PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

MODULE-3
ENGINEERING AS SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION.

S4 ECE-A&B

Prepared By
Sithara Jeyaraj
Assistant professor
Dept of ECE,MACE

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1
 SYLLABUS
• Engineering as social Experimentation.
• Engineering as Experimentation
• Engineers as responsible Experimenters
• Codes of Ethics
• Plagiarism-A balanced outlook on law
• Challenger case study
• Bhopal gas tragedy

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 2
 ENGINEERING AS EXPERIMENTATION
• Before manufacturing a product or
providing a project, we make several
assumptions and trials, design and
redesign and test several times till the
product is observed to be functioning
satisfactorily.
• We try different materials and
experiments. From the test data
obtained we make detailed design and
retests.
• Thus, design as well as engineering is
iterative process as illustrated in Fig

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 3
 ENGINEERING AS EXPERIMENTATION
• Several redesigns are made upon the feedback information on the performance or
failure in the field or in the factory.
• Besides the tests, each engineering project is modified during execution, based on the
periodical feedback on the progress and the lessons from other sources.
• Hence, the development of a product or a project as a whole may be considered as an
experiment.

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 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• Similarities
Partial The project is usually executed in partial ignorance. Uncertainties exist in the
ignorance: model assumed. The behaviour of materials purchased is uncertain and not
constant They may vary with the suppliers, processed lot, time, and the process
used in shaping the materials There maybe variations in the grain structure and
its resulting failure stress. It is not possible to collect data on all variations. In
some cases, extrapolation, interpolation, assumptions of linear behaviour over
the range of parameters, accelerated testing, simulations, and virtual testing are
resorted.
Uncertainty The final outcomes of projects are also uncertain, as in experiments. Some
times unintended results, side effects (bye-products), and unsafe operation have
also occurred. Unexpected risks, such as undue seepage in a storage dam,
leakage of nuclear radiation from an atomic power plant, presence of pesticides
in food or soft drink bottle, an new irrigation canal spreading water-borne
diseases, and an unsuspecting hair dryer causing lung cancer on the user from
the asbestos gasket used in the product have been reported.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 5
 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• Similarities
Continuous Monitoring continually the progress and gaining new knowledge are needed
monitoring before, during, and after execution of project as in the case of experimentation.
The performance is to be monitored even during the use (or wrong use!) of the
product by the end user/beneficiary.

Learning from Engineers normally learn from their own prior designs and infer from the analysis
the past: of operation and results, and sometimes from the reports of other engineers. But
this does not happen frequently. The absence of interest and channels of
communication, ego in not seeking information, guilty upon the failure, fear of
legal actions, and mere negligence have caused many a failure, e.g., the Titanic
lacked sufficient number of life boats

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 6
 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• Contrasts
Experimental In standard experiments, members for study are selected into two groups
control: namely A and B at random. Group A are given special treatment. The group B is
given no treatment and is called the ‘controlled group’. But they are placed in the
same environment as the other group A. This process is called the experimental
control. This practice is adopted in the field of medicine. In engineering, this does
not happen, except when the project is confined to laboratory experiments. This
is because it is the clients or consumers who choose the product, exercise the
control. It is not possible to make a random selection of participants from various
groups. In engineering, through random sampling, the survey is made from
among the users, to assess the results on the product.
Humane touch: Engineering experiments involve human souls, their needs, views, expectations,
and creative use as in case of social experimentation. This point of view is not
agreed by many of the engineers. But now the quality engineers and managers
have fully realized this humane aspect.

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 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• Informed consent
• Engineering experimentation is viewed as Societal Experiment since thesubject and
the beneficiary are human beings. In this respect, it is similar to medical
experimentation on human beings. In the case of medical practice, moral and legal
rights have been recognized while planning for experimentation. Informed consent is
practiced in medical experimentation. Such a practice is not there in scientific
laboratory experiments.
• Informed consent has two basic elements:
• Knowledge: The subject should be given all relevant information needed to make the
decision to participate.
• Voluntariness: Subject should take part without force, fraud or deception. Respect for
rights of minorities to dissent and compensation for harmful effect are assumed here

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 8
 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• For a valid consent, the following conditions are to be fulfilled:
– Consent must be voluntary
– All relevant information shall be presented/stated in a clearly understandable form
– Consenter shall be capable of processing the information and make rational decisions.
– The subject’s consent may be offered in proxy by a group that represents many subjects of like-
interests
• Informed consent when bringing an engineering product to market, implies letting the
customer know the following:
– the knowledge about the product
– risks and benefits of using the product
– all relevant information on the product, such as how to use and how not to use (do’s and don’ts).
• The relevant factual information implies, that the engineers are obliged to obtain and
assess all the available information related to the fulfilment of one’s moral obligations
(i.e., wrong or immoral use of a product one designs), including the intended and
unintended impacts of the product, on the society
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 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• Still there exists a possibility of a large gap of understanding between the
experimenter and the subjects (public).
• Sometimes, the managements have not been willing to disseminate the full
information about the project or product beyond the legal requirements, because of
the fear of potential competitions and likely exposure to potential litigation
• People object to involuntary risks wherein the affected individual is neither a direct
participant nor a decision maker.
• In short, we prefer to be the subjects of our own experiments rather than those of
somebody else.
• If it is an asbestos plant or nuclear plant to be approved, affected parties expect their
consent to be obtained.
• But they are ready to accept voluntary risks as in the case of stunts and amazing
races.

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 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
• Knowledge gained:
• Not much of new knowledge is developed in engineering experiments as in the case
of scientific experiments in the laboratory.
• Engineering experiments at the most help us to
(a) verify the adequacy of the design,
(b) to check the stability of the design parameters,
(c) prepare for the unexpected outcomes, in the actual field environments.
• From the models tested in the laboratory to the pilot plant tested in the field, there are
differences in performance as well as other outcome

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 ENGINEERS AS RESPONSIBLE EXPERIMENTERS
• Although the engineers facilitate experiments, they are not alone in the field.
• Their responsibility is shared with the organizations, people, government, and others.
• No doubt the engineers share a greater responsibility while monitoring the projects,
identifying the risks, and informing the clients and the public with facts.
• Based on this, they can take decisions to participate or protest or promote.
• The engineer, as an experimenter, owe several responsibilities to the society, namely,
– A conscientious commitment to live by moral values.
– A comprehensive perspective on relevant information. It includes constant awareness of the
progress of the experiment and readiness to monitor the side effects, if any.
– Unrestricted free-personal involvement in all steps of the project/product development (autonomy).
– Be accountable for the results of the project (accountability).

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 ENGINEERS AS RESPONSIBLE EXPERIMENTERS
• Conscientiousness
• Conscientious moral commitment means:
• (a) Being sensitive to full range of moral values and responsibilities relevant to the
prevailing situation and
• (b) the willingness to develop the skill and put efforts needed to reach the best
balance possible among those considerations.
• In short, engineers must possess open eyes, open ears, and an open mind (i.e., moral
vision, moral listening, and moral reasoning).
• This makes the engineers as social experimenters, respect foremost the safety and
health of the affected, while they seek to enrich their knowledge, rush for the profit,
follow the rules, or care for only the beneficiary.
• The human rights of the participant should be protected through voluntary and
informed consent.

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 Comprehensive Perspective
• The engineer should grasp the context of his work and ensure that the work involved
results in only moral ends.
• One should not ignore his conscience, if the product or project that he is involved will
result in damaging the nervous system of the people (or even the enemy, in case of
weapon development)
• A product has a built-in obsolete or redundant component to boost sales with a false
claim.
• In possessing of the perspective of factual information, the engineer should exhibit a
moral concern and not agree for this design.
• Sometimes, the guilt is transferred to the government or the competitors.
• Some organizations think that they will let the government find the fault or let the
fraudulent competitor be caught first.
• Finally, a full-scale environmental or social impact study of the product or project by
individual engineers is useful but not possible, in practice.
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 Moral Autonomy
• Viewing engineering as social experimentation, and anticipating unknown
consequences should promote an attitude of questioning about the adequacy of the
existing economic and safety standards.
• This proves a greater sense of personal involvement in one’s work

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 Accountability
• The term Accountability means:
– The capacity to understand and act on moral reasons
– Willingness to submit one’s actions to moral scrutiny and be responsive to the assessment of others.
• It includes being answerable for meeting specific obligations, i.e., liable to justify (or give reasonable excuses) the
decisions, actions or means, and outcomes (sometimes unexpected), when required by the stakeholders or by law.
• The tug-of-war between of causal influence by the employer and moral responsibility of the employee is
quite common in professions. In the engineering practice, the problems are:
– (a) The fragmentation of work in a project inevitably makes the final products lie away from the immediate work
place, and lessens the personal responsibility of the employee.
– (b) Further the responsibilities diffuse into various hierarchies and to various people. Nobody gets the real feel
of personal responsibility.
– (c) Often projects are executed one after another. An employee is more interested in adherence of tight
schedules rather than giving personal care for the current project.
– (d) More litigation is to be faced by the engineers (as in the case of medical practitioners).
• This makes them wary of showing moral concerns beyond what is prescribed by the institutions.
• In spite of all these shortcomings, engineers are expected to face the risk and show up personal
responsibility as the profession demands.

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 CODES OF ETHICS
• The ‘codes of ethics’ exhibit, rights, duties, and obligations of the members of a
profession and a professional society. The codes exhibit the following essential roles:
1. Inspiration and guidance. The codes express the collective commitment of the profession the
ethical conduct and public good and thus inspire the individuals. They identify primary
responsibilities and provide statements and guidelines on interpretations for the professionals and
the professional societies
2. Support to engineers. The codes give positive support to professionals for taking stands on moral
issues. Further they serve as potential legal support to discharge professional obligations.
3. Deterrence (discourage to act immorally) and discipline (regulate to act morally). The codes serve
as the basis for investigating unethical actions. The professional societies sometimes revoke
membership or suspend/expel the members, when proved to have acted unethical. This sanction
along with loss of respect from the colleagues and the society are bound to act as deterrent.
4. Education and mutual understanding. Codes are used to prompt discussion and reflection on
moral issues. They develop a shared understanding by the professionals, public, and the
government on the moral responsibilities of the engineers. The Board of Review of the
professional societies encourages moral discussion for educational purposes.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 17
 CODES OF ETHICS
5. Create good public image. The codes present positive image of the committed profession to the
public, help the engineers to serve the public effectively. They promote more of self regulation and
lessen the government regulations. This is bound to raise the reputation of the profession and the
organization, in establishing the trust of the public.
6. Protect the status quo. They create minimum level of ethical conduct and promotes agreement
within the profession. Primary obligation namely the safety, health, and welfare of the public,
declared by the codes serves and protects the public.
7. Promotes business interests. The codes offer inspiration to the entrepreneurs, establish shared
standards, healthy competition, and maximize profit to investors, employees, and consumers
• Limitations: The codes are not remedy for all evils. They have many limitations,
namely:
– General and vague wordings. Many statements are general in nature and hence unable to solve all
problems.
– Not applicable to all situations. Codes are not sacred, and need not be accepted without criticism.
Tolerance for criticisms of the codes themselves should be allowed.

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 CODES OF ETHICS
– Often have internal conflicts. Many times, the priorities are clearly spelt out, e.g., codes forbid public
remarks critical of colleagues (engineers), but they actually discovered a major bribery, which might
have caused a huge loss to the exchequer.
– They can not be treated as final moral authority for professional conduct. Codes have flaws by
commission and omission. There are still some grey areas undefined by codes. They can not be
equated to laws. After all, even laws have loopholes and they invoke creativity in the legal
practitioners.
– Only a few enrol as members in professional society and non-members can not be compelled.
– Even as members of the professional society, many are unaware of the codes
– Different societies have different codes. The codes can not be uniform or same! Unifying the codes
may not necessarily solve the problems prevailing various professions, but attempts are still made
towards this unified codes.
– Codes are said to be coercive. They are sometimes claimed to be threatening and forceful

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 INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS
• Industrial standards are important for any industry. Specification helps in achieving
interchangeability.
• Standardization reduces the production costs and at the same time, the quality is
achieved easily.
• It helps the manufacturer, customers and the public, in keeping competitiveness and
ensuring quality simultaneously.
• Industrial standards are established by the Bureau of Indian Standards, in our country
in consultation with leading industries and services.
• International standards have become relevant with the development of the world
trade.
• The International Standards Organization has now detailed specifications for generic
products/services with procedures that the manufacturers or service providers should
follow to assure the quality of their products or service.
• ISO 9000-2000 series are typical examples in this direction.
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INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS

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 A BALANCED OUTLOOK ON LAW
• The ‘balanced outlook on law’ in engineering practice stresses the necessity of laws
and regulations and also their limitations in directing and controlling the engineering
practice.
• Laws are necessary because, people are not fully responsible by themselves and
because of the competitive nature of the free enterprise, which does not encourage
moral initiatives.
• Laws are needed to provide a minimum level of compliance.
• The following codes are typical examples of how they were enforced in the past:
• Code for Builders by Hammurabi
• Hummurabi the king of Babylon in 1758 framed the following code for the builders:
– “If a builder has built a house for a man and has not made his work sound and the house which he
has built has fallen down and caused the death of the householder, that builder shall be put to
death.
– If it causes the death of the householder’s son, they shall put that builder’s son to death.

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 A BALANCED OUTLOOK ON LAW
– If it causes the death of the householder’s slave, he shall give slave for slave to the householder.
– If it destroys property, he shall replace anything it has destroyed; and because he has not made the
house sound which he has built and it has fallen down, he shall rebuild the house which has fallen
down from his own property.
– If a builder has built a house for a man and does not make his work perfect and the wall bulges, that
builder shall put that wall in sound condition at his own cost”
• This code was expected to put in self-regulation seriously in those years

• Steam Boat Code in USA

• Whenever there is crisis we claim that there ought to be law to control this.
• Whenever there is a fire accident in a factory or fire cracker’s store house or boat
capsize we make this claim, and soon forget.
• Laws are meant to be interpreted for minimal compliance

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 A BALANCED OUTLOOK ON LAW
• On the other hand, laws when amended or updated continuously, would be counter
productive.
• Laws will always lag behind the technological development.
• The regulatory or inspection agencies such as Environmental authority of India can
play a major role by framing rules and enforcing compliance.
• In the early 19th century, a law was passed in USA to provide for inspection of the
safety of boilers and engines in ships.
• It was amended many times and now the standards formulated by the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers are followed.

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 A BALANCED OUTLOOK ON LAW
• Proper Role of Laws
• Good laws when enforced effectively produce benefits. They establish minimal standards of
professional conduct and provide a motivation to people. Further they serve as moral support and
defence for the people who are willing to act ethically.
• Thus, it is concluded that:
1. The rules which govern engineering practice should be construed as of responsible experimentation rather
than rules of a game. This makes the engineer responsible for the safe conduct of the experiment.
2. Precise rules and sanctions are suitable in case of ethical misconduct that involves the violation of
established engineering procedures, which are aimed at the safety and the welfare of the public.
3. In situations where the experimentation is large and time consuming, the rules must not try to cover all
possible outcomes, and they should not compel the engineers to follow rigid courses of action.
4. The regulation should be broad, but make engineers accountable for their decisions, and
5. Through their professional societies, the engineers can facilitate framing the rules, amend wherever
necessary, and enforce them, but without giving-in for conflicts of interest.

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 Plagiarism
• Plagiarism is presenting someone else’s work or ideas as your own, with or without
their consent, by incorporating it into your work without full acknowledgement
• All published and unpublished material, whether in manuscript, printed or electronic
form, is covered under this definition.
• Plagiarism may be intentional or reckless, or unintentional. Under the regulations for
examinations, intentional or reckless plagiarism is a disciplinary offence
• The necessity to acknowledge others’ work or ideas applies not only to text, but also
to other media, such as computer code, illustrations, graphs etc.
• It applies equally to published text and data drawn from books and journals, and to
unpublished text and data, whether from lectures, theses or other students’ essays.
• You must also attribute text, data, or other resources downloaded from websites.

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 Plagiarism
• The best way of avoiding plagiarism is to learn and employ the principles of good
academic practice from the beginning of your university career.
• Avoiding plagiarism is not simply a matter of making sure your references are all
correct, or changing enough words so the examiner will not notice your paraphrase; it
is about deploying your academic skills to make your work as good as it can be.
• Forms of Plagiarism
• Verbatim (word for word) quotation without clear acknowledgement
– Quotations must always be identified as such by the use of either quotation marks or indentation,
and with full referencing of the sources cited.
– It must always be apparent to the reader which parts are your own independent work and where
you have drawn on someone else’s ideas and language.
• Cutting and pasting from the Internet without clear acknowledgement
– Information derived from the Internet must be adequately referenced and included in the
bibliography. It is important to evaluate carefully all material found on the Internet, as it is less likely
to have been through the same process of scholarly peer review as published sources.
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 27
 Plagiarism
• Paraphrasing
– Paraphrasing the work of others by altering a few words and changing their order, or by closely
following the structure of their argument, is plagiarism if you do not give due acknowledgement to
the author whose work you are using.
– A passing reference to the original author in your own text may not be enough; you must ensure that
you do not create the misleading impression that the paraphrased wording or the sequence of ideas
are entirely your own.
– It is better to write a brief summary of the author’s overall argument in your own words, indicating
that you are doing so, than to paraphrase particular sections of his or her writing.
– This will ensure you have a genuine grasp of the argument and will avoid the difficulty of
paraphrasing without plagiarising.
– You must also properly attribute all material you derive from lectures.
• Collusion
– This can involve unauthorised collaboration between students, failure to attribute assistance
received, or failure to follow precisely regulations on group work projects. It is your responsibility to
ensure that you are entirely clear about the extent of collaboration permitted, and which parts of the
work must be your own.
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 Plagiarism
• Inaccurate citation
– It is important to cite correctly, according to the conventions of your discipline. As well as listing your
sources (i.e. in a bibliography), you must indicate, using a footnote or an in-text reference, where a
quoted passage comes from.
– Additionally, you should not include anything in your references or bibliography that you have not
actually consulted. I
– f you cannot gain access to a primary source you must make it clear in your citation that your
knowledge of the work has been derived from a secondary text (for example, Bradshaw, D. Title of
Book, discussed in Wilson, E., Title of Book (London, 2004), p. 189).
• Failure to acknowledge assistance
– You must clearly acknowledge all assistance which has contributed to the production of your work,
such as advice from fellow students, laboratory technicians, and other external sources.
– This need not apply to the assistance provided by your tutor or supervisor, or to ordinary
proofreading, but it is necessary to acknowledge other guidance which leads to substantive changes
of content or approach.

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 Plagiarism
• Use of material written by professional agencies or other persons
– You should neither make use of professional agencies in the production of your work nor submit
material which has been written for you even with the consent of the person who has written it.
– It is vital to your intellectual training and development that you should undertake the research
process unaided.
– Under Statute XI on University Discipline, all members of the University are prohibited from
providing material that could be submitted in an examination by students at this University or
elsewhere.
• Auto-plagiarism
– You must not submit work for assessment that you have already submitted (partially or in full), either
for your current course or for another qualification of this, or any other, university, unless this is
specifically provided for in the special regulations for your course.
– Where earlier work by you is citable, ie. it has already been published, you must reference it clearly.
– Identical pieces of work submitted concurrently will also be considered to be auto-plagiarism

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 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• The orbiter of the Challenger had three main engines fuelled by liquid hydrogen.
• The fuel was carried in an external fuel tank which was jettisoned when empty.
• During lift-off, the main engines fire for about nine minutes, although initially the thrust
was provided by the two booster rockets.
• These booster rockets are of the solid fuel type, each burning a million pound load of
aluminium, potassium chloride, and iron oxide.
• The casing of each booster rocket is about 150 feet long and 12 feet in diameter. This
consists of cylindrical segments that are assembled at the launch site.
• There are four-field joints and they use seals consisting of pairs of O-rings made of
vulcanized rubber. The O-rings work with a putty barrier made of zinc chromate.

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 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• The engineers were employed with Rockwell International (manufacturers for the
orbiter and main rocket), Morton-Thiokol (maker of booster rockets), and they worked
for NASA.
• After many postponements, the launch of Challenger was set for morning of Jan 28,
1986. Allan J. McDonald was an engineer from Morton-Thiokol and the director of the
Solid Rocket Booster Project.
• He was sceptic about the freezing temperature conditions forecast for that morning,
which was lower than the previous launch conditions.
• A teleconference between NASA engineers and MT engineers was arranged by Allan.
• Arnold Thompson and Roger Boisjoly, the seal experts at MT explained to the other
engineers how the booster rocket walls would bulge upon launch and combustion
gases can blow past the O-rings of the field joints

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CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 33
 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• On many of the previous flights the rings have been found to have charred and
eroded. In freezing temperature, the rings and the putty packing are less pliable. From
the past data gathered, at temperature less than 65 °F the O-rings failure was certain.
But these data were not deliberated at that conference as the launch time was fast
approaching.
• The engineering managers Bob Lund and Joe Kilminster agreed that there was a
safety problem. Boisjoly testified and recommended that no launch should be
attempted with temperature less than 53 °F. These managers were annoyed to
postpone the launch yet again. The top management of MT was planning for the
renewal of contract with NASA, for making booster rocket.
• The managers told Bob Lund “to take-off the engineering hat and put on your
management hat”. The judgment of the engineers was not given weightage. The
inability of these engineers to substantiate that the launch would be unsafe was taken
by NASA as an approval by Rockwell to launch.

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 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• At 11.38 a.m. the rockets along with Challenger rose up the sky. The cameras
recorded smoke coming out of one of the filed joints on the right booster rocket. Soon
there was a flame that hit the external fuel tank.
• At 76 seconds into the flight, the Challenger at a height of 10 miles was totally
engulfed in a fireball. The crew cabin fell into the ocean killing all the seven aboard.
• Some of the factual issues, conceptual issues and moral/normative issues in the
space shuttle challenger incident, are highlighted hereunder for further study.

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 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• Moral/Normative Issues
• The crew had no escape mechanism. Douglas, the engineer, designed an abort
module to allow the separation of the orbiter, triggered by a field-joint leak. But such a
‘safe exit’ was rejected as too expensive, and because of an accompanying reduction
in payload.
• The crew were not informed of the problems existing in the field joints. The principle of
informed consent was not followed.
• Engineers gave warning signals on safety. But the management group prevailed over
and ignored the warning

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 36
 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER
• Conceptual Issues
– NASA counted that the probability of failure of the craft was one in one lakh launches. But it was
expected that only the 100000th launch will fail.
– There were 700 criticality-1 items, which included the field joints. A failure in any one of them would
have caused the tragedy. No back-up or stand-bye had been provided for these criticality-1
components.
• Factual/Descriptive Issues
– Field joints gave way in earlier flights. But the authorities felt the risk is not high.
– NASA has disregarded warnings about the bad weather, at the time of launch, because they wanted
to complete the project, prove their supremacy, get the funding from Government continued and get
an applaud from the President of USA.
– The inability of the Rockwell Engineers (manufacturer) to prove that the lift-off was unsafe. This was
interpreted by the NASA, as an approval by Rockwell to launch

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 Bhopal’s Gas Tragedy
• Bhopal’s Gas tragedy is the world’s worst industrial disaster that occurred in 1984, due
to the gas leakage from a pesticide production plant, The Union Carbide India Limited
(UCIL) located in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh.

• It was believed that slack management and deferred maintenance together created a
situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water into the MIC
tank, triggering the disaster.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 38
 What Led to The Disaster?
• In the early hours of December 3rd, 1984, a rolling wind carried a poisonous gray
cloud from the Union Carbide Plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh of India. The
poisonous gas released was 40tons of Methyl Iso Cyanate (MIC). This particular gas
is very toxic that leaked and spread throughout the city.
• The following image shows how the plant got destroyed after the accident.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 39
 What Led to The Disaster?
• The residents of the city, woke up to the clouds of suffocating gas and struggled to
breath. They started running desperately through the dark streets. The victims arrived
at hospitals, breathless and blind.

• The people who survived had their lungs, brain, eyes, muscles affected severely.
Their gastro intestinal system, neurological, reproductive and immune systems were
also dangerously affected. By the morning, when the sun rose clearly, the roads were
all filled with dead bodies of humans and animals, the trees turned black and the air
filled with foul smell.

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 Cause of The Accident
• The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) team and also the CBI (Central Bureau of
Investigation) team conducted separate investigations on the cause of the incident
and came to the same conclusion. It was understood that a large volume of water had
been released into the MIC tank and this further caused a chemical reaction that
forced the pressure release valve to open and allowed the gas to leak.
• UCC’s investigation proved with virtual certainty that the disaster was caused by the
direct entry of water into Tank 610 through a hose connected to the tank.
• The documentary evidence gathered after the incident reveals that the valve near the
plant’s water-washing section was fully closed and leak-proof. Based on several
investigations, the safety system in place could not have prevented a chemical
reaction of this magnitude from causing a leak.
• The safety systems are designed in such a way that water cannot enter unless it is
deliberately switched and the water flow is allowed forcefully. The causes and the
persons responsible for this deliberate operation are not known.
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Cause of The Accident

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 42
 The Fatal Effects
• As per government’s announcement, a total of 3,787 deaths occurred immediately. Around 8,000 of the
survivors died within two weeks and other 8,000 or more died from acute diseases caused due to the
gas later.
• A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the gas leak incident caused 5,58,125 injuries, including
38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.
None can say if future generations will not be affected.
• Initial effects of exposure were −
– Coughing
– Severe eye irritation
– Feeling of suffocation
– Burning sensation in the respiratory tract
– Blepharospasm
– Breathlessness
– Stomach pains
– Vomiting

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 The Fatal Effects
• The staff at the nearby hospitals lacked the knowhow required to treat the casualties
in such situations. To add to this, there is no antidote known for MIC. Hence, even
after running to the hospitals, the survivors could not be cured and most of them had
to face death eventually.
• Primary causes of deaths were −
– Choking
– Reflexogenic Circulatory Collapse
– Pulmonary Edema
– Cerebral Edema
– Tubular Necrosis
– Fatty Degeneration of the Liver
– Necrotizing Enteritis
• As an after effect of this disaster, the rate of stillbirths increased by 300% and the
neonatal mortality rate by around 200%. This came to be known as the world’s worst
disaster in the industrial sector.
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 44
 Bhopal’s Gas Tragedy
• Maintenance was neglected and the trained maintenance personnel were reduced as
economy measure. Need for quick diagnosis aggravates the situation by causing
considerable psychological stress on the plant personnel.
• Training activities for the supervisory personnel were stopped. This led to inadequate
training of the personnel to handle emergencies.
• Periodical Safety Inspection teams from U.S. which visited previously were also
stopped. From the initial U.S. Standards, the safety procedures were reduced to low
level Indian standards. The procedures had been deteriorating at these sites for
weeks or months, prior to the accident. There was clear lack of management systems
and procedures to ensure safety.
• Vital spares for equipment's and machineries were not available
• Absence of capital replacement led to the stagnant economy of the plant.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 45
 Bhopal’s Gas Tragedy
• The high turnover of the experienced engineers and technicians, who were
demoralized by the lack of development.
• Lack of experienced personnel to operate and control the vital installations.
• They have not conducted a thorough process hazards analysis that would have
exposed the serious hazards which resulted in disaster later.
• No emergency plan was put in practice, during the shut down and maintenance.
• Above all, the commitment of top-level management to safety was lacking. They have
been paying only lip service to safety of people of the host country.

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 Bhopal’s Gas Tragedy
• Technologically, the tragedy was caused by a series of events listed:
• The safety manual of Union Carbide prescribed that the MIC tanks were to be filled
only upto 60% of the capacity. But the tanks were reported to have been filled up to
75%.
• The safety policy prescribed that an empty tank should be available as a stand-bye in
case of emergency. But the emergency tank was also filled with to its full capacity.
These facts confirmed that the MNC had not followed and implemented appropriate
safety standards of the home country in the host country. Can this be called as an
example of ‘misappropriate technology’?
• The storage tanks should be refrigerated to make the chemical less reactive. But here
the refrigeration system was shut down as an economy measure. This raised the
temperature of the gas stored.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 47
 Bhopal’s Gas Tragedy
• The plant was shut down for maintenance two months earlier. The worker who
cleaned the pipes and filters connected to the tanks and closed the valves, was not
trained properly. He did not insert the safety disks to prevent any possible leakage of
the gas. This led to the buildup of temperature and pressure in the storage tanks.
• When the gas started leaking out, the operators tried to use the vent gas-scrubber that
was designed to reduce the exhausting gas. But that scrubber was also shut down.
• There was a flare tower that was designed to burn-off the gas escaping from th
scrubber.That was not also in working condition.
• The workers finally tried to spray water up to 100 feet to quench the gas (which is
watersoluble). But the gas was escaping from the chimney of 120-feet high.
• The workers were not trained on safety drills or emergency drills or any evacuation
plans.

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