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 CYBERLAW

INTEL CORP. V. HAMIDI: TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

AND A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE
By Steven Kam

It stands to reason that the faster a technology develops, the more

rapidly it will surpass preexisting law, and the more prominent
common law theories may become ... . It is not surprising,
therefore, that as the Internet geometrically expands its speed...
intellectual property owners again must consider the common
law as a source of protection .... 1
The revival of the once moribund action of trespass to chattels exem-
plifies the truth of this statement. In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California
Supreme Court became the first state high court to recognize the applica-
tion of this tort to networked computers. The court affirmed the tort's ex-
pansion as a pragmatic answer to the problem of electronic invasions, but
also imposed restraints to prevent the degradation of the Internet's useful-
ness through misuse of this tort. 3 The court's discussion of harms and
benefits also transcended the rule-based construction of trespass to chat-
tels. A reading of the analysis suggests that the tort may well come to re-
semble a doctrine of nuisance in cyberspace or pave the way for cyber-
nuisance as an action unto itself.4 The economic foundations of nuisance
law adapt readily to the social and commercial realities of cyberspace,
where the consequences of interconnected behavior demand a more bal-
anced and nuanced analysis than bright-line rules can offer.

© 2004 Berkeley Technology Law Journal & Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.

1. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misap-

propriationand Other Common Law Theories of Protectionfor Intellectual Property, 11
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 428 (1998).
2. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003).
3. See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 439 (2003). Misuse could lead to a "tragedy of the anti-
commons," in which the Internet never achieves its full potential due to excessive trans-
actions costs (in this case, in the form of burdensome litigation and licensing procedures).
Id. at 444. The court's opinion reflects that concern by quoting amici curiae, including
Professor Mark Lemley, who note that such a tangle of property rights would signifi-
cantly impede everyday activities on the Internet. See Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1362-63.
4. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
27, 53-54 (2000) (suggesting "nuisance to websites" or "cyberspace nuisance" are better
foundations than a doctrine of trespass for property rights in cyberspace).
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

Part I of this paper provides a primer on the technical terminology and

concepts needed to understand the issues presented by the new generation
of trespass to chattels cases. Part II summarizes modem treatment of tres-
pass to chattels prior to Hamidi. Part III explains the facts of Hamidi and
the court's addition of considerable flexibility in allowing the doctrine of
trespass to chattels to reflect the realities of networked computers. It also
discusses the selective rigidity which the court imposes for the sake of
preventing overbreadth. Part IV discusses the court's balancing analysis of
harms and benefits, which steps outside the literal, bright-line boundaries
of personal property law and into the territory of nuisance law. Part V il-
lustrates possible applications of nuisance law to cyberspace and demon-
strates its relative advantages in governing activity on the Internet.

I. TECHNICAL PRIMER
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, on its most basic level concerns the permissibil-
ity of one of the most common forms of electronic communication on the
Internet: e-mail. Intel Corporation owns and operates an e-mail system for
use by its employees in business and reasonable personal use. 5 An ex-
employee, Kenneth Kourosh Hamidi, sent several unsolicited e-mails to
thousands of addresses on Intel's system, the contents of which were un-
sympathetic to Intel.6 Intel then sought both technical and legal means to
forbid Hamidi that use of its system. 7 By itself, e-mail is just a form of
electronic communication, but its use in both commercial advertising as
well as personal and business communication has given rise to many ques-
tions concerning its proper use.
A. Basic Architecture of the Internet
Though any privately-owned computer qualifies as personal property,
it must be understood that connecting such a computer to the Internet
makes it accessible to many other entities attached to the architecture. The
Internet is a network of computers which transmit information and data to
one another through an established series of protocols. 8 Its utility increases
exponentially as more computers are connected to it due to the phenome-
non of "network benefits." 9 Each computer, as a point on the network,

5. Hamidi,30Cal.4that1349 n.1.
6. Id.at 1349, 1356.
7. Id.1348-49.
8. See generally CompuServe Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1018 (S.D. Ohio 1997); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
9. See generally Burk, supra note 4, at 50-51; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985);
20041 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 429

possesses a permanent or temporary IP address and often an associated

alphanumeric domain name.10 A prearranged protocol" uses these ad-
dresses to route "packets" of data, containing anything from digital video
to malicious viruses or worms, across one or more computers for delivery
at its final destination.
B. Network Congestion
Network congestion adversely affects the speed of Internet communi-
cations. Though Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 12 strive to provide facili-
ties that allow fast and uninterrupted flows of information, a deluge of
data can still create excessive traffic at individual points on the network.
While the Internet's infrastructure regularly deals with simultaneous trans-
fers to the same address, the intermediaries between two computers may
be overwhelmed when the frequency of requests and data packets saturates
the server's capacity.' 3 When a legitimate user cannot access the online
resource because another party, legitimately or not, occupies it, a "denial
of service" has occurred.' 4 Moreover, when large amounts of wanted or
unwanted data arrive at their destination, they take up storage space on the
destination computer.' 5 These occurrences constitute denial of service on
the Internet, and such actions purposely undertaken to deny 6
access to a
given online resource are called denial of service attacks.'

Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy,

8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135, 139-40 (1994). "Utility" is a general measure of value or
usefulness, and though it is an abstract concept, economists often use monetary value as a
convenient stand-in. "Network effects" describe increases in utility that benefit dispro-
portionately from increased membership, with communications networks being an excel-
lent example.
10. See generally Alan Silverstein, Under the Hood of the World Wide Web, Learn-
theNet.com, at http://www.learnthenet.com/english/html/70alan.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2004).
11. Howard Gilbert, Introduction to TCP/IP, at http://www.yale.edu/pclt/COMM/
TCPIP.HTM (last updated Feb 2, 1995).
12. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832-34; see Silverstein, supra note 10.
13. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1028.
14. See Denial of Service, CERT Coordination Center, Carnegie Mellon Software
Engineering Institute, at http://www.cert.org/tech-tips/denial-of service.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 17, 2003).
.15. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
16. See Denial of Service, supra note 14.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

C. Spam
Communication over the Internet is fast, inexpensive, and convenient;
a boon to private users as well as to commercial entities.' 7 Spam refers to
any unwanted unsolicited bulk e-mail ("UBE") or unsolicited commercial
e-mail ("UCE"). 8 While most think of spam as unwanted e-mail, the
broad definition of spam can include webpages and "pop-up" ads which
arrive in the course of ordinary web surfing 19 or through "adware" or
"spyware" which a remote party installs on a computer, often without the
owner's knowing or intended acquiescence. 20 The intent behind the trans-
mission of spam is sometimes commercially "legitimate," but often it is
fraudulent. 2 1 Even proponents of free speech and open access rarely advo-
cate, much less defend, the practice of "spamming. ' 22 Private parties
sometimes attempt to stem the tide of spam on their own, generally
through the use of filters 23 that selectively block IP addresses or identify
unwelcome messages by their e-mail address or message headers. Spam-

17. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1018; Carol Jones, E-Mail Solicitation: Will
Opening a "Spain-Free" Mailbox Ever Be a Reality?, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV 69, 70-
72 (2002) (sending spain is so inexpensive that even a low response rate gives a better
return on marketing over the Internet than through junk mail).
18. See generally Scot M. Graydon, Much Ado about Spain: Unsolicited Advertis-
ing, the Internet, and You, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77, 78 (2000); David E. Sorkin, Technical
and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 327-36
(2001).
19. See, e.g., Reuters, FTC Accuses Pop-Up Maker of 'Extortion', CNN.COM, Nov.
7, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/ 11/07/microsoft.popup.reut/index.
html.
20. See Stefanie Olsen, Gator Sheds Skin, Renames Itself CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1024 3-5099212.html (last modified Oct. 29, 2003).
21. See generally Calvin Whang, Comment, An Analysis of California's Common
and Statutory Law Dealing with UnsolicitedCommercial Electronic Mail: An Argument
for Revision, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1201 (2000).
22. See generally Burk, supra note 4, at 54; Hunter, supra note 3, at 478; Sorkin,
supra note 18, at 344-57; Whang, supra note 21.
23. See What is Firewall?, Webopedia Computer Dictionary, at http://www.
webopedia.com/TERM/F/firewall.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). The Webopedia de-
fines "firewall" as
[a] system designed to prevent unauthorized access to or from a private
network. Firewalls can be implemented in both hardware and software,
or a combination of both. Firewalls are frequently used to prevent un-
authorized Internet users from accessing private networks connected to
the Internet, especially intranets. All messages entering or leaving the
intranet pass through the firewall, which examines each message and
blocks those that do not meet the specified security criteria.
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 431

mers often employ techniques that circumvent such measures. 24 The prob-
lem of spain has reached such magnitude that Congress, after several false
starts, recently passed the "CAN-SPAM" Act, the first federal statute
aimed at curbing fraudulent and unduly burdensome advertising through 26
electronic communications. 25 In addition, services such as Brightmai
turn a Yprofit by selling services specifically designed to thwart or intercept
spam. The result is a free-for-all between senders of spam, unwilling re-
cipients of spam, and third parties seeking to turn a profit by aligning
themselves with or against one side or the other.28
D. Spiders and Robots
Spiders, webcrawlers, and robots are all computer programs that auto-
mate the process of cataloguing information available on the web. 29 A
human web-surfer can peruse pages and copy information of particular
interest. A spider does the same thing, requesting webpages or other data
from other computers connected to the Internet and combing through such
data or text for particular information. These requests and data transfers
constitute electronic communication, just like e-mail, instant messages, or
other exchanges of information. This activity comprises part of the traffic
on the Internet and therefore can contribute to congestion, depending on
the frequency and intensity of the spider's activity.3 °

24. See generally Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1371 n.2 (2003) (Brown,
J., dissenting); Sabra-Anne Kelin, Note, State Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-
Mail, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 435 (2001); Whang, supranote 21, at 1205-08.
25. See generally Associated Press, Bush Signs Anti-Spain Bill, CNN.CoM, Dec. 16,
2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/16/bush.bills.ap/index.html; Grant
Gross, U.S. Senate Approves Antispam Bill, InfoWorld, Dec. 16, 2003, at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/10/25/HNantispambill_1.html. The bill was ap-
proved on December 19, 2003, and codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2000).
26. See Jones, supranote 17, at 73.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Reuters, FTC Accuses Pop-Up Maker of 'Extortion',CNN.CoM, Nov.
7, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/intemet/ 1/07/microsoft.popup.reut/index.
html.
29. See generally Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The
Emerging Law of ElectronicAgents, 56 Bus. LAW. 341 (2000) (describing the technology
behind spiders and laws which bear on automated search and indexing).
30. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2000). Bidder's Edge's robots accessed eBay's site approximately 100,000 times per day.
Id. at 1063. While a search engine aggregating website locations and subject matter might
need to visit a site only periodically to make sure its data is up-to-date, Bidder's Edge
was in the business of aggregating auction data. Id. at 1061-62. Timeliness of information
in an online auction is, of course, critical to bidders, and time-sensitivity is a feature of
many subjects of online commerce besides auctions. See, e.g., Press Release, Smith
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

As with e-mail, an entity may employ spiders for good aims or ill pur-
poses. Search engines, indispensable in the realization of the Internet's
utility,3 1 use spiders to aggregate indexing information. 32 But spiders also
enable spammers to comb webpages for personal and 33
commercial e-mail
addresses that they can add to their distribution lists.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: PRIOR APPLICATIONS OF

TRESPASS TO CHATTELS TO CYBERSPACE
Several years of litigation preceding Hamidi produced a substantial
body of cases which revived the doctrine of trespass to chattels by apply-
ing it to Internet activities. 34 Essentially moribund, the tort caught the at-
tention of creative attorneys seeking a private cause of action applicable to
the concept of trespass on the Internet. Although metaphors and analogies
relating cyberspace to real property pervaded academic literature and case
law, 35 courts began to view such arguments with suspicion during the
1990s. 36 But even if analogies comparing cyberspace to real property fail
under legal scrutiny, computers still qualify as personal property. Armed
with this reinvigorated doctrine, plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining
37
selective
injunctions against outsiders' intrusions on their computers.

School of Business Gets $2 Million NSF Grant to Study e-Markets, Robert H. Smith
School of Business, University of Maryland (Aug. 26, 2002), at http://www.rhsmith.umd
.edu/pr/news-nsf.htm.
31. See, e.g., Laura Quilter, Note, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Tres-
pass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 436 (2002).
32. See Maureen O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In
Search of an AppropriateAnalogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 570-74 (2001).
33. See Jones, supra note 17, at 71-31. For example, a spider may search for text
strings within the code of personal and commercial websites, whether text or HTML
markup, that matches the format of an e-mail address. Public, unprotected publishing on
the World Wide Web makes the e-mail address available by default to anyone with Inter-
net access.
34. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000); eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058; Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996).
35. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 443.
36. Id. at 447.
37. See generally Burk, supra note 4, at 37 (noting that the harm associated with
spam is "unwanted content, and not some fictional lessening of goodwill or the capacity
of the proprietary network," because if the spam were offering something desirable, for
instance "certificates for free beer, or $100 in e-cash-not a word would have been
said"); Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. and the
Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace-Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (2001); Hunter, supra
note 3, at 483; Quilter, supra note 31, at 428-36.
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 433

The original tort provided redress for unauthorized use of, or inter-
meddling with, the personal property of another. 38 The tort requires proof
of intentional physical contact, causation, and the infliction of actual, sub-
stantial harm to the chattels. 39 The definitions of "intentional physical con-
tact" and "actual harm" underwent radical changes in order to apply this
ancient doctrine, more associated with livestock disputes, to the World
Wide Web.
A. Electron Trespass as Physical Trespass
In the 1996 decision of Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, a case involving
phreaking (unorthodox access to telephone systems) in telephone net-
works, a California Court of Appeal held that a flow of electrons is suffi-
ciently physical to satisfy the requirement of intentional physical contact
for purposes of Trespass to Chattels. 40 CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promo-
tions, Inc. followed in 1997, explicitly applying Thrifty-Tel's doctrine of
4
electron trespass directly to electronic communications on the Internet. 1
But electronic communications of any sort inherently involve this kind of
electron "trespass," leaving the element of "intentional physical contact"
completely trivial when applying trespass to chattels to activity in cyber-
space.42
B. Courts Broaden "Actual Harm" to Include "Threatened
Harm"
"Substantial" actual harm, originally meant harm that amounted to
more than a mere theoretical or de minimis deprivation,43 but when faced

38. Quilter, supra note 31, at 424-26.

39. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 14, at 85-86 (5th ed. 1984).
40. 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1567 n.6 (1996); Burk, supra note 4, at 29 (describing
"phreaking" and the Thrifty-Tel court's reliance on other cases which hold that colloqui-
ally "intangible" interferences such as dust or sound waves constitute trespass when they
result in tangible harm); see also Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F.
Supp. 178, 186-88 (D. Or. 1959) (holding that advancements in science have allowed for
the apprehension and measurement of gases, shockwaves, and particulates once consid-
ered uncertain and intangible for purposes of trespass); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (holding that gases and particulates, while invisible to the naked
eye, can be agents of direct trespass).
41. See CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
42. See Burk, supra note 4, at 34 ("Such 'dispossession' by impinging electrons
amounts to a rule of inviolability-the equipment was contacted by electrons, not
touched, not damaged, not removed, not rendered inoperable. One wonders where the
limits of such 'trespass by electrons' might lie.").
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. i (1965) ("A mere momentary or
theoretical deprivation of use is not sufficient unless there is a dispossession.").
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

with Internet-related cases, courts expanded their interpretations to include

threatened, inchoate harms. Prosser and Keeton write that, despite a "sur-
prising dearth of authority" on the lower bounds of the requirement,
IT]he dignitary interest in the inviolability of chattels ... is not
sufficiently important to require any greater defense than the
privilege of using reasonable force when necessary to protect
them. Accordingly it has been held that nominal damages will
not be awarded, and that in the absence of any actual damage the
action will not lie. 44
The line of cases which expanded actual harms to include threatened
harms involved various uses of spiders or robots. In Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., defendant Verio used spiders to cull information from Regis-
ter.com's publicly accessible database in furtherance of its spamming ac-
tivities.45 In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., defendant Bidder's Edge
sent spiders 100,000 times daily 46 to eBay's site for the purpose of main-
taining an online auction data aggregation service. 47 In both cases, the
courts found no significant actual harm but granted judgment for the plain-
tiffs because of the potential for copycat crime. 48 Though actual harm had
yet to occur, these courts found it likely that others would copy the defen-
dants' behavior, collectively causing congestion or creating49unintended
but foreseeable denial of service if not preemptively enjoined.

44. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 39, at 87. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
contains a comment which says substantially the same thing: "The interest of a possessor
of chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given
legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the
chattel." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, e.
45. 126 F. Supp. 2d238, 249-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
46. 100,000 is not necessarily a large number in context. This activity caused no
visible end-user impact on the service. Computer systems vary widely in power and pur-
pose, and numbers should always be read with any relevant technical facts in mind. eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063-65 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
47. Id. at 1061-62.
48. See Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250 (quoting Register.com's VP for tech-
nology's declaration, "I believe that if Verio's searching of Register.com's WHOIS data-
base were determined to be lawful, then every purveyor of Intemet-based services would
engage in similar conduct"); see also eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d. at 1071-72 ("[I]f the court
were to hold otherwise, it would likely encourage other auction aggregators to crawl the
eBay site, potentially to the point of denying effective access to eBay's customers.").
49. See, e.g., Register com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 252. The court found:
[I]t is highly probable that other Internet service vendors would also
use robots to obtain this potential customer information were it to be
permitted .... If the strain on Registercom's resources generated by
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 435

However, not all courts adopted such lenient standards for inchoate
harms. The court in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. found for the
defendant. 50 Although it noted that no actual harm had occurred, it distin-
guished eBay on the ground that in its present case, there was no "specter
of dozens or more parasites joining the fray, the cumulative total of which
could affect the operation of business," implicitly accepting the eBay
court's interpretation of cognizable harms, only disagreeing as to the
threshold of harm. 5 1
The application of trespass to chattels against senders of spain was not
nearly as controversial because the volume of spammers' activities pro-
vided straightforward, plausible measurements of actual harm.5 2 The
CompuServe court also found that actual harm had occurred because
CompuServe's end users experienced significant degradations in utility
and increases in cost.53 These harms resulted from the defendant's activity
on CompuServe's chattels, but the inconvenience to end users was cer-
tainly one degree removed from the computers' literal physical condition
or functionality.5 a
C. Creeping Strict Liability
Scholars, judges, and commentators began to fear a creeping doctrine
of strict liability for any unwanted or unsolicited electronic trespass, since
the plaintiffs were winning most of the cases even when the defendant was
not sending spain or engaging in spain-related activities. 55 In the absence

robotic searches becomes large enough, it could cause Register.com's

computer systems to malfunction or crash.
Id.
50. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
51. Id. The Ticketmaster court was quite cognizant of the holding in eBay, but held
for the defendant, stating that the threat of copycat behavior was too low in this case to
find for the plaintiff.
52. See Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. 98-20064 JW, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10729, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D.
Va. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1015 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
53. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1019.
54. See id. at 1022.
55. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350 (2003) (quoting the dissenting
justice in the prior decision, who stated that the Court of Appeal's affirmation of the doc-
trine's expansion would "expand the tort of trespass to chattel in untold ways and to un-
anticipated circumstances"); see also Burk, supra note 4, at 32 (noting that, at the time,
the lower court's injunction against Hamidi "further suggests that the claim of 'trespass'
is mutating from an innovative claim to deter commercial spain into a more general claim
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

of any appellate decisions, writers had to speculate as to the doctrine's ul-

timate reach. While some writers defended the expanded doctrine's use-
fulness in filling a legislative void,56 many more worried that trespass to
chattels had been expanded beyond reasonable bounds as a nearly unbri-
dled cause of action in cyberspace, capable of defending an interest in in-
violability that the old doctrine did not countenance. 57 Even Ticketmaster,
despite its relative restraint, still respected eBay's standard of potential or
threatened harm. 58 Writers predicted that continued broad application of
trespass to chattels would eventually create a tragedy of the anticommons,
an over-protection of private rights which would hamper basic activities
on the Internet.59

III. INTEL V. HAMIDI: THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

A. Factual Background
Intel Corporation maintains and operates an intranet, 60 which it uses to
transmit messages among its employees, its customers, and other third par-

to deter unwanted messages. This change has troubling implications for the free flow of
information on the network... ").
56. See, e.g., Mark D. Robins, Electronic Trespass. An Old Theory in a New Con-
text, 15 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1998).
57. See generally Burk, supra note 4, at 35 (attributing the expansion of the doctrine
to a blurring between the traditional divide between real property law and personal prop-
erty law); Hunter, supra note 3, at 487; Quilter, supra note 31, at 440-42. Real property
trespass recognizes a legally defensible interest in inviolability and injunction is a natural
remedy for this kind of right. It is argued that the power of these remedies should not be
allowed to leak into other theories of trespass unless it addresses an interest of similar
gravity.
58. Quilter, supra note 31, at 433.
59. See generally Burk, supra note 4, at 42; Hunter, supra note 3, at 509-14; Quilter,
supranote 31, at 441. Quilter writes,
[t]he doctrine has become completely malleable, able to fit any and all
situations. With trespasses as they have now been defined, and without
a harm requirement, it would be difficult to conceive of anything that
might not constitute a trespass; trespass is effectively defined purely at
the owner's will and can encompass almost any kind of act.
Quilter, supra note 31, at 441. The California Supreme Court also notes academic opin-
ions that warn against propertization of the Internet which would have resulted from en-
forcement under Intel's theory. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1362-63. Anticommons concerns
were also anticipated in the literature. For example, Edward Chang states that "cyber-
trespass theory will curtail the free flow of price and product information on the Internet
by allowing website owners to tightly control who and what may enter and make use of
the information housed on its Internet site." Chang, supranote 37, at 459.
60. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1349 n.1 ("An 'intranet' is 'a network based on TCP/IP
protocols (an internet) belonging to an organization, usually a corporation, accessible
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 437

ties. Though Intel maintains the intranet to facilitate business, its policy
also allows employees to make "reasonable nonbusiness use" of the intra-
net. 61 Kenneth Kourosh Hamidi, a former Intel employee, had an acrimo-
nious falling out with Intel and subsequently founded FACE-Intel (Former
and Current Employees of Intel). 62 For a period of over twenty-one
months Hamidi, as president of FACE-Intel, sent six unsolicited mass e-
mails to a list of thousands of addresses. 63 The contents of these e-mails
criticized Intel's employment practices, warned employees that work at
Intel was damaging to their health and to their careers, encouraged em-
ployees to leave Intel and work elsewhere, and invited them to visit
www.faceintel.com. 64 Intel disapproved of the messages, asked Hamidi to
stop sending them, and engaged in technical self-help in an attempt to
block the messages. 65 Hamidi used techniques similar to those of spam-
mers to circumvent Intel's self-help, but did not actually breach any secu-
rity barriers or hack into Intel's computers in the process.66 No evidence
suggests that Hamidi's unsolicited e-mails adversely affected the technical
performance of any part of Intel's computer systems. The missives were 67
only e-mails, and the system handled them as it handled all e-mail.
Though Hamidi refused to heed Intel's requests to cease sending his unso-
licited e-mails, he did include within his messages an opt-out provision for
the end recipients, which Hamidi honored.68
B. The Holding
The California Supreme Court held that, in California, the common
law tort of trespass to chattels did "not encompass, and should not be ex-
tended to encompass, an electronic communication that neither damages
the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning." 69 The court
also stated that the dispositive issue in a case such as this was whether the

only by the organization's members, employees, or others with authorization.'

<http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/i/intranet.html> [as of June 30, 2003]. Hamidi used
only a part of Intel's computer network accessible to outsiders.").
61. Id. at 1346.
62. See Ken Hamidi WON, Intel LOST, FACE Intel, at http://www.faceintel.com/
kenwonintellost.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2003) (providing a comprehensive account of
this case and its preceding history from Hamidi's point of view).
63. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1349, 1356 (noting that the extent of Hamidi's activity is
miniscule compared to that of a typical spammer).
64. Id. at 1348-49.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1346.
69. Id. at 1347.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

activity "caused or threatenedto cause damage," in an explicit acceptance

of the doctrine's expansion in eBay, Register.com, and Ticketmaster.
1. DemonstratingFlexibility in the Common Law
The court thus adopted the changes imposed upon trespass to chattels
by federal district courts in California. In so doing, the court recognized
the need for a limited private cause of action against trespass to personal
computers. At the very least, the court's decision makes it clear that tres-
pass to chattels, though ancient in its lineage, includes trespass to net-
worked computers. 7 ' Without this adaptation of the common law, indi-
viduals would be limited to statutorily-defined theories of relief, which are
typically slow to arrive.72 As a first step, however, this change to trespass
to chattels remained consistent with the historical adaptability of trespass
law to changing times and technologies. If this adaptability to cyberspace
extends to other forms of trespass law, the result may be a doctrine of cy-
ber-nuisance. This has the potential to thwart any anticommons problems
that the Internet and its successors would otherwise face in the future.
2. The CaliforniaSupreme Court Embraces the Holdings of
PriorCourts
If the California Supreme Court wished to repudiate the trend towards
breadth in trespass to chattels, it could have done So.73 It instead embraced
the prior decisions-including eBay, which is the most controversial of the
spidering cases-and from their holdings harmonized a new threshold of
harm for the tort.

70. Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).

71. Id. at 1361 ("The plain fact is that computers, even those making up the Internet,
are-like such older communications equipment as telephones and fax machines-
personal property, not realty."). The court made this point and avoided settling the "cy-
berspace as real property" debate, and thus, it would actually be quite premature to call
this doctrine "Trespass to Chattels in Cyberspace" given its implicit real-property bias.
72. Legislative progress is notoriously slow, while communications technology has
advariced rapidly in the past few decades. The motivations for other courts' extensions to
trespass to chattels are obvious enough. See Quilter, supra note 31, at 435-36. This is not
to say that the legislature has been inactive, however-gridlock and political considera-
tions have caused the demise of several federal anti-spain measures. See generally Asso-
ciated Press, supra note 25; Gross, supra note 25.
73. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1357 n.5 (concluding that a federal magistrate judge in
Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22520, at *37-38 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001), "incorrectly read eBay as establishing,
under California law, that mere unauthorized use of another's computer system consti-
tutes an actionable trespass" and that the court did "not read eBay ... as holding that the
actual injury requirement may be dispensed with").
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 439

a) Trivial Trespass: Electronic Communication is Intentional

Physical Trespass
The court implicitly accepted the theory of trespass by electrons with-
out substantive criticism. At no time during its review of electronic tres-
pass cases, including telephone,74 spamming,75 and spidering cases76 did
the court question whether trespass by electrons legally satisfied the inten-
tional physical trespass element. If the court had decided to reject the the-
ory, it could not have endorsed any of these cases as good law and would
not have even needed to analyze the issue of harm to find for Hamidi.
b) Expanded Harms: Either Actual Harm or Threatened Harm
Sufficient to Sustain Cause of Action
By focusing on the holdings of the spidering cases, the court also en-
dorsed the expansion of the requirement of actual harms to include physi-
cal harms. As noted above, no evidence supported a finding of substantial
or actual harm in eBay, Register.corn, or Ticketmaster. Though fact pat-
terns varied in each of these cases, a common thread was the courts' de-
terminations of the probability or improbability of "copycat crime." eBay
and Register.com held for the plaintiffs because the courts believed that
they would suffer from overwhelming copycat activity if they lost their
cases. 77 Ticketmaster
78
found copycats situationally unlikely and held for
the defendant.

74. Id. at 1353 (discussing Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996)).
75. Id. at 1353-54 (discussing Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444
(E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Hotmail
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C 98-20064 JW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015
(S.D. Ohio 1997)).
76. Id. at 1354-56 (summarizing "unauthorized robotic data collection" in Regis-
ter.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000); eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
77. Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52; eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72.
78. Ticketmaster.com, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 19:427

IV. FIRST STEPS TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-

NUISANCE

A. Legal Primer: The Real Property Doctrine of Private Nuisance

The nuisance doctrine has its genesis in real property law, 79 but em-
bodies an economic rule of conduct, consequences, and context that would
make an excellent foundation for a rule of liability in cyberspace. Nui-
sance evolved to handle "nontrespassory" invasions of the public or pri-
vate interest in the use and enjoyment of land. 80 A modem understanding
of physics blurs the line between actions that qualified traditional trespass,
such as bodily intrusion and bricks thrown through windows and "intangi-
ble" invasions now understood to be "physical," such as particulate matter
(smog, industrial fumes) and electromagnetic energy. 81 The semantic nice-
ties of "invasion" or "interference" and the involvement of real property
serve as the gatekeepers to this doctrine, which otherwise is chiefly8 2con-
cerned with aggregate social utility and efficient economic outcomes.

79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. b (1965) (discussing the growth
of modem nuisance doctrine from the former rule of strict liability articulated in Fletcher
v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), and affirmed in Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 E. & I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868)). Early in its history, strict liability encompassed some of the legal
territory covered by nuisance law. Strict liability's doctrinal inflexibility was incompati-
ble with the realities of the then-dawning Industrial Age, and so the nuisance doctrine
developed, a sensible compromise necessitated by the proximity and press of modem
living. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. f ("Not every intentional and
significant invasion.., is actionable, even when he is the owner of the land in fee simple
absolute .... Life in organized society and especially in populous communities involves
an unavoidable clash of individual interests."). A similar development is presently in the
works, as the previous extensions of TTC in cyberspace began establishing a doctrine of
near-strict liability. Only Ticketmaster and eBay suggested any resistance to this trend
until Hamidi's authoritative limitations. See Ticketmaster, 2000 WL 1887522 at *4; eBay,
100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065-66. The earlier cases could be seen as an Information Age analog
to Fletcher v. Rylands, which was an early doctrine of strict liability developed for a
situation in which there was no established tradition of case law. See, e.g., Am. Online,
Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548; CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. 1015; Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal.
App. 1559. But the aggregate realities of the Internet demand a rule of give and take, so
the common law must move past cyberspace's Fletcher v. Rylands and into the land of
nuisance.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. a.
81. Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 176 F. Supp. 178, 186-88 (D. Or.
1959).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829 cmt. d, illus. 2 states:
A and B own small farms on the outskirts of a village. Their farms are
on opposite sides of a highway and their residences are directly oppo-
site one another and about 75 yards apart. A makes a practice of breed-
ing livestock in his front yard and in full view of persons in the front
20041 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 441

An action for private nuisance arises when an activity or invasion is

both intentional and unreasonable. 83 The determination of unreasonable-
ness is principally an economic question, turning upon whether the gravity
of the harm caused by the defendant's conduct outweighs its social, or ag-
gregate, utility. 84 Unreasonableness alternatively may exist if the activity
is meritorious but the defendant fails properly to internalize the costs of
his activity, thereby imposing a negative externality on society in addition
to whatever social utility his activity provides. 85 Section 827 of the Re-
statement Second of Torts lists five disjunctive86 factors which weigh the
gravity of the harm caused by the defendant's conduct in context:

rooms of B's house. This is a source of considerable annoyance and

embarrassment to B and his family. A's conduct is indecent and he is
subject to liability to B.
Id. Section 829 states that an actionable nuisance can consist solely of sight and sound,
when the principle object of the conduct is to cause harm to the other or is contrary to
common standards of decency. Id. § 829.
83. Id. §§ 822, 825-31. These balancing tests to not apply to unintentional conduct,
which was not at issue in Hamidi. Nuisance doctrine deals with such questions sepa-
rately. See id. § 822(b) cmt. a. The legislature may deem certain activities, even if unin-
tentional, to be inherently unreasonable, which obviates the need for a nuisance analysis.
Judicial rules for determining unreasonableness otherwise reside in §§ 519-20. See also
id. § 822 cmt. j. Some courts, often informally, consider certain activities so inherently
risky that they apply a standard similar to strict liability. Though damages for worms,
viruses, and hacker intrusions are usually adjudicated under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), it stands to reason that such activities that have the
power to cripple the Internet and inflict billions of dollars in damage or endanger human
life in the hundreds or more would qualify as ultrahazardous activities. See, e.g., Philip
W. Esbenshade, Hacking: Juveniles and UndeterredRecreationalCybercrime, 23 J. Juv.
L. 52, 58 (2003) (describing an incident where another juvenile hacker unwittingly shut
down the FAA control tower at Worcestor airport); Rebecca Allison, Hacker Attack Left
Port in Chaos, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 7, 2003 (detailing a case being heard in the
UK, where a 19-year-old hacker disabled a major Texas port through a denial-of-service
attack intended only for one individual user's computer; the interconnected, relatively
decentralized structure of the Internet makes it all the more likely that a denial-of-service
attack may have serious but unanticipated consequences), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
online/news/0,12597,1057454,00.html. The creation and release of malicious viruses
might also be considered ultrahazardous activities. See, e.g., Melissa Virus Creator Jailed,
BBC NEWS, May 2, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1963371.stm;
House Science Subcomm. on Tech., The Love Bug Virus: ProtectingLovesick Computers
from Malicious Attack (May 10, 2000), available at http://www.nist.gov/hearings/2000/
lovebug.htm.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822(a), 826(a).
85. Id. § 826(b). But see id. § 830 cmt. c, illus. 2, 3 (noting that if the defendant rea-
sonably internalizes the costs to the extent possible, he may not always be liable even
though the conduct causes both utility and harm).
86. The Restatement suggests:
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

the extent of the harm involved;

the character of the harm involved;
the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoy-
ment invaded;
the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and
the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. 7

Still, the defendant's conduct may be excused or justified if it does more

good than harm. Section 828 lists three conjunctive 88 factors which ana-
lyze the utility of the defendant's conduct:
the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of
the conduct;
the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion. 89

B. First Steps Toward a Nuisance Doctrine in Cyberspace

Several parts of the court's analysis, especially those sections justify-
ing the expansion of traditional thresholds, resounded with reasoning that
would be appropriate under an analysis of nuisance. At least one other
court had read past case history to mean that trespass to chattels embodied

Since the gravity of harm is its seriousness from an objective stand-

point, it is the product of all relevant factors. There is no general rule as
to the relative weight of the particular factors in all the ever-varying
cases .... The list of factors here stated is not intended to be exhaus-
tive.
Id. § 827 cmt. b.
87. Id. § 827(a)-(e).
88. Id. § 828 cmt. c.
It is only when the conduct has utility from the standpoint of all the
factors as a whole that its merit is ever sufficient to outweigh the grav-
ity of the harm it causes. If the conduct has no utility from the stand-
point of one of the factors, the fact that it has utility from the standpoint
of other factors is not controlling.
Id. (emphasis added). Supposing for the sake of argument that nuisance does apply to
cyberspace, if an ISP were to send a mail bomb back to a spammer, it would fail this test
outright. The ISP nonetheless may attempt to excuse its retaliatory self-help by arguing
that the social value the law attaches to the use or enjoyment invaded-a spammer's ca-
pacity to attack spain-has almost no social value, and that a spammer could easily avoid
the retaliation by not subjecting the ISP and its customers to outrageous amounts of spam
in the first place.
89. Id. § 828(a)-(c).
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 443

a rule approaching strict liability, a ruling which the California Supreme

Court authoritatively denounced in Hamidi.91
1. Employing Nuisance-Like Reasoning
Proper analysis of actual harms under trespass to chattels is a quantita-
tive discipline that emphasizes categorical rules and measurable effects,
but the substance of the court's opinion emphasizes utilities and harms in a
manner reminiscent of the balancing tests in the nuisance doctrine. 92 Lit-
erature analyzing the traditional doctrine of trespass to chattels states that
deprivations must occur for a substantial or measurable period of time and
cannot be merely theoretical.93
a) The Gravity of the Harm (§ 827)
The court noted that though Hamidi employed evasive tactics in send-
ing his UCEs to Intel's servers, he never actually breached any security
barriers. 94 This fact has relevance in the calculation of damages only in the
negative because the calculation of employee time and resources spent in
deleting Hamidi's e-mails from the system could not contain figures for
time and resources not expended on damages that did not occur. The court
implicitly made value judgments on the nature of Hamidi's behavior that 95
would weigh upon the extent and the character of the harm involved.
The court also noted that the extent of the harm of Hamidi's conduct was
miniscule compared to the impact of a typical spammer's activity, which
was the 96cornerstone of its finding in favor of Hamidi under trespass to
chattels.

90. Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL
1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001).
91. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1357 n.5 (2003).
92. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 39; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 218. The Restatement notes that for an interference or intermeddling to give rise
to an action, the deprivation of use "must be for a time so substantial that it is possible to
estimate the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is
not sufficient unless there is a dispossession." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 218.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 218-19.
94. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1346, 1349, 1353.
95. Recall that these are the first two listed factors weighing against the defendant's
activity or behavior. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827(a)-(b).
96. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1356.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

b) The Utility of the Conduct (§ 828)

i) Social Value and Purpose
For the defendant to justify or excuse his activity, the law must attach
some social value to the primary purpose of the conduct. 97 The court did
not decide Hamidi on First Amendment grounds, 98 but there was a hint of
similar sympathy in the court's characterization
99
of Hamidi's UBEs as "oc-
casional advocacy messages," not spain.

ii) Suitability
Secondly, the court must consider the suitability of the conduct to the
character of the locality.' 00 The court placed special emphasis on the fact
that Hamidi merely used an e-mail system connected to the Internet for the
transmission of e-mail. Specifically, the court found that Hamidi did not
use Intel's system "in any manner in which it was not intended to function
.... 9,,A01Intel's e-mail system was equipment designed for speedy com-
munication between employees and the outside world; Hamidi communi-
cated with Intel employees over that system in a manner entirely consis-
tent with its design."' 0 2 The court had no need to make statements such as
these in an analysis of damages. Within the confines of trespass to chattels
doctrine, it would have sufficed to say that the effect of six UBEs in
twenty-one months consumes negligible storage space and computing
power. 10 3 Applied to nuisance analysis, however, these statements would

97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(a).

98. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1364-65. First Amendment issues were important to a
number of people working on this case. Hamidi considered them the most important as-
pect of the case and was disappointed that the court chose not to answer these questions.
See Ken Hamidi WON, Intel LOST, supra note 62.
99. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1356.
100. THE RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(b).
101. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1353.
102. Id. at 1360-61 n.7. The Court also stated,
Intel connected its e-mail system to the Internet and permitted its em-
ployees to make use of this connection both for business and, to a rea-
sonable extent, for their own purposes. In doing so, the company neces-
sarily contemplated the employees' receipt of unsolicited as well as so-
licited communications from other companies and individuals. That
some communications would, because of their contents, be unwelcome
to Intel management was virtually inevitable.
Id.This language should bring to mind the "give-and-take," "live and let live" characteri-
zations inRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g.
103. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1356.
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 445

reduce the weight of harm in the0 4context of the "suitability of the conduct
to the character of the locality."'
iii) Unavoidable/Unpreventable Harm
Finally, there must be some impracticability of preventing or avoiding
the invasion, without which the defendant cannot excuse his conduct de- 05
spite its value, as otherwise the defendant inflicts unnecessary harm.'
The court noted that Intel's employees would have had an easy time opt-
ing out of Hamidi's mailings, as Hamidi made this option explicit and
genuine in the content of his UBE. 10 6 The court in effect emphasized that
the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm' 0 7 was slight, and
hence, the harm was also small. 10 8 Certainly, Hamidi could have avoided
completely any distraction to Intel's employees by not sending the UBE.
Still, by including an opt-out provision in his messages, Hamidi went to
lengths to notify recipients of their right to refuse further missives and his
willingness to abide by0 9their wishes, which demonstrates respect for the
intent behind § 828(c).'
2. Rigid Categorization:This is Still Not Cyber-Nuisance
Fundamentally, trespass to chattels still only protects possession and
related interests in personal property. Though the analysis in Intel v.
Hamidi often sounds like nuisance-based reasoning, the decision does not
rest primarily upon balancing economic efficiency or social utility, but
upon categorical pronouncements of what constitutes "harm" and "inter-
ests" under the rules of the tort. 110 Thus, the decision does not actually
create a common-law doctrine of cyber-nuisance under the name of tres-
pass to chattels. The court made rigid and categorical rejections of em-

104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(b).

105. Id. § 828(c).
106. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1346, 1349.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827(e).
108. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1352-53.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. h. This comment on clause (c)
states,
An invasion is practicably avoidable by the actor if the actor by some
means can substantially reduce the harm without incurring prohibitive
expense or hardship. Thus, if the actor can carry on his activity with
more skill or care or in a different manner or at a different time and
thereby avoid a substantial part of the harm without substantially di-
minishing the value of his own enterprise, the invasion is practicably
avoidable.
Id.
110. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1352-53, 1356, 1358-60.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

ployee time and productivity as interests in the "condition, quality, or

value" of the computer system."' Therefore, practitioners seeking to em-
ploy trespass to chattels against unwanted electronic communications must
be able to identify a defensible interest attaching tightly to the basic inter-
est of possession; an interest too tangential or remote from possession or
technical performance is likely to face dismissal. Nuisance law counte-
nances no such rigidity; "enjoyment and use" 12
covers any legally protect-
ible interest, weighted by utility and harm.
The court kept trespass to chattels lashed to its foundations, despite
some newfound flexibility. It dismissed several metaphors equating cyber-
space and real property" 3 and flatly stated that "computers, even those
making up the Internet, are ...personal property, not realty."' 1 4 Though
trespass to chattels has been extended to include trespass to networked
computers, this did not create a distinct theory of trespass via cyberspace.
In addition, the court categorically rejected characterizations of employee
time and attention as interests in computers or their functionality. 15 The
court also viewed the loss of consumer goodwill and economic revenues
recognized by the CompuServe court with suspicion." 6 Common sense
suggests that the user or owner of a personal computer has an interest in a
mailbox free of spam and a computer free from unwanted spyware, 1 7 but
Intel's complaint was only indirectly related to the computer system's
functional condition.1 8 Even so, quantities of spam and pop-ups will harm
a private user's utility long before the computer itself suffers actual degra-

111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b).

112. In economic terms, these are benefits and costs, respectively. See generally Jo-
SEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 322-23 (3d ed. 2002).
113. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1360-61.
114. Id. at 1361 (describing networked computers as being literally similar to other
communications networks, like telephones and fax machines, whereas comparison of
such computers to real property requires a metaphor).
115. Id. at 1347, 1359. ("Whatever interest Intel may have in preventing employees
from receiving disruptive communications, it is not an interest in personal property, and
trespass to chattels is therefore not an action that will lie to protect it."). As part of this
argument, the California Supreme Court quoted Burk, supra note 4, at 36: "The Restate-
ment test clearly speaks in the first instance to the impairment of the chattel .... But em-
ployees are not chattels (at least not in the legal sense of the term)." Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th.
at 1359.
116. Id. at 1357-59.
117. See generally Whang, supra note 21, at 1203-04; John Simons, The Battle over
Spare Gets Ugly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 1997, at 55.
118. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1348, 1353 ("In the present case, the claimed injury is
located in the disruption or distraction caused to recipients by the contents of the e-mail
messages, an injury entirely separate from, and not directly affecting, the possession or
value of personal property.").
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 447

dation in performance. 1 9 The receipt of several thousand pieces of spam

in one's mailbox might not noticeably affect a computer's technical per-
formance, but it does reduce the usefulness of the e-mail system to the
user.
C. Historical Parallel: The Development of the Original Nuisance
Doctrine
Intel v. Hamidi added another page in a story that mirrors the devel-
opment of the original doctrine of private (real-property) nuisance from its
beginnings in strict liability. Fletcher v. Rylands originally established a
doctrine of strict liability for trespass to land. 120 This doctrine did not
stand unmodified in the face of technological progress. Over time, courts
incorporated rules of context and economically-motivated balancing tests
into the doctrine, changing it from a landowner's weapon into a mecha-
nism designed to safeguard the economic goals of aggregate utility maxi-
mization and cost internalization. 12' For instance, a Texas court held that
above-ground reservoirs, which Rylands v. Fletcher did not consider a
"natural use of the land" in England, were, in fact, a necessary and there-
fore natural use of Texan land, given the realities of Texan climate. 22 And
a series of cases decided during and after the Industrial Revolution repudi-
ated strict liability except in cases of negligence, recklessness, or inher-
ently dangerous activities because the proximity and congestion character-
istic of an increasingly mechanized, industrialized
123
urban life demanded
that everyone accept a degree of give-and-take.

119. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071-72 (N.D. Cal.
2000). Also, some pop-up ads can be so aggressive as to render the computer unusable
until it is rebooted or until the user performs an action dictated by the pop-up maker.
Though the computer may still have memory or processing power available for other
tasks, the user's ability to enter input or access desired programs may be wholly dis-
rupted. See, e.g, Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming a
judgment against the defendant for cybersquatting). In conjunction with cybersquatting,
the defendant in designed sites that "mousetrapped" visitors, rendering them "unable to
exit without clicking on a succession of advertisements." Id.
120. Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866). The court in Fletcherheld that
the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep
it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for
all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Id.
121. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 790 (Or. 1959).
122. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822 cmt. b, 828 cmt. g (1965); see
also Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969) (abolishing the former distinction
between "debris" as a tangible agent of trespass and "concussion" as an intangible which
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

Context, cost internalization, and network benefits are all concerns that
favor the development of a doctrine of cyber-nuisance. Whereas nuisance
in real property usually affects only neighbors or other landowners in the
immediate geographical vicinity, on the Internet, everyone is just an IP
address away. This interconnectedness magnifies network benefits-and
network harms. That many activities on the Internet have both highly pro-
ductive and highly destructive uses makes the inclusion of context, costs,
and benefits indispensable for fair and efficient adjudications.
The greatest obstacle to the development of cyber-nuisance lies in the
formalistic objection that one should not equate cyberspace with realty and
that nuisance is, by lineage, a real-property doctrine. Despite this formalis-
tic obstacle, the efficiency aims that comprise the underlying principles of
nuisance apply aptly to the problems of inherently communal cyber-
space. 124 The networked nature of the Internet leads to the conclusion that
a balancing of benefits and harms will achieve results that are superior to
the overdeterrence threatened by bright-line rules.125

V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CYBER-NUISANCE VERSUS

TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

A. Give-and-Take: Nuisance Is the Preferable Rule of Aggregate

Utility, While Trespass to Chattels Is Provincial and Absolutist
Trespass to chattels exists to defend possession and related harms, and
its harm-based analysis focuses on literal damages but asks few questions
as to the worth of the trespassory activity. 126 Had the Ticketmaster court
employed the California Supreme Court's analysis, it could not have per-
mitted or justified defendant Tickets.com's activity simply because Tick-
ets.com furnished more good (data aggregation that facilitates comparison
shopping) than harm (light activity on Ticketmaster's website) to the
community. The theory of trespass by electrons, by its very scope, impli-
cates all electronic communications, and as a strict damages analysis,

will not support a claim of trespass). Use of the Internet and networked computers for
electronic communications would appear to be a "natural use" of such a system, qualified
by context. The California Supreme Court states that occasional unwanted communica-
tion is inevitable when a computer or system is connected to a network as large as the
Internet. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1359-60. And frequently, as in the case with personal e-
mail, unsolicited communication is often welcome.
124. SINGER, supra note 112, at 325-31.
125. Recall the "tragedy of the anticommons" described by Hunter, supra note 3.
126. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 39, at 85-87. Though there is some analysis
as to the trespasser's intent or purpose, the analysis deals more with questions of culpa-
bility or thresholds than it deals with utility or defenses.
2004] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 449

wholly controls liability. But use of a spider to aggregate data for search
engines or comparison shopping and use of a spider to collect e-mail ad-
dresses for facilitating spam should be treated differently, though the tech-
nical impact of their activity on the visited sites may be similar. Trespass
to chattels examines only the harm to the property's owner; the doctrine
does not address network harms or benefits.
B. Hamidi: Speech and Advocacy
Assume for the moment that a nuisance doctrine in cyberspace ex-
ists. 127 Hamidi's FACE-Intel messages dance on the borderline of UBE
versus UCE; Hamidi undoubtedly received some measure of personal sat-
isfaction in the activity and its results, and the court still recognized an as-
pect of "advocacy" in his speech without a detailed analysis of First
Amendment concerns.' If the court had considered the speech argument
under nuisance, it would have had to consider the social value of Hamidi's
speech. 129 The court did not endorse using electronic communication as a
means of harassment, but noted that if Intel wished to object to the content
or consequences of Hamidi's speech, it had other avenues of relief.1 30
Connecting an intranet to the Internet results in inevitable give-and-
take and requires a degree of reasonable tolerance sufficient to grant
Hamidi leeway under § 828(b). 131 Moreover, Hamidi mitigated the burden
of his conduct upon his audience to the extent possible through an opt-out
policy, satisfying § 828(c). In general, the extent of the harm of Hamidi's

127. As noted, the only reason why nuisance does not already apply to the Internet is
because by tradition it has always been a doctrine protecting "use and enjoyment of
land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827. Therefore, either nuisance must be ex-
pressly expanded to include electronic communications in cyberspace (the preferable
route) or the academic debate over Cyberspace as Place must be resolved in favor of
treating cyberspace as real property (undesirable due to anticommons concerns).
128. See Hamidi,30 Cal. 4th at 1356.
129. Id. at 1364-65. The court said nothing specific about the value of Hamidi's
speech per se. Its brief discussion of constitutional concerns implied that it would have
decided in Hamidi's favor. The court offered no opinion as to whether the content of
Hamidi's speech was valuable, nor did it suggest that he had an absolute right to use the
Internet as an avenue of expression. The court based its dicta on two facts: that Intel had
recourse to self-help, and that it does not find the constitutional right "not to listen" to
grant an employer the right to decide when its employees should or should not listen. Id.;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(a) (providing commentary and exam-
ples on evaluating the "social value" the law attaches to the defendant's conduct).
130. Hamidi,30 Cal. 4th at 1347-48.
131. See id at 1359-60; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g. This also
implicates § 828(b) because Hamidi's conduct was not beyond the extent of unwanted
communications that Intel would expect from connection to the Internet.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

conduct under § 827 is quite low.' 32 Therefore, the weighing of harms and
balances under nuisance would also result in a finding for Hamidi. Note
also that if Hamidi's activities achieved a volume approaching commercial
spain, a court applying nuisance would find the gravity of the harms under
§ 827 sufficient to justify enjoining Hamidi. Such conduct would have
gone inexcusably beyond what is needed for the dissemination of speech,
and as a matter of policy, the extension of unbounded spamming rights to
everyone with a private opinion would encourage waste of Internet re-
sources. Intel's employees are not chattels and neither is Intel's interest in
their time, 133 but nuisance measures the value of conduct, use, and enjoy-
ment, not just the right of possession.134 Hamidi's e-mails are neither cate-
gorically condoned nor forbidden, but weighed in context.
C. Spidering: eBay, Ticketmaster, and Register.com Revisited
Nuisance would handle the spidering cases with greater factual consis-
tency than trespass to chattels because its analysis pays heed to the pur-
poses of the spidering. Although the California Supreme Court managed
to synthesize a rule from these cases, the outcomes remain awkward. eBay
and Ticketmaster both involve defendants who employ spiders to perform
data aggregation services thereafter made available to the public.' 35 In
both cases, the impact was too small to result in actual harm, yet courts
found threatened harm cognizable in eBay but not in Ticketmaster.136 A
"specter" of copycat auction aggregators was deemed likely, but not a
specter of copycat ticket sales aggregators. Why? The Register.com
court's concern about copycat spammers is legitimate because spammers
do not curtail their activities unless an outside agency imposes penalties
on their behavior, and spammers are not known for their concern about the
impact of behavior beyond their own profit margins or liability for dam-

132. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1355-56.

133. Id. at 1359.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 828.
135. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, No. 99CV7654; 2000 WL 1887522, *2
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061-
62 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
136. Id.
20041 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 451

ages. 137 But how many data aggregators are likely to enter the same mar-
use? 138
ket, where profits derive from competitive popularity of
A nuisance analysis would capture this concern under § 828 or its
equivalent. Section 828(a) addresses the social value that the law attaches
to the primary purpose of the conduct. Search engines have proven value
in cyberspace and have contributed immensely to the utility of the Inter-
net.139 But when the primarypurpose of the spidering is to facilitate spam,
the outcome of an application of § 828(a) is clear: the law attaches very
little social value to spain. Many states have already enacted anti-spain
statutes, with some even imposing criminal liability for failure to comply
with provisions that facilitate opt-out mechanisms, 40 and the CAN-SPAM
Act, which also provides for per-violation fines for spain-related offenses,
was approved on December 19, 2003.141 This factor alone would be
enough to halt fraudulent or misleading spain under nuisance without re-
gard to the resultant degree of harm. 14 Section 828(c) also examines the

137. See Jones, supra note 17, at 70-72 (sending spam is so inexpensive that even a
low response rate gives a better return on marketing over the Internet than through junk
mail). Much of the cost of dealing with spam is not borne by the spammers themselves,
and this failure to internalize the cost of their activity upon the end user results in a pre-
dictable, empirically obvious overproduction of spam.
138. Many businesses may pursue the same market, but the field becomes highly
competitive. Revenue models employed in Internet business have evolved from support
via advertising revenue to actual e-commerce involving fees, transactions, and the sale of
actual goods. The result is a crowded space, where generally a few firms pursue similar
revenue models but in different fields, waging a constant battle to maintain name recogni-
tion. See generally Gary P. Schneider, Chapter 3: Selling on the Web: Revenue Models
and Building a Web Presence, in ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (3d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.course.com/downloads/mis/ecommerce3eoc/ch03.cfm.
139. Quilter, supra note 31, at 424 ("[L]ocating any information on the Internet
would be an almost impossible task without search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or
FindLaw.").
140. See Kelin, supra note 24, at 441-49.
141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2000). The chapter is titled "Controlling the As-
sault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing" and leaves no doubt as to the con-
temporary target of the legislation. The act does not make spam illegal per se, but § 7703
imposes mandatory opt-out provisions and prohibits "predatory and abusive commercial
e-mail." Section 7704(b) targets other techniques including use of spidering and diction-
ary attacks as "aggravated violations" when employed in preparation for or execution of
spamming activities.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. c (1965).
It is only when the conduct has utility from the standpoint of all of the
factors as a whole that its merit is ever sufficient to outweigh the grav-
ity of the harm it causes. If the conduct has no utility from the stand-
point of one of the factors, the fact that it has utility from the standpoint
of other factors is not controlling.
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:427

impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion, which would force

spammers to comply with any statutes that govern their behavior or face
nuisance liability. Compliance with several current statutes is often trivial.
For instance, one statute merely requires that the first characters in the
subject header be "ADV:", which allows any user of e-mail to employ a
filter that automatically screens out every such message. 143 It would be
difficult for a spammer to prove that this requirement imposes an unrea-
sonable burden.
Nuisance is also versatile with respect to remedies, with both damages
and injunctions available.1 45 Bidder's Edfe provided a useful service, but
did not pay for the impact of its activity. 146 Nuisance analysis would find
in favor of Bidder's Edge's spidering under equivalents to § 827(a) and (b)
since actual harm was not substantial, and under § 827(d) because spider-
ing is a form of electronic communication that has long existed as an ele-
ment of other useful information services. The relative lightness of the
harm weighs against the utility of the conduct. Section 828(a) would as-
cribe significant value to theprimary purpose of the spidering, in this case
legitimate data aggregation. Bidder's Edge would only fail § 828(c) for
not paying for the impact of its activity on eBay's servers, but the nuisance
doctrine would encourage damages instead of an injunction, allowing so-
ciety to enjoy the benefits
148
of Bidder's Edge's service while Bidder's Edge
internalizes its costs.

Id.
143. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(g) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); Kelin,
supra note 24, at 444-49.
144. But see Jones, supra note 17, at 76-77. The statement is true if the various spam
regulations are internally consistent; if one jurisdiction requires that the message header
begin with "ADV:" and another jurisdiction requires that the message header begin with
"XXXSPAM:" then literal compliance with both will prove tricky if not impossible. This
is a strong argument for preferring a federal anti-spain statute enabled by the Commerce
Clause over separate and potentially inconsistent state commercial e-mail statutes.
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 827, 828 cmt. h, 830.
146. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal.
2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 830 (discussing the balancing con-
sideration regarding the defendant's attempt to mitigate the harm imposed by his or her
conduct). Even when the overall utility of a defendant's conduct may outweigh the harm
it inflicts, this does not by itself excuse the defendant from a duty reasonably to mitigate
that harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 803.
147. See Quilter, supra note 31, at 424.
148. See generally SINGER, supra note 112, at 325-3 1.
20041 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS & A DOCTRINE OF CYBER-NUISANCE 453

VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court clarified the newly revived doctrine of
trespass to chattels in a way that achieved consistency with the majority of
prior case history and harmony with the concerns of economic efficiency
and freedom of expression. The expansion reflected the need for ready re-
lief against network congestion in a technology characterized by rapid ad-
vances and geometric growth. The court also restricted the tort, anchoring
it to its traditional foundation as a means for defending possession in per-
sonal chattels, and thereby forestalled the rise of a crippling rule of strict
liability in cyberspace. Though a landmark decision in tort law, Intel v.
Hamidi does not end the controversy regarding trespass law in cyberspace.
Rather, it highlights the limitations of one doctrine and encourages further
development of a responsible doctrine that prefers an efficient balancing
of rights to an awkward system of rigid rules and absolute interests. Law
has historically moved to accommodate changes in reality arising from
changes in technology, and just as tort law adapted to the advances of the
Industrial Age, so too will it adapt to the advances of the Information Age.
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL