PEOPLE v. LINO ALEJANDRO Y PIMENTEL, GR No.

223099, 2018-01-11

Facts:

AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a
school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted
his penis into her vagina.

Two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA's house through a window one night,
undressed himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On both occasions, accused-
appellant threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had happened.

AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health
Office where she was examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she found, among others, deep,
healed, old and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated
positive sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present
any evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision.

RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant

On the same day, however, the RTC recalled.

Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration... arguing that a judgment of acquittal is

immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so
would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy.

RTC denied the motion

Accused-appellant appealed to the CA

CA dismissed the appeal and held that the RTC's Order of recalling and setting aside the judgment
of acquittal was justified.

Issues:

The error committed by the RTC cannot be validly recalled without transgressing the accused-
appellant's right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable.

There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to
which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal
was thereafter rendered and promulgated

What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken
notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with
a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact
that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal
may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of
the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.

in this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified during the
trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The RTC then
realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the case would have had a different
outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the
purpose of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-
appellant for two counts of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling
would transgress the accused-appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy.
 People of the Philippines vs. Barpoga, 54 Phil. 27 (1929)

Facts:

Victor Barpoga was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide. It was
alleged that during the commission of a robbery, Barpoga and his accomplices
killed the victim. The trial court sentenced him to death. Barpoga appealed,
raising issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence against him.

Issue:

Whether or not Barpoga was guilty of robbery with homicide.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed Barpoga's conviction. The Court found that the
evidence presented during the trial sufficiently proved that Barpoga was guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide. The evidence established that the killing
occurred as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, which fulfilled the
elements of the crime charged.

Ratio Decidendi:

In crimes of robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove that a robbery
was committed and, in the course or as a result of the robbery, a homicide
occurred. Even if the intent to kill is not established, the accused can still be
convicted if it is proven that the homicide was committed in the course of the
robbery. The participation of the accused in both the robbery and the killing
connects him to the crime.
 PEOPLE v. DARIO MARGEN ET AL., GR No. L-2681, 1950-03-30

Facts:

The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life

imprisonment with perpetual disqualification by the Court of First Instance
of Samar. The case involved Diego Testor, who was asked to take fish to a
constabulary detachment in Calbayog, Samar. When he was sent to
account for the breach of trust, he brought kalapion fish, which Sergeant
Margen threw into his face and threw at him. Three other soldiers, Julian
Tarrayo, Domingo Ramos, and Andres Midoranda, also maltreated Testor.
Testor died in Calbayog on March 12, 1944, due to internal hemorrhage
from the perforation of his intestines by fish bones.
Issues:

For the death of Diego Testor, Margen, Tarrayo, and Midoranda were prosecuted for
murder. But only Midoranda, the herein appellant, was tried because the other two were
able to escape

It is not disputed that the crime of murder was committed in this case, it appearing that
the acts which resulted in the death of Diego Testor were performed when the latter, with
his hands bound behind his back, was entirely defenseless. But counsel for the defense
argues... that, in the absence of proof of conspiracy, appellant should not be held liable
for the said crime because he merely obeyed the orders of his superior.

Ruling:

Obedience to an order of a superior gives rise to exemption from criminal liability only
when the order is for some lawful purpose (Art. 11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code). Sergeant
Margen's order to have the deceased tortured was not of that kind. The deceased may
have given... offense. But that did... not give the sergeant the right to take the law in his
own hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was
illegal, and appellant was not bound to obey it. Moreover, it does not appear that in
taking part in the maltreatment of... the deceased, appellant was... prompted solely by
his sense of duty toward his superior. What appears is that he and his companions had a
common grievance against the deceased, because the latter had misappropriated a
quantity of fish intended for their consumption. It... was,... therefore, but natural that
they should all want to teach the deceased a lesson by making him suffer for the fault he
had committed.
 United State vs APEGO, 23 Phil 391

FACTS:

The defendant was charged of Murder and was sentenced by CFI Batangas on February 15, 1912,by Honorable
Mariano Cui, the penalty of twelve years and one day of

reclusion temporal to the accessories, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the
costs. At about 8 o'clock in the evening of December 24, 1911, the spouses, Pio Bautista and Maria
Apego,coming from the municipality of Nasugbu, returned to their house, situated in the barrio of
Sampaga,pueblo of Balayan, Batangas, and before entering the same called to Genoveva Apego, the woman’s
sister, who they knew was therein, and as they received no reply, went up into the house; thehusband led the
way and opened the door; the house was so dark, Maria went directly to look for match and lit a kerosene, while
Pio stumbled on the defendant and accidentally touched her left arm.Defendant was awaken and immediately
reached for her pocketknife thinking that someone entered the house and is going to rape her, before she
striking Pio with her pocketknife, she first inquired of his identity, when there was no answer, she immediately
struck him to the chest. The wound inflicted by the defendant to the victim was so deep and fatal that it injured
both the heart and left lung. A few moments later Pio died.

ISSUE:

WON the defendant is criminally liable for killing her brother-in-law?

HELD:

Defense: Defendant is only defending herself, upon awakening, defendant was startled and thought someone
is going to rape her, the house was pitch black so before striking her knife, she first

inquired of the “intruder’s” identity, receiving no answer she immediately struck him to his chest.Defendant, 25
years of age, single and uneducated, lived with Pio and Maria for two years, and they never developed any
conflict.

Prosecution: The defendant exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real need of wounding the man
who had merely caught by her arm.From the foregoing considerations it is concluded that in the commission of
the crime there was present the circumstance of incomplete exemption from responsibility, as all the three
requisites specified in sub article 4 of article of the Penal Code are not applicable wherefore the criminal act is
not altogether excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said requisites, although a majority of
them were present, that is, the first and the third requisites; and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
article 86 of the code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by article 404 of the code, in
the discretion of the court, must be imposed upon the defendant.

In view of the fact that the accused is an ignorant woman, wholly uneducated, and that it was not shown that,
at the time when she assaulted the deceased, she knew that he was her brother-in-law, account must be taken
of the circumstance prescribed by article 11 of the code in connection with Act No. 2142, as no aggravating
circumstance whatever was present to counteract the effects of the said extenuating circumstance; therefore,

the penalty applicable to the defendant is the one lower by two degrees and in the minimum period. For the
foregoing reasons it is our opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, the defendant,
Genoveva Apego, should be, as she is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of two years of prison correccional to
the accessories of article 61 to pay an indemnity of five hundred pesos to the heirs of the deceased and, in case
of insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the
payment of the costs of both instances.In computing the time of the sentence, credit shall be allowed for one-
half of the time of imprisonment suffered by the defendant while awaiting trial. So ordered .
 PP vs. Sazon, G.R. No. L-59524, 189 SCRA 700 (November 16, 1990)

Facts:

Carmelo Sazon, along with other defendants, was charged with illegal possession of firearms, a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Sazon claimed he was wrongfully accused and contended that his right to due process
was violated because he was convicted without the benefit of a fair trial.

Issue:

Whether or not Sazon’s constitutional right to due process was violated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Sazon’s right to due process was violated. The Court held that a
fundamental requirement of due process is that every individual should have the opportunity to be
heard. The fact that the lower court rendered a decision without giving Sazon a full and fair
opportunity to defend himself constituted a denial of due process.

Ratio Decidendi:

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard before any judgment is rendered. A
conviction without such an opportunity is invalid as it deprives the accused of the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial. The Supreme Court stressed that even in cases involving public interest or
public safety, procedural safeguards cannot be disregarded. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower court, acquitting Sazon on the grounds that his constitutional right to due
process was violated.