "being understood as") teleological
with regard to those complex electronic
systems l . What Taylor says next of machines is
devices now being developed under the
also true of non-self-conscious organisms:
name of artificial intelligence. Perhaps some
[T] he goals of machines are derivative,
day computer scientists and engineers will
whereas the goals of a living thing are
construct beings whose internal processes
original. The ends and purposes of
and electrical responses to their sur-
machines are built into them by their
roundings closely paraliel the functions of
human creators.... Although they manifest
the human brain and nervous system.
goal-directed activities, the machines do
Concerning such beings we may begin to
not, as independent entities, have a good of
speak of their having a good of their own
their own. Their "good" is "furthered" only
independen tly of the purposes of their cre-
insofar as they are treated in such a way as
ators. At that point the distinction drawn
to be an effective means to human ends.
above between living things and inanimate
A living plant or animal, on the other
machines may break down. (124-125)
hand, has a good of its own in the same
sense that a human being has a good of its The breakdown would come because, as Taylor
own. It is, independently of anything else in implies here, such machines would be self-con-
the universe, itself a center of goal-oriented scious, as humans are. They would have minds,
activity [Whose goals? Its own, if it is self- so they could have intentions, purposes, and
conscious; perhaps no one's if it is not]. goals of their own. They would then be teleo-
What is good or bad for it can be under- logical centers, as non-self-conscious entities are
stood by reference to its own survival, not. Taylor ignores this insight. He goes on to
health, and well-being [its own?]. As a living claim that:
thing it seeks its own ends in a way that is
not true of any teleologically structured Our ability to understand and take the
mechanism. It is in terms of its goals standpoint of individual organisms depends
[Taylor's emphasis] that we can give teleo- ... on our conceiving of them as teleological
logical explanations of why it does what it centers of life. Our disposition to conceive
does. [But the question just is whether or of them this way is supported by our looking
not an entity that does not have a mind, at ourselves and them as fellow members of
sense of self, and conscious intentions can a community of life that includes both of us
have its own "why" or seek its own goals in on equal terms. To the extent that we see
the sense required to designate it as a teleo- ourselves to be one with other living things
logical system.] We cannot do the same for in the Earth's biosphere, to that extent we
machines, since any such explanation must are able to achieve the frame of mind for
ultimately refer to the goals their human having a full sense of the reality of their
producers had in mind when they made the individual existences. (125)
machines. (124)

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 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

Being "fellow members of a community of life" is as we see ourselves, we are ready to place
based only on being a living organism, which is the same value on their existence as we do
not enough to establish that an entity has an on our own. (128)
individual existence as a teleological center.
I have two arguments here. First, in his dis-
Taylor goes on:
cussion of stones and machines, Taylor shows
We achieve wholeness of vision in our that we can learn by objective observation about
understanding of an animal or plant to the the conditions that will disrupt or facilitate the
extent that we no longer look at it in terms survival or preservation of non-self-conscious
of a role or function it might have in entities. Taking the imagined subjective stand-
human life.... point of such an entity is not necessary for
To free ourselves from such one-sidedness learning about these conditions. In fact, the only
is to gain an understanding of the whole sense of "standpoint or point of view" that Taylor
character or "personality" [Note the actually presents for non-self-conscious entities
qualification here; Taylor knows that only makes the phrase merely a way of referring to
persons actually have personalities and wants objective conditions. His use of "standpoint or
here to avoid being accused of point of view" with its subjective nuances con-
anthropomorphizing; he should use the fuses the reference to these objective conditions
same caution in potentially misleading uses and is an unwarranted verbal bridge to the false
of "standpoint or point of view"] of an conception that non-self-conscious entities can
individual based on our recognition of its have, do have, or can be imagined to have sub-
concrete qualities in all their particularity .... jective points of view.
in our grasp of an organism's uniqueness, we Second, Taylor's discussion of the fact that
come to know the life of that individual as non-self-conscious entities cannot have
lived by it. [But every particular entity is knowledge of themselves because they cannot
unique, so our grasp of uniqueness does not have knowledge of anything is equivalent to
establish that we "know the life of that saying that they do not have selves. We cannot
individual as lived by it." Taylor says correctly "see them as we see ourselves" because we cannot
on p. 122 that non-self-eonscious entities imaginatively take the standpoint of an entity
cannot live their own lives, i.e., they do not that does not and cannot have self-conscious
have their own lives] .... experiences, i.e., cannot see themselves. It is thus
When our consciousness of the life of an just as much fantasy to project oneself imagina-
individual organism is characterized by both tively into the "life" of a non-self-conscious
objectivity and wholeness of vision, we have organism as it is to pretend to be a stone or a
reached the most complete realization, cog- machine.
nitively and imaginatively, of what it is to be Explicitly, there is no "what it is to be" a non-
that particular individual. We have let the self-conscious entity. It is sheer nonsense to talk
reality of another's life enter into the world of any non-self-conscious entity as though we
of our consciousness. We know it as fully could "achieve a full understanding of the point
and intensely as it can be known .... of view defined by its good" (29). For some-
As a result of our heightened awareness thing to have "a-good-of-its-own" and a "what it is
of the reality of another living thing's exis- to be" that entity, it must be conscious of its own
tence, we gain the genuine capacity to take good and its own being. By definition, non-self-
its standpoint and make judgments based conscious beings do not own or have "their own
on its good. Shifting out of the usual bound- lives. "
aries of anthropocentricity, the world- Beyond that, if it is a category mistake to make
horizon of our moral imagination opens up merit comparisons between entities that do and
[metaphorically and anthropomorphically] do not have self-consciousness (130 ff), then it is
to encompass all living things. Seeing them also wrong (as I have detailed,) to say that a self-

Spring 1989 99 Between the Species

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

conscious entity can "take the standpoint" of a The necessary condition for having a stand-
non-self-conscious entity (that does not have a point or point of view is not that of being a living
standpoint in the self-conscious sense that is pur- organism (or that of being a teleological center
portedly taken for it). of life in Taylor's sense, which I argue is too
What we do when we "take the standpoint or broad), but that of having consciousness of one's
po in t of view" of a non-self-conscious living self as occupying the standpoint from which one
organism, or, for that matter, a mountain, is fan- has a point of view. So we cannot "take the stand-
cifully pretend what it would be like to be self- point" of a non-self-conscious entity. But we can
conscious in that kind of organism or thing. In take the standpoint or point of view of other self-
charades, one tries to posture one's body so it conscious entities.
looks like a mountain. When stalking rabbits to Similarly, non-self-conscious entities do not
photograph them in the wild, one reviews what have their own goals. Not all living organisms have
one knows about rabbit behavior. It would be a goals, so they cannot be separated from
mistake to think what one might do next if one machines or inanimate things on the basis that
had the body of a rabbit and were being stalked, all living organisms are teleological centers. Only
because rabbits do not behave when stalked as some are and can be so separated. Taylor says
you would if you had the body of a rabbit. Wild that machines cannot have standpoints and
rabbits are easy to stalk because their species- goods-of-their-own because machines are artifacts
specific behavior is very predictable, something that facilitate their makers' goals. People who
we learn by observing them objectively, not by believe that God made all nonhuman living
subjectively "taking their standpoint." One's organisms for human use say the same thing
success in charades or in photographing wild about them. Biologists say living organisms
rabbits is not, then, because we plug into "what behave the way they do not on purpose but
it is to be" a mountain or into "the reality of a because they have been conditioned by processes
rabbit's life," because non-self-conscious entities of natural selection. Most living organisms do not
do not have ways of being nor anything that is have their own goals but like some machines
their way of life. merely look as though they do to self-conscious
entities who are aware of themselves as having
goals. It is precisely to avoid the anthropo-
morphic fallacy that behaviorist psychologists
and biologists methodically do not "take the
organism's standpoint." To speak of a non-self-
conscious entity's having a standpoint or point of
view and a-good-of-its-own is anthropomorphic
because it is to pretend that it is self-conscious as
humans are. This impossibility is just what
Taylor's position requires of us.
To be very clear about this, let me say that I
think that many nonhuman animals - at least
dolphins, whales, elephants, and the great apes
- are self-conscious through time and so do
have standpoints or points of view that we can
imaginatively project ourselves into. This makes
them persons. But note that if inherent worth, in
Taylor's sense as worthy of respect, applies only
to entities whose standpoint we can take, the
concept is far from covering all living organisms.
And given that a person is not necessarily an
agent, and an agent is not necessarily a moral

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 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

agent, if moral categories apply only to moral If it is to make sense to say that bearers of
agents (as reciprocity theorists of ethics argue), moral rights are entitled to press their rights
then we are also far from having reason to say against moral agents and to demand that all
that all persons or all agents are worthy of such agents respect their rights, it must be
respect. Taylor treats reciprocity theory - that theoretically possible for them to do what
moral categories apply only to agents who can they are entitled to do. That is, it must be
have both rights and duties - as being special to conceivable for them to press their claims
human ethics, but obviously it can be extended against others if they choose to.... It is a
to any domain of agents, whether they are matter oflogical conceivability. What it
human or not. means to press claims against others and
It makes sense imaginatively to take the stand- demand that the legitimacy of those claims
point or point of view of another self-conscious be acknowledged is simply incompatible
person. As Taylor says: with what it means to be an animal or a
plant. An animal or plant would not be the
If one does not have the capacity for kind of thing it is if it were possible for us to
imaginative awareness of another person's conceive of it as choosing to press its legit-
experienced world, one will not be able fully imate claims against moral agents and to
to conceive of what it means to be that other demand that they acknowledge the legit-
person living his or her life. On the other imacy of its claims. Therefore ... it is incon-
hand, to the extent that we develop the ceivable for animals and plants to be bearers
imaginative power to envisage what it is like of moral rights. (247)
to experience the world as other people do,
I explicitly deny that it is theoretically con-
to that extent we are able to achieve in our
ceivable for a non-self-conscious entity to be a
own consciousness a clear grasp of the reality
teleological center and thus have inherent worth.
of others' lives. Our sense of another
Taylor says that "As moral agents we see our-
person's existence then becomes a
selves under an ethical requirement to give equal
recognition that the other is a subjective
consideration to the good of every entity, human
center of awareness, just like ourselves. (128)
and non-human alike, that has a good of its own"
What is essential here is the other's possession of (158). One can agree with this and still have an
"a subjective center of awareness," which I argue ethics that is neither biocen tric nor an thro-
an entity must have if it is to be a teleological pocentric. Its scope would cover all self-conscious
center. Thus I deny that: persons, but not necessarily all agents and not
necessarily all humans. Taylor seems to support
Our conceiving of each organism as a this scope of moral respect in stating the prin-
teleological center of life is our recognition ciple that "Moral agents are permitted to defend
of the reality of its existence as a unique themselves against harmful or dangerous
individual, pursuing its own good in its organisms that are not moral agents" (266-267).
own way. By developing the powers of He stresses that "The statement of the principle
heightened awareness of it as the particular refers only to moral agents and organisms (of
individual it is, we achieve a full under- whatever species) that are not moral agents" so it
standing of the point of view defined by its is not anthropocentric (266). But it is agent-cen-
good. (129) tered. At most, Taylor's notions of taking an
Taylor himself provides the argument for the entity's standpoint and of an entity's own good
inconceivability of this kind of empathetic under- allow extension of moral scope only to entities
standing of non-self-conscious entities. What he that are self-conscious persons (who might not
says about bearers of moral rights, I say with be agents). I see nothing wrong with this,
respect to bearers of inherent worth as Taylor agreeing totally with Taylor's exposition of the
defines it: fact that we can assign legal rights to non-persons
for their protection or preservation.

Spring 1989 101 Between the Species

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

In sum, one obviously can and does gain new concepts" (254). He must see that if the
objective (not subjective) knowledge "of the indi- concept of an animal's having a moral right can
viduality of each living thing ... through close be criticized as he has done, then the same
observation of its behavior and environmental concept referred to with the phrase "inherent
circumstances" (165). But it is misleading and worth" can be so criticized also. Taylor thus
unnecessary nonsense to say that this knowledge himself shows how to argue against the view that
is "a state of heightened consciousness" from non-self-conscious entities have inherent worth. I
which add the related argument that because his
crucial concept, of inherent worth - like that of
one becomes more fully and more deeply
having a moral right - depends on taking a
cognizan t of what it means to be that
standpoint, it incorporates the illegitimate
particular center of life. One is thus enabled
importation of imaginary personhood by the pre-
to take its standpoint and imaginatively to
tense that non-self-conscious animals and plants
view the world from its perspective. On the
have subjective standpoints with which we can
basis of this capacity one can then make
empathize and from which we can speak for
accurate judgments concerning what is
them by recognizing their own goods.
favorable or detrimental to the realization
Let me close by remarking that Taylor, like
of its good. (165)
many environmental ethicists, appears to be (I
Nevertheless, such "standpoint" talk is know he is not) ignorant of the strength of the
harmless as long as one realizes that all that is opposition. He presents a biocentric environ-
being said is that we can learn objectively about mental ethics on the unargued assumption of
the life cycles of different species of organisms materialist scientific realism, "the entire outlook
and the behavior of particular individuals by is fIrmly rooted in the findings of the physical
observing them, and on the basis of that and biological sciences" (160). His brief
knowledge can do things that will facilitate or argument against Biblical ethics (139-143) is to
hinder their survival. But Taylor uses such show that it is anthropocentric! He does not even
metaphorical talk in an attempt to convince begin to face the problem that belief in reve-
others that all living non-self-conscious entities lation from some God is the basis of most systems
are teleological centers with goods of their own. of ethics accepted by most humans in the world
He uses this false claim to bolster his recommen- today. How easy if religious belief in theological
dation of a life-centered environmental ethics in ethics could just be put aside! Taylor himself
which all living organisms are worthy of equal makes implicit appeal to religious sentiments by
respect. And that view, as I have shown,. he capitalizing the phrase "Community of Life" (99,
cannot support. passim) and by using the religious rhetoric of
There is a considerable amount in Taylor's commitment and conversion (98, 134, 154-157,
book that I do agree with: his laudable concern 312). And his explanation that moral validity
for individuals; most of what he says about (see index) depends on belief in the very prin-
human rights and particularly about stipulating ciples being validated sounds very like pleas that
legal rights to non-conscious entities (222, 253- belief in Jesus (or in Peter Pan and the fairies?)
254), and in the second half of his book, much' will make it true.
of the substantive working out of moral conflicts Taylor does not even consider idealism. If he
when one assumes that entities other than took idealism at all seriously, he could not
humans have inherent worth or moral rights. pander as he does to death-wish misanthropy by
But Taylor fails in his attempt to avoid argu- saying that "It is not inconsistent for a human to
ments against animals having moral rights by believe in all sincerity that the world would be a
using the phrase "inherent worth" to refer to the better place if there were no humans in it" (52)
content of "moral rights" (254-255), for he says and that "if we were to take the standpoint of
explicitly that they mean the same thing, that that Life Community and give voice to its true
'The use of the language of rights introduces no interest, the ending of the human epoch on

Between the Species 102 Spring 1989

 What Does Respect For Nature Mean?

Earth would most likely be greeted with a hearty By all means let us have respect for nature. But
'Good riddance!'" (115). This shows that as agents and as philosophers, let us be clear
metaphorical talk of taking non-self-conscious about exactly what this means. An agent- or
entities' standpoints is, after all, dangerous non- person-oriented ethics, as Taylor points out, is
sense. The "Life Community" has no stand- not strictly speaking anthropocentric even if the
point, and Taylor's own text shows that so far as only moral agents we know of are humans.
we know concerning earth's inhabitants, if Despite Taylor's talk of the standpoints or points
there were no humans on earth, there would be of view, goods of their own, and inherent worth
no one who could say (or think) "Good rid- of all living organisms, he shows at most that
dance!" So why does he perpetrate this cant that these concepts apply only to person-agents. In his
on the one hand supports the ideology of the attempt to make all living organisms into moral
"rights" of the state or of the "corporate person" subjects he obscures the useful non-anthro-
against individuals and on the other hand pocentric distinction between primary and sec-
expresses genocidal hatred for the human race! ondary moral subjects. It makes no sense to talk
Both from many religious viewpoints and of a quasi-religious Community of Life consisting
from the idealistic viewpoint, it is strictly incon- of all living organisms that are primary moral sub-
sistent to say that the world would be a better jects because they are teleological centers that
place without humans, because if there were no have goods-of-their-own that give them inherent
humans in it, for Christians, for example, the worth, which means that we should respect them.
world would have no value at all, and for ide- On the other hand, it does make sense to say that
alists the world would not exist. I am not con- living organisms - and, as far as that goes,
vinced that either of these views makes sense, mountains, which Taylor denies moral sub-
but I do not think they can just be dismissed. jecthood because he knows we cannot think like a
Moreover we should not forget that mountain - be given stipulative, secondary moral
Aristotelians find teleological forces and goods status by moral agents. Taylor does not, and with
in all things. Taylor is not an Aristotelian his naturalistic foundation (160), cannot, show
because he denies that inanimate entities are that more than this is possible. Why isn't it
teleological centers. enough?
Taylor asks that biocentric environmental
ethics be considered on the basis of his com-
plete presentation of it. What his presentation
shows is the strength of the claim that the insti-
tution of morality is generated through interac-
tions among person-agents who have mutually
agreed to abide by a set of rules .that designates
reciprocal rights and duties among themselves.
In such a system, nothing is primarily morally
1 See my arguments for the priority of self-con-
good or bad, right or wrong, except moral
sciousness in the following articles: "Self-
agents and their actions, and - by metaphorical
Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman
allusion - the results and objects of their
Animals and Nature," Environmental Ethics, Vol. 1,
actions. Taylor agrees with this reciprocity
1979, pp. 99-129; "Self-Conscious Rights," Ethics
theory of ethics for humans and other agents,
and Animals, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 90-92; "Interests,
but he wants all living organisms to be primary
Righ ts, and Self-Consciousness," Environmental
moral subjects. Taylor both fails to establish this
Ethics, Vol. 4, 1982, pp. 285-287. On taking points
and shows that it is not necessary. Anything (all
of view, see Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be
"subjects") that agents want to protect other
A Bat?" Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, 1974, pp.
than themselves can be given secondary stipu-
435-450.
lative rights - call them legal or moral, it does
not matter which, so long as they are respected.

Spring 1989 103 Between the Species