Civ Pro Notes Based on Syllabus
Civ Pro Notes Based on Syllabus
JURISDICTION
A. Classes of Jurisdiction- authority and power to hear try and decide a case
i. over the subject matter- power of the court to hear the type of case the is then before it.
RuIncluding real actions, personal actions or actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
No jurisdiction- no right conferred, can be declared -can be declared void anytime unless
estoppel ang either party.
Determine Cause of action- act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
Conferred by law and determined by the complaint which comprise a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Doctrine of judicial stability- precludes a court from interfering by injunction with the
regular orders of a co-equal court. Jurisdiction=== exclusion of others.
Jurisdiction over SM == can be raised any time even on appeal. – can be tackled motu
proprio
Non-waivable defense
a) No jurisdiction
b) Litis pedentia (case pending in other court)
c) Res judicata (has prior judgement)
d) Prescription
- Person not within the jurisdiction of the court is not bound by the judgement
How acquired?
-depending on the plaintiff and defendant
-Plaintiff- soon as filing of complaint or petition. Mere filing is an act of
submission of jurisdiction
Quasi in rem- named after a person as defendant but the action is over his interest to the
obligation or lien burdening the property.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Summons are served not as jurisdictional
requirement but as compliance to due process.
Action over the thing or the res which concerns the status of a person like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries.
how conferred?
-also conferred by failure to object to the presentation of evidence on a matter raised in the pleadings.
-Q of Law if need to determine what law will apply to set of facts. Q of facts- determination of the
truth/veracity of the facts.
-test to determine if the q is of law or of fact—whether the court do not need to evaluate the evidence then
it is Q of Law if there is a need then it is q of Fact.
If parties try an issue which is not found on the pleadings, it can be treated as if they are raised in the
pleadings provided that parties consented to it. Consent may be inferred from not interposing an objection
to the presentation of evidence on a matter not alleged in the pleadings.
Has exclusive original jurisdiction in pet certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against:
-CA
-CoA
-COMELEC
-Sandiganbanbayan
-CTA
Has also original and concurrent jurisdiction with CA in petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus against:
-RTC
-CSC
-Central board of assessment appeal
-NLRC
-Other quasi-judicial agencies.
-Concurrent orig jurisdiction with the RTC in cases affecting ambassadors, pulic ministers and consuls
-Appeallate jurisdiction –per rev on certiorari (rule 45) aginst : CA, SB, RTC on questions of law and on
cases involving constitutionality of law, treaty international or exec agreement, PD, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation, legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or penalty, jurisdiction of
lower couts.
2. Courts of Appeals
-annulment of judgement of RTC
-Appellate jurisdiction of Commissioner of Internal revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges penaltie arising under
National Internal revenue code or other laws administered by BIR.
-In action of CIR in cases involving the previous mentioned above.
-Decisions orders or resol of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in
the exercise of their original/appeallate jurisdiction.
-Decisions of Commissioner of customs (liability of customs duries, fees, money charges seuzyre
detention or release of property Matters arising under customs law
-Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, involving taxation of real property
originally decided by the city or provincial assessment appeals
-Sec finan on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review
-Decisions of Sec DTI,commodity or article
-Sec agri – agri product commodity article involving dumping and countervailing duties under
sec 301 and 302
-With SC- actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
-Concurrent and orig jurisdiction with SC and CA--- Cert, prohibition, and mandamus against
lower courts and bodies . Quo warranto and habeas corpus.
-Appeallate jurisdiction of MTC and MCTC.
A. Intellectual Property Courts
B. Special Courts
4. Family Courts
b) Petitions for guardianship [Minors], custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to
marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different
status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No.
7658; and
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of
physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's
personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their
development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings
and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the
regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising
under this Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or
correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this
Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they
have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all
other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and
commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the
parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are
Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
(1) Shari'a District Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari'a
Circuit Courts within their territorial jurisdiction.
(2) The Shari'a District Court shall decide every case appealed to it on the basis of the evidence
and records transmitted as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral arguments as the parties may
submit.
6. Sandiganbayan
Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA (2011)
-
CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. vs. Prov. Of Nueva Ecija 759
CRA 180
-Casecnan a project under BOT with NIA. Stipulated in the contract that the NIA shall pay the RPT of the
project
-However, NE sent an assessment from 2002- 2008
-Casecnan filed a petition for TRO in RTC—dismissed
-Preliminary injunction-dismissed
-SC held that CTA has appellate jurisdiction over controversy involving local tax
-Case was a local tax issue- Filling of preliminary injunction over the enforcement of assessment of RPT
is an implied action to question the assessment. Thus it is a local tax issue and jurisdiction is vested over
CTA.
SECTION 1. Scope.— This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No, 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
(n)
Ruling:
In the above case, while it true that both private petitioner and private respondent
are both Muslims, the word “parties” referred to the above law necessarily refers to the
real parties in interest which is the Municipality of Tangkal and the private respondent.
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as those who
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails
of the suit. Therefore the Shariah District Court of Marawi has no jurisdiction over the
above case
5. Residual jurisdiction
Dev. Bank of the Phil. vs. Carpio, 816 SCRA (2017) o
Requisites: trial, judgment, appeal
6. Epistolary jurisdiction
7. Split jurisdiction
8. Expanded/Extended jurisdiction
9. Equity jurisdiction
The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the
respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City, Manila. The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s
favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises and pay the rentals due until the respondent
actually complies.
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent consigned
the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals. The RTC affirmed the
decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent.
In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and
dismissed the ejectment case. The dismissal of the case became final and executory.
The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-appellant as lessee) praying
for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the respondent with the RTC. The RTC granted the
petitioner’s motion. The RTC explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would mean that there
was no complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of rentals for the use and
occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed contracts of lease and on the basis of justice
and equity.
CA affirmed the order RTC.
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to
proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing rentals for the leased properties
from May 2001 to October 2001, and to withdraw the lease payments deposited by respondent from
November 2001 until August 2003. The RTC granted the motion.
Petitioner assailed the said order in the CA. CA reversed the decision of the RTC explaining that the RTC
has no jurisdiction to levy the property of the respondent.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction when it allowed the withdrawal of the bond and the execution of the
levied property of the respondent.
Held:
Yes, the RTC exercised its equity jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law.
The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal
inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case.
The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was
nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of
the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC
orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.
14. Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation: First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Phil Bank of
Communications, June 19, 2018,
References:
Aug 5, 2024
Appellate and original jurisdiction
Aspects of jurisdiction
-Subject matter
-Issues
-Parties
-res
A filed case against B with 3M sum of money. B filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since according to B, only 1.5M is the actual amount of deb. Will you grant the motion?
A.NO. Jurisdiction shall be determined in the complaint and not on the answer. If this will be allowed
it can be abused to be a ground for motion to dismiss.
BP 129 as ammended
Jurisdiction is determined at the commencement of action.
A filed B in 2019.
How acquired?
-depending on the plaintiff and defendant
-Plaintiff- soon as filing of complaint or petition. Mere filing is an act of submission of jurisdiction
Concurrent jurisdiction—doctrines:
a) Hierarchy of courts
b) Transcendental importance
c) SC is not a trier of facts.
Has exclusive original jurisdiction in pet certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against:
-CA
-CoA
-COMELEC
-Sandiganbanbayan
-CTA
Basis-
>400 thousand.
In loan agreement.
Monetary interest is the compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. On the
other hand, compensatory interest is that imposed by law or by the courts as penalty or indemnity for
damages.
In a case decided by court, when amount is material -exclude the compensatory. Include the monetary
interest to determine the jurisdiction.
If stipulated in the loan agreement, atty’s fees is included in the computation to determine jurisdiction.
FLCs
Kinds of procedures by FLCs
-Regular
-If the assessed value or interest in of the real property does not exceed Php 400,000
-Admiralty and maritime action <2M
-Probate where the value of estate is <2M
-Summary procedure
Civil cases covered by the rule on summary procedure now consist of:
2) civil actions and complaints for damages where the claims do not exceed ₱2,000,000.00;
Title and possessions of property shall not be covered by summary procedure regardless of cases.
3) cases for enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration award where the
money claim exceeds ₱1,000,000.00;
4) cases solely for the revival of judgment of any first level court; and
5) the civil aspect of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), if no criminal action has been
instituted. Provisions on the evidentiary nature of pleadings, filing and service, and pre-trial from the
2019 Amendments have likewise been adopted, unless inconsistent.
With respect to criminal cases, violation of BP 22 is explicitly included, and the penalty
threshold of all other criminal cases is increased to imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or a fine not exceeding ₱50,000.00, or both, and a fine not exceeding ₱150,000.00 for offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence. Arraignment and pre-trial shall be
scheduled and conducted in accordance with the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal
Cases.
The procedure of appeal has also been simplified. Any judgment, final order, or final
resolution may be appealed to the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) exercising
jurisdiction over the territory under Rule 40 for civil cases and Rules 122 for criminal cases,
of the Rules of Court. The judgment of the RTC on the appeal shall be final, executory,
and unappealable.
-Small claims
---
These Rules shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment of money where the value of the claim
does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (400,000.00)
exclusive of interest and costs
Delegated Jurisdiction
original jurisdiction lies in other court but is delegated for certain cases, Cadastral and land registration
with no controversy or <100K
SC delegated this to SC
The grant of authority to inferior courts to hear and determine cadastral and land registration cases
under certain conditions. These are the courts of delegated jurisdiction:
1. Metropolitan Trial Court
2. Municipal Trial Court
3. Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Land registration case filed FLC, issued unfavorable to the party. Where will the party go?
-CA since it is delegated. Normally, RTC ang may jurisdiction. Thus, the decision of FLC is
tantamount to the decision of RTC.
Special---
Application for bail may be heard in FLC in the absence of judges of RTCs
One which restricts the court’s jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by the governing law. It is confined to particular causes, or whichcan be exercised
only under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge,
Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and
decide:
1. Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or
2. Applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the
absent Regional Trial Judges sit.
RTC:
-If the assessed value or interest in of the real property exceeds Php 400,000
- If the gross value, claim, or demand exceeds Php 2,000,000 i
- Actions the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Something other than the
right to recover a sum of money or the money claims is merely incidental to the principal relief )
Sunset clause, TRO has limited time [72 hours or 120 days]. If no WPI, TRO shall be ineffective.
-According to Justice leonen it is a violation of sunset clause.
From internet
“To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be ascertained.
If the principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery
of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of money or real property results
as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.”
-Regular
-Family
-Commercial
-special
b) Petitions for guardianship [Minors], custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to
marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status
and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o neglected children, petitions
for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of
parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No.
56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658;
and
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical,
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as
battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom
movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings
and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in
the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
Under Sec. 5.2 of the Securities and Regulations Code, to hear and decide:
a. Cases involving Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business
associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
b. Controversies arising out of Intra-corporate or partnership relations
c. Controversies in the elections or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
corporations, partnerships or associations
d. Petitions or corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared
in a state of suspension of payments (Securities
IMPORTANT
Special agrarian court
-LBP v Dalauta
-
-Determination of just compensation if judicial function
-final determination rests with the court. DARAB has only preliminary powers.
When the subject matter does not lie under any court. Jurisdiction lies with the RTC.
Court with limited jurisdiction--- probate court. Cannot issue question of ownership. It cannot issue
decision question raised other by the heirs.
Primary jurisdiction- courts will no resolve a controversy involving question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, experience, and service of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Regulus case
Jurisdictional estoppel
(From the book --- Court barred a belated objection to jurisdiction that was raised by a party only when
an adverse decision was rendered by the lower court against it. Question of lack of jurisdiction may be
waived if the party has actively participated in the case.
II. RULES 1 to 5
A. Actions: Commencement (Sections 3 and 5, R-1)
Cases:
1. Alday vs. FGU Insurance– 350 SCRA
FGU filed a complaint for sum of money against Alday amounting to P114k. Alday filed her Answer by
way of counterclaim and asserted that it is FGU who owes them P104k and for premium reserves of
P500k. She also prayed for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages
for the allegedly unfounded actions filed by FGU. FGU then moved to strike out Alday’s answer and to
declare her in default for filing the answer out of time. The motion was denied. FGU again moved to
dismiss Alday’s counterclaim by contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same
because of non-payment of docket fees. Alday also in response, asked the RTC to declare her
counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that FGU be declared in
default for failing to answer such counterclaim.
RTC dismissed Alday’s counterclaim it being merely permissive and that failure to pay the docket fees
prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. CA sustained the RTC.
Issue: WON counterclaim of petitioner exempt from the payment of docket fees and therefore the court
acquired jurisdiction over the same
Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and
accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioner's claims
differs from that needed to establish respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from
petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent's claims is not
contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials
will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. One would
search the records in vain for a logical
connection between the parties' claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own
admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not
based upon the Special Agent's Contract. However, petitioner's claims for damages, allegedly suffered as
a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.25 On the
other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner
is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the same, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims
and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of
an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of
respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely
result in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.
Facts: Proton availed of the credit facilities of BNP and executed a corporate guarantee of the extent of
US$2 million to guarantee its obligation. Under their trust agreement, Proton would receive imported
motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it in case the vehicles are
not sold, Proton would return them to BNP with the documents of title.
Proton failed to deliver the proceeds and to return the unsold motor vehicles. Proton’s guarantors refused
to pay its obligation so BNP filed a complaint ordering them to pay the initial amount of US$2 million
with accrued interest and other related charges. RTC Makati Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees at
P352,000. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by BNP for failure to pay the correct
docket fees thus preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. In addition, the petitioners
allege the prematurity of the complaint since BNP did not priorly send a demand letter.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR. The CA denied the appeal by way of
certiorari stating that Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the
principal amount being claimed in the pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. CA
denied their MR.
The petitioners argue that pursuant to Administrative Circular 11-94, interests claimed should be included
in the computation of the docket fees. Thus since BNP underpaid, RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
the case.
Issue: WON the RTC fail to acquire jurisdiction over the case for insufficient docket fees.
Held: No. When the complaint was filed in 1998, Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative Circular
11-94.
The payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time
of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were
initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply (court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees)
BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court which turned out to be incorrect.
As priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular 11-94,
which was the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands, BNP cannot claim the
interest unless respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and
specify the precise amount of interest Proton owe and pay the corresponding docket fee.
4. Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Formaran, 578 SCRA 283 (Nangutang bahay ang
ginawang security)
Ruby Shelter, herein petitioner, obtained a loan amounting to P95,700,620.00 from respondents Romeo
Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo) secured by real estate mortgages consisting of five (5)
parcels of land in the name of the petitioner. After several negotiations and despite the extension granted
by Tan and Obiedo, petitioner still wasn't able to pay. Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of real estate mortgages,
executed Deeds of Absolute Sale in their favor consisting the five parcels of land. It is provided for in the
Memorandum Agreement that if petitioner fails to pay the loaned amount, five Deeds of Absolute Sale
would be executed in favor of Tan and Obiedo.
On March 16, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court for declaration of nullity
of the deeds of sale and damages believing that respondents' action was one which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Upon filing its complaint, petitioner paid docket fees amounting to P13,644.25 as
assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. It was stated that it only wanted to annul the deeds of
absolute sale, so therefor, no issue of title or recovery of possession is present to classify it as a real
action.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, there was a provision which states that if Ruby Shelter
brought suit against respondents, it would be amounting to P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages
inclusive of costs and attorney's fees. Tan and Obiedo moved to dismiss the complaint contending that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the case involved recovery of
real property making it a real action which requires payment of docket fees equivalent to a percentage of
the fair market value of the land amounting to P720,392.60.
RTC and Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo ordering Ruby Shelter to pay additional
docket fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruby Shelter should pay additional docket fees to acquire jurisdiction
HELD:
Yes.
Payment of Docket fees is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. In Manchester Devt. Corp. vs. CA, 149
SCRA 562, the court explicitly pronounced that, the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. "Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatoty, but
also jurisdictional.
A real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. No matter how
fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its complaint in
Civil Case no 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by
petitioner of its title and possession of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo. A real
action is one which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in what is now
section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession
of real property.
The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real
property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing
the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead on relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties ( as stated in the Tax
Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the
absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
5. St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias, 626 SCRA 649 * (SLU, di nagbayad docket sa
appallate)
For failing to comply with the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Respondent with the Petitioner,
The Petitioner suspends the respondent for one semester,
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery.
Despite the conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting Cobarrubias to file a
case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of
the Department of Labor and Employment, When circulation and mediation again failed, the parties
submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).
VA dismissed the case. He noted that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to place its teaching employees on
forced leave when they fail in the evaluation for three (3) years within a five-year period, without a
distinction on whether the three years fall within one or two CBA periods.
Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay
the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record. The CA
dismissed the petition outright for Cobarrubias’ procedural lapses. Cobarrubias received the CA
resolution, dismissing her petition filed her motion for reconsideration, arguing that the ground cited is
technical. She, nonetheless, attached to her motion copies of the material portions of the record and the
postal money orders for ₱4,230.00. She maintained that the ends of justice and fair play are better served
if the case is decided on its merits.
The CA reinstated the petition. It found that Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying
the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion for reconsideration. SLU insisted
that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias’ failure to pay the docket fees on time.
When the CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, SLU filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within
the reglementary period, and in reversing the VA decision.
Held:
Yes, Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in
accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the
judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay
to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural
requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees
within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement,
without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been
filed.
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to
provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be
followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as:
Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
6. Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute, 726 SCRA, June 18, 2014
Facts: On February 26, 1996, respondent Southern Luzon Institute (SLI), an educational institution in
Bulan, Sorsogon, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against
petitioners Alonzo Gipa, Imelda Marollano, Juanito Ludovice, Demar Bitangcor, Virgilio Gojit, Felipe
Montalban and four others namely, Arturo Rogacion, Virgilio Gracela, Rosemarie Alvarez and Rosita
Montalban (Rosita). During trial, defendant Rosita executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of her
sister Daisy M. Placer (Placer) authorizing the latter to represent her in the case and to sign any and all
papers in relation thereto.
Finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the property by preponderance of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision in its favor on January 5, 2005.
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted by the RTC in its Order of
January 27, 2005. The CA, however, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution of August 26, 2005 since it
was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. Petitioners and their
co-defendants promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a Certification from
the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of₱3,000.00 under Official Receipt No. 18091130
dated January 25, 2005. In view of this, the CA granted the said motion and consequently reinstated the
appeal through a Resolution dated November 2, 2005. Subsequently, however, the CA further required
petitioners and their codefendants, through a Minute Resolution dated March 1, 2006, to remit within ten
days from notice the amount of ₱30.00 for legal research fund, which apparently was not included in the
₱3,000.00 appeal fee previously paid by them. Copy of the said resolution was received on March
13,2006 by petitioners‘ counsel, Atty. Jose G. Gojar of the Public Attorney‘s Office. Despite the lapse of
nine months from their counsel‘s receipt of the said resolution, petitioners and their co-defendants,
however, failed to comply with the CA‘s directive. Hence, the said court dismissed the appeal through its
Resolution of December 20, 2006. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration
invoking the principle of liberality in the application of technical rules considering that they have paid the
substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount
of ₱30.00. As compliance, they attached to the said motion a postal money order in the sum of ₱30.00
payable to the Clerk of Court of the CA. The CA, however, was not swayed, hence, the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of March 30, 2007.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal for the nonpayment of the ₱30.00.
Held: No. Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and
jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court explained
that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment
of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional.
It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a
decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this
period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full
amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes
final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its
own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and
appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees.
Suffice it to say that “[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.”
Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence
of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. Petitioners‘ failure to advance any
explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same
within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on
the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted. Neither do the cases cited by petitioners help because they
are not in point. Unlike in this case, the CA in Camposagrado no longer required the petitioners therein to
complete the payment of the appeal fee by remitting the ₱5.00 deficiency but just dismissed the appeal
outright. Moreover, a justifiable reason for the insufficient payment was tendered by petitioners in the
said case, i.e., that they relied on the assessment made by the collection officer of the court and honestly
believed that the amount collected from them was that which is mandated by the Rules.
Facts: Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico in 1994 entered into a Contract of Lease covering 5
parcels of agricultural land owned by the latter. Ogsos, Sr. agreed to pay the Heirs 290.95 liquid-kilogram
of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from as lease rental. In, 1996 the lease contract was
extended for 3 more years. On that same year, the said contract was amended, and the lease rental
modified from lkg. centrifugal sugar every crop year to P 150k cash.
Sy-Vargas one of the heirs, filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Ogsos,
before RTC claiming that the lease rentals were not paid. RTC declared Ogsos’ counterclaim as
compulsory; thus holding that the payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary and
ordered Sy to pay Ogsos. CA affirmed RTC.
Issue: WON the CA correctly ruled that respondents’ counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not
permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required.
Held: Permissive. The nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is
required to pay docket fees. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim that
may be filed separately in another case.
By reason of the respondents’ counterclaim being permissive, and not compulsory, Ogsos are required to
pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees,
per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of the counterclaim. While the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, its non-payment at the time
of the filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees
are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud
the government.
Ogsos cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their counterclaim, primarily
because as early 2006, the RTC had already found such counterclaim to be compulsory in nature. As
such, the lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule on their
entitlement
Woodrow B. Camaso signed a contract on July 15, 2014, with TSM Shipping (Phils), Inc., Utkilen, and
Jones Tulod (respondents) to work as a Second Mate on-board the vessel "M/V Golfstraum" for six
months, with a basic monthly salary of US$1,178.00. Prior to this contract, Camaso had been working
with the respondents for nearly five years and had served on eight of their vessels.
In November 2013, Camaso began experiencing a throat obstruction and coughing, which worsened by
February 2014, leading to the development of lymph nodules on his jawline. He requested a medical
check-up while in Amsterdam, where he was initially diagnosed with tonsillar cancer and was
recommended for medical repatriation.
Upon his return to the Philippines on September 8, 2014, Camaso was referred to Dr. Nolasco at St.
Luke's Medical Center, where his diagnosis of tonsillar cancer was confirmed. He underwent
chemotherapy and radiation therapy, all paid for by the respondents. However, the respondents later
refused to continue covering his medical expenses, prompting Camaso to file a complaint for disability
benefits and other claims before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Camaso's favor, awarding him total and permanent disability benefits.
However, the NLRC reversed the LA's decision on appeal, dismissing Camaso's complaint for lack of
merit. Camaso then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari for non-payment of docket fees. Camaso moved for
reconsideration, arguing that a check representing the payment was attached to his petition, but the CA
denied the motion, citing that the payment was made through an unauthorized personal check.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari for non-payment of
docket fees.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Camaso, stating that the petition is meritorious.
The Court explained that while the non-payment of docket fees may render an original action
dismissible, the rule on payment of docket fees may be relaxed under certain circumstances. The
failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in dismissal if the fees are paid within a
reasonable time and there is no intention to defraud the government.
In this case, although the check used for payment was not an authorized mode under the 2009
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA), the attachment of the check showed that Camaso
acted in good faith and did not intend to defraud the government. The Court found that the CA's
assertion that no check was attached was belied by the fact that the check was still stapled to the petition
when examined.
Given these circumstances, the Court deemed it appropriate to relax the rules in the interest of
substantial justice and remanded the case to the CA for resolution on the merits, directing Camaso
to pay the required docket fees within thirty (30) days from notice.
B. - One suit for a single cause of action (Sec. 3, R-2)
Section 3. R2 One suit for a single cause of action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for
a single cause of action. (3a)
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)
-Not allowed as this breeds multiplicity of suits, clogs court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation,
operates as an instrument of harassment, and generates unnecessary burden.
-applied not only to claim but also counterclaim and cross-claim
-If 1st complaint is filed when the second complaint was filed, it shall be dismissed based on lites
pendentia. If 1st complaint has rendered a final judgement, 2nd complaint is dismissed based on res
judicata.
-not automatically second complaint can be subject of dismissal. 1 st may also be a subject based on
judicial discretion and prevailing circumstaces.
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
Dynamic Builders vs. Presbitero, 755 SCRA 90 (2015) No injunction against national govt projects
Indispensable
-Real party of interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
-Subject matter of the suit and the relief sought are so inextricable intertwined with the other
parties that his legal presence as a party is not indispensable to the suit of his interest.
Necessary parties
-Not indispensable but who ought to be joind as a party to the case if complete relief is to be
accorded so as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of action.
REQUISITES:
-Subject matter of the controversy must be of common or general interest to many
persons
-Persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties
-Parties actually before the court are sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully
protect the interest of all concerned
-Rep sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Juana Complex Homeowners Asso. Vs. Fil-Estate, 667 SCRA 440, March, 5 2012
Juana Complex and other neighboring subdivisions instituted a complaint on January 20, 1999
for damages who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road. The complaint alleged that were
regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and
Calamba.
RTC issued TRO ordering Fil-estate for a period of 20 days. RTC then conducted several
hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance. Fil-estate then filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a
class suit.
Fil-estate filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that JCHA failed to satisfy the
requirements for the issuance of WPI. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration filed by fil-estate.
On appeal, CA partially granted the petition, granting the writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby annulled and set aside but the portion of the omnibus denying the motion to dismiss is
upheld. CA also ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as alleged in the
complaint.
Issue:
(1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action? (2) Whether the complaint has been
properly filed as a class suit (3) whether a WPI is warranted.
Held:
(1) The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is
initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that
numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention
to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating
the La Paz Road.
(2) In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their
right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since
they have no clear legal right therein.
Death or Separation of a Party (S-16,17,18, R-3)
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of
his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party,
within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased.
The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. (16a, 17a)
Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. — When a public officer is
a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor
if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the
court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for
continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or
continue to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the
party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable
notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard. (18a)
Section 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to
whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
(20)
Contractual Money Claims (S-20, R-3)
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery of
money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided
in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (21a)
Cases:
1. Relucio vs. Lopez, 373 SCRA 578
-Lopez filed a complaint against her husband and relucio (partner) to assign her as the administrator of
properties with her husband
-She alleged that her husband abandoned her along with her 4 kids.
-She alleged that since her husband has abandoned her, the saidhusband has sold, transferred,
-Relucio filed a motion to dismiss averring that Lopez has no cause of action against her. This was
subsequently dismissed holding that she is a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject
properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez She filed an MR but was subsequently denied.
-She filed an MR with the CA but was also denied.
Issue: W/N Relucio as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication
Ruling: No. Nowhere in the cause of actions and relief sought that relucio is involved. All the cause of
action only involves her husband.
W/N: The complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure of impleading indispensable parties.
Ruling: Solidarity does not make a solidary obligog an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor.
NCC provides that creditor may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously.
ORQUIOLA VS. CA
TOPIC: RULE 3 - Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded
Facts: Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions
of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of Pedro. Pedro sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to
Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided
them into smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including
Orquiola (1964). Sometime in 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint in RTC against Pedro and Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development
Corporation replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in
favor of said corporation. In 1991, RTC finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and
severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff’s land.
Issue: WON the decision in the Civil Case can be enforced against petitioners even though they were not
impleaded thereto
Held: NO, petitioners are not privies (interested in the outcome of the action) and cannot be bound by the
judgment against Lising and his predecessors-in-interests. The Medina doctrine relied upon by the CA is
markedly different from the one before the court. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before
the commencement of Civil Case and petitioners acquired the registered title in their own names.
In other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could
reasonably rely on Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third-
party claim.
Petitionon granted.
David M. David (David), Paragas, and Lobrin established Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia)
in Hong Kong (HK) in 1995. Olympia engaged in selling consumer products to Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) in HK and later became the exclusive general agent in HK of Philam
Plans Inc. (PPI) for pre-need plans. Olympia launched a program called "Pares-Pares," where
subscribers could earn points that would be used for payment of their premiums.
A dispute arose in 2002 when Lobrin discovered that David allegedly failed to remit 30% of the
cash equivalents of the bonus points to PPI. David was then removed as a director of Olympia,
and legal actions followed, including a complaint filed by David against PPI, Lobrin, Paragas,
and others.
David filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint and, along with Lobrin and Datoy, a
Joint Omnibus Motion, presenting a compromise agreement. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
approved the compromise agreement, but Paragas contested the agreement, claiming it was
unauthorized and involved a non-party (Olympia).
The Court of Appeals (CA) later annulled the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement,
leading David to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the July
21, 2003 RTC Order, despite Paragas’s petition being limited to the September 30,
2003 RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.
2. Whether the CA erred in annulling the compromise agreement, particularly on the
grounds that Olympia, a non-party to the case, was involved in the agreement.
3. Whether David was denied due process when the CA annulled the compromise
agreement based on allegedly unsubstantiated allegations by Paragas.
Ruling:
1. Jurisdiction of the CA: The Supreme Court held that the CA did not exceed its
jurisdiction. Although Paragas’s petition specifically questioned the RTC’s September
30, 2003 Order, the resolution of the motion for reconsideration inherently involved
reviewing the RTC's July 21, 2003 Order. Thus, the CA was within its authority to
address and modify the earlier order.
2. Validity of the Compromise Agreement: The Supreme Court agreed with the CA’s
decision to annul the compromise agreement. The agreement involved Olympia, a non-
party to the case, which made it invalid as a basis for dismissing the complaint and
counterclaims. Additionally, the RTC had no authority to approve the agreement since
Olympia’s participation was indispensable to the resolution of the controversy, and there
was no sufficient proof that Olympia authorized the agreement.
3. Due Process: The Supreme Court found no denial of due process. The CA’s decision
was based on an analysis of the records and the circumstances surrounding the
compromise agreement, not merely on unsubstantiated allegations by Paragas. Therefore,
the annulment of the compromise agreement was upheld.
Facts:
1. Background:
o Pedro Joaquin filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership,
cancellation of title, and damages against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Joaquin claimed he executed a Deed
of Sale with petitioners to secure a ₱9,000 loan, which was actually an equitable
mortgage. He sought to repurchase the land under the agreement.
o The RTC ruled in favor of Joaquin, declaring the transaction a sale with a right of
repurchase, and ordered the petitioners to reconvey the land to Joaquin upon
payment.
Issues:
Ruling:
1. Jurisdiction:
o The Supreme Court ruled that noncompliance or belated formal compliance with
the substitution of parties does not necessarily invalidate the decision if due
process is satisfied. In this case, the legal representatives of Joaquin voluntarily
appeared and participated in the case, which negated any claims of a violation of
due process. Hence, the RTC retained jurisdiction despite the delay in formal
substitution.
2. Forum Shopping:
o The Court found that petitioners failed to prove forum shopping or res judicata.
The claim of an earlier case was not sufficiently supported with details showing
identity of parties, subject matter, or cause of action. Without clear evidence of
the earlier case’s merits or its similarity to the current case, the Court did not find
forum shopping.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court denied the Petition and affirmed the CA’s decision and resolution,
upholding the RTC’s ruling and rejecting claims of jurisdictional issues and forum
shopping.
10. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1
11. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87
12. Enrique vda de Santiago vs. Vilar, 857 SCRA (2017)
n this case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in
impleading Antonio Vilar as party-plaintiff in substitution of Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago,
who was the rightful party-plaintiff in the action for reconveyance against the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Facts
1. Background: The case involves the reconveyance of certain excluded lots that were
erroneously included in a foreclosure sale by GSIS. The original action was filed by
Eduardo Santiago (Eduardo), who was later substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez
Vda. de Santiago (Rosario), after Eduardo's death.
2. Trial Court Decision: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Rosario,
ordering GSIS to reconvey the excluded lots or pay their market value. This decision was
affirmed by the CA and became final and executory in 2003.
3. Execution and Disputes: Issues arose regarding the implementation of the writ of
execution. GSIS challenged the RTC's orders, and the CA modified certain aspects of the
execution process. Rosario's counsel, Atty. Jose A. Suing, also contested the attorney's
fees awarded.
4. Vilar's Involvement: Antonio Vilar claimed rights to the judgment proceeds based on
assignments he purportedly received from Eduardo and Rosario. Vilar filed a motion to
be substituted as party-plaintiff, which the RTC did not act on. Vilar’s petition was
granted by the CA, which led to the substitution of Rosario by Vilar.
Issues
1. Indispensable Party: The primary issue was whether Rosario, as the original party-
plaintiff, was an indispensable party to the proceedings concerning the implementation of
the writ of execution.
2. Validity of Substitution: Whether Vilar’s substitution was valid, considering Rosario’s
status and the purported assignments of rights.
Ruling
1. Indispensable Party: The Supreme Court ruled that Rosario was indeed an indispensable
party. The CA’s failure to implead Rosario in the proceedings deprived her of her right to
due process. The CA’s decisions affecting Rosario’s rights, including the substitution by
Vilar, were deemed null and void.
2. Invalid Substitution: The Court found that the CA’s basis for substituting Vilar was
unfounded, particularly given the belated nature of the deeds of assignment. These
assignments were dismissed by the Court in a prior decision, making Vilar's claim to
substitute Rosario invalid.
3. Reinstatement of RTC Orders: The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the CA's
decisions, reinstating the RTC's order from December 8, 2010, which had been
previously altered by the CA. The reinstated order required the enforcement of the
judgment award as originally decreed.
Conclusion
The Court granted the petitions filed by Rosario and GSIS, reversing the CA’s decisions and
nullifying Vilar’s substitution. The case highlighted the importance of ensuring all indispensable
parties are involved in legal proceedings, particularly when their rights and interests are at stake.
Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff. (2[b]a)
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any of the defendants does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of
said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court
Cases:
1. Pacific Consultants International Asia vs. Schonfeld - 516 SCRA
-respondent is a Canadian citizen who was employed by a company in the Philippines with a partner
japanes
-Terminated the employment contract since the PCIJ and PPI were not successful in the water and
sanitation sector in the PH.
Sometime from 1996 to 1998, Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB). To secure the loans, he mortgaged certain property in favor
of the bank. He was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans obtained in 1998 which
amounted to more than a million pesos. Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure against the
spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by the trial judge. The Sherriff served the summons to Ernesto at
the latter's office. No summons was served to Teresa.
Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa because she was not aware sans the summons
being served her). The case was heard ex-parte and the spouses were ordered to satisfy the debt and
failure to do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property.
Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+
debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued against the personal properties of Teresa to
satisfy the deficiency.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to have
the judgment annulled as she now claims that she was deprived of due process when she did not receive
summons; that it was only her husband who received the summons; that there was extrinsic fraud because
her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure proceeding.
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresa's participation is not
required so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in the case at bar;
that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in her case because she is a
co-defendant of Ernesto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for lack of
jurisdiction over her person.
HELD: Yes.
It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem proceeding and that the presence of Teresa is not
required because the trial court was able to acquire jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged property).
However, her constitutional right to due process is superior over the procedural matters mentioned. Her
right to due process was violated when she did not receive summons. Teresa, as a resident defendant, who
does not voluntary appear in court must be personally served with summons as provided under Section 6,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential
in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband's office
cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve
summons upon her but that such efforts failed. Further, the order of the trial court compelling Teresa to
pay off the debt using her personal property is a judgment in personam which the court cannot do because
it only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of Teresa.
3. BPI Savings Bank vs. Sps. Yujuico – 763 SCRA 486 (7/2015)
Facts: On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the
expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent
Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261331
and TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
On June 30, 2000, the Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the
five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory on January 28,
2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment on March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently
filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but
the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’
loan. After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest
bidder at ₱10, 000, 000.00. Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18, 522155.42, the petitioner sued the
respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents
moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that
the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or
extinguished. In the reply, respondents objected and alleged that the venue is improper.
Issues: Whether or not improper venue as a ground for objection maybe raised at anytime?
Whether or not a claim for deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure is a real action?
Held: No. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is
meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other
words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the
improper venue.
No. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court
and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may
include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action
is considered a transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
4. Planters Dev. Bank vs. Ramos, 840 SCRA (2017)
Action is commenced upon the filing of complaint. Aside from actual filing, aside from filing
what does the petitioner need to do?
After the foreclosure sale the RTC ordered the execution of real properties of Biacio. That
action removed it from being the ambit of quasi in rem. The recovery of the recovered amount
it is already converted to action in personam. Since the summon is not served upon mrs. Biaco,
no jurisdiction over her person. Thus, the RTC cant execute the action since no jurisdiction.
That is why it is important. Because if In rem and Quasi In rem, no need to acquire the
jurisdiction of the defendant. To satisfy the requirement of due process.
If in personam, need to acquire the jurisdiction over the person.
“the order of the trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using
her personal property is a judgment in personam which the court cannot
do because it only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the
person of Teresa.”
-A entered (di na note ang facts) loan agreements with b A creditor B debtor. Amount 1million
pesos each.
Mr B failed to pay the amounts for the loan agreement. Mr A asked whther a single action
arising from 3 agreement.
---joinder of action.
If a asked 3 separate complaints arising from 3 different loan agreements. What will you tell?
Joinder of action is permissive. It is up to the litigant whther to combine or the the causes of
action
-A entered (di na note ang facts) loan agreements with b A creditor B debtor. Amount 1million
pesos each. 4th loan agreement real estate mortgage. B failed to pay all 4.
Mr A asked if he can file collection of 3 loan agreement with 4 foreclosure of mortgage.
-allowed to join the 4 causes of action? Action of foreclosure of mortgage is governed by rule
68 Rule 62-71 special civil action
If Mr insisted to join the causes of action and filed it with the RTC. Can Mr. B filed a motion
to dismiss?
IT is not a ground for dismissal but the defendant can file a motion to sever the joinder of
cause of action. The court can also order the severance of court of action. It is subject to
waiver. If defendant did not issue, or court did not notice the effect?if the mortgage value
assessed not exceed 400k.
The RTC May not render a valid judgement.
-This is another requisite. When the claim is principally for the recovery of money? The test of
jurisdiction is total amount of money.
-Since 3 M it falls in the RTC.
-Remember RTC threshold is 2M and above.
-A entered loan agreement b=2M, C=2M, D=2M. Single case for those 3 agreements.
-Joinder of parties--- Requirement if there are multiple defendants.
-For a proper joinder of causes of action must comply to the joinder of parties.
-Can only be joined if
where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in
the action;
-Cannot joined. Because under Rule 3- joinder there should be a common question of law or
fact among plaintiffs or defendant.
-Cause of action must arise on the same transaction or series of transaction.
-in the example, different transactions and separate from each other. NO propert joinder and
Thus, the causes of action should not be joined.
Parties
-Natural, juridical, or persons authorized by law(Labor union, estate, not a juridical but for
purpose of filing cases they are allowed)
Held:
Failure of petitioners to implead 7J as indispensable party CA did not acquire jurisdiction over
7J
Indispensable party is different from the real party of interest-
Indispensable party- -Real party of interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action
Absence of indispensable party the decision of the court shall be null and void. Not only to the
absent parties but to the presence.
-Absence cannot bind the indispensable party.
-The whole decision of the CA is null and void for failure to be impleaded.
-
If spouses, is it okay if you just implead the husband?
-Generally, implead both husband and wife. There is an exception provided by law.
-If the property relation is complete separation, then only the relevant parties shall be included.
-In an action for partition are all the co-owners are indispensable parties?
“In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless
it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially
settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition. Until and unless
this issue of co-ownership is resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties.
In the current case, while Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr.,
as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the
subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be
determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested
interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint. The
absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial
partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.”
What if, X, Y, Z own a parcel of land and now Mr A forcibly entered the property of X,Y,Z. Is
it required that all the co-owners be made parties if they want to sue Mr A.
-No.
Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1
-SC ruled that kahit isa lang sa co-owners can institute an action for recovery without joining
other co-owners.
-SC said that co-ownership may bring actions to recover the co-owned properties without
necessarily including the other co-owners. The suit is presumed to have been brought on
behalf of co-owners.
Continuation parties, venue, until rule 8.
Rule 3,4,5 and Rule 8.
GGH land ang number to sa quiz.
Definition:
Small claims cases are civil actions for the payment or reimbursement of a sum of money where the
amount involved does not exceed a certain threshold.
Key Points:
Amount of Claim: As of the latest amendment under the Revised Rules on Small Claims Cases
(A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC), the jurisdictional amount for small claims cases in the first-level courts
(Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, etc.) is up to ₱1,000,000.00.
Nature of Claims: The small claims process is applicable to the following:
o Money claims arising from contracts of loan, services, sale, or mortgage.
o The enforcement of a promissory note or other contracts.
o Cases for payment of money involving purely civil aspects of disputes.
No Lawyers: Parties are not allowed to be represented by lawyers during hearings, although they
can consult one beforehand.
Expedited Process: The process is simplified and expedited, with no formal pleadings like
motions or memoranda allowed.
Finality of Judgment: Decisions in small claims cases are immediately final and executory, with
no appeal.
2. Summary Procedure:
Definition:
The summary procedure is a streamlined process designed to expedite the resolution of certain cases
without the need for a full-blown trial.
Key Points:
Applicable Cases: The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure apply to the following:
o For Civil Cases:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases (ejectment cases), regardless of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought.
Cases involving the enforcement of civil obligations where the amount of the
claim does not exceed ₱2,000,000.00 (for first-level courts outside Metro
Manila) or ₱3,000,000.00 (for first-level courts within Metro Manila).
o For Criminal Cases:
Offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not
exceeding ₱50,000.00.
Violations of city or municipal ordinances, except when the penalty is
imprisonment exceeding one year or a fine exceeding ₱50,000.00.
Offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence.
No Formal Trial: The summary procedure eliminates the need for a formal trial and speeds up
the resolution of cases through affidavits, position papers, and other documentary evidence.
No Preliminary Investigation: In criminal cases under summary procedure, there is no
preliminary investigation.
Limited Appeal: While there is a right to appeal, the procedures and grounds are more limited
compared to regular cases.
How to Determine:
Summary:
Case:
A.L. Ang Network Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA (1/28/14)
- A.M. 08-8-7 has further increased the jurisdiction amounts (1M – 2M)
(b) All civil actions, except probate proceedings, admiralty and maritime actions, and small claims cases
falling under Rule IV hereof, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed Two Million
Pesos (₱2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
(c) Complaints for damages where the claim does not exceed Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00),
exclusive of interest and costs.
(d) Cases for enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration awards where the
money claim exceeds One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been enforced
by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the settlement or date of receipt of the award or
from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and demandable,
pursuant to Section 417, Chapter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991.
(e) Cases solely for the revival of judgment of any Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court.
The civil aspect of a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), if no criminal
action has been instituted therefor. Should a criminal action be later instituted for the same violation, the
civil aspect shall be consolidated with the criminal action and shall be tried and decided jointly under the
Rule on Summary Procedure. All other cases not included herein shall be governed by the regular rules of
procedure
Small Claims Cases, as defined hereunder, where the claim does not exceed One Million Pesos
(₱1,000,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.
(b) The enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration awards, where the
money claim does not exceed One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been
enforced by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the settlement or date of receipt of the
award or from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and
demandable, pursuant to Section 417, Chapter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991.
Cases:
Cases:
The Board of Investments (BOI), a government agency attached to the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), is responsible for promoting investments in the Philippines. SR Metals, Inc.
(SRMI), a corporation engaged in mining in Tubay, Agusan Del Norte, applied for registration
as a new producer of beneficiated nickel ore. The BOI approved SRMI's application and granted
an Income Tax Holiday (ITH) incentive for 2008 to 2012.
However, in 2010, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubay issued a resolution requesting the
cancellation of SRMI's BOI registration, claiming that SRMI was not a manufacturer or
processor as it claimed but was instead engaged in direct shipping of unprocessed ore. The BOI
later withdrew SRMI's ITH incentive, citing SRMI's failure to comply with specific project
requirements, including the establishment of a beneficiation plant and new investment in fixed
assets.
SRMI challenged this decision before the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in favor of SRMI,
stating that the company was entitled to the ITH incentive and that the BOI had violated due
process in withdrawing the incentive.
Court's Ruling:
1. Due Process: The Supreme Court found that although there were procedural lapses,
SRMI was essentially afforded due process because it was informed of the allegations
and given an opportunity to respond.
2. ITH Incentive Entitlement: The Court upheld the CA's decision that SRMI was entitled
to the ITH incentive. It found that the BOI's withdrawal of the incentive was not
supported by the law or evidence. The Court ruled that the BOI erred in its decision to
withdraw the ITH incentive based on SRMI's alleged failure to establish a beneficiation
plant and infuse new investments in fixed assets.
3. Authority of the Officer-in-Charge (OIC): The Court also addressed a procedural issue
raised by SRMI regarding the authority of the BOI's OIC to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. The Court found that the OIC was indeed authorized
to sign these documents, as it was part of her duties to protect the government's interests.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court denied the BOI's petition and upheld the CA's decision, which annulled and
set aside the BOI's resolutions withdrawing SRMI's ITH incentive. The Court emphasized the
importance of following procedural rules while ensuring that justice is served by not rigidly
applying rules if it would lead to an unjust outcome.
9. Heirs of Josefina Gabriel vs. Segundina Cebrero, Nov. 12, 2018
Cases:
1. Fernando Medical Enterprises vs. Wesleyan University 781 SCRA 508, January 20, 2016
Facts:
3. Respondent’s Objections:
o On May 27, 2009, the Respondent claimed the contracts were defective and
rescissible and rejected the February 11, 2009 agreement, arguing it lacked board
approval and was signed by an expired officer.
o The Respondent also filed a complaint for rescission in the RTC Cabanatuan City,
arguing that the contracts were voidable due to defects and overpayments.
4. Petitioner's Complaint:
o The Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money in the RTC Manila on July 6,
2009, demanding the balance of PHP 54,654,195.54. The complaint included
allegations about the agreements and the default in payment by the Respondent.
Issues Raised:
2. Respondent’s Answer:
o The Respondent’s answer admitted some facts but denied others, particularly the
balance due, citing lack of knowledge or information, and raised several
affirmative defenses including lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, litis
pendencia, and forum shopping.
The RTC Manila denied the Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
November 23, 2011. The court found that issues were raised by the Respondent’s answer
and that the matter should proceed to pre-trial rather than being decided on the pleadings
alone.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s denial of the motion. The CA noted that
the Respondent had admitted the contracts and the February 11, 2009 agreement but
subjected these admissions to its special and affirmative defenses.
The CA found that factual issues remained, particularly concerning the outstanding
balance, as the Respondent’s complaint for rescission and other defenses raised contested
facts that required trial for resolution.
The Supreme Court ruled that the CA committed reversible error. The Court held that:
o Judgment on the Pleadings: The essential criterion for a judgment on the
pleadings is whether the pleadings tender an issue of fact. Since the Respondent’s
admissions in its answer included critical material allegations, such as the
existence of contracts and the amount of liability, the Petitioner was entitled to
judgment based on the pleadings.
o Effective Denials: The Respondent’s denials based on lack of knowledge or
information for material facts clearly known or easily ascertainable were deemed
ineffective. Thus, these did not raise valid issues of fact.
o Relevance of Other Pleadings: The trial court’s consideration of pleadings in
other cases (e.g., the rescission case) was incorrect. The determination of a motion
for judgment on the pleadings should rely solely on the answer filed in the case at
hand.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found that the Respondent’s answer did not properly contest the
material allegations in the complaint and that the trial court should have granted the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court emphasized that when material
allegations are admitted or inadequately denied, and no valid issues are raised, a
judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.
2. Go Tong Electrical Supply vs. BPI Family Savings Bank 760 RA 486
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the Court of Appeals' decision on June 30, 1994,
and its resolution on September 29, 1994, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149. The RTC had dismissed the complaints filed by petitioner
Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) against private respondents Seawood Shipping, Inc.
(Seawood Shipping) and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd. (Switzerland Insurance).
On November 29, 1985, Benguet filed a complaint for damages against Seawood Shipping in the
RTC of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 12394. On March 4, 1986, Benguet filed another
complaint for damages against Switzerland Insurance, docketed as Civil Case No. 13085. The
two cases were consolidated, and Switzerland Insurance filed a third-party complaint against
Seawood Shipping for indemnity.
The cases were jointly tried, and Benguet presented two witnesses, Rogelio Lumibao and
Ernesto Cayabyab, both employees of Benguet.
On cross-examination, Lumibao admitted that he did not witness the actual loading of the cargo
at Poro Point, nor was he present when the cargo was unloaded in Japan. His knowledge was
based solely on the bill of lading and the draft survey report. He also confirmed that he was not
involved in the preparation of the bill of lading, the weighing, or the shipment of the cargo.
Ernesto Cayabyab, a secretary of Benguet, testified that he was present during the loading of
the copper concentrates at Poro Point. He identified several documents, including the Certificate
of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and Mate's Receipt, which indicated that 2,243.496 wet metric
tons of copper concentrates were loaded onto the vessel. However, during cross-examination,
Cayabyab admitted that he was not always present during the loading process and could not
confirm if any spillage occurred.
Switzerland Insurance presented three witnesses: Eduardo Pantoja, Anastacio Fabian, and
Edgardo Diño.
Eduardo Pantoja, assistant branch manager of Switzerland Insurance, testified that the marine
insurance policy was based on the information provided by Benguet, under the principle of
uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith). The policy included a specific condition that the vessel be
equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead, which was later found to be absent on the vessel
Sangkulirang No. 3. This led Switzerland Insurance to cancel the policy and refund the premium
paid by Benguet.
Anastacio Fabian, marine manager of Certified Adjusters, Inc., testified that during his
investigation, he discovered that the vessel did not have a steel centerline bulkhead. He also
suggested that the shortage might have been caused by the evaporation of moisture during the
voyage.
Edgardo Diño, president and general manager of Certified Adjusters, Inc., confirmed that the
vessel lacked a steel centerline bulkhead and expressed doubt that the shortage could be
attributed solely to the evaporation of moisture.
The RTC dismissed Benguet's complaint, finding that Benguet failed to prove the actual weight
of the copper concentrates loaded onto the vessel and the alleged shortage. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC's decision.
Petitioner's Arguments on Appeal
Benguet contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that it failed to establish the loss or
shortage of the cargo. Benguet argues that the documentary evidence, including the bill of
lading, Certificate of Weight, and Mate's Receipt, creates a prima facie presumption that
2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded onto the vessel, and that the Draft
Survey Report proves the shortage.
The Supreme Court emphasized that only questions of law may be raised on appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor, is in a
better position to assess their credibility. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
In this case, the Court found no basis to overturn the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. Benguet failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the actual weight
of the copper concentrates loaded onto the vessel was 2,243.496 wet metric tons and that there
was a shortage of 355 metric tons upon unloading in Japan. The testimonies of Benguet's own
witnesses revealed that they were not present during the critical stages of the loading and
unloading process and lacked firsthand knowledge of the events.
Conclusion
The petition for review on certiorari was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed. The findings of the lower courts were upheld, as they were supported by the evidence
on record and not based on a misapprehension of facts.
-If defendant naman--- pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
Elements of cause of action 1) right, 2) obligation to respect the right 3) actions that violated.
Violated right—plaintiff
One being sued—defendant
In a counter-claim, the defendant becomes the plaintiff and plaintiff becomes the defendant
3 kinds of parties
-Real party in interest
-indispensable
-Necessary
-Why necessary? Every civil action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of a real party
in interest
-If the action is not filed by the real party in interest, remedy? Before, ground for motion to
dismiss. But now, it can be an affirmative defense(section 12(4), Rule 8).
Indispensable party
-A RPI without whom no final determination be had of an action
-Mandatory to include. Without the presence of indispensable party.
Ex: Partittion suit. All co-owners are indispensable- because all has distinct share to the party.
- Action for the recovery of land against defendant, who is a tenant of a 3-rd party who claims
ownership, the 3rd party is an indispensable party.
-In an action for annulment of title over a lot, the registered owner of the lot is an
indispensable party.
-After finality of judgement- amendment nor intervention is no longer- the judgement is null
and void
-The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
In action to recover a co-owned property, are all the owners indispensable parties.
-No. In co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property
without the necessity of joining all the co-owners as co-plaintiff because the suit is presumed
to have been filed for the benefit of co-owners.
-The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
Necessary party
-A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined.
Ex.
The principal debtor is merely necessary. If loan is secure by surety and principal debtor is
solidary.
In loan agreement, a,b,c d– 400k loan joint obligation. Distinct ang loans nila. Each joint
obligor is a necessary party. Because you need to consider the necessary party for the full
settlement of the loan.
Ex. There is a parcel of land. 3 hectares. Pwede isangla or mortgage many times. If you are the
first mortgagee, at may action for closure of mortgage. If maraming naka mortgage, yung iba
junior mortgagees. Sila necessary lang
-The pleader shall state his name, if known, and state why he is omitted.
-If the court finds that the reason for the omission us unmeritorious, the court may order the
inclusion of the omitted necessary party (condition if jurisdiction
-Failure to comply with the order without justifiable cause: Waiver of the claim over such
necessary party.
Representatives
-Include the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case--- the real party in interest
-May be trustee of an exper trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by or the rules.
Executor or administrator may filed recovery of property in behalf of the estate who died.
Spouses
-Husband and wife shall be sue or be sued jointly
-EXpn: provided by law
Ex: property recovered by the wife. If separation ang property regime, no need to implead the
husband since it is complete separation
Permissive joinder of parties; Requisites (required for joinder of proper sources of action
-Right to relief arises out of the same transactions or series of transactions
-There is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants
-Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provision
Sa plaintiff
Ex. A, B and c are owners of adjoining houses. X is a driver of gasoline tanker. X struck
Meralco post resulting to explosion. Burning house.
Can they file together against X?
Yes- because the damage or injury to D occurs from one incidence. There is a common
question of fact or law. Can filed O and P to be joined.
Ex:
Juana Complex Homeowners Asso. Vs. Fil-Estate, 667 SCRA 440, March, 5 2012
-
The developer closed a road which were used by the residents of inland subdv for entry and
exit to SLEX. Some of the residents filed a class suit against the developer. Is class suit
proper?
Yes. The suit is clearly on that benefits all commuters and motorist who use the road. They
have common interest on the subject matter of the controversy which is the closure of road.
Unwilling co-plaintiff
Ex. A and B are spouses. A and B bought a condominium unit from X. However, it turned out
that the unit was heavily damaged. A now wants to file an action for recission of contract
against X. X and B friend, does not want to join A. What A should do?
-B can be unwilling plaintiff.If the consent of the party (Section 10, Rule 3)
-Alternative defendant (If di sure sino sa defendants an liable talaga. He can sue as many
defendants as possible
Ex. Multiple cars collision. Di siya sure kung si X, or Z. He can make alternative X,Y, Z
Death of a party
-A filed a complaint for recovery of property. During the pendency of the case B died. What is
the duty of B’s counsel?
-A filed an action for support against B. (action that does not survive)
Death of a party
=The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the couty may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
-The court may procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased
-Dahil sila ang cousel ng government. They are expected to defend the validity of ordinance
etc.
-Ex.
Venue
-In civil cases, it is procedural matter and not jurisdictional, as compare to criminal cases,
where the venue is jurisdictional.
-Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought…….
-General rule:
-Venue of real action
-Actions affecting title to or possession of real property…
-Forcible entry and unlawful detainer…..
Ex. MR a taga manila. Tapos defendant Mindanao. Siyempre manila ilalagay ni plaintif.
For corporation
-Place of principal office not the branch office
-A 3rd-party complaint is ancillart to the main case. Thus, a third-party complaint has to yield
to the jurisdiction and venue of the main action
-Kahit na taga Visayas or Mindanao ang iba, di madedeprive ang court ng main action.
Kung ano pinili ng plaintiff.
-Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof
-Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule,
-in the absence of qualifying or restrictive word, provided in the contract shall be additional
forum.
Qualifying or restrictive words: Only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save,
particulary, nowhere else but/except
Planter DB v Ramos
-Bank invoked the loan agreement Which pertains to the exclusion of all other venue but only
to the court/s of makati
-SC Held that the stipulation is restrictive. Because it has the word “Exclusively”. Action may
only be brought to the courts of makati
-Kaso annulment ay real estate mortgage, kaya dapat di dapat ito iapply according to the SPS
Ramos. SC held that this should not be applied. Real estate mortgage is illegal or immoral
there is nothing to do with consent regarding venue. Even though they are trying to seek the
annulment of real estate mortgage, since they agree on the stipulation on venue, even if your
complaint is on annulment of real estate mortgage since the validity is not in question but only
due to the illegality of high interest rate, stipulation shall be upheld. Case was dismissed. Note:
This was decided before the effectivity of amended rules. It can only be regarded as
affirmative defense
-It is different if a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself
should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed
in accordance with the general rules on the venue. (Example: consent was obtained through
fraud, vitatiated consent-don’t apply the exluc)
For matter that are not covered by small claims and summary procedure.
Claims of a party:
1. Complaint, counterclaim’
2. Cross-claim
3. 3rd party claim
Complaint-
-The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff’s or claiming party’s cause of ……….
-Importance of the allegations in the complaint: Allegations of the complaint determine the
nature of the cause of action and the body or court which has jurisdiction over the action.
If action it is action incapable of pecuniary estimation then RTC but pag Nakita sa
complaint…
Pag negative deny ang statement sa complaint. But should be in the form of specific denial.
Pag general ito ay macoconsider na admission. Allegation sa complaint ay i-aadmit.
Pag
B obtained loan of 3M – Dec 2023 obtained.
Negative defense- di ako nag obtain in dec 2023
Affirmative- oo nag loan ako pero pleading a new matter that will absolve. Nangutang pero
binayaran na.
Statute of limitation or prescription ay example ng affirmative defense.
Partial denial
-Made when the defendant does not make a total deniel of the material allegations….
Ex. On this particular day pumunsa ng US si A. Then pwede mag sabi na walang knowledge
or information sufficient
Negative pregnant
-A negative pregnant does not qualift as a specific denial. It is concealed to be actually an
admission. It refers to a denial which implies its affirmative opposite by seeming to deny only
a qualification or an incidental aspect
Republic V Sandiganbayan
-22. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 23….
SC said that the tenor of this denial is in the form of negative pregnant.
-The only deny the manner of acquisition of the property and sum of money but the effect is
that the allegation of PCGG on the presence of overseas bank then it is
Affirmative defense:
-Fraud
-Statute of limitations
-release
-payment
-illegality
-estoppel, former recovery
-Dischage in ba
Affirmative dismissal.
-Lack of personal
-Improper venue
-Lack of legal capacity to sue
-
Counterclaim
-is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
-A counterclaim may either be compulsory counterclaim or a permissive counterclaim.
Compulsary Counterclaim
-it arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim
-It does not require for its adjudication the presence of 3rd parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction
-It must be within the jurisdiction of the court both amount and nature, EXpn: that in a original
action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the
amount.
Ex. A employer filed action B employee: Employee cannot file a counter claim for illegal
dismissal. Dahil di ito cognizable sa court.
Ex.
-A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same action is barred, unless otherwise allowed
by these rules.
Ex. A filed complaint against B for 3M- B counterclaim suffered damage as a result of
premature filing. If B failed to file a compulsary counterclaim, then he can no longer file a
second complaint. Expn if allowed by the rules
Cross-claim
-A cross-claim is any claim by one party against against a co-party…….
Counterclaim v cross-claim
Counterclaim Cross-claim
Opposing Co-party
Third-party complaint
-A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may
-Ex the issurance company wants to run after the party who caused the vehicular collision. Ex.
Mr y ang owner, insurance company may file a 3rd party complaint against Mr. Y.
Court renders a judgement favorable to the plaintiff, the insurance company can reimburse that
amount to Mr. Y.
There should be a prior leave of court. Seek permission of leave of court. There must be an
approval from the court.
Ans. Not allowed. Claim of A against X will raise other issue other than the complaint of the
bank against A. The only issue is may utang ba at di ba nakabayad? If the court allowed, then
new issue will arise, nature of agreement? Liability of X to the loss or wreckage? It would
introduce new and separate controversy into the action.
The plaintiff may file a reply only if the defending party attaches an actionable document to
his or her answer.
A reply is a pleading, the office, or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or
avoi
Ex. Contract of loan. Contract of loan is the basis for a complaint for a sum of money. Real
estate mortgage. If the basis of action for the petition of foreclosure of mortgage.
If you want to deny this, specific denial under oath.
Rejoinder
-In the event of an actionalble document attached to the reply, the defendant may file a
rejoinder if the same is based solely on a actionalble document.
-Lawyer or law firm cannot pass on the monetary penalty to the client
Verification
-Generally, pleadings not required to be verified. Unless required specifically.
-All pleadings for ROSP-
-Pleading for Corp rehab
-Initiatory pleadning- verified
-If nag reply because want to deny the genuineness of actional document—need to be verified
-Contents of verification
-May be signed by party, his lawyer or his representative, or any person who personally knows
the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading. If made by a person other than the party, such per
Rule 7: Parts and contents of a pleading
Verification
The signature of the affiant shall futher serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the
allegations in the pleading.
If unsigned ang pleading- court cannot act open on the assigned pleading
Some personnel not required to attach CAFS since they have knowledge if the corp has
commenced other action.
Until rule 13.
Memorize until rule 39.
Bring
X. RULE 13: Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
(Sections 1-19)
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means
of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can
be justified under the third mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.8 Moreover, there are several
reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons
on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not
made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, §17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by
the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial
court as required also in Rule 14, §17. As provided in §19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte
was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after
notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the
period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the
period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her
attorney-infact. Although she wrote private res- pondent's attorney that "all communications" intended for
her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latter's address in Manila, no power
of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven
months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the
negotiations between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the
property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of correspondence was carried
on by counsel for the parties. But the authority given to petitioner's husband in these negotiations
certainly cannot be construed as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.
3. Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp., vs Tan- 326 SCRA (doctrine of substantial compliance not
applicable [old ang doctrine of substantial compliance hindi na applicable under new rules and
per Manotoc v CA])
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby,
the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, A13 requires
that service of summons be made upon the corporationas president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors. The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued
as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal
papers received by him
.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, A13 is exclusive and that service of summons upon one who is not
enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving
summons on persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule 14, A13,
if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation, there is substantial compliance with
the rule as its purpose has been attained.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the application of the doctrine of
substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring
possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or
the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom
the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose
of the rule on service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third, the appellate
court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the
summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the
summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there
was direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through
the person upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual receipt
of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For
there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be
shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some
person or means other than the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly
true in the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was
effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd
Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation orpartnership is now
limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The rule now states "general
manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase
"agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
Question to ask: Bakit di nag assume ng jurisdiction dahil late filing. Contrary to provision.
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the
court may order. (emphasis supplied) Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons
despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner
was properly served with summons by publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that
substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to
which the rule was applicable.10 Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule
to in rem actions only.11
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem.12
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19,13 Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court simply speaks of the following:… an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons
and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail
to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal
clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons.
The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the
deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to
the defendant by registered mail to his last known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of
court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to
make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted
service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. A review of
the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes,
Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of
Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the
United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were
undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process
server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of
Summons is reproduced as follows:
"That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon
were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is
somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted
service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court."
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either
the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best,
the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the
details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.
The necessity of stating in the process server's Return or Proof of Service the material facts and
circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton
v.Levy, from which we quote:
"x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in
the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal
service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made.
Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders
said service ineffective."
Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of noncompliance with
the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed in Madrigal v.Court of Appeals as follows:
"In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment
of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards
personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons
must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is
essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted
service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds."
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service. The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that
the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party."23 Under the Rules,
the service of summons has no set period.
However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the
latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed.24 What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal
service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more
than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
"reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court
to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the
issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant. Sheriffs
are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try
their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to
try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in
serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is
only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service.25 The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in
detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though
futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on
Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure.26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such
efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be
the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
-nullity of marriage
-used the manotoc ruling on the service of summons over persons. Laid out the requirement for
substituted summons.
“The server's return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process
server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general
statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of
summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying
reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to
locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the
summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted
service.
The server's return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of
petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient
age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the competence of the
security officer to receive the summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to
uphold the CA's denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly,
the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void”
9. Domagas vs. Jensen – 448 SCRA 663
10. Dole Phil. Vs. Quilala – 557 SCRA 433
11. Green Star Express v. Nissin Universal Robina Corp – 761 SCRA
12. Guy vs. Gacott – 780 SCRA 579 (1/13/16)
13. G.V. Florida Transit Inc. vs. Tiara Commercial Corporation
842 SCRA, October 18, 2017
14. Arrieta vs. Arrieta, 866 SCRA 140, Nov. 19, 2018 On
voluntary appearance:
1. Sunrise Garden Corp. vs. CA – 771 SCRA 616
2. Tujan-Militante vs. Nustad, 827 SCRA (2017)
Comment: what doctrines/principles in the above cases have been abandoned,
modified, retained and incorporated in the amended rules?
September 9, 2024
If fraud- state the particular circumstance that constitute the fraud. But as to intent, it can be
stated in a general manner
AM--- filing should be filed by electronic mail. Starting sept 1, 2024. By dec 1, 2024—the
primary manner of filing and service is through electronic filing. Expn: initiatory pleading
personal filing.
When is considered the date of filing if the filing is done by personal filing?
Ans. Date of submission to the court.
Registered mail- upon receipt of the court
.
Palileo vs. Planters Dev. Bank – 738 SCRA – decided under old rules. Dati walang accredited
courier sa rules. Kung kelan nareceive ng court.
But under the amended rules sa 2019—kung kelan na nag mail ang date ng filing.
Under the old rules walang accredited courier as a mode of filing.
Sab isa rules it is the date of mailing which is considered the date of filing.
Dec 1, 2024, email na ang mode of service. I-copy raw ang email ng other party. Di ito
covered by initiatory pleading.
Pag order ng court how this can be sent to the party litigant? Registered mail.
Can the court send the orders through LBC? Under rule 13, yes. In expense ng party litigants
Under AM … , through email na rin ang orders ng court. Expn: Pag galing sa court ang orders
expn: Summons.
How the party prove that they serve a pre-trial brief to the opposing counsel?
-need i-attach sa affidavit of service and tracking receipt(original dapat).
-What if it was done through registered mail? Affidavit of service.
Fortune Life Ins. Co. Inc. vs. COA 845 SCRA 599, Nov. 21, 2017
-Nag filed ng petition nag Provided proof of service: a) affidavit of person who deposited the
pleading b) attached copies of registry receipts.
Is this valid? No. Di pwede na photocopy lang. Dapat original bawal.
A file involving land in manila. The land is in the possession of B. A claimed he is the rightful
owner of the land. If you were the counsel, to protect the interest of the client during the
pendency of action for the recovery of the property?
-notice of lis pendens. Notice given to the registry of deeds of the province in which the
property is situated informing them the pendency of the action.
-To prevent the situation of B disposing the land. So that the interest of A shall be protected.
What if sept 9 nag send ng notice of lis pedens. Nabenta na pala noong sept 1 kay Mr. X? Can
mr X invoke that he is a buyer in good faith?
Ans. Yes. Because no notice was issued when mr. X acquired the property. No notice was
given that the property is subject to a civil action..
Q: May case sa civil case ng RTC ng manila. Pre-trial on Sept 10, 2024. Plantiff was
represented by a law firm in Pasay. The court sent a copy of a notice of pre-trial last August 1,
2024 in the registered mail. Walang nareceive ang law firm consequently di nakaattend.
Failure to attend in the pre-trial of the plaintiff amounts to dismissal of action. Pwede bang
sabihin ni law firm na wala silang nareceive na order?
Filing of complaint titignan muna kung dismissable. If the complaint is sufficient and not
dismissible, then the court will direct the clerk of court to issue the summons within 5 days.
Sino nag iissue ng summons? (sec 3)
Sheriff
If malayo o outside judicial region, plantiff shal be authorized to cause the service of summons
If sabi ng plaintiff nag serve pero di naman.
What will happen if the court finds out that the summons was not served tapos may judgement
na?
Ans: the entire proceedings shall be nullified. Notice of summons is an aspect of due process.
What if nawawala si miss de vera. Then nakabalik 4 times.
How can she served the summons? Can the summon by publication be served by oct 1? (Sec
16, R14)
-Tignan sino yung defendant. Dahil iba iba ang manner ng service.
-If the defendant is Mr. B, resident of manila.
-If Mr B. (Tao). Nakatira sa malate. Nagbakasyon sa Boracay. Can the sheriff issue the
summon in Boracay?
-Manotoc V CA*.
-No valid service of summons.
-Was there a valid substituted service of summon?
Ex. Nakita ni sheriff ay person na 24 y/o kaya lang di siya dun natutulog pwede ba siyang dun
matulog?
Requirement
a) At least 18 y/o
b) Sufficient discretion- understand the contents of the summons
c) Residing in the place
Pag walang tao? If refused?
a) Sec 6 (c), R14
Pag place of business ng defendant at ang defendant ay wala sa office, sino ang authorized to
receive summons?
a) Person in charge of the office or to person who customarily receives correspondence of
the defendant
Ask leave of court to effect substituted summons by electronic mail.
If defendant is 15 y/o?
If minor? Parent or guardian
If incompetent? Upon him, parents or legal guardian If wala, the court may assigned guardian
ad litem.
You sued abc corp-abc filed corporate rehabilitation.---summon upon the rehabilitation
receiver
If liquidation--- liquidator.
Section 17—not a resident of the PH, applicable to in rem and quasi-in rem. If in personam,
not applicable.
Quasi in rem- if you want to attach the property of the defendant. Subject the interest of the
defendant in the property
-Personal service
-mode allowed by international convention
-publication
-any other manner allowed.
Valmonte v CA
-Property in malate.
-action filed
-When defendants are spouses where does the summons be filed?
-Tag isa. One sa wife one sa husband
-no valid service of summons upon the wife. Quasi in rem ito so applicable ang sec 17.
-if there is no prior leave of court summons under sec 17 shall not be applicable.
May project sa Switzerland. May case filed against her for specific performance? Is it possible
Ans. Applicable din ang sec 17 sa cases na PH residents living outside the PH. Any actin na
ito.
Sa Switzerland si Mr. A. Naita ni sheriff sa bahay niya yung asawa niya si Mr B. Yung sheriff
iniwan ang summon to B. The husband of Mrs. A. Sabi ni sheriff, valid substituted service of
summon? May prior leave of court ito.
a. Yes. Lack of
Sa rule 15 may omnibus motion rule. Lahat ng defect, you should include it in one motion.
Otherwise it is waived.
Ong v Co
-nullity of marriage
-used the manotoc ruling on the service of summons over persons. Laid out the requirement for
substituted summons.
“The server's return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to
personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons
was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the
specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the
corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service.
He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in
the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in
the return to justify substituted service.
The server's return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of
petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and
discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to
receive the summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to uphold
the CA's denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the decision in
Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void”
Pre-MTE
Rule 1 to Rule 14
5 questions.
Then 22 rule 15 and 17
Then lecture rules 8-12
A. Definition
B. Requirements
C. Kinds: litigious; non-litigious
D. Omnibus Motion
E. Prohibited Motions
F. Dismissal with prejudice
Cases:
1. Republic vs. Dimarucut, 857 SCRA (2017)
- what happened to the 3-day notice rule?
2. Acampado vss. Cosmilla, 771 SCRA
3. Laude vs. Gines-Jabalde, 775 SCRA
4. De Guzman vs. Ochoa, 684 SCRA
Rule 8
-How to write a pleading
Actionalble document—specific denial shall be under oath--- not only a specific denial
Failure to do so, the genuineness and due execution shall be deemed admitted.
Mistake, fraud, does not bar the questioning of the actionable document.
Affirmative defense for group a—no hearing is necessary. Motu proprio the court will resolve the
affirmative defense.
Rule 9
Rule 15
Q: What is a motion?
Application for relief other than a pleadings
When should the court decide the oral motion? In motion, indicate the relief sought. State the grounds
you relied upon.
Ex. Extension of time to file an answed—ground under rule 11. Can file only once.
Non-litigious motion--- the court shall not set a hearing and shall be resolved in 5 calendar days.
Bakit? – can be acted upon dahil it cannot prejudice the rights of the other party.
Not because of urgency--- because it will not prejudice the right of other party.
Litigious motion.
Example:
Under the old rule,If you will a motion then ensure that the motion is given to the other party,.
Under the amended rules, the 3-day notice rule was already amended. Because even if it is litigious
motion, the court may conduct the hearing or not. This is different from the old rule that all litigious
motion shall be subjected to a hearing.
Laude v gines-jabalde
-Sister of Jennifer filed a motion to surrender the custody of Pemberton to olangapo city jail
-Motion Dismissed due to the failure to comply in the 3-day notice rule.
-Inabot ang motion during the hearing? Are there any substantial compliance.
-3-day notice rule is given in favor of the opposing party to give them a chance.
Omnibus motion rule- if filing omnibus motion, include all available motion in a single motion. Failure
to do so other grounds shall be considered waived.
That is why problematic ang section 23 rule 14—if include other jurisdiction of a person over the
defendant… considered voluntary appearance.
De guzman v Ochoa
-Reason for the denial of 2nd motion to dismiss
-2nd motion to dimiss was denied due to defective CAFS.
-RTC and CA denied the 2nd motion to dismiss.
-motion to dismiss in this case is in the form of omnibus motion..
-Since the motion in this case is in the form of OM. Then it shall be subjected to OM rule
-because the ground relied upon should be included in the motion to dismiss.
-Question on the CAFS and verification was not granted because it was deemed waived as it was not
included in the motion to dismiss (waived na dahil di nalagay sa motion itong question on CAFS)
-Ex. B want to amend the complaint because in the original complaint, Mr. Kho was only impleaded
but want to include Mr lopez. Answer of Kho was already received. Want to file an amended
complaint. Need to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Sa motion for leave, isasama
na ba ang amended? Or should the court wait to decide?
A want to file demurer to evidence- but gusto mag file ng motion for leave?
15 calendar days to
--prohibited motion
-Only grounds for MD under new rules- is only 4
-Lack of jurisdiction over SM
-Litis pendentia
-Res judicata
-Prescription.
In X answer may allege na affirmative defense of statute of frauds. Not sure if the basis of the parties
action is unenforceable. Set affirmative defense for hearing
Ans. cant file a motion for affirmative defense for hearing. That is why it is a prohibited motion.
Counsel of the plaintiff—the defendant attached an actionable document. Want to deny the due
execution and genuineness--- what do you need to file??
A. If may actionalble document, want to deny the Genuineness and due execution. File a
reply. That is the only time you are allowed to file a reply.
B. How many days under rule 11?
15 calendar days to file answer.
Ex. Busy ka, di ka Nakagawa ng reply, that is already for filing a reply. So
walang time. Nag file ng motion for extension of time? Bawal ito.
Prohibited ang extension to file a reply.
C. Counsel for plaintiff ka, at mag pepresent ka ng witness tomorrow? Pero mag tatravel
siya. So di siya makakapg present? Yes. Sec12 (f), Rule 15- Bawal ito except for acts
of God, force majeure, or physical inability of the witness
D.
If mag motion for postponement, di na-attach ang receipt, can the court grant the motion?
No- di aaccept kung walang attachment. *In theory lang ito. Pero in practice very liberal*
-If with prejudice--- refiling is not allowed. Operates an adjudication of the merits
-filed complaint for sum of money. Averred affirmative defense of payment--- with prejudice ito.
Can the plaintiff appeal order dismissing the complaint??? The plaintiff can appeal the order of
dismissal since it is with prejudice it operates as adjudication upon the merits. Appeallable to.
If the plaintiff failed to files an appeal, then no longer allowed to file under the same action.
Rule 17
Counsel for plaintiff ka, then sabi nung client ayaw na niya i-continue. What would you file based on
the wish not to proceed?
Ans. Notice of dismissal can be filed. After the receipt of the notice, the court shall confirm the
dismissal.
Nagbago ulit ang isip, gusting irefile. Same action. Recovery of property. Same CoA. Now after the
filing of the 2nd complaint nagbago nanaman, ayaw nanaman ulit ituloy. Nagfile ulit. Court was able to
confirm the dismissal. After a year, gusto na ulit.
Now nag file ng complaint against mr b. – court granted on motion to dimiss- nag refile ng case sa
other court. But after few days nagbago ng isip, the client asked to file a notice of dismiss. The court
confirmed the notice of dismissal. Then after some months, the client urges you to file the same
complaint. Can you file the same complaint.
Ans.
Ching v cheng
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the
defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
Sa first case, defendant ang may cause. Not at the instance of the plaintiff.
Blay v Bana
-may annulment filed si Blay tapos si Bana nag file ng compulsory counter claim
-What is the issue?
-Family court ordered the dismissal. Did the CA agree with the trial court that the dismissal should
include the compulsory counter claim? CA said that the dismissal shall only be limited to the petition.
15 days – period for the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same action.
-This case, the respondent did not manifest to prosecute the counterclaim in the same action. Under the
rules, if you want to prosecute then you have 15 days.
-failure to do this, your counter claim can only be prosecuted on a separate action.
-“required to manifest the interest to prosecute the counterclaim in the same action.”
-bakit? Dahil the passing of 15-day period triggers the passing of the finality. The order becomes final
after 15 days. Manifest intention within the 15-day period.
Schedule ng presentation ng evidence. Then namove until feb. dahil sa pagpapapostment mo.
-That is unreasonable length of time.
Sa number 7—di applicable ang class suit. Ang sagot in basan v coca cola bottlers. Even if one of the
employee signed it is considered as substantial compliance because the parties has common interest.
Signing of one is considered a substantial complaince
Oct 7, 2024
Sum of money against begnotea, then no actionable document, when does the notice of pre-
trial to be given?
Ans: Who issues? Branch clerk of court. Within 5 days of the last actionable document.
What is the content of notice of pre-trial?
Notice of pre-trial will be sent to the cousel of the parties, if no counsel then served to the
parties.
Kelan ang schedule ng pre-trial?
Within 60 days of the filing of the answer. Any time between sept 10 – nov 10 dapat maset
ang pre-trial.
There is a
Effect of failure to file pre-trial brief? Similar effect of not attending to attend the trial:
Plaintiff-dismissal of the action
Defendant- allowance of the plaintiff to present his or her evidence to present ex-parte. No
objection, no cross-examination. Minsan dinedelegate lang sa clerk of court.
If wala yung party, during pre-trial. Non-appearance bai to? Presence of parties is mandatory
in pre-trial however pwedeng wala but dapat may SPA.
The counsel in order to act as a representative of the party, must be with a special power of
attorney.
Granting him 3 powers
1) Enter amicable settlement
2) Alternative dispute resolution
3) Enter stipulation of facts
Tinatanong ito ng judge, if wala, hahanapan ng SPA.
What if nakalimutan ang evidence during pre-trial? One of the matters that is discussed in pre-
trial is marking of evidence. Failure to bring, the effect is prohibition to present this during
trial .Waiver ito to present. Only evidence marked are allowed to be presented during pre-trial.
What if di na-marked?
Generally bawal, but court may allow if
What if 4 witness pero 3 lang nagawang affidavit. Para mapresent ano ang dapat gawin?
Susubmit judicial affidavit. Remaining affidavit shall be deemed waived.
Making of a reservation? Is that allowed?
IF the evidence is not available during pre-trial allowed to present the evidence, testimonial or
documentary
If testimonial, manner of reservation—provide the name and the position of the witness (if di
ka pa sigurado).Ex. Intend to present a witness from the auditing firm pero di pa sure. Nature
and proposed testimony of the witness.
General reservation is that allowed? Reservations if made not in the manner provided under
the rule, it is not allowed to testify during trial
Documentary evidence—
You need to at least describe the documentary evidence and the purpose of the evidence
What if the defendant and his counsel failed to attend during the pre-trial? Effect to the
marking
A: waiver of objection to the due execution of the evidence.
Pag marami ang exhibit, magseset ng separate date for marking of evidence.
It may be orig, certified true copy, or faithful reproduction.
Mahalaga na i-mark to para di na isa isa ichecheck ng opposing counsel. Para di masayang
oras ng court.
Plaintiff: a,b c, d
Defendant: 1,2,3,4,
Failure to attend di na maquestion ang authenticity, considered as faithful reproduction.
ANo unang nangyayari pre-trial or mediation?
Sa practice--- depende sa court. In makati and Taguig, babasahin PTB , bago ang pre-trial,
irerefer sa Philippine mediation center.
What if sabi ng court, need iforego ang mediation at mag trial na?
A: Mediation is mandatory. Irerefer dito for mediation proceedings.
Dun pwede sabihin na di talaga uubra ang mediation, then proceed sa trial pero di pwedeng i-
skip
If during the pre-trial then nabasa ng judge na umamin talaga, then as the judge ano gagawin?
Judge can make an order to submit the case for summary judgement or judgement on the
pleading– answer failed to tender an issue.
Can you file a motion to question ?
The order of the court for summary judgement and judgement on the pleading, not subject to
appeal or certiorari.
Complaint in intervention
-Why is it proper to file an intervention?
-as legitimate child, entitled sa interest to the estate of karl. In order to protect his right
intervene in the proceeding.
When to file? Anytime before the rendition of judgement of the trial court.
What are the 2 kinds of pleading in intervention
a) Complaint in intervention – If you have a claim against both the plaintiff or defendant
b) Answer in intervention – if you want to join the defendant in a case.
Pwede lang itong mga ito ifile if may prior leave of court
If may order admitting the
If complaint in intervention the defending parties are given 15 days from the admission of the
pleading in intervention.
It is subject to the discretion of the court if the intervention is to be admitted or not. What is
the reason of given allowance
Sec 1, R19
If the party has interest to the subject matter in the litigation, automatic ba?
No.
Possible reasons to deny the intervention?
If it will unduly or prejudice the adjudication of the main action
If the right of the intervenor may be protected in a different action then pwedeng i-deny
Anunuevo
-Court to allow intervention even if a judgement is already rendered or have attained finality??
A: Yes….. john roles.. justice and equity.
In multiple sala courts, maraming branch in that particular court.
Ex. Taguig there are 5 courts. Branch 1, 2,3,4,5. How are the cases assigned??
Raffle.
Depende kung anong araw.
If isa lang ang court na pwedeng mag hear, then dun na deretso.
Rule 23
Deposition pending action
If you need to deposed someone need na subpoena to deposed.
If you are the counsel and want to quash a subpoena ad testificandum? Remedy?
a. Witness is beyond 100 km
b. Right of the witness on the ground that his residence exceeds on the 100km-- viatory
right of a witness
Ground to quash subpoena duces tecum
-documents irrelevant for pending case
Ang finile na case ay annulment of title, alleging false affidavit of lost that he executed. TO
prove that the affidavit is lost, I want to present an official from the registry of deeds?
Pwedeng mag subpoena—under judicial affidavit rule compel the person to testify as witness.
Compel to testify before the court by virtue of subpoena. Issued for potential witness. Pwede
rin for depositions. For PI under the DOJ, subpoena is issued to the respondent to begin the PI.
Subpoena is issued by the senate and congress for investigation under their chamber.
Computation of time---- exclude the time or the day on the period should begin but include the
day of performance.
Ex. Oct 7 ang issueance. Then exclude to. Then include day of performance
Ex. Motion for bill of particulars and it was granted---- nareceive ito oct 7. But instead of
filing of answer, nag file ng bill of particulars. Ang filing ng motion of bill of particulars
interrupts the counting.
Oct 20, …
If the plaintiff filed the amended pleading ex nov 5. Ilan na lang natitira dito. If nagamit na ang
13 days, continue sa count na 17 days from nov 5.
Always count the period on the next day. If holiday, sat, Sunday, then the filing date is the
next working day.
Cases:
Rep. vs. Heirs of Enrique Oribello, 692 SCRA
SECTION 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so
that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to
the parties.25 To promote this end, the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the
court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases.26 The Court explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several
actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out
originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)1âwphi1
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits
into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for
trial
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was
consolidated with the complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91).
While these two cases involve common questions of law and fact,28 each action retains its separate and
distinct character. The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the State, while the
recovery of possession case determines which private party has the better right of possession over the
subject property. These cases, involving different issues and seeking different remedies, require the
rendition and entry of separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably,
the complaint for recovery of possession proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed
of accordingly by the trial court.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not
necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the
appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further,
severance is within the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not
mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a party can
appeal an adverse ruling on such case.
Marano vs. Pryce Gases Inc., 755 SCRA
Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent's complaint for cancellation of certificate of title, we
find that the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of certificate of title case
to be the appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation is proper when two or more actions
pending, not necessarily, before the same court involve a common question of law or fact.27 In such cases,
the court may: order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the
actions consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for the purpose of avoiding
unnecessary costs and delay.
Considering that the validity of the petitioners' certificate of title is the crucial issue in both the
reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation of certificate of title case filed by
the respondent, these two cases should be consolidated in order to avoid the possibility of rendering
conflicting decisions and for the orderly administration of justice.29 And since the issue of validity of the
petitioners' certificate of title has been subjected to a full-blown trial before the MTC and is now the subject
of appeal before the RTC, allowing the cancellation of certificate of title case to proceed independently and
separately would be needlessly circuitous and would necessarily delay the resolution of the present issue.
“Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or at least such a trial should be
undertaken only with great caution and sparingly. There should be one full and comprehensive
trial covering all disputed matters, and parties cannot, as of right, have a trial divided. It is the
policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far as possible, and
separate trials are granted only in exceptional cases. Even under a statute permitting trials of
separate issues, neither party has an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue involved.
The trial of all issues together is especially appropriate in an action at law wherein the issues are
not complicated, x x x, or where the issues are basically the same x x x
x x x Separate trials of issues should be ordered where such separation will avoid prejudice,
further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we
conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate
trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct
and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away
from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably
shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay,
expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."27
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of
the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or
when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will
give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did
not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue
relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in
furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was
necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants.1âwphi1 Should
the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the
evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged as
ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being given the
opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards
Metrobank.”
A. Demurrer to Evidence
- Distinguish between civil and criminal actions (PAGE 551)
Cases:
Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render judgment on the basis of
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for further proceedings" would be an
outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
On the other hand, respondents argue that the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on
the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support of their defense when the Demurrer to
Evidence was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to petitioner, but
was silent on when their obligation became due and demandable.
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence
on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads
as follows:
"SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence."14
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana15
pronounced:
"The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e.,
demur to the plaintiff’s evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable
law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that
plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still
remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s evidence so
that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as
well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the
established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered
evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus
assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct
judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded
evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule,
however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the
order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and
he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence. In
such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on
the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence." (Underscoring supplied)
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal,
the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the
right to present their own evidence.16 The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render
judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations
The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial
court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he
effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for
decision insofar as he was concerned.
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of
evidence against the accused and, second, the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense.
If, after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a
conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the
second stage and dismiss the criminal action.10 There is no point for the trial court to hear the
evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the
case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court,
he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered
submitted for judgment.11 On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation
in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a
demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled
that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections12 that, to determine whether the
pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the
allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the
primary objective of the party filing it.
Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss read as follows:
On November 9, 2001, the accused was arrested and subsequently brought to the
Quezon City jail through a commitment order dated November 21, 2001 where he
had been detained during the course of this case.
It can be seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in paragraphs 2, 3,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in the case had painfully dragged
on for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of
the prosecutor’s absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecution’s
repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such
time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the
CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabador’s motion as
a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12
regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right
to speedy trial.14 This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays
without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the
trial.15 This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this
up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12,
saying that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and
that "the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the
accused in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial
had accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He
did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects
such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not
touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed,
he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of
exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.16 To say that Cabador filed a demurrer
to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and
exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to
object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only
after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed
his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial
court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said
that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to
evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented
after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue.11
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.-After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to
show that he is entitled to his claim, and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to make such a
determination.12
A review of the dismissal of the complaint naturally entails a Calibration of the evidence to determine
whether the material allegations of the complaint were sufficiently backed by evidence. We have repeatedly
stressed that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law, not of fact.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.
There is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. The
resolution of a question of fact necessarily involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific
situations. It is for this reason that this Court defers to the factual findings of a trial judge, who has had the
distinct advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and determining from their demeanor
whether they· were speaking or distorting the truth.
Oribello
Facts: Cases: 1) Reversion 2)recovery,
[Note ang contentions per case filed]
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such.
(quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions
are pending
between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint.
(actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
single
action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
Metrobank vs. Sandoval, 691 SCRA
Case filed against the cronies of Marcoses
-Court reversed the decision of SB. Severance was not proper. Failed to present an exemption.
SC said that separate trials is an exemption. Cases with similar issues should be tried together.
Exemption allowed if there is a special circumstance or extraordinary ground. In this case, no
showing. If allowed, then if Manalo ang republic then maforfeit ang property. Metrobank
should have an opportunity to be heard even in forfeiture proceedings.
Rule 32 (Commissioners)
-If there are technical issues ---- refer to commissioners
-May be done by consent.
-If no agreement, can be referred through a motion.
-Court may moto propio refer.
-Under the rules, R67 and R68 ang pwedeng irefer.
---sa expropriation 2 issues 1) use for public purposes 2) determination of just compensation.
Yung number 2 ang nirerefer sa commissioners.
----sa partition din may 2 issues 1) w/n there is a co-ownership 2) how divided (ito ang
nirerefer)
-Pag nirefer, ang proceeding ay as if done by the court. Commissioners were vested to issue
subpoena and instance of failure to present power to issue contempt.
-Commissioners may rule admissibility of evidence.
-Then submit report.
-Court rule if adopt,etc.
Rule 33
IMPORTANT:
Difference ng demurrer sa civil at criminal
If demurrer to evidence is denied, can it be questioned through Pet Cer? No. It cannot be
subject of pet cer. Remedy, proceed to trial and present evidence.
Macapagal-Arroyo---
-cannot file an appeal the decision granting demurrer
-if there is a GAD, then can file pet cer.
-General rule, cannot be subject on appeal or pet cer.
Demurrer to evidence is governed by R15, then when the defendant files a demurrer since it is
a litigious motion
Plaintiff may file opposition 5 days.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is
a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. The resolution of a question of
fact necessarily involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the
relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations. It is for this reason that this Court
defers to the factual findings of a trial judge, who has had the distinct advantage of directly observing the witnesses
on the stand and determining from their demeanor whether they· were speaking or distorting the truth.
-SC upheld the decision of the RTC.
Rule 34 [ judgement]
Comglas Corp. vs. Santos Car Check Center – 754 SCRA 481
Essentially, comglasco admitted that there is a contract of lease. Its only defense is that they
were affected by Asian financial crisis.
RTC- granted the motion for judgement on the pleadings.
Decision: Proper
Failure to tend an issue--- action was for breach of contract. Determine lang if nag breach. In
this case, comglasco admitted that there was a premature termination of contract. Deemed
admitted. No need for trial due to the absence of contentious facts that need to be resolved.
R34-R35
If trial court deny the motion for summary judgement
Not appealable or through pet cer, prohibition, certiorari
What is the remedy if the court grants the motion??? File an appeal to the judgement not the
order granting the motion.
Rule 36
-Court may require submission of memorandum.
-The court has 90 days to render its decision from the date it was submitted for resolution.
-Doctrine of immutability of judgement- Once judgement has attained finality, it cannot be
appealed, modified.
Expn: 1) Need clerical errors
2) Nunc pro tunc
3) void judgement—void judgement cannot attain finality.
4) in cases of special and exceptional nature as when facts and circumstances transpire which
render the judgement’s execution impossible or unjust.
FASAP V PAL
-CA- May valid retrenchment ba? Wala kasi di nagsubmit ang pal ng FS
-SC Agreed that no valid retrenchment. Then PAL filed an MR. Then denied. Then PAL filed
another MR—denied.
-Then, PAL’s counsel, ------ resolution vacating the 2nd MR. upon the refiling of MR- then
valid ang MR thus workers were validly dismissed.
Doctrine of immutability----
XXIII. RULE 36: Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof (Sections 1-6)
- When is judgment deemed entered? Effect?
- Several judgments (S-4)
- Separate judgments (S-5)
- Judgments against entities without personality (S-6)
Case:
FASAP vs PAL, 858 SCRA (for class discussion)
After judgement become F and E: Petition for relief from judgment, action to annul a judgment, Pet Cer,
and Collateral attack of a judgment.
Judgement become executory when lapse of period to appeal. A judgement is also executory upon the
resolution of taken appeal.
Period of appeal is reckoned in the entry of judgement. Except for cases that is immediately executory
Remedy should be a) prior to become final and executory and after same becomes executory.
a) FAMEN which ordinary prudence could not have guard against and, by reason of which, such
aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights
b) Newly-discovered evidence
Elements:
a) evidence was discovered after the trial,
b) evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with execercise of reasolable diligence
c) material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, that the
evidence would probably change the judgment, if admitted
When to file during appeal—any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected before CA
losses jurisdiction- MNT may be filed.
It is not sufficient to mention the ground relied upon. Need to specifically point out the finding or
conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported with evidence or which are contrary to
law.Non-compliance would reduce this to pro-forma motion --- this shall not toll the reglementary period
of appeal even if timely filed.
Pro forma motion- does not specify the …
-NEW trial---if granted, original judgement or final order shall be vacated, but the recorded evidence
taken upon the former trial, in so far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be
used at the new trial without retaking the same.
-effect- if less than the issues are ordered retried, the court may either enter a judgment or final order as to
the rest, or stay the enforcement of judgement until after new trial
Sec 9—remedy for denial of MNT or MR--- not appealable- remedy is to appeal from the judgement or
final order.
Neypes rule---The movant has freshx period of 15 days from the receipt of the the denial of MR, within
which notice of appeal may be filed.
Counting shall start from the date when the MR or MNT was denied.
Cases:
2. Mendezona vs. Ozamis – 376 SCRA
-Quieting of title.
-Alleged that the deed of sale in favor of mendezona was simulated and Ozamis was not of sound mind to
effect the said sale.
-RTC said that the sale was valid however CA reversed the sale saying that the sale was void which
promted Mendezona to appeal and file motion for new trial on the ground that newly discovered evidence
in relation to the testimony of Judge Durias.
-SC held that for motion for new trial to be granted.. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly
discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:
(a) the evidence had been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of
such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result.
All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.
-New trial was denied.
-SC reversed the decision saying that no sufficient evidence to establish that the s
“Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such
were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so
long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional
commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction”
-motion for new trial is filed within the period for taking an appeal. After the court gave its final order.. In
this case, erroneous kung kelan nag file ng motion for new trial.
“The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when
was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been
discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in
order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new
trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence
nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is
that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or
during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.”
XXVI. RULES 38
Applicable even after the entry of judgment or final order such as an order of execution.
-60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or proceeding and not more than 6 months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken
-not extendible.
-Allowed only in execeptional circumstances, as no available remedy.
If sufficient, adverse party should answer within 15 days from the receipt of motion.
-
Effect:
If not true ang allegation—dismissed --
If granted—Decision shall be set aside as if no judgment or action is taken. Court shall then hear and
determine the case as if MNT or MR is granted.
Petition for relief from judgement cannot be filed in SC as it is not included in the petitions that can be
filed under Rule 56.
Petition for relief from judgement is not applicable to summary procedure and small claims. A party
cannot file the petition for relief fromjudgement with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an
unlawful detainer case. It cannot also be filed in RTC as it has no jurisdiction over said case.
For environmental cases- yes. It can be allowed under highly meritorious circumstances to prevent
miscarriage of justice.
Cases:
3. Thomasites Center for International Studies Vs. Rodriguez – 782 SCRA 391 (1/27/16)
-Compliance with the periods provided under the rules should be strictly observed because such petition
is a final act of liberality on the part of the stat, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further
fundamental principle that a judgement order to proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in
order to put an end to litigation.
A. Kinds of Execution
1. Matter of right, ministerial (S-1)
2. Discretionary (S-2)
a. stay of discretionary execution (S-3)
The following are immediately executory, but court may order otherwise. This may also be suspended,
modified, restoring or granting injunction, receivership, accounting of support.
-injunction
-receivership
-accounting
-support
“As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed when
superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ.
Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression
and inequity.
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent
circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We
note that petitioner did not refute respondent’s allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she
has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make
execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception”
Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of
the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the court‘s decision that should prevail. All that was
required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate
execution should be based ―upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale why such
execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, ―to give as much recognition to
the worth of a trial judge‘s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by
the board of canvassers.
Discretionary execution is permissible only when "good reasons" exist for immediately executing the
judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. "Good
reasons" are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes
illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become unable to enjoy it, considering
the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case except to delay.
-Execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule. The Court explained the nature of
execution pending appeal as follows: Execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, being
more of the exception rather than the rule. This rule is strictly construed against the movant because
courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired finality.
Such execution affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal. The
requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following: (a) there
must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be good
reasons for execution pending appeal; (c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order.
In the instant case, the posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons required under
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending appeal. The mere filing of
a bond by a successful party is not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a
combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate
execution
the Court restates the rule that the trial court‘s discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be
strictly construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of―good reasons,‖ which consist of
compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory.―The
circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might results hould the losing
party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make ofexecution pending appeal, instead
of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool ofoppression and inequity.‖The sufficiency of ―good
reasons‖ depends upon the circumstances of the case and theparties thereto. Conditions that are personal
to one party, for example, may be insufficientto justify an execution pending appeal that would affect all
parties to the case and theproperty that is the subject thereof.‖
B. Mode of Execution
- Immutability of judgment. Exceptions. In re: Adoption of Karen Herico Licerio, 886 SCRA 318, Nov.
21, 2018
In Antonio Mendoza v. Fil-Homes realty Development Corporation,25 this Court discussed that "under
the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law." In the same case, however, this
Court also pointed out the four (4) exceptions to the doctrine on immutability of judgement, to wit:
-But it has been repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after
judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which
render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts
-the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new facts and circumstances, and thereafter
suspend execution thereof and grant relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant
1. By motion (S-6)
A final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years or by action for revival
of judgment within ten years reckoned from the date of entry of judgment. The date of entry, in
turn, is the same as the date of finality of judgment. By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to be
valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the accomplishment of two acts within the five-year
prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution;
and (b) the court's actual issuance of the writ.
The five-year prescriptive period reckoned from the entry of judgment mentioned in Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules, should be observed both by the winning party who filed the motion, i.e., judgment
obligee/creditor, andthe court that will resolve the same. Simply put, the winning party may file the
motion for execution within the five-year period; and the court should issue the actual writ of
execution pursuant to the motion within the same period. After the lapse of the five-year period, any
writ issued by the court is already null and void, since the court no longer has jurisdiction over the
issuance of the writ
RCBC vs. Sera, 701 SCRA 124
-Nagkaroon ng dispute sa lupa. Upon judgement, Nakita na natransfer na ang title. Need ng petitioner
na mag file ng annulment ng title para ma-convey sa kanya ang title. Kaya naman nag lapse ang 5
years.
-SC held” Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within
five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action." Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it
allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds.
These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned
by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.”
This Court sustains the petitioners' position. Considering that the delay was not due to the fault of the
petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sold the subject property to another to avoid the
outcome of the case filed against them, and which delay incurred to their benefit/advantage, it is only
logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an action for annulment of title and document
was being litigated upon shall be deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running of the five-year
period for enforcement of a judgment by mere motion. Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for
escaping the fulfilment of their obligation. Therefore, in computing the time limited for suing out an
execution, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be
extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.
C. Manner of Execution
- The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging
to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one
who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment
debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man‘s goods shall not be sold for
another man‘s debts. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a writ of execution is claimed by a third
person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for the remedy of such third party claimant.
The third party claimant may execute an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property
levied, and serve the same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof to the judgment creditor.
This remedy is known as terceria.
-several judgment
-multiple causes of action ---- court can render judgment for each CoA- separate judgment
Upon decision of the court
Post-judgment remedies
-Decision is no immediately F and E, unless provided by the rules
Rule 37
-Ex: action for damages. A filed case against B. Claim amounting to 1.8M. trial court renders
its judgment granting the relief prayed for by A.
Can you file an MR?? Di applicable ang MR sa Rules on summary procedure.
If RTC—then can file MR
Grounds for MR a)
MNT – 2 grounds
-FAMEN --- accompany with affidavit of merit
-Newly-discovered evidence
Requisite newly-discovered evidence
-
Chua v People
-SC held that additional evidence cannot be considered as newly-evidence because it already
existed during the trial. If was not only found by Chua during the pendency of trial. Evidence
should be found after the trial.
Granting of MR effect–
Effect of granting MNT (sec 6): Reception of additional evidence. But the previous evidence
shall still stand on the new trial.
Mendezona vs. Ozamis – 376 SCRA
-Contract to sell was seek to be annulled due to the old age of
-motion should be denied. No requisite…
Rule 38
Naging F and E na yung judgment. One of the remedies against a judgment is petition for
relief.
Petition for relief of judment or denial of appeal within 60 days from the knowledge of
judgment and within 6 months of entry of judgment.
Thomasites Center for International Studies Vs. Rodriguez – 782 SCRA 391 (1/27/16)
-filed petition for relief on judgment
-ground for pet for relief on judgmetn
-Period for filing Important
-
Ex Entry Jan 10, 2024— Nalaman noon june 1, 2024 — lapse ng 6 months ay july 10, 2024
Mesina v Meer
-due to unfavorable ruling, mesina filed Pet relief before the CA
-Bawal ang Pet relief in CA
-SC held that “such court” refers to the MeTC and RTC. Rules in CA is found under different
rule.
-there was no FAMEN…
After the filing of answer– 15 days to answer. Then the court may grant or deny the pet relief
If granted—Decision shall be set aside as if no judgment or action is taken. Court shall then
hear and determine the case as if MNT or MR is granted.
Petition for denial of appeal Section 7– given due course to the appeal and to elevate the
record of the appealed case as if a timely and proper appeal had been made.
Santos V. COMELEC
-Santos filed an election protest. Trial court upon reevaluation of the ballots, santos was the
rightful winner.
-It took 1 year for the trial court to hear the case. Nakaupo ang kalaban during the pendency.
-Upon decision of the trial court, santos filed an execution to the trial court.
-Good reason ito. Konti lang ang term.
Ayaw mo talaga, you can post a bond to stay the execution of the judgment. The bond will
stand a security because the judgment was not executed
Filing of appeal has the effect of staying the judgment. Dahil as a general rule di pa pwede i-
execute dahil di pa F and E.
Ocampo v Enriquez.
-marcos burial
-no law prohibiting the burial of former president
-Petitioners filed MR.
-Kahit sa SC, losing party may still file MR within 15 days
-Within the 15 day period. Di pinatapos ang 15-day period.
-SC held that the decision of the SC dismissing the petition for prohibition is similar to an
injunction. And under the rules injunction is immediately executory.
Banes v banes
-Hindi good reason ito. Walang immediate reason for the execution of the decision of trial
court.
Modes of execution
a. By motion
b. By independent action
Villareal case
-Date of entry ang reckoning point.
-dapat pati issuance ng writ ay within 5 years. DI lang filing ito. But the order granting and
issuance of the writ should comply to the 5-year period.
Davis v Davis
-same sa RCBC v Sera
-
-if not a party to the original action then you cannot be bound to the judgment of the original
action.
-The order was for the developer. They have no obligation to provide space, they are not
-Violation of due process if i-include ang party na hindi included sa original action.
3 kinds of judgment
a. Money- Cash, levy, garnishment
b. Specific acts
c. Special judgments
If specific acts–
Ex: judgment ay delivery ng vehicle- pag ayaw nung judgment obligor, gagawing at the
expense of others.
For specific performance, execution of deed of sale— eh kahit fulfilled na ang condition for
the performance, file action for specific performance. Seller will be order to na perform. Pag
ayaw, pwedeng ang clerk of court ang mag sign. This shall have the effect of the seller
performing the obligation.
Ex case:
-may tax payer may delinquency . The city government auction. May certificate of sale but in
order need ng final bill of sale by the city treasurer. Nag refuse ang city treasurer na mag
issue. Nag file ng pet for mandamus
-SC held na wrong remedy. Dapat daw nag file to cite the treasurer in contempt. Because
considered itong special judgment since it is only the city treasurer can issue the certification.
-if mag post ng bond ang judgment obligee, pwedeng mag chargeable sa bond
-file separate action so the action shall be fully ventilated.
Redemption shall be reckoned from the date of registration with the cert of sale with the
registry of deeds. –1 year.
Pag si judgment obligor na stop na ang redemption kasi bumalik na ang property Bawal na
ang another redemption once JO is
-Kung wala na talagang alam, the judgment obligor can be examined to ascertain whether
he/she has remaining properties to satisfy the judgment.
-Another is the examination of obligor of the judgment obligor,. Ask court to issue sub-poena
to be issued in favor of the obligee. Sa mga taong may utang kay judgment obligor.
-If may property at in danger to be dissipated, what is the remedy?? Ask for appointment of
receiver to manage the property
If wala parin,
Res judicata
Section 47-48
Conclusiveness of judgment?
-No identity of CoA.
-Conclusive lang ay directly resolved sa 1st case ang applicable sa 2nd case . Mga incidental
ay di conclusive sa 2nd case
b) personam
c)--- conclusivenes of judgment
Local courts cannot review the merits of the case decided in the foreign court. Grounds to
enforce judgments is a) jurisdiction, notice, mistake of fact and law
BPI vs. Guevarra, 752 SCRA 342
Sarto vs. People, 856 SCRA 548
Cannot use evidence used in foreign court. The type of review is a limited type of review.
Local courts cannot review the merits of the case. Limited review lang.
Rule 23.