2
2
1
Aharon Barak, ‘A Judge on Judging: the Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (2002) 116
Harvard Law Review 19, 23.
2
ibid 21.
Learning Outcome
This unit aims at achieving the following learning outcomes:
Understanding the vital link in between judiciary and democratic societies,
Appreciating the role played by the judiciary in the maintenance of democracy,
Realizing the role of Indian Supreme Court in maintaining democracy in India.
Judiciary
Personal and
institutional Absence of bias Faith in judges
independence
One of the primary tasks of the judges, apart from adjudication of disputes, is to uphold the
Constitution and democracy. For this, the judge needs to be independent individually and
institutionally. Judge shall be subservient only to law. Independence of the judge as a person is
complete only when it is accompanied by institutional independence. In many democracies the
institutional independence may be lacking. Independence of judiciary may be clearly specified
in the Constitution or may be implied. This may be visible through a number of measures like
security of tenure, salary and allowances not to their disadvantage, removal only through
impeachment etc. Independence of judiciary may be adversely affected if the appointment
3
ibid 53.
process is flawed. Supersession of judges In India in the 1970s was seen as interference by the
executive affecting the independence of judiciary. The collegium system of appointment of
judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts were founded on participatory, consultative
process to reflect the collective wisdom of the members of the collegium. However, in the
recent years serious questions were raised about the very working of the collegium system. It
raised questions about the accountability of the judges and the public confidence in the system.
Whether the procedure suggested in the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill of 2013 4 will
be a suitable alternative to restore public confidence in the process of appointment of judges
and therefore their independence is yet to be seen.
4
The National Judicial Appointments Commission Bill (2014)
<www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/national%20judicial/National%20judicial%20Appointment%20com
m%20bill,%20201> accessed 19 November 2014.
5
Barak (n. 1) 56.
6
ibid 57.
impartial search for truth. 7 It therefore demands an element of seclusion and restraint on
freedom of expression. It is not to suggest that judge shall withdraw from society. He is part of
the society in which he operates. In the recent years some controversies surfaced when a just
retired judge of the Supreme Court of India accepted the offer of Governorship by the Union
executive. Similarly, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court of India was nominated by
Government of India to become judge of the International Court of Justice.8
For the judiciary to maintain public confidence the following traits are suggested:9
The judge ought to be aware of the power and limits on the power.
The judge must recognize his mistakes.
The judge must display modesty and an absence of arrogance.
The judge should be honest.
7
ibid 60.
8
Arghya Sengupta, ‘Judicial Propriety in an Age of Scandal’ the Hindu, (Delhi, 14 May 2012)
<www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/judicial-propriety-in-an-age-of-
scandal/article3416452.ece> accessed 20 November 2014.
9
Barak (n. 1) 61-2.
name of majority, the organs of Government cannot act arbitrarily and therefore the power of
judicial review is exercised by the judiciary.
Let us examine some of the factors10 influencing the relationship between judiciary and other
branches of Government as represented below:
Relationship
between judiciary and
other branches of
Government
10
Barak (n 1) 117.
11
ibid 121.
occupy the position of senior partners and the latter juniors. By acting as a check on the
executive and legislature, the judiciary is restoring the constitutional balance meant by the
theory of separation of powers.
Judicial review is a check on the exercise of power by other organs of Government. Separation
of powers is not the absolutism of each branch in its own sphere. Such absolutism harms the
freedom whose realization is the basis for separation of powers. Tension would prevail among
the organs if they do not accept separation of powers in its true perspective.
Bradley C. Canon, ‘A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism’ in Stephen C. Halpern and
12
Charles M.Lamb (eds), Supreme Court Activism and Restraint (Lexington 1982).
4. Power of judicial review
4.1 Judicial review of statutes
Many of the Constitutions after the Second World War have provision for review of the
constitutionality of the statutes by the judiciary. Even in Constitutions where no express
provision existed, courts have upheld the implied power of review. Counter arguments may not
have sustainability as long as judicial review enjoys public confidence.
By the exercise of judicial review not only a tension exists between the judiciary and legislature
but a dialogue operates or continues between them. This may occur when the judiciary strikes
down a statute as unconstitutional or interprets the statute in a way not desired by the legislature.
In both these instances, the legislature may bring in amendments or override by replacing with
a new statute. Shah Bano case is an example to illustrate the point. In the Shah Bano13 case, the
Court held that section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, provides for maintenance
of children, wife, parents and it includes maintenance of divorced Muslim women. Thus the
general law of the land was held to be applicable to the Muslim community too. Section 125 is
lays down criminal law and not civil law obligation and to that extent the Court was able to
suggest that criminal law is uniformly applicable to all citizens across India. As far as civil law
obligations were concerned, the Court stated that the article 44 of our Constitution has remained
a dead letter and suggested a common Civil Code. The judgment generated heated debate
among the Muslim Community, both progressive and fundamentalists. However, political
pressures succeeded in passing of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act
1986. Shah Bano case was an ordinary case in the form of an appeal to the Supreme Court. But
the impact generated by the judgment among the Muslim Community created tension for the
political class, thereby leading to the enactment of the law. It shows how a verdict by the Court
is overcome by the legislature. Whether it is the right course of action expected of the legislative
organ in a democracy is doubtful. It is another matter that even the new statute can be subject
of judicial review.
The discussion on judicial review of legislative actions is not to undermine the democratically
assigned specific filed of activity for the legislature. This is so due to the majority rule based
on free and fair elections. Undermining the role of legislatures and overstating the role of the
judiciary are dangerous to the democratic societies. Separation of powers shall ensure to retain
the balance. Wherever lapses occur, judiciary may step in to restore democratic values.
4.2 Judicial review of executive actions
Executive derives authority from the Constitution and statutes. What constitutes executive in
the Indian constitutional scheme is elaborated in the Ram Jawaya Kapur14 decision of 1955.
13
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum (1985) 3 SCR 844.
14
Ram Jawaya Kapur v State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549.
Whenever the action of the executive is challenged, the judiciary can scrutinize the action and
see its legality. Unlawful activities cannot be permitted as lawful as it is done by the executive.
Members elected by the people need to show more accountability. Appointment of public
officials should go through the scrutiny by the court on the logic that every state authority that
makes an unreasonable decision is subject to the court’s intervention and the executive action
is no exception to this rule. When the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner was
challenged, the Court stipulated the need to appoint people with impeccable integrity to such
constitutional posts.15
The Court is the professional interpreter of the Constitution and statutes. Executive is the
professional implementer. These are the roles assigned in the democracy to the executive and
judiciary. It cannot be forgotten by the judges and judges shall not shy away from that
responsibility.
The test of reasonableness and its consistent application in all governmental actions will
increase public confidence. The yardstick to be applied is not the reasonableness of the judge
concerned, but reasonableness of the executive concerned. In the Advisory Opinion on coal
block allocation,16 the Court revisited reasonableness in detail in the context of article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Proportionality was also developed by the Court along with the
reasonableness test to judge the legitimacy of executive action. Both these measures are
powerful tools in the hands of the judiciary to realize their role in a democracy.
15
Centre for PIL v Union of India (2010) < www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/wc34810.pdf>
accessed 22 November 2014.
16
In re Special Reference No.1 of 2012 <www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/op27092012.pdf>
accessed 22 November 2014.
17
Barak (n.1) 148.
democracy. The Election case18 of Smt Indira Gandhi and the ADM Jabalpur decision19 were
critically evaluated by Upendra Baxi.20
Affixing a stamp of approval to an unlawful law or executive action would make the judicial
decision part of the doctrine of Constitution. It is worth quoting Lord Atkin’s minority opinion
during the Second World War:21
In England, amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be
changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always
been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for
which…we are now fighting, that the judges…stand between the subject and
any attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that
any coercive action is justified in law.
Struggle against terrorism turns our democracy into defensive democracy and even the
defensive democracy needs to retain its democratic character. The judges in a modern
democracy must remember this point while performing their judicial task. Even while fighting
the war against terrorism a democratic state acts within the framework of law and according to
the law.
Democracies fighting terror have to strike a proper balance. On the one hand it needs to protect
the security of the state and its citizens. On the other, national security shall not be a reason for
compromising democratic values and rights and liberty of the individual. Approach of the
Supreme Court of India while upholding the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 195822 or the
use of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1964 with its latest amendments to cover naxalite
operations23 is criticized for not maintaining the democratic balance.
6. Summary
To sum up, the maintenance of good democratic traditions depends on the continuance of
vibrant judiciary. A written Constitution vesting judiciary with the responsibility to guard the
Constitution and democratic spirit would secure democratic governance in the country. It is
possible through judicial review of executive and legislative actions. Judiciary has to maintain
its accountability and independence. Other branches of the Government have to guarantee
independence to judiciary. There is an ongoing process of evolving and reforming democratic
18
Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1.
19
ADM Jabalpur v Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521.
20
Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Its Politics, (Eastern Book Co 1980).
21
Liversidge v Anderson, 3 All ER 1941 338, 361 quoted in Barak (n 1) 150.
22
Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 682
23
Ujjwal Kumar Singh, ‘Anti-Terror Laws and Human Rights’ in Kamala Sankaran and Ujjwal Kumar
Singh( eds) Towards Legal Literacy: an Introduction to Law in India (OUP 2008) 181-97; Nandini
Sundar v State of Chattisgarh (2011) 7 SCC 547.
process in countries like India. Sunil Khilnani24 argues that India did not begin with democratic
practices. Therefore, judiciary is instrumental in the maintenance and development of
democracy. The basic structure doctrine propounded by the Court in Keshavananda Bharati25
case and holding free and fair elections as part of that doctrine 26 are part of the process of
development of democracy.
24
Sunil Khilnani, ‘ The Indian Constitution and Democracy’ in Zoya Hasan, E Sridharan and R
Sudarshan (eds) India’s Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices and Controversies (Permanent Black
2002) 64-82.
25
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225.
26
PUCL v Union of India (2013) 2 SCC 663.