PrCL
PrCL
Voluntary act
Bimla Devi was married to appellant and was ill-treated and barely given any food
(starved), she ran away.
Sec 307 of IPC "Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and
under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be
guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and,
if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either
to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
When any person offending under this section is under sentence of
imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death."
For the purpose of constituting an attempt under s. 307, Indian Penal Code,
there are two ingredients required, first, an evil intent or knowledge, and
secondly, an act done."
The word 'act' again, does not mean only any particular, specific,
instantaneous act of a person, but denotes, according to s. 33 of the Code, as
well, a series of acts. The course of conduct adopted by the appellant in
regularly starving Bimla Devi comprised a series of acts and therefore acts
falling short of completing the series, and would therefore come within the
purview of s. 307 of the Code.
In English law, the doctrine of joint enterprise derives from R v Swindall and
Osborne (1846) where two cart drivers engaged in a race. One of them ran down
and killed a pedestrian. It was not known which one had driven the fatal cart, but
since both were equally encouraging each other in the race, it was irrelevant which
of them had actually struck the man, so both were held jointly liable.
Thus, the parties must share a common purpose and make it clear to each other by
their actions that they are acting on their common intention so that each member of
the group assumes responsibility for the actions of other members in that group.
(Defendant must take the victim as he finds him) (Egg Shell Rule) (Chain of causation) - R v
Holland (1841) 2 Mood & R 352, 174 ER 313
- The victim refused medical treatment for an infected wound inflicted by Holland. The
victim would likely have survived had he accepted the treatment.
- Law: The “but for” test is used: ‘but for the initial injury, would the victim have
died?’ Although the victim’s refusal of medical treatment broke the causal chain,
the defendant was the one who set off the chain therefore he is convicted of the
murder.
MENS REA
Intention :
Oblique Intent : Oblique intent operates as a form of intention which may be used
to ascertain a defendant’s mens rea. It is mostly used where a direct intention
cannot be proven. In other words, oblique intention is bringing about another
consequence, which although the accused
foresaw as a probable consequence of the prohibited act claims that he did not intend.
Facts : The appellant held a grudge against Viola Foreshaw and, following threats to "burn
her out," he went to her house. He poured paraffin through the letter-box and onto the front
door, igniting it without warning.The house burned down, resulting in the death of Viola's 12-
year-old son, Lloyd. The appellant initially denied involvement but later confessed to police,
emphasising he didn't intend for anyone to die and claiming he only sought to frighten her.
Nedrick poured paraffin into a woman’s letter box and started a fire, as a result of
which one of her children had died. He protested that he did not want anyone to die.
The judge directed the jury that if death had been the highly probable result they
should convict on murder.
He was convicted and appealed. The appeal was allowed since the judge had equated
foresight with intent, when in fact foresight is evidence of intent. Therefore to convict
based on foresight is only acceptable where the consequence is appreciated as
inevitable by the defendant, so that no other conclusion can be found except that he
intended what he did.
Keypoints:
In murder cases, if it's not clear from a simple direction, the jury should understand that they
can't infer intention unless they're convinced that death or serious harm was almost certain
due to the defendant's actions and the defendant knew this. The decision lies with the jury
based on all the evidence presented.
The accused poured petrol through the letterbox of a door, stuffed newspaper through it and
set it alight. Two of The occupier’s daughters died in the fire. The accused claimed to have
started the fire only to frighten the occupants and that she had not intended to kill anybody.
The trial judge instructed the jury to convict the accused of murder if the facts established
that she knew that it was ‘highly probable’ that her act would cause death or serious bodily
harm. The accused was convicted of murder and the House of Lords upheld her conviction
stating that murder is committed by a person who has the intention to cause death or serious
bodily harm. To establish the mens rea of murder it was sufficient for the prosecution to
prove that when the accused performed the unlawful act knowing that it was probable that the
performance of those acts would result in grievous bodily harm, notwithstanding the fact that
the accused did not desire to bring about that particular result. Furthermore, in the
circumstances of this case the jury must have been satisfied that when the accused set fire to
the house she realised that it was highly probable that one or more of the occupants would
suffer death or serious bodily harm, and that she had deliberately exposed them to that
danger.
Transferred Malice
https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/landmark-judgement/indian-penal-
code/emperor-v-mushnooru-suryanarayana-murthy-1912-22-mlj-333
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bc_vlCC9TjI
https://www.studocu.com/en-gb/document/university-of-kent/
criminal-law/case-note-ag-ref-no-3-of-1994-1996-2-all-er/4438764
( Manslaughter- Attorney- General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)
[1997] 3 ALL ER 936 HOUSE OF LORDS)
Transferred malice
Case: R v Latimer-
IPC section 301. Culpable homicide by causing death of person
other than person whose death was intended.—If a person, by
doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause
death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any
person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be
likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is
of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the
death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be
likely to cause.
essentials
Causes death,
By doing an act with an intention or knowledge of causing the death
of a person or,
Causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
Causes the death of another person instead of the intended person.
Facts: In this case, the defendant, Latimer, had an altercation with another
man in a pub. During the altercation, Latimer intended to hit the man with
his belt but missed and struck a woman instead, causing her injury.
Legal Issue: The main legal issue in the case was whether Latimer could
be held liable for the injury caused to the woman, even though he did not
intend to harm her.
Decision: The court held that Latimer could be held liable for the injury
caused to the woman under the principle of transferred malice.
Transferred malice is a legal doctrine that holds a person responsible for
the intended harm to one person, even if the harm is actually caused to
another person.
Knowledge
https://lawplanet.in/emperor-vs-mt-dhirajia-case-summary-1940-sc/
Ratio : Rashness consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge
that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running
the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences.
Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to
exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either
to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the
circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the
accused person to have adopted.
Strict Lability
Facts: Defendant ran away with a girl with her parent’s consent, the girl was 14
but she made him believe that she is 18. The statute he was convicted under
was silent as to the mental state required to make the act a crime. Defendant
appeals.
Held : The Court held that “Mistake of fact does not stand as a defense to a
crime where the statute making the act a crime contains no requirement of
knowledge of that fact to begin with. In this case the forbidden act is wrong in
itself and the legislature has enacted that if anyone does this act, he does so at
his own risk. The dissent believes that there can be no conviction of a crime
without a finding of criminal intent mens rea. A reasonable mistake of fact,
where the mistaken belief, if true, would not have resulted in the defendant
committing a criminal act, should be an excuse that is implied in all criminal
charges”.
Held : On appeal, the House of Lords reversed the decision. The House of Lords found that is
necessary for the prosecution to prove the absence of a genuine belief (not necessarily a
reasonable belief) on the part of the defendant that the victim was 14 or over. The House of
Lords found that mens rea is an essential ingredient unless Parliament has indicated a contrary
intention either expressly or by necessary implication (that the offence is one of strict liability).
Since Section 8(1) and Section 24(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
put the burden of proof on the accused that he had permission to bring gold to
India, the question of mens rea does not arise. The court, in the case of State of
Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, coined the term luckless victim where the
respondent was held strictly liable for the act of bringing gold into India without
due permission. The court stated that in such cases where the legislature clearly
imposes liability on the mere act, the intent does not matter.