Case: 1:24-cv-07145 Document #: 46 Filed: 12/18/24 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:915

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

WHAM BAM SYSTEMS, LLC,

Case No. 24-cv-7145
Plaintiff,
Judge April M. Perry
v.
Magistrate Judge Keri L. Holleb
THE PARTNERSHIPS AND Hotaling
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE "A",
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JOINDER

Plaintiff Wham Bam Systems, LLC (“Plaintiff”) submits the following in response to the

Court’s December 16, 2024 Minute Entry (Dkt. 42) wherein the Court requested Plaintiff submit

a supplemental briefing on the issue of joinder. For the reasons outlined herein, joinder of the

Schedule A Defendants is proper and necessary to allow Plaintiff any meaningful chance at

seeking relief for the gross infringement of Plaintiff’s intellectual property rights. Further, joinder

in this case is consistent with the hundreds if not thousands of similar cases brought by similarly

situated plaintiffs seeking to enforce and protect their intellectual property rights.

INTRODUCTION

This action has been filed by Plaintiff to combat the e-commerce stores listed in Schedule

A to the Complaint (“Defendant Internet Stores”) who trade upon Plaintiff’s reputation and

goodwill by making, using, offering for sale, selling and/or importing into the United States for

subsequent sale or use the same unauthorized and unlicensed product, namely the silicone work

surfaces (“Counterfeit/Infringing Products”) that infringe Plaintiff's federally registered SLAP

MAT trademark (Registration No. 6,193,462) (“Plaintiff’s Trademark”).

Since 2011, over a thousand factually similar cases have been filed in this District against

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foreign based (mostly Chinese) e-commerce stores, wherein most judges in the Northern District

of Illinois have permitted joinder based on parallel fact patterns and similar assertions to those

made in this case i.e., “the majority approach.” However, by 2021, and as referenced in this Court’s

Order (Dkt. 20), a handful of judges in this District took a minority approach wherein a heightened

standard was imposed upon plaintiffs when seeking to establish joinder, i.e. the “minority

approach.” In short, this minority approach (1) places an unreasonable and impractical evidentiary

burden upon plaintiff in the early stages litigation which cause delays that frustrate plaintiffs’

ability to meaningfully enforce their intellectual property; and (2) disregards well pleaded

allegations supported by documentary evidence that establish joinder because of minute

differences amongst the defendants.

Notably, the entire justification for these types of intellectual property resides in the

modern reality that defendants (hundreds in this case) purposely and deliberately act in parallel

with one another to avoid detection and judicial enforcement for their infringing activity online. A

January 24, 2020 report titled Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods prepared

by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Strategy, Policy & Plans provides further

insight regarding the operation of e-commerce stores like the Defendant Internet Stores. Amongst

other things, the report noted that defendants take advantage of anonymity, as well as the mass

reach afforded by the Internet and the cover afforded by international borders, to violate domestic

trademark rights and exploit U.S. consumers with impunity. Plaintiff, like many other

rightsholders, thus faces a “swarm of attacks” on its trademark rights, and “filing individual causes

of action against each counterfeiter ignores the form of harm” Plaintiff faces. Bose Corp. v. P’ships

& Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, 334 F.R.D. 511, 517 (N.D. Ill. 2020)

(factually similar case in which the majority approach was followed). Further, the filing of multiple

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cases against confirmed pockets of infringers ignores the practical reality that once a Plaintiff files

a case against a group of infringers, their peers are then aware of plaintiff’s enforcement efforts.

Hence, Plaintiff’s need to file its initiating documents under seal.

Joinder at this stage is thus consistent with hundreds, if not thousands, of factually similar

cases1 and comports with the strongly encouraged policy of “entertaining the broadest possible

scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.” See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); See also Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 517 (e-commerce stores offering for

sale counterfeit Bose products properly joined); Oakley, Inc. v. The Partnerships, et al., No. 1:20-

cv-05972 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020) (unpublished) (Dkt. 27) (“Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated

that [the asserted claims] arise out of the same occurrence or series of occurrences. Therefore,

joinder of the ‘Schedule A’ Defendants is proper at this preliminary stage.”); Weifang Tengyi

Jewelry Trading Co. Ltd v. The Partnerships, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-04651 (N.D. Ill. July 5,

2018) (unpublished) (Dkt. 150) (“[Plaintiff's] claims against [Defendants] rest in substantial part

on the same legal and factual grounds as [Plaintiff’s] claims against the other defendants, including

that [Defendants] were involved in a counterfeiting network with the other defendants. Given the

nature of [Plaintiff’s] claims, joinder is proper under Civil Rule 20(a)(2).”); Too Faced Cosmetics,

LLC v. Operators of KTKT Store, et al., Case No. 19-cv-07762 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2020) (Lefkow,

J.) (Dkts. 22, 27, 30) (finding joinder appropriate in factually similar case after supplemental

briefing); Gold’s Gym Licensing LLC v. Operators of dropshipping fast ship Store, et al., Case No.

19- cv-07446 (N.D. Ill. Jan.15, 2020) (Lefkow, J.) (Dkts. 32, 38, 43) (same); Craig C. Burnham v.

1 Similar cases against multiple e-commerce store seller aliases have been filed across the country for nearly a decade. See, e.g.
Farouk Systems, Inc. v. Eyou Int’l Trading Co., Ltd., et al., No. 4:10 CV 2672 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010); The North Face Apparel
Corp., et al. v. Fujian Sharing Import & Export Ltd. Co., et al., No. 10 CIV 1630 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2010); Louis Vuitton Malletier
v. aaalvshop.com, et al., No. 19- cv-61986 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2019); Volvo Car Corporation, et al. v. The Unincorporated
Associations Identified in Schedule A, No. 18-cv-00977 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2019); CCA and B, LLC v. Douyong toy, et al., No. 19-
cv-01851 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2019); Talavera Hair Products, Inc. v. Taizhou Yunsung Elec. Appliance Co., Ltd., et al., No. 18-cv-
00823 (S.D. Ca. Apr. 30, 2018), including hundreds of cases in the Southern District of New York and the Southern District of
Florida.

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The Partnerships, et al., Case No. 1:24-cv-04034 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2024) (unpublished) (Dkt. 21)

(same).

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR JOINDER

Under 20(a)(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may join multiple

defendants in a single action if (1) the claims against them arise out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) there is a question of law or fact

common to all defendants through that action. The Supreme Court has guided that under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, “[j]oinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” Gibbs,

383 U.S. at 724. The Seventh Circuit has further instructed that the purpose of a liberal Rule 20(a)

joinder requirement “is to enable economies in litigation.” Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009,

1012 (7th Cir. 2000). This rule is intentionally designed to allow flexibility so that the Court is

empowered to allow effective trial management for parties. See, In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351,

1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012), citing, 7 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedures § 1653

(3d ed. 2001); See also Bailey v. Northern Trust Co., 196 F.R.D. 513, 515 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Rule

20 should be construed in light of its purpose, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite

the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.”).

As to the first prong of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit has not fashioned a

definitive standard for determining what constitutes a single transaction or occurrence, or a series

of transactions or occurrences. See Bailey, 196 F.R.D. at 515 (explaining that “no hard and fast

rules have been established” in this context); See also Burlington N.R. Co. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707,

711 (7th Cir. 1990) (“there is no formalistic test to determine whether suits are logically related.

A court should consider the totality of the claims, including the nature of the claims, the legal basis

for recovery, the law involved, and the respective factual backgrounds.”). Similarly, the phrase

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“transaction or occurrence” is not defined in Rule 20(a); however, courts have looked to the similar

“transaction or occurrence” test for compulsory counterclaims in Rule 13(a). Mosley v. General

Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974).

For the purposes of Rule 13(a), the Supreme Court has stated that “’[t]ransaction’ is a word

of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much

upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.” Moore v. N.Y.

Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). The Court therefore has “considerable discretion” and

“flexibility” in determining whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged such a relationship. UWM

Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2018). Factors considered by Courts in this

District include whether the alleged conduct occurred during the same general time period,

involved the same people and similar conduct. Lozada v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 3487952, at

*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2010).

Neither is absolute identity of all alleged events necessary for joinder to be proper. For

example, other Circuits apply the “logical relationship test” to interpret the “same transaction or

occurrence” standard in Rule 20(a). See Mosley., 497 F.2d at 1332 (“the impulse is toward

entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of

claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”).

Against these principles, a minority approach has arisen in this District that places an

unreasonably steep and impractical burden for rightsholders to overcome which all but stymies

their ability to meaningfully protect their intellectual property against the deluge of online

infringements. This interpretation of permissible joinder requires plaintiffs to link unique

information between Defendant Internet Stores (e.g., email addresses, phone numbers, etc.) and

show near identical listings to establish a logical connection. See Estée Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. v.

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P’ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule A, 334 F.R.D. 182, 188 (N.D. Ill. 2020)

(Chang, J.) (“Estée Lauder I”); Estée Lauder Cosmetics Ltd., et al. v. The Partnerships, et al., No.

20-cv-00845 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 22, 2020) (Lee, J.) (Docket Entry No. 40) (“Estée Lauder II”).

Moreover, the information required to meet such a stringent requirement is typically not available

prior to court ordered discovery, and even if it was, could easily be (and often is) circumvented by

defendants using false or different information. Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged how Defendant

Internet Stores are typically in communication with each other and participate in online chat

platforms such as QQ.com, sellerdefense.cn, kaidianyo.com, and kajingvs.com, where they discuss

tactics to avoid detection. Dkt. 19 at ¶ 24.

Further, the minority approach also construes facts in the light most favorable to the

defendants by downplaying other commonalties between Defendant Internet Stores as merely

coincidental. See, e.g. Estée Lauder I, 334 F.R.D. 188-89 (“[i]t is just as likely that each online

retailer decided to avoid being shut down yet again by removing the trademarks”); Estée Lauder

II at p. 9 (“defendants with nearly identical product descriptions may in fact share no ties, with

each simply copying the same description from elsewhere”).

Finally, the minority approach overstates the concern that “this Court must evaluate the

evidence submitted in support of liability and, eventually, damages” which the minority approach

reasoned undermines judicial economy given the sheer number of infringers. Estée Lauder I, 334

F.R.D. at 189. However, this fear is unwarranted given Plaintiff will likely be seeking a statutory

award for each Defendant Internet Store, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2). See, e.g., Oakley,

Inc. v. Forfar Outdoors Store, et al., No. 20-cv-02955 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2020) (Dkt. 64). With

respect to statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting cases, even the minority approach, like

other Courts in this District, have formulated baseline statutory damages awards for all defaulting

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defendants who do not appear or participate in the litigation. Further since the majority of

defendants in these cases default, there is therefore no “ensuing discovery and variety of defenses”

to evaluate when a defendant defaults. Estée Lauder I, 334 F.R.D. at 190. See also, Estée Lauder

II at p. 7 (citing statutory damages cases involving defendants that appeared and made an

adversarial presentation).

II. PLAINTIFF’S WELL-PLEADED ALLEGATIONS ESTABLISH JOINDER

Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Defendants’ Actions Arise Out of the Dame Transaction,
Occurrence, or Series of Transactions or Occurrences Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)

“In assessing whether the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2) are met, courts must accept the

factual allegations in a plaintiff's complaint as true.” Desai v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc., 2011 WL

2837435, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2011). A court must construe the complaint “in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible

inferences” in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plaintiff must only put forth

enough “facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the

plaintiff's allegations. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th. Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has met this

standard. Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations2 establish that the Defendant Internet Stores are all

operating in the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and,

therefore, joinder is proper.

As pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. 19), not only are each of the Defendant Internet

Stores infringing Plaintiff’s trademarks within the same time frame but also each of the Defendant

2
Plaintiff’s allegations are referring to unique identifiers, not just general common elements found on e-commerce stores. The
Court should avoid speculating that the unique identifiers are a coincidence and that Defendants are merely acting similarly, but
independently of each other. The Court must construe the complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true
all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences” in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.

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Internet Stores use (i) common design elements, (ii) the same or similar Counterfeit/Infringing

Products that they offer for sale, (iii) similar Counterfeit/Infringing Product descriptions, (iv) the

same or substantially similar shopping cart platforms, (v) the same accepted payment methods,

(vi) the same check-out methods, (vii) the same dearth of contact information, and (viii) identically

or similarly priced Counterfeit/Infringing Products and volume sales discounts. Dkt. 19 at ¶ 16.

More specifically, among the 150 Defendants, 87% sell products that look identical; 93% appear

to be located in China; and 40% use the same product photos (which are not photos that are owned,

controlled, or offered by Plaintiff).3

Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations that Defendant Internet Stores are collectively

working in a similar manner and during the same time period to sell Counterfeit/Infringing

Products, shows the necessary logical relationship and same “occurrence of mass harm,” to support

joinder of these Defendant Internet Stores. As the court in Bose correctly observed when reviewing

the reality of harms intellectual property owners face with foreign e-commerce based

infringement:

“Rule 20’s inclusion of the term ‘occurrence’ should allow plaintiffs to join in a
single case the defendants who participate in such unlawful occurrences, despite
the lack of a ‘transactional link.’ The kind of harmful occurrences the internet
enables - including mass foreign counterfeiting - were inconceivable when Rule 20
was drafted . . . [E]very individual counterfeiter can be said to cause a distinct
injury. But that is not Bose’s reality. Bose does not perceive any one counterfeiter
to be the problem. Each injury by itself is relatively inconsequential to Bose.
Rather, it is the injuries in the aggregate - the swarm - that is harmful and from
which Bose seeks shelter. From Bose’s perspective, filing individual causes of
action against each counterfeiter ignores the form of harm it faces. Seeking relief
against each member of the swarm one by one defies common sense, because it is
the swarm - the fact that all Defendants are attacking at once - that is the defining
aspect of the harm from which Bose seeks relief. Joinder of all defendants who are
part of the swarm attacking Bose’s trademarks flows easily from conceptualizing
the swarm as the relevant Rule 20 “occurrence.” Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 516–
517.

3
Defendants also use common phrases in their titles such as “silicone slap mat 410x310mm photosensitive resin
protector pad 3d printer accessories,” “dlp sla 3d printer,” and “resin transfer to protect work surface.” See Exhibit A.

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Plaintiff faces an identical swarm concerning its own trademark.

Neither has Plaintiff’s investigation been so limited to cursory reviews of the Defendant

Internet Stores listings online. At great cost, Plaintiff has also devoted time and finances toward

test purchases of the Defendant Internet Stores’ Infringing Products and has captured further

evidence of the Defendant Internet Stores’ commonalities. Amongst other things, Plaintiff has

found that a majority of Defendants are using the same materials and color pigments for their

Infringing Products which all share the same dimensions. This plausibly leads to the conclusion of

a common manufacturer and distributor. For example, Plaintiff’s sample purchases from the fifteen

Defendant Internet Stores pictured below use the same gray Infringing Product (See Exhibit A):

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Further, despite the Defendant Internet Stores’ efforts to conceal their relationship, Plaintiff

has pieced together commonalities to further show the web of interrelatedness of the majority of

these Defendant Internet Stores (See Exhibit A):

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Moreover, a vast majority of the Defendants who have successfully settled or have started

negotiations toward a settlement did so in a group, which points to their common ownership and/or

control. 57 Defendants have already been dismissed. Of those 57 dismissed Defendants, 51

Defendants (89%) negotiated settlement as a group. An additional 22 Defendants have also

approached Plaintiff as a group and are presently negotiating for settlement. In total, 73 of the 79

Defendants (92%) who have negotiated settlement have done so in a group.4

Plaintiff has thus exhausted its efforts toward linking the Defendant Internet Stores to the

same transaction or series of transactions. Without further assistance from the Courts, it is

impossible for Plaintiff to attain additional points of commonality. Thus, in light of the

commonalities already plead and supported by evidence, joinder at this pleading stage is proper,

especially without adversarial opposition and the opportunity to conduct discovery.

Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Questions of Law or Fact Common to All Defendants Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B)

Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations also satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B), which provides

that joinder is proper if “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the

action.” In this case, the Defendant Internet Stores, without any authorization or license from

Plaintiff, have knowingly and willfully offered for sale, sold, and/or imported into the United

States for subsequent resale or use products that infringe directly the Plaintiff’s Trademark.

Docket 19 at ¶ 15. In addition, the methods Plaintiff will use to investigate, uncover, and collect

evidence about any infringing activity will be the same or similar for each Defendant Internet Store.

While each Defendant Internet Store may later present different factual evidence to support

individual legal defenses, prospective factual distinctions do not defeat the commonality in facts

and legal claims that support joinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B) at this stage in the litigation.

4
The figures in this paragraph are accurate as of December 17, 2024.

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See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1–500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 251–52 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (Castillo, J.).

III. JOINDER IS CONSISTENT WITH FAIRNESS, CONVENIENCE AND JUDICIAL

ECONOMY

This Court should find joinder is proper in this case as it is the best avenue to promote

judicial economy - a critical consideration of the Court’s discretion when interpreting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 20. See also, First Time Videos, LLC, 276 F.R.D. at 251-252. Joinder at this stage serves the

important interests of convenience and judicial economy, leading to a just, speedy, and inexpensive

resolution for Plaintiff, Defendants, and the Court. In this case, joinder does not create any

unnecessary delay, nor does it cause any undue prejudice upon any party. On the other hand,

severance is likely to cause delays and prejudice to Plaintiff and the Defendant Internet Stores alike.

As noted in Bose, “[r]equiring the filing of separate complaints could flood the courts with

thousands of additional single defendant [trademark infringement] cases, with no difference

in resolution of nearly every case in a practical sense. The only thing that will inevitably occur

is the slowdown of adjudications of other lawsuits, or the decrease of filings of cases which on

their face have alleged plausible violations of the [Lanham Act].” 334 F.R.D. at 517, n.6. Worse

still, while severance may temporarily lead to a spike in generated court fees, respectfully, the

more likely outcome is that rightsholders such as Plaintiff will ultimately decide to not bring forth

their actions in light of the realities that surround the nature of these mass infringements i.e. the

defendants’ ability to maintain anonymity, create new storefronts once infringement is detected,

swiftly move finances beyond the reach of the courts, and concealment of the full scope of their

operations. As a result, rightsholders may view domestic intellectual property rights and

registrations as nothing more than pieces of paper given their inability to meaningfully enforce

their rights in the age of online commerce. Thus, severance of defendants here and in similar cases,

despite well pleaded allegations, would have a pernicious effect and ultimately chill rightsholders’

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willingness and incentive to pursue domestic intellectual property rights.

Joinder at this Stage Will Benefit the Defendants

From the Defendants’ perspective, Defendants may be required to defend identical,

concurrent lawsuits if severed prematurely into separate cases. More to the point, even severing

defendants down to a handful based on arbitrary commonalities may not result in proper

joinder as the minority approach noted above envisioned. For example, in SanDisk LLC v.

tinabeet, et al., Case No. 18-cv-08335 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2019) (Chang, J), the Court questioned

the proprietary of joinder (Id., Dkt. 23). The plaintiff thereafter severed all but two defendants,

“TINABEET” and “WINDSTARS57_3,” based on “the date/time stamp [being] within minutes

of each other and the almost identical (except 1 digit) return-address labels” (Id., Dkt. 30).

However, it was later discovered that these two remaining defendants ended up not being related,

defendant “WINDSTARS57_3” defaulted and defendant “TINABEET” settled with plaintiff.

Chrome Cherry Limited v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on

Schedule “A”, Case No:1:21-cv-05491, Dkt. 19-1 ¶ 7. Further, one of the defendants that remained

operated another seller alias that was severed into a different case. Id. Thus, not only did the

minority approach lead to the joining of two parties that were not related, but also left a single

defendant forced to unnecessarily defend two separate, identical cases.

It is thus possible that Defendants would actually benefit from joinder. In London-Sire

Records the court noted that since the cases involved similar, even virtually identical, issues of law

and fact, consolidating the cases “ensures administrative efficiency for the Court, the plaintiffs,

and the ISP, and allows the defendants to see the defenses, if any, that other John Does have

raised.” London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 161 (D. Mass. 2008). Indeed,

as Plaintiff has alleged, the Defendants work in concert to secure counterfeit goods and in defense;

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sites such as sellerdefense.cn, kaidianyo.com, and kuajingvs.com (Dkt. 19 at ¶ 24) serve to

coordinate the activities of the counterfeit sellers and coordinate their defenses. Plaintiff further

anticipates that Defendants will be individually subject to default, and “there is no prejudice to any

defaulting defendant, whose liability may be established upon default irrespective of the presence

of any other defendant.” Coach, Inc. v. 1941 Coachoutletstore.com, 2012 WL 27918, *4 (E.D. Va.

2012); See also Oakley, Inc. v. The P’ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A,”

No. 1:20-cv-05972 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (Dkt. 27) (“The Court additionally notes that no Defendants

are prejudiced by permitting joinder at this juncture”).

Joinder of the Defendants is the Most Efficient Option for the Courts

The resources of the Court, other judges in this District, and other Districts will be

substantially taxed if Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Internet Stores are severed into

multiple separate lawsuits. Estée Lauder I, and H-D U.S.A. v. The Partnerships et al., echo the

concern that joinder in these e-commerce cases would create “a burden on courts since courts must

evaluate the evidence submitted in support of liability and, eventually, apportion damages among

the parties.” H-D U.S.A. v. P’ships et al., 2021 WL 780486 at *3 (N.D. Ill. March 1, 2021). Against

this fear, Sandisk illustrates the inefficiencies that were identified in Bose Corp. resulting from the

narrow approach to joinder.

This concern also ignores the reality that the vast majority of defendants named in these

cases will result in default judgements. See e.g., Entm't One UK Ltd. v. 2012Shiliang, 384 F. Supp.

3d 941, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (indicating how most defendants in these online infringement cases

result in default judgements). However, allegations in the complaint are accepted as true if a

defendant defaults, so there would not be any evidence beyond plaintiff’s allegations to evaluate

with respect to liability. U.S. v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). If, in the often

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minority of circumstances, an individual Defendant Internet Store does come forth and

demonstrate that joinder is improper as to them individually, this Court is well within its power

to sever that Defendant on its own or order the Plaintiff the cure the deficiency in Plaintiff’s

pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

In sum, cases like this one, and more specifically, a position toward a liberal joinder of

parties, provides Plaintiff and similarly situated rightsholders one of the few avenues available to

them for stopping and deterring online infringement.

IV. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT WARRANT DEPARTURE FROM THE
LIBERAL APPLICATION OF JOINDER THAT HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN
APPLIED IN PARALLEL CASES

In this district, courts have consistently applied a liberal position toward Fed. R. Civ. P. 20

that not only gives rightsholders an avenue of protecting their intellectual property but also

comports with legislative action5 and reports such as “Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and

Pirated Goods” prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Strategy,

Policy, and Plans (January 24, 2020) (the “Report”). Since the Report was published, this District

has seen hundreds if not thousands of cases like the instant action wherein rightsholders have

turned to the Courts for assistance in combating the swarm of infringement they have suffered.

More often than not, a liberal application of Rule 20 and permissive joinder has been applied. The

facts of this case do not warrant any departure from the consistent application of this Rule.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, joinder of the Defendant Internet Stores is proper. Joinder

is consistent with other courts and comports with the strongly encouraged policy of entertaining

5
See Press Release, U.S. Senator Thom Tillis, Tillis, Coons, Cassidy & Hirono Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to
Seize Counterfeit Products and Protect American Consumers and Businesses (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/12/tillis-coons-cassidy-hirono-introduce-bipartisan-legislationto-seizecounterfeit-
products-and-protect-american-consumers-and-businesses.

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the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.

Date: December 18, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/S/BRANDON BEYMER
BRANDON BEYMER (ARDC NO. 6332454)
DALIAH SAPER (ARDC NO. 6283932)
SAPER LAW OFFICES, LLC
505 N. LASALLE, SUITE 350
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60654
(312) 527-4100
BRANDON@SAPERLAW.COM
DS@SAPERLAW.COM
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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