CSS 791

NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA
COURSE CODE : CSS791
COURSE TITLE:
EMERGENCY, RIOT AND DISASTER CONTROL
MANAGEMENT
CSS791 COURSE GUIDE
COURSE
GUIDE
CSS791
EMERGENCY, RIOT AND DISASTER CONTROL
MANAGEMENT
Course Team Dr. R.A. Okunola (Developer/Writer) - UI

Dr. Adeniyi T. Adegoke(Co-developer/Co-writer) - NOUN
Dr. Akeem Akinwale (Editor) - UI
Dr. Adeniyi T. Adegoke (Coordinator) - NOUN
Dr. Olu Akewusola (Programme Leader) - NOUN
ii
CSS791 COURSE GUIDE
National Open University of Nigeria

Headquarters
14/16 Ahmadu Bello Way
Victoria Island
Lagos
Abuja Office
No. 5 Dar es Salaam Street
Off Aminu Kano Crescent
Wuse II, Abuja
Nigeria
e-mail: centralinfo@nou.edu.ng
URL: www.nou.edu.ng
Published By:
First Printed 2010
ISBN:
All Rights Reserved
iii
CSS791 COURSE GUIDE
CONTENTS PAGE
Introduction …………………….………………………………….. 1
The Message of this Course…………………….………………….. 1
Course Aims …………………….………………………………….. 2
Course Objectives…………………….…………………………….. 3
Working through this Course…………………….……………..…. 4
Course Materials …………………….…………………………..... 4
Study Units …………………….……………………………….…. 5
Text books, Journals and References …………………….…….….. 6
Assignment File…………………….………………………......….. 11
Assessment …………………….……………………………....….. 11
Tutor- Marked Assignment …………………….………………….. 11
Final Examination and Grading …………………….…….……….. 11
Course Marking Scheme …………………….………………..…... 12
Course Overview …………………….………………………..….. 12
Presentation Schedule…………………………………………..….. 13
How to Get the Best from This Course………………………..….. 13
Facilitators/Tutors and Tutorials…………….………………..….. 15
Summary…………………….………………….……………..….. 15
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Introduction
CSS791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control Management is a 3-

credit unit course. It is a compulsory course for all postgraduate students
in the field of Criminology and Security Studies of the University. The
course is also recommended for any other student(s) particularly those in
the school of Arts and Social Sciences, who may have interest in the
study and survey of security theory and practice. The course can also be
taken as an elective or a required course by other students whose main
field(s) of discipline is not Criminology and Security Studies. However
the course shall consist of 20 units, which include the meaning and
approaches to nature, forms, and types of Emergency, Riots and
Disasters Management. In this study, Emergency, Riot and Disaster
Control Management in Nigeria, Africa, other developing nations and
countries in the Americas and Europe; both natural and man made
disasters are given special attention with the aim of stimulating effective
knowledge of the overall security situations and agenda in Nigeria and
Africa, among the students so that they can identify, analyse, and proffer
solutions to Emergency and Disaster problems locally and
internationally.
The registration for the course does not require any compulsory
prerequisite for it to be registered for. The course guide provides
information informs us on what this course is all about, what student
should appreciate in each unit, the text materials to be used and how to
make the best use of these materials. This course guide also emphasises
the need for students to take tutored marked assignments so seriously.
However, necessary information on marked assignments shall be made
known to students in a separate file, which will be sent to each of them
at an appropriate time. This course is also supported with periodic
tutorial classes.
The Message of This Course
CSS791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control Management as a

course in the field of Criminology and Security Studies at the National
Open University of Nigeria focuses on a wide range of issues that bother
on ways to effect basic security measures and policies and identifying
various disasters and threats that can jeopardise the safety of any people
or community. This course deals with the analysis and assessment of
various disasters, disasters prone areas, and their management and
prevention where possible will be expected to identify these disasters
and develop diagnostic frameworks through which they can proffer
solutions towards hazard mitigation and effective disaster management.
In this course, students and readers will be exposed to various measures
CSS791 EMERGENCY, RIOT AND DISASTER CONTROL MANAGEMENT
that can safeguard the protection of life and property against the
incidence of disasters and other forms of hazards.
Nevertheless, the essence of these control and management measures is

at least to provide students and readers with various ways through which
they can minimise losses from any disaster that cannot be prevented.
Knowing the impact that active involvement of civilians in disaster
management can have in complementing and increasing the capacity of
the security personnel to carry out their duties effectively, the course
also explores the strategic importance of civil security and how it can
contribute to effective disaster management and threat mitigation. The
issue of intelligence is relevant in disaster management. In recognition
of this fact a number of countries expend huge resources in human and
financial terms for the prevention of disaster through promotion of
science and technology in disaster management.
The course covers a wide range of issues regarding disaster management

including the meaning of emergency, riots, disasters, management and
control to mention a few. Every aspect of this course is very interesting
and knowledge driven.
Course Aims
The overall aim of CSS791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control

Management as a course is to introduce students to basic definitions of
concepts relating to emergency, riots, disaster and disaster management.
It is also aimed at exposing students and readers to knowledge of
various disasters such as natural and man-made disasters. In the
furtherance of its overall aim, the study will also explore some other
issues like information on warning signs in disaster management,
conflicts such as riots, war, hostage taking and negotiation approaches.
The course will present the conceptual meaning, case studies and the
impact assessment of these issues to illuminate how they constitute
threat to human existence.
Undoubtedly, the way the course draws its references from Nigeria and
Africa in the analysis of various disasters makes it astounding and
thought provoking in providing a pathway for African Students and
Scholars in the field of Criminology and Security Studies to instil
analytical consciousness on the aspects of general practice of disaster
management, which are vulnerable to human livelihood with hope of
energising them towards developing viable frameworks through which
disaster problems ravaging Nigeria in particular and Africa as a whole
can be addressed. There is a general belief that disaster issues are very
crucial and should be given attention. The course seeks to:
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• Define and explain emergency situations

• Examine emergency management history, organization,
terminology, resources, facilities, and agency responsibilities.
• Discuss emergency management systems (organizational,
communication, response, warning, planning, recovery, and
mitigation), mass media involvement in disasters, roles of non-
profit organizations, and emergency management in the private
sector. Students will examine
• Identify the basic ideas of what emergency entails
• Differentiate and clarify various forms of emergencies especially
as they constitute threat to lives and properties.
• Understand the meaning and causes of civil disturbance with
emphasis on riots
• Conceptualise the term disaster
• Clarify Natural and Man-made Disasters
• Elucidate Disaster Management
• Develop social responsibility by engaging with local
organizations in need of emergency planning and management
guidance.
• Understand the roles of federal, state, and local governments as
well as community partnerships in emergency management
planning, mitigation, response, and recovery.
• Examine Youths, Unemployment and substance use
Course Objectives
With utmost desire to achieve the above mentioned aims, the course has
some set of objectives as demonstrated in all the units of the course.
Each unit has its own objectives. Objectives are always included at the
beginning of every unit to assist students in appreciation of what they
will learn in the study of each unit to facilitate their understanding of the
course, CSS. 791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control Management.
Students are therefore advised to read these objectives before studying
the entire unit(s). Thus, it is helpful to do so. They should always look at
the unit objectives. In this way, they you can be sure of the expected
outcomes of the unit. Stated below are the wider objectives of this
course as a whole. By meeting these objectives, students would achieve
the aims of the course as a whole.
At the end of the course, students should be able to:
• Assess and identify disasters prone areas in the country

a. Assessment method
b. The five-step risk process
c. Matching the response to the threat
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• Measuring Risk
• Implement disaster avoidance strategies
a. Avoiding disasters by taking effective

b. preventive actions
c. Creating contingency plans for unavoidable threats
• Organize team structures for use in an emergency

• Create a recovery plan from the response to a disaster
• Identify appropriate strategies to recover the infrastructures/
• Respond to recovery scenarios
• Organize and manage recovery teams
• Test and maintain an effective recovery plan in a rapidly
changing technology environment
Working through this course
In completing this course, students are required to study the whole units,
and try to read all (or substantial number of) the recommended
textbooks, journals and other reading materials including electronic
resources. Each unit contains self assessment exercise(s) and students
are required to submit their assignment for the purpose of assessment.
At the end of the course, student(s) shall be examined. The time of the
final examination and venue shall be communicated to all the registered
students in due course by relevant school authorities-study centre
management. Below are the components of the course and what students
are required to do
Course Materials
Major components of the course include:
1. Course Guide
2. Study Units
3. Textbooks
4. Assignments Files
5. Presentations Schedule
It is incumbent upon every student to get his or her own copy of the
course material. Students are also advised to contact their tutorial
facilitators if they have any difficulty in getting any of the text materials
recommended for further reading.
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Study Units
In this course there are twenty units which include:
Module 1
Unit1 Emergency: Meaning and Types

Unit 2 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction
Unit 3 Emergency Management History
Unit4 Riot and Disturbance Control Prevention Procedures and
Techniques
Unit 5 Causes of Prison Riots
Module 2
Unit 1 Psychosocial Consequences of Disaster

Unit 2 The Stages of Psychological Response to Disasters
Unit 3 Community and Social Impacts of Disasters
Unit 4 Assessing the Psychological Impact of Disasters
Unit 5 Principles of Psychosocial Intervention Following
Disasters
Module 3
Unit 1 Social Capital Utilization and Preparedness for Natural

Disasters
Unit 2 Understanding Crisis
Unit 3 Crisis Intervention Goals and Steps
Unit 4 Crisis Intervention Assessment
Unit 5 Crisis Intervention Treatment Approaches and Techniques
Module 4
Unit 1 The Role of Microfinance in Disaster Settings

Unit 2 Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and their Consequences: A
Case Study of Hurricane Katrina
Unit 3 Domestic Threats and the Niger Delta Region Crisis
Unit 4 Hostage Taking and Negotiation
Unit 5 Youths Poverty and Unemployment
Course Material
The first module consists of five units, which will expose students and
readers to the conceptual definition of disaster and various approaches to
the management of riot and disasters. The units’ coverage includes
forms of emergency; emergency management history; riot and
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disturbance, control prevention procedures and emergency preparedness.

The second module of this course to various techniques for handling
unusual occurrences, organisational procedure and causes of civil
disturbances. The meaning and understanding of civil disturbances from
the social and criminological point of view shall be emphasised in order
to illuminate further on the issue at hand (Emergency, Riot and Disaster
Control Management). Agency approach and responsibility will also be
discussed.
The third module will provide useful information on emergency

management systems. Here the use of Geographic Information System
for disaster management will be examined. Fire fighting principles and
procedures in the course of youths’ uproar and other civil disturbances
will also be considered. The role of mass media in disaster management
is paramount in the twenty-first century world of which Nigeria has an
important role to play; hence particular emphasis will be placed on
various contributions in the past, present and future. This shall be done
by appraising media involvement within and outside the shores of the
nation. Knowing fully well that in Nigeria like most developing
countries the tasks of disaster management are usually ascribed to
Governmental agencies, care will be taken to examine Non-
Governmental efforts in the management of disaster and civil
disturbances, alongside the concerted efforts of government over time.
Text books, Journals and References
The following Text books, Journals are recommended to each student

taking the course
Introduction
Required Readings:
Haddow, G. D. & Bullock, J. A. (2003). Introduction to Emergency

Management. Amsterdam: Butterworth-Heinemann.
International Association of Emergency Managers (2007). Principles of

Emergency Management. IAEM Hand Book.
Haddow, George D., Jane A. Bullock and Damon P. Coppola. (2008).

“The Historical Context of Emergency Management.”
Introduction to Emergency Management. Third Edition.
Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. pp 1-26 (Chapter 1).
Kaplan, L. G. (1996). Emergency and Disaster Planning Manual. New

York: McGraw-Hill. Response and Recovery from Disasters.
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Required Readings:
Golam M. Mathbor (2007). Enhancement of community preparedness for

natural Disasters: The role of social work in building social
capital for sustainable disaster relief and management. Journal of
International Social Work Vol. 50; 357-369. Sage Publications:
London
Perry, Ronald W. and Michael K. Lindell (2007). “Disaster Response”

(Chapter 9) and Phillips, Brenda D. and David M. Neal
“Recovery” (Chapter 11) in Emergency Management: Principles
and Practice for Local Government. Second Edition. William
Waugh, Jr. and Kathleen Tierney (eds.) Washington, DC: ICMA
Press. pp 159-182 (Chapter 9) and pp 207-234 (Chapter 11).
Hazard Mitigation Strategies
Required Reading:
Lindell, Michael K., Carla S. Prater and Ronald W. Perry. (2006).

“Hazard Mitigation.” Chapter 7 in Fundamentals of Emergency
Management. Washington DC: Federal Emergency Management
Agency. pp 192-220 (Chapter 7).
Emergency Management Systems
Required Readings:
Hossain, H., C.P. Dodge and F.H. Abed (1992). From Crisis to
Development: Coping with Disasters in Bangladesh. Dhaka:
University Press.
Waugh, Jr., William. (2007). “Local Emergency Management in the

Post 9-11 World” and Rubin, Claire B. “Local Emergency
Management: Origins and Evolution.” both in Emergency
Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government.
Second Edition. William L. Waugh, Jr. and Kathleen Tierney
(eds.). Washington D.C.: ICMA Press. pp 3-37 (Chapters 1 and
2).
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Warning and Evacuation
Required Readings:
Fitzpatrick, Colleen and Dennis S. Mileti. (1991). “Motivating Public

Evacuation.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and
Disasters Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 137-152.
Mileti, Dennis S. and John H. Sorensen. (1990). “Building and

Evaluating a Warning System,” and “Organizational Aspects of
Warning Systems,” Communication of Emergency Public
Warnings: A Social Science Perspective and State of the Art
Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory for
FEMA.
Drabek, T. (2003). Strategies for coordinating disaster responses.

Boulder: University of Colorado, Natural Research and
Applications Information Centre.
Group disaster planning:
Required Readings:
Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Council of State

Governments. (2006). Assessing Your Disaster Public Awareness
Program. 36 pp. http://www.emaponline.org/?299
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Emergency Alert System.

(2002). Guide to Developing a Public Warning Plan to Serve
Local Areas. 9pp.
http://www.tab.org/documents/emergency-systems/eas-
guideforlocalplans.pdf
Erickson, Paul A. (2006). “The Emergency Response Plan.” Emergency

Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers.
Second Edition. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-
Heinemann. pp 65-94 (Chapter 3).
Role of Business and Non-Profit Agencies in Emergency

Management
Required Readings:
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2007). “Business

Community Response in Hurricane Katrina.” Chapter 11 in
Emergency and Risk Management Textbook. FEMA Emergency
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Management Institute Higher Education Project. (Chapter 11, 39

pp)
Waugh, Jr., William L. (2000). “The Involvement of Nonprofit and For-

Profit Organizations in Emergency Management.” Living With
Hazards, Dealing with Disasters. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. pp
44-47.
Kapucu, N and Van Wart, M.V. (2006). The Evolving Role of the
Public Sector in Managing Catastrophic Disasters: Lessons
Learned. Journal of Administration and Society Sage Publication.
Vol. 38; 279-308.
Media in Disasters
Required Reading:
Haddow, George D. and Kim S. Haddow (2009). “Disaster

Communications in a Changing Media World” (Chapter 2) and
“Principles of a Successful Communications Strategy”(Chapter
3) in Disaster Communications in a Changing Media World.
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. pp 23-44
(Chapter 2) and pp 45-65 (Chapter 3).
Dynes, R. R., & Quarantelli, E. L. (1977). Organizational

Communications and Decision Making in Crisis. Columbus: The
Ohio State University, Department of Sociology Disaster
Research Centre. Cohen, S., Eimicke, W., & Horan, J. (2002).
Catastrophe and the Public Service: A Case Study of the
Government response to the Destruction of the World Trade
Centre. Public Administration Review, 62, 24-32.
Social and Cultural Issues in Response and Recovery
Required Readings:

“Myths and Realities of Household Disaster Response.” Chapter
8 in Fundamentals of Emergency Management. Washington, DC:
Federal Emergency Management Agency. pp 221-243 (Chapter
8).
Phillips, Brenda D. (1993). “Cultural Diversity in Disasters: Sheltering,

Housing, and Long-Term Recovery.” International Journal of
Mass Emergencies and Disasters. Vol. 11, No. 1, pp 99- 110.
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Enarson, Elaine. (2007). “Identifying and Addressing Social

Vulnerabilities.” Chapter 13 in Emergency Management:
Principles and Practice for Local Government. Second Edition.
William Waugh, Jr. and Kathleen Tierney (eds.) Washington,
DC: ICMA Press. pp 257-278 (Chapter 13).
Fox, Fiona. (2001). “New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral

Banner for the 21st Century?” Disasters 25 (4): 275–89.
International Emergency Management
Required Reading:

“International Emergency Management.” Chapter 13 in
Fundamentals of Emergency Management. Washington, DC:
Federal Emergency Management Agency. pp 373-391 (Chapter
13).
Application of Information Technologies in Emergencies
Required Reading:
Cutter, Susan L., Christopher T. Emrich, Beverley J. Adams, Charles K.

Huyck, and Ronald T. Eguchi. “New Information Technologies
in Emergency Management.” Chapter 14 in Emergency
Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government.
Second Edition. William Waugh, Jr. and Kathleen Tierney (eds.)
Washington, DC: ICMA Press. Pp 279-298 (Chapter 14).
Financial and Human Resources Issues in Emergency Management
Required Readings:

“Emergency Management Standards and Evaluations.” Chapter
12 in Fundamentals of Emergency Management. Washington,
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency. pp 346-372
(Chapter 12).
Sylves, Richard T. (2007). “Budgeting for Emergency Management.”

Chapter 15 in Emergency Management: Principles and Practice
for Local Government. Second Edition. William Waugh, Jr. and
Kathleen Tierney (eds.) Washington, DC: ICMA Press. Pp 299-
318 (Chapter 15).
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World Bank (2006) ‘Social Capital’. Available online at:

www.web.worldbank.
org/wbsite/external/topics/extsocialdevelopment (accessed 18
August).
Assignment File
In this file students will find the necessary details of the assignments
they must submit to their tutor for assessment. The marks they get from
these assignments will form part of their final assessment in this course,
Assessment
There are two aspects to the assessment of the course: the tutor-marked
assignment, and the written examination. In tackling the assignments,
students are expected to apply information and knowledge acquired
during this course. The assignments must be submitted to their tutors for
assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the assignment
file. The work they submit to their tutors for assessment will count for
30% of their total course work. At the end of the course, students will
need to sit for a final three-hour examination. This will also count for
70% of the total course mark.
Tutor- Marked Assignment
There are twenty tutor-marked assignments in this course. Students need

to submit four assignments out of which the best three will be used for
assessment. These three assignments shall make 30% of the total course
work. Assignment question for the units in this course are contained in
the assignment file. Students should be able to complete their
assignments from the information and materials contained in the
recommended textbooks, reading and study units. However, students are
advised to use other references to broaden their knowledge and provide
a deeper understanding of the subject. Completed assignment should be
sent together with TMA (Tutored-marked Assignment) file to the tutors
as stipulated. The possibility of an extension can be discussed with
tutors or the study centre manager if the deadline could not be met.
Final Examination and Grading
The final examination of CSS791 shall be of three hours duration and

have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination shall
consist of questions which reflect the type of self-testing, practice
exercises and tutor-marked problems. All areas of the course will be
assessed. Students are advised to revise the entire course after studying
the last unit before they sit for the examination. They will find a review
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of their tutored-marked assignments and the comments of their tutors

very useful before the final examination.
Course Marking Scheme
This table shows an outline of the assessment and marks in the course.
Assessment Marks
Assignment 1-4 Four assignments are to be
submitted, out of which the three
best shall be considered at 10%
each, making 30% of the overall
scores
Final Examination 70% of overall course marks
Total 100% of course marks.
Table 1: Course Marking Scheme
Course Overview
The table brings together the entire units contained in this course, the
number of weeks that will be taken, and the assignments that follow
them.
Unit Title Week’s Assessment (end

Activity of unit)
Course Guide 1
Module 1
1 Emergency: Meaning and types 1 Assignment 1
2 Natural Disasters and Emergency 2 Assignment 2
Reconstruction
3 Emergency Management History 2 Assignment 3
4 Riot and Disturbance Control Prevention 3 Assignment 4
Procedures and Techniques
5 Causes of Prison Riots 4 Assignment 5
Module 2
1 Psychosocial Consequences of Disaster 5 Assignment 6
2 The Stages of Psychological Response to 6 Assignment 7
Disasters
3 Community and Social Impacts of 6 Assignment 8
Disasters
4 Assessing the Psychological Impact of 7 Assignment 9
Disasters
5 Principles of Psychosocial Intervention 7 Assignment 10
Following Disasters
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Module 3
1 Social Capital Utilization and 8 Assignment 11
Preparedness for Natural Disasters
2 Understanding Crisis 9 Assignment 12
3 Crisis Intervention Goals and Steps 10 Assignment 13
4 Crisis Intervention Assessment 11 Assignment 14
5 Crisis Intervention Treatment Approaches 11 Assignment 15
and Techniques
Module 4
1 The Role of Microfinance In Disaster 12 Assignment 16
Settings
2 Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and their 13 Assignment 17
Consequences: A Case Study of Hurricane
Katrina
3 Domestic Threats and the Niger Delta 14 Assignment 18
Region Crisis
4 Hostage Taking and Negotiation 15 Assignment 19
5 Youths Poverty and Unemployment Crisis 16 Assignment 20
Revision 17
Examination 18
Table 2: Course Overview
Presentation Schedule
The presentation schedule included in the course materials gives the

important dates for the completion of tutor-marked assignments and
attending tutorials. Students should remember to submit all their
assignments by the due date. They should guard against falling behind in
their work.
How to Get the Best from This Course
In distance learning the study units replace the university lecturer. This
is one of the great advantages of distance learning; in which students can
read and work through specially designed study materials at their own
pace, and at a time and place that suit their best. This is considered as
reading the lecture instead of listening to a lecturer. Like a lecturer
reading is instructions on the study units guide students on reading. Just
as a lecturer gives in-class exercises, the study units provide exercises
for students to do at an appropriate time. Each of the study units follows
a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter
of the unit and the course as a whole. Next is a set of learning
objectives. These objectives guide the students towards completing the
unit. Students should use these objectives to guide their study. When
students have finished the units, they must go back and check whether
they have actualised the objectives. If they have a habit of doing this
xvii
they will significantly improve their chances of passing the course. The
main body of the unit guides students through the required reading from
other sources.
Reading Section
Students should remember that they would be assisted by their tutor

whenever they need help. Students should:
1. Read this Course Guide thoroughly.
2. Organise a study schedule and refer to the ‘Course Overview’ for

more details. Note the time allotted to each unit and how the
assignments relate to the units. Whatever method they chose to
use, students should decide on and write in their own dates for
working on each unit.
3. Once they have created their own study schedule, do everything

they can to stick to it. The major reason why students fail is that
they get behind with their course work. If students get into
difficulties with their schedule, tutors should be informed before
it is too late for help.
4. Turn to unit 1 and read the introduction and the objectives for the
unit.
5. Assemble the study materials. Information about what is needed

for a unit is given in the ‘Overview’ at the beginning of each unit.
Students will almost always need both the study unit they are
working on and one of the books on their desk at the same time.
6. Work through the unit. The content of the unit has been arranged
to provide a sequence for follow up. As students work through
the units they will be instructed to read sections from your books
or other materials.
7. Review the objectives for each study unit for confirmation and
assurance.
8. When students are confident that they have achieved a unit’s

objectives, they can then start on the next unit and proceed unit
by unit through the course and try to pace their study on
schedule.
9. When students have submitted an assignment to their tutors for

marking, they should not wait for its return before starting on the
xviii
next unit. When the assignment is returned students should pay

particular attention to their tutor’s comments, both on the Tutor-
Marked Assignment Form and also on what is written on the
assignment. Consult your tutor as soon as possible if you have
any questions or problems.
10. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare
yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved
the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the
course objectives (listed in this Course-Guide).
Facilitators/Tutors and Tutorials
There are between eight (8) and twelve (12) hours of tutorials provided
in support of this course. The dates, time and venue of these tutorials
shall be communicated to you. The name and phone number of your
tutor will be made available to you immediately you are allocated a
tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments,
keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might
encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must
mail your tutor marked assignments to your tutor well before the due
date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by
your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible. Do not hesitate to
contact your tutor by phone, e-mail, or discussion board if you need
help. You will definitely benefit a lot by doing that. Contact your tutor
if:
• You do not understand any part of the study units or the assigned
readings;
• You have difficulty with the self-tests or exercises; and ;
• You have a question or problem with an assignment, with your
tutor’s comment on an assignment or with the grading of an
assignment.
You should make an effort to attend the tutorials. Thus, it is the only
opportunity you have to enjoy face contact with your tutor and to ask
questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem
encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefits
from the course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them.
You will learn a lot from participating in discussion actively.
Summary
CSS791 aims to expose you to issues, ideas and methodologies to

Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control as well as various techniques and
technological advancement in the management of emergency and social
xix
and cultural issues in response and recovery. As you complete this

course, you should be able to answer the following questions:
• Explain the meaning of riots and disaster as an emergency issues

• Assess and identify disasters prone areas in the country
- Assessment method
- The five-step risk process
- Matching the response to the threat
• Measuring risk
• Implement disaster avoidance strategies
- Ways of avoiding disasters by taking effective and preventive

actions
- Creating contingency plans for unavoidable threats
• Organize team structures for use in an emergency

• Create a recovery plan from the response to a disaster
• Identify appropriate strategies to recover the infrastructures/
• Respond to recovery scenarios
• Organize and manage recovery teams
• Test and maintain an effective recovery plan in a rapidly
changing technology environment
• And other issues such as youths and unemployment substance
use hostage taking deviance and criminality
Finally, you are advised to read the course material appreciably well in
order to prepare fully and not to be caught pants down by the final
examination questions. So, we sincerely wish you success in your
academic career as you will find this course (CSS791) very interesting.
You should always avoid examination malpractices!
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Course Code CSS791

Course Title Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control Management
Course Team Dr. R.A. Okunola (Developer/Writer) - UI

Dr. Adeniyi T. Adegoke (Co-developer/Co-writer) - NOUN
Dr. Akeem Akinwale (Editor) - UI
Dr. Adeniyi T. Adegoke (Coordinator) - NOUN
Dr. Olu Akewusola (Programme Leader) - NOUN

xxi

Headquarters
14/16 Ahmadu Bello Way
Victoria Island
Lagos
Abuja Office
No. 5 Dar es Salaam Street
Off Aminu Kano Crescent
Wuse II, Abuja
Nigeria
e-mail: centralinfo@nou.edu.ng
URL: www.nou.edu.ng
Published By:
First Printed 2010
ISBN:
All Rights Reserved
xxii
CONTENTS PAGE
Module 1 ………………………………………………………. 1
Unit 1 Emergency: Meaning and Types …………………… 1

Unit 2 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction …. 7
Unit 3 Emergency Management History …………………… 14
Unit 4 Riot and Disturbance Control Prevention Procedures
and Techniques ……………………………………… 26
Unit 5 Causes of Prison Riots……………………………….. 33
Module 2 ………………………………………………………. 40
Unit 1 Psychosocial Consequences of Disaster …………... 40

Unit 2 The Stages of Psychological Response to Disasters... 49
Unit 3 Community and Social Impacts of Disasters ………... 60
Unit 4 Assessing the Psychological Impact of Disasters …… 76
Disasters ……………………………………………... 85
Module 3 ………………………………………………………. 102
Unit 1 Social Capital Utilization and Preparedness for

Natural Disasters…………………………………… 102
Unit 2 Understanding Crisis ……………………………….. 112
Unit 3 Crisis Intervention Goals and Steps ……………….. 123
Unit 4 Crisis Intervention Assessment …………………….. 134
Unit 5 Crisis Intervention Treatment Approaches and
Techniques ………………………………………… 146
Module 4 ………………………………………………………. 162
Unit 1 The Role of Microfinance In Disaster Settings …… 162

Unit 2 Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their
Consequences: a Case Study of Hurricane Katrina... 176
Unit 3 Domestic Threats and the Niger Delta Region Crisis...191
Unit 4 Hostage taking and Negotiation ……………………. 202
Unit 5 Youths Poverty and Unemployment ……………… 216
xxiii
MODULE 1
Unit 1 Emergency: Meaning and Types

Unit 2 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction
Unit 3 Emergency Management History
Unit 4 Riot and Disturbance Control Prevention Procedures and
Techniques
Unit 5 Causes of Prison Riots
UNIT 1 EMERGENCY: MEANING AND TYPES
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Definition of Emergency
3.2 Emergency Types
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Emergency for a very long time has been an integral part of existence as
well as the greatest concern to humanity, irrespective of the level of
civilization- (developed, developing or underdeveloped); religious
affiliation-(Traditional, Christianity, Islam, Hindu etc); or political
inclinations-(democratic or undemocratic). Its importance to individuals,
groups, organizations, nations and the international community cannot
be overemphasized. Emergency occurrence in addition to its
management determines human existence along with extinction from the
surface of the earth. Its importance to preservation of humanity and
global system is found in the pre-eminence given to it by all nations in
the world with various agencies and organizations.
However, the last decades show that the world has witnessed
unprecedented and dramatic increase in the number of emergency
situations that have destroyed both lives and properties in large
magnitude whether natural or man-made. Perhaps the losses are not due
to the severity of the emergencies but rather due to poor or inadequate
management strategies by the affected societies and nations. Equally
their increasing occurrences and magnitude of destruction with reference
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to natural disasters are most often an aftermath of human actions and

inactions on the earth.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
• define and explain the term emergency and other related concepts
• identify various types of Emergencies.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
The word emergency emanated from the Latin word emergere or

mergere, meaning to rise out or move up, dive, or plunge. To a layman
the word emergency means sudden crisis requiring action. It is an
unexpected and sudden event that must be dealt with urgently. As a
result of the universality of disaster occurrences and destruction
associated with the concept nations, scholars and practitioners have
given different definitions to the concept and management strategies.
Some nations refers to emergency management as disaster or risk
management. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Risk Reduction (2004) defines disaster management as the systematic
process of using administrative decisions, organization, operational
skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping
capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of
natural hazards and related environmental and technological disasters.
This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-
structural measures to prevent or to limit (mitigation and preparedness)
adverse effects of hazards. Haddow and Bullock (2004) exchangeable
present emergency management as disaster or risk management. For
them it is the discipline of dealing with and avoiding risks. It is a
discipline that involves preparing for disaster before it occurs, that is
responding (e.g. emergency evacuation, quarantine, mass
decontamination, etc.), as well as supporting, and rebuilding society
after natural or hu man-made disasters have occurred. In general, any
Emergency Management is a continuous process by which all
individuals, groups, and communities manage hazards in an effort to
avoid or ameliorate the impact of disasters resulting from the hazards.
Each year, more than 700 major natural catastrophe events shatter lives,
destroy assets, and disrupt communities across broad geographic
regions, particularly in developing countries. What impact do these
natural disasters have on the development of poor countries? It is well
known that natural catastrophes cause sharp increases in poverty; what
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is uncertain is the extent of their long-term impact on the economic

viability of developing nations.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Define and explain Emergency
Emergency Types
Most emergency situations fall under two broad categories:
a. Natural and
b. Artificial Emergencies
Natural Emergency: Equally their increasing occurrences and magnitude

of destruction with reference to natural disasters are most often an
aftermath of human actions and inactions on the earth leading to climate
change. Climate Change or Global Warming is measurable increases in
the average temperature of the earth’s atmosphere, oceans, and
landmasses (Ayoade, 2003:6). Scientists believe earth is currently facing
a period of rapid warming resulting from the rising levels of heat-
trapping gases, known as greenhouse gases, in the atmosphere. Popular
natural disasters consist of mostly drought, earthquake, flood, famine,
forest fire, tsunami, hurricane and tornadoes etc. There is no continent in
the world that has not been a victim of at least two or more natural
disasters and Asia has been worst affected.
In the last few years, several earthquakes occurrences in China, Japan,

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Pakistan buttress this point. In North
America, Hurricane Katrina of 2006, the current forest fire incident, in
Australia; several snow and wildfires in Europe and numerous cyclones,
floods and landslides in South America also illustrates the severity and
spread of natural disasters globally. Statistic available shows that of the
ten top deadliest natural disasters that has ever occurred in the world,
eight are in Asia with a total death toll of over 100 million between 1900
and 2004 (Wikipedia, 2008) These disasters have not only caused
substantial loss of human lives and property, but also reduce the pace of
sustained economic development often leading to heavy drain of the
resources meant for developmental programmes and even threaten
collapse or overthrow of government. In the United States of America,
President George Bush government was criticized for late response to
Hurricane Katrina in Michigan which later affected support for his
government policies. More worrisome as observed by scholars is
national and international tensions and threats generated in the course of
natural disasters management in the contemporary world. In 2004, the
United States of America and India had security tussle over relief
3
administration during the tsunami disaster and similar problem occurred

in 2008 during earthquake in China, Pakistan, and Myanmar.
Africa is not an exception from natural disasters phenomena, although, it

is not ranked among the worst affected continent in the world.
Nevertheless, natural disasters have also increased in the continent
lately. However, though minor, the level of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) and other associated after-effects disaster problems seem
to be enormous due to lack of well institutionalized and coordinated
disaster management strategies and programmes. For example some of
the countries in West African sub-region had the following figures of
internally displaced persons arising from natural disasters: Mali-88,790,
Senegal- 23,235, Burkina Faso- 366,606, Liberia-115,380, Sierra Leone-
52, 000, Cote d’Ivoire- 545,100, Togo-12,500, and benin-25,500
(Abolurin, 2007:12). In addition, the number of people killed or affected
by natural disasters per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 for some selected
African countries are: Malawi-37,376, Niger-30,863, Zambia-10,666,
Djibouti-9859, Kenya-7497, Mozambique-7461(Ibid).
Even though the statistic for Nigeria is absent, the nation has also
witnessed natural disasters with high level of human and material loses
as well as displacement and other forms of suffering as an aftermath.
The absent of statistic in Nigeria per chance shows the value placed on
disaster issues in the country.
Artificial Disasters
Artificial disasters and their devastating consequences have also taken

place in different countries in the world. Studies by scholars show that
African countries seem to top the list in this category. Artificial
disasters are those disasters caused by human action, negligence, error,
or involving the failure of a system. Artificial disasters are in turn
categorized as technological or sociological. Technological disasters are
the results of failure of technology, negligence, carelessness or inability
of managing mechanical eventualities such as engineering failures,
transport disasters, or environmental disasters. Some of the major
globally recognized technological disasters are the Chernobyl chemical
discharge in Ukraine in 1986, various oil spills, aircrafts mishaps,
maritime, military equipments explosions, terrorist attacks, and various
occupational industrial accidents. Sociological disasters have a strong
human motive, such as criminal acts, stampedes, riots, and war. In
modern history, World Wars I and II and other international and national
wars fall within the viewpoint of sociological aspect. The current wars
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) and East Timor have resulted in high rates of human casualties
and material destructions. Most of these conflicts have been more
4
deadly than ever and even consume more lives and property than natural
disasters especially in Africa.
In the context of Artificial disasters,Africa maintain the lead owing to

conflicts arising from power struggle over land, positions etc.They arise
mostly from struggle or conflict over control of human and material
resources either by individuals, groups or nations as well as carelessness
or negligence. There is no country in the continent that has not
witnessed one form of sociological disasters or another. However,
Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan top the list with several years of wars
experiences. Report globally shows that between 1945 and 2005 of the
253 sociological orchestrated disasters (conflicts), over 50% took place
in Africa (Clements, 2005:4). The severity of human suffering and
destruction arising from these disasters has been worsening owing to
lack of effective and efficient disasters management agencies and
strategies.
Discuss some of the emergency situations you know and their

magnitude.
4.0 CONCLUSION
Africa, particularly Nigeria is not an exception from natural emergencies

especially as related to disasters phenomena, although it is not ranked
among the worst affected continent in the world. Nevertheless, natural
and artificial emergencies have also increased in the continent lately.
However, though minor, associated after-effects of disaster problems
seem to be enormous as a result of lack of well institutionalized and
coordinated disaster management strategies and programmes.
5.0 SUMMARY
In this unit, our focus has centred on describing and explaining the
meaning of the term emergency as it relates to disasters. Emphasis was
also made on the types of emergency situations; artificial emergency and
natural emergencies, and their magnitude in some countries. The writer
wishes to inform you that there are other definitions and related issues
on emergency around all other disciplines and life endeavours. Other
issues not discussed here can easily be found on the internet and other
scholarly materials recommended. In case you have any question
regarding any aspect of this study group for assistance please contact
your tutorial facilitator.
5
6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Write short note on emergency situations from the natural to artificial

emergencies.
7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING
Benson, Charlotte. and Edward J. Clay. (2000). "Developing Countries

and the Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters." In Alcira
Kreimer and Margaret Arnold, eds., Managing Disaster Risk in
Emerging Economies, Disaster Risk Management Series no. 2.
World Bank, Disaster Management Facility, Washington, D.C.
Gilbert, Roy. and Alcira Kreimer. (1999). Learning from the World
Bank’s Experience of Natural Disaster Related Assistance. World
Bank, Urban Development Division,Washington, D.C.
Otero, Romulo C. and Ricardo Z. Marti. (1995). "The Impacts of

Natural Disasters on Developing Countries: Implications for the
International Development and Disaster Community." In M.
Munasinghe and C. Clarke, eds., Disaster Prevention for
Sustainable Development: Economic and Policy Issues. Report
from the Yokohama World Conference on Natural Disaster
Reduction. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Ovosi, Sa'adatu (2008). Preventing Disaster in Nigeria.

www.allafric a.com. Ac cessed on 12 Febraury, 2009. Pretoria:
th
Government Printer.
Quarantelli, E.L. (1998). Where We Have Been and Where We Might

Go. What Is A Disaster? London: Routledge. pp146-159.
Red Cross. (1999). Jonathan Walter, (ed.). World Disasters Report.

International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies,
West Chiltington.
6
UNIT 2 NATURAL DISASTERS AND EMERGENCY

RECONSTRUCTION
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The most common natural disasters are recurrent rather than single
events: they strike the same nations repeatedly. When the devastation
caused by storms, floods, earthquakes and other natural disasters in
industrial and developing countries is compared, the injury and death
rates can be up to 100 times higher in the poorer developing countries.
Disaster prevention measures in industrial countries reduce the risk of
disaster damage, thereby making insurance rates affordable. Conversely,
in highly vulnerable areas of the developing world the certainty of
disaster precludes the laying-off of financial risk outside the vulnerable
area. Both the typically recurrent nature of disaster and the availability
of technological, social, and organizational remedies make disaster
response necessary for mitigation – policies and actions that are
intended to reduce the impact of the next disaster.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, students should be able to:
• highlight common natural disasters and their cause and effects

• explain why developing nations are not emergency ready
• discuss emergency reconstruction in the pre-post disaster period
and the way forward.
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3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Disasters
Various definitions of disasters have been given by scholars,

practitioners and disasters victims. However, despites different opinions
on the concept, one common denominator that seem to be paramount is
that disasters connote negative event leading to suffering and
destruction. Etymologically, the word disaster originates from the
French désastre and that from Old Italian disastro, which in turn comes
from the Greek Pejorative prefix δυσ-, (dus-) "bad" + αστήρ (aster),
"star" Henry Geoge Liddell and Robert Scott quoted in Susanna and
Oliver-smith, (2002). The root of the word disaster ("bad star" in Greek)
comes from an astrological theme in which the ancients used to refer to
the destruction or deconstruction of a star as a disaster. Hornby (2001)
defines disaster as an unexpected event such as a very bad accident, a
flood or fire that kills a lot of people or causes a lot of damages. In this
study, it is a sudden, accidental event that causes many deaths, injuries,
destruction of property, and poverty. It is also interchangeably used with
the word emergency. Both words refer to catastrophe, crisis, tragedy,
calamity, predicament and crunch. According to South African Disasters
Management Act (2002), disaster is a natural or artificial event,
occurring with or without warning, causing widespread human, material,
economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the
affected community or society to cope with its effects using only their
own resources. It further adds that disaster is a function of the risk
process. It results from the combination of hazards, conditions of
vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the
potential negative consequences of the disaster risk
Disaster could be natural or artificial. Common natural causes of

disasters include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes
tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, drought, wildfires, landslides and
avalanches. Artificial disasters comprise both technological and
sociological disasters. Some of its examples are airplanes, ships, or
railways, and vehicular mishaps. Other artificial disasters can be traced
to the collapse of buildings, bridges, tunnels, and mines or bombs
explosions and fires unintentionally triggered by humans, terrorism as
well as violent conflicts and war whether international or national
ethnic violence.
In contemporary academia, disasters are seen as the consequence of

inappropriately managed risk. These risks are the product of hazards and
vulnerability. Hazards that strike in areas with low vulnerability are not
considered a disaster, as is the case in uninhabited regions (Quarantelli,
1998). Disasters are determined by death toll and their effects on human.
8
The consequences of disaster cut across political, social and economic,

masses or elite, irrespective of the level of civilization- (developed,
developing or underdeveloped); religious affiliation-(Traditional,
Christianity, Islam, Hindu etc); or political inclinations- (democratic or
undemocratic). Researchers in disaster management assert that each
disaster strikes, deprives and deny victims of their source of livelihood,
basic needs such as food, healthcare and housing which cansnowball
into abject poverty. Observation also shows that world poorest nations
(countries with Gross Domestic Product less than $900 and per capita
income less than $1) are those worst affected by either natural or
artificial disasters. Afghanistan, Burundi, Niger, Somalia, Albania,
Yemen and East Timor top the list due to war and drought catastrophes
(CIA World Factbook, 2005). Developing countries suffer the greatest
costs when a disaster hits. According to World Bank (2004, more than
95 percent of all deaths caused by disasters occur in developing
countries, and losses due to natural disasters are 20 times greater (as a
percentage of GDP in developing countries than in industrialized
countries.
On the classification of disasters researchers for more than a century

have been studying disasters and for more than forty years disasters
research has been institutionalized through the Disaster Research
Center. The studies reflect a common opinion when they argue that all
disasters can be seen as artificial, their reasoning being that human
actions before the strike of the hazard can prevent it developing into a
disaster. All disasters are hence the result of human failure to introduce
appropriate disasters management measures (Wisner et al, 2004).
3.2 Emergency Reconstruction
Emergency must be an integral part of any strategy of both recuperation

and pre-disaster planning. Of course, the longer the return period, the
more difficult it often is for governments to justify the needed mitigation
investments. Lack of mitigation is an indicator of underdevelopment as
evident in most developing nations, one that the World Bank can help
overcome. While the consequences of disasters are not entirely
preventable it is often technically possible to mitigate them so that fewer
lives and less of the constructed environment are lost. Systems of
prediction and risk analysis and mapping for many types of natural
disaster are well developed, and with suitable institutions and adequate
resources catastrophe is avoidable. The problem in developing countries
often comes down to making difficult development choices from among
the many competing demands. Disaster mitigation, because it is a
periodic need rather than a constant one, tends to lose out to other
priorities – especially once the disaster has fallen out of the international
media and the immediate relief needs have been met.
9
National agencies and the World Bank should be involved in natural

disaster response from the outset. The use of consultative groups has
been particularly effective in mobilizing aid resources and facilitating
coordination in post-conflict situations. Consultative groups could also
be used for natural disaster operations. Front-end preparation, including
joint damage and needs assessments preparatory to consultative group
meetings and robust institutional arrangements, should be undertaken
before specific operations are put in place. Identifying strong local
leadership and project management offices is particularly important.
When disaster assessments are credible, and they include an assessment
of the economic and social impact of the event as well as a physical
needs assessment, countries ultimately mobilize more assistance than
would be the case with clearly exaggerated claims.
Ways must be found for other multilaterals to work together or in

parallel – in the short term – on a clearly defined set of activities
with the same eligibility requirements and benefits.
Other potential collaborators include those bilaterals that are accustomed
to post-disaster work.
Disaster management agencies should have sufficient authority to

make programming and implementation decisions in the field, and
experienced staff should be assigned to emergency operations. While
experienced staff commonly comes forward to assist in such operations,
there is no clear procedure for ensuring that the right staff are assigned.
Over the longer term, the Bank needs to ensure that it continues to
develop a cadre of experienced disaster professionals, and give them
assignments that allow for their rapid deployment. The development of
written guidelines for task managers confronting natural disasters should
also be a priority.
Reallocating resources from existing projects, the traditional

approach to emergencies affects the ability to attain long-term
development goals and is less effective than specific reconstruction
lending. While shifting resources from existing programs to
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts with very high rates of return
can be justified, experience has shown that new financing well designed
and managed by special disaster units that are authorized to respond
quickly tends to be used more effectively. Restructuring old projects is
often politically easier than new lending and allows the Bank to support
government entities that are already accustomed to working with the
Bank – but delivery by staff committed to the goals just abandoned is
often not effective and eventually proves not to be very good for the
programs the money has been earmarked.
1
Project design should be simple, based on extensive participation by

the local communities and beneficiaries, and take into account local
implementation capacity. More specifically, it should limit the number
of implementing agencies and the numbers of sectors involved, and
reduce the conditions placed on the lending. Implementation should be
flexible to ensure responsiveness to community needs and rapidly
changing conditions on the ground.
At the outset providing survivors with income earning opportunities

tied to physical work often seems to help as much as grief
counselling. In disasters that cause significant damage to housing,
taking the time to ensure that all usable building materials are recovered
and recycled is one way to ensure that the poor will be able to afford to
rebuild. Once work opportunities associated with rubble clearance and
materials recycling diminish, cash assistance targeted to affected
families (especially) as they wait for more permanent shelter is very
important – more important than providing food, blankets and clothing.
Indeed in most disasters sending in canned food and used clothing from
overseas is enormously counterproductive.
It is necessary to assess whether the reasons for relocation are

technically correct before planning to relocate people or entire
villages. Particularly when moving people away from coastal zones. The
tendency to return is almost irresistible. When relocating people away
from one risk, it is important to keep exposure to new risks in mind.
While it may be important to settle people away from flood-prone areas,
in situ reconstruction should be promoted after earthquakes to take
advantage of existing infrastructure and community facilities, while
minimizing resettlement and its attendant social dislocation. In situ
reconstruction has stimulated considerable self-help efforts in low-cost
reconstruction. It also provides a good opportunity to build on the
knowledge growing out of the experiences of other developing countries
as they face similar emergencies.
Reconstruction of damaged infrastructure is imperative, but

insufficient. It is equally important to identify local vulnerabilities and
determine how to reduce them in ways that lead to durable solutions.
The sustainability of infrastructure reconstructed after disaster is always
in doubt when long term measures to address disaster mitigation are
absent. Reaching agreement on the mitigation measures with the
government within the first three months is very important because it
gets much harder to get politicians to focus on disaster once the memory
of the emergency recedes. Once these agreements are reached they need
to get locked into some form of public commitment - so that people can
be reminded of it, and outcomes are usually better if some financing
mechanism for the mitigation measures is discussed and locked in.
11
Options to be considered (within the context of what is affordable)

include financial incentives, land use and management practices, a
review of land tenure patterns, upgraded building codes, training for
construction craftsmen, and other non-structural measures to lessen
vulnerability.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What are the necessary steps in emergency reconstruction?
4.0 CONCLUSION
Disasters are seen as the consequence of inappropriately managed risk.

These risks are the product of hazards and vulnerability. Hazards that
strike in areas with low vulnerability are not considered a disaster, as is
the case in uninhabited regions. The consequences of disaster cut across
political, social and economic, masses or elite, irrespective of the level
of civilization- (developed, developing or underdeveloped); religious
affiliation-(traditional, Christianity, Islam, Hindu etc); or political
inclinations- (democratic or undemocratic). It is against this background
that disaster management experts assert that each disaster strikes
deprives and deny victims of their source of livelihood, basic needs
such as food, healthcare and housing which snowball into lack and
abject poverty
5.0 SUMMARY
This unit examines the nature of disasters; natural or artificial.

Common natural causes of disasters include earthquakes, floods,
hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, drought,
wildfires, landslides and avalanches. Artificial disasters comprise both
technological and sociological disasters. Some of its examples were
given as airplanes, ships, or railways, and vehicular mishaps. Other
artificial disasters can be traced to the collapse of buildings, bridges,
tunnels, and mines or bombs explosions and fires unintentionally
triggered by humans, terrorism as well as violent conflicts and war
whether international or national ethnic violence among others. Various
steps necessary in emergency reconstruction were highlighted such as:
traditional approach to disaster management; technical decision in
emergency situations; community participation in disaster management;
the importance of reconstructing damaged infrastructure.
a. The concept of disaster to human life is inevitable. Discuss

b. List and discuss the concept of emergency reconstruction.
1
Quarantelli, E.L. (1998). Where We Have Been and Where We Might

Go. In: What is a Disaster? London: Routledge. pp146-159.
Susanna, M. H. and Anthony, Oliver-Smith. (2002). Catastrophe and

Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster. Eds. Santa Fe NM:
School of American Research Press.
Wisner, B. P.; Blaikie, T. Cannon and Davis, I. (2004). At Risk -

Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters. Wiltshire:
Routledge.
World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, (ed.). (1998). Disaster

Assistance. Précis, Autumn No. 174.
World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (2004). Natural

Disaster Study Database. Various Project Assessment Reports
and ICRs. Pan American Health Organization, PAHO, (October
2004). Disasters: Preparedness and Mitigation in the Americas.
News and Information for the International Community, Issue
No. 97.
11
UNIT 3 NATURAL DISASTER AND CIVIL

DISTURBANCES
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Civil Disturbances: Causes and Effect
3.2 Natural Disasters and Civil Disturbance: Similarities and
Differences
3.3 Natural Disasters and Emergency Reconstruction
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Civil disturbance(s) occurs regularly in society. Most times disturbances

are not envisaged or prepared for. For this reason it is necessary to note
that in as much as human wants are insatiable and complex; the
possibility of disturbances arising from action and inactions of some
individuals in position of authority, civil disturbances should always be
expected, be it mild or turbulent. Hence, the need to prepare and be
familiar with the warning signs, in knowing how and when to curb,
curtail, avoid, minimise or civil disturbances in case of occurrence or
avoiding or minimising the catastrophic effect. In agitating for this study
will throw more light on the meaning of civil disturbances, causes and
effect and other related aspect of civil disturbances
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• meaning of civil disturbances, causes and effects and mitigation

• the relationship between civil disturbances and emergency
management.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Civil Disturbances: Causes and Effects
Civil unrest is the result of groups or individuals within the population

feeling, rightly or wrongly, that their needs or rights are not being met,
either by the society at large, a segment thereof, or the current
1
overriding political system. When this results in community disruption

of a nature where intervention is required to maintain public safety it has
become a civil disturbance. Civil disturbance spans a wide variety of
actions and includes, but is not limited to: labour unrest; strikes; civil
disobedience; demonstrations; riots; prison riots; or rebellion leading to
revolution. Triggers could include: racial tension; religious conflict;
unemployment; a decrease in normally accepted services or goods, such
as extreme water, food, or gasoline rationing; or unpopular political
actions such as wars: civil and non civil. (www.wa.gov/doc)
Communal riots are types of disorders that are classified by direct
battles between groups. Commodity riots are disorders that stress the
economic and political distribution of power among groups.
Hazard Identification
Civil disturbances, while possible in any area where people live,

typically occur presently in areas of dense population. The more
urbanized a country is, the greatest potential for ethnic and racial
tension, labour strife, organized demonstrations, and riots. Different
disturbances will focus around different centres of the community.
Labour disturbances will tend to happen at individual companies that are
being struck, or during marches in support of the workers. Anti-abortion
violence will happen around Planned Parenthood offices, or medical
facilities that condone or perform abortions. Ethnic and racial violence
will tend to happen in areas with high minority populations, especially
when combined with high unemployment and/or other signs of poverty
or low social/economic class. Violent confrontations can happen at
universities especially during periods of protest against governmental
policy, university policy, or during and after sporting events. Religious
disturbances are also common place in countries where there are two
dominants divide.
In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, the Boko-Haram incidents, the 2009 Christmas suicide
bombing attempts, there are the potentials for an elevated level of
religious and ethnic strife. It could lead to an increase in hate crime
against those who are believed to be foreigners, especially against those
who manifest a “Middle Eastern” appearance. In areas of the Country
with a lower population density, there are continued complaints from
citizens that their rights are being violated through land use regulations,
that their needs are being ignored, and that the more urbanized areas get
most of the benefits. While much of this discontent is unorganized, the
potential for civil disturbance is there.
11
Vulnerability Analysis
Large cities are the most highly vulnerable areas for civil unrest and
civil disturbances. This does not imply that rural areas are exonerated.
However, as cities grow, their vulnerability also increases.
Demonstrations, strikes, riots or other forms of civil disturbance could
disrupt the commerce of a Country. Highways and other portions of the
infrastructure could be adversely affected. Businesses could be forced to
close, and the economic impact to the region could be severely affected.
A longshoreman’s (dockworkers) strike could cripple the Ports cities of
Lagos; Port-Harcourt; Calabar and Warri.
Some issues that could potentially flare up include, but are not limited
to: conflict between anti-abortion demonstrators, gay rights campaigners
and pro-choice advocates; military intervention overseas allowing all the
anti- war groups to find a cause to rally large support around; labour
strikes; disorder resulting from a controversial arrest or verdict; and
white supremacy and neo-Nazi movements, which includes the potential
for backlash and other activities.
History has shown that overcrowding in prisons or jails is the main

cause of prison uprisings. This should not be the case with any of the
very small facilities. However the possibility could arise within the
larger facilities. Most prisons in Nigeria for years have had problem
with overcrowding. This has led to the agitation by various human right
activists and NGOs for the construction and expansion of prison
facilities and the adoption of other modern corrective measures such as
work release facilities and halfway houses. This should alleviate the
overcrowding in the largest of the correction facilities in the County.
Effects
Civil disturbance can, in extreme cases, cause:
1. Extensive social disruption,

2. Loss of jobs,
3. Death, and
4. Property damage.
These may result either from those involved in the action or initiated by
those in higher authority in response to what they perceive as a threat to
either the status quo or their own authority. In addition, the government
may also curtail certain civil liberties even to the eventual imposition of
martial law. At the request of the Nigerian Military Government (headed
by General Ibrahim Babangida), military men were sent into the street to
1
shoot at sight anybody demonstrating to restore order during the 1985

SAP riots as well as other riots
Looting and general vandalism are the most common activities

associated with civil disturbance. Fire setting is also quite common and
can quickly spread due to slow response times of overwhelmed fire
departments. Transportation routes can become blocked making it
difficult for non-rioters to leave the area and difficult for the emergency
response personnel to arrive. Long-term effects may include a local
depressed economy, environmental damage, social disruption, and long
lasting animosity between the contending groups.
Mitigation
The variable nature of civil unrest demands a cautious approach to the

actual situation. In order for society at large to prevent or mitigate civil
unrest it must be responsive to social problems inherent in the
community. As conditions that could lead to widespread civil unrest
arise, the prevailing authorities must monitor the situation and then plan
and execute whatever actions are needed in order to lessen the tension
and/or resolve the dispute.
The ability to respond quickly to civil disturbances is a crucial

mitigative act for both emergency practioners and the general public.
Thus, emergency response agencies should plan and train for such
events.
Current mitigation efforts vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,

therefore it include both not limited to:
a. Maintaining a list of local community contacts or leaders who are

available to assist when strife or controversial events effect the
community;
b. Making sure there is an accurate and timely release of critical

information to the public through a designated public information
officer;
c. Developing a disorder response team of personnel who are

specially trained to intervene before minor disturbances escalate;
d. Meeting with leaders of labour disputes before they escalate into

strike or illegal activities;
11
e. Holding meetings with members of the local community to listen

to their concerns, both on a regular basis, to develop community
trust, and when tensions arise.
Identify some of the basic ways of combating civil disturbances
3.2 Natural Disasters and Civil Disturbance: Similarities and

Differences
The classification of the dimensions of disasters calls for attention to a

generic class of social phenomena in stress situations (Barton, 1970:37,
47). Under this rubric a wide variety of events such the sudden death of
a head of state, earthquakes, ghetto riots, the economic decline of cities,
explosions, political purges, air bombings, and the status deprivation of
untouchables in a caste system. In addition to suggesting this general
typology of collective stress situations, it is important to outline some of
the dimensions upon which it is based:
a. Scope of impact
b. Speed of onset
c. Duration of the impact and
d. Social preparedness
From these basic dimensions it becomes obvious that there are

similarities and differences, hence this outline seeks among others to
note some of the essential similarities and differences between two of
the major types of collective stress events, that is, natural disasters and
civil disturbances. There are similarities. For example, each produces a
large number of sudden demands which threaten and/or disrupt the
normal flow of community activities and each often creates an
imbalance in the social systems involved. This disequilibrium is
collectively perceived as a threat to the community by its members, and
as a consequence they set in motion a wide range of activities designed
to restore a systemic balance. Apart from this basic similarity, there are
a number of fundamental differences between events such as floods,
earthquakes, hurricanes, and so forth, and civil disturbances.
They have different patterns of origin, warning, scope and duration.

And, in addition, they occur within differing consensual contexts. As a
result of these differences, they produce differing demands on the
communities in which they occur. In this unit we examine these
similarities and differences in the context of their most common
sequential development:
1
Origin
One of the fundamental differences between all natural disasters and

civil disturbances is the origination of the stressful agent. Earthquakes,
tsunamis, hurricanes, floods and similar events arise in a community’s
physical environment while disturbances have their origins in the
thoughts and behaviours of people and social groups. Natural disasters
arise from non-social forces which are external to a community’s social
systems; civil disturbances emerge from social sources internal to the
system. Natural disasters occur as purposeless, asocial events; civil
disturbances can be viewed as instrumentally initiated to achieve certain
social goals which are in conflict with those of the wider society
(Geschwender, 1971). It is important to state here that civil disturbances
have a profound effect on a community and its emergency subsystems in
terms of response and recovery.
Warning
Another difference between some natural disasters and civil

disturbances is the type and amount of warning each affords. Drabek
and Stephenson (1971), and Mileti (1975) have noted the crucial role
that warning plays in a community’s response to a disaster event. Many
types of natural disasters provide definite clues to the likelihood of their
occurrence; some of these are general in character, while others are quite
specific. Hurricanes, for example, can be monitored, their speed
measured and course determined; tsunamis can be reasonably predicted
to follow severe earthquakes, and floods can be projected on the basis of
meteorological and geographical factors. Civil disturbances, on the other
hand, are more like earthquakes in what they provide little or no specific
advance warning, and their occurrence is difficult to predict even when
some general conditions known to be associated with them are prevent.
Because of their unpredictability, civil disturbances pose serious for a
community as it attempts to deal with the problems created by the
emergency.
Duration
The duration of the collective stress situation is also extremely important

in evaluating the impact it will have on a community and on the amount
of time and resources required to return the community to some
semblance of its pre-impact state. The duration of the disaster agent in
natural disaster agent in natural disasters varies widely; tornadoes and
earthquakes are usually over in a matter of minutes, hurricanes may last
several days. Major civil disturbances are probably more like floods
than any of the other natural disasters, since they tend to last for several
11
days and are marked by unpredictable alterations in location and

intensity (Abudu et. al, 1972).
Variations in the duration of a collective stress agent are important to

note since they affect the ability of a community to deal with the
emergency. When the duration of the disaster agent is brief, such as in
an earthquake or tornado, it takes community leaders a relatively short
time to define the disaster situation, establish priorities and allocate the
resources necessary to meet the demands created by the disaster agent.
When the collective stress agent persists in a highly unpredictable
fashion overtime, as in a major civil disturbance, it is difficult to arrive
at a single and statistical definition of the emergency situation, the
establishment of priorities becomes an ongoing process, the allocation of
resources must be constantly reappraised and there is a great need for
inter-organisational coordination and integration as first one
organisation and then another has the resources relevant to the
community’s recovery. The unpredictability of human behaviour (the
stressful agent) during civil disturbances is a significant problem for
those attempting to deal with the crises being created. The human,
volitional, anti-social dimension is rarely, if ever, a salient factor in
community responses to natural disasters.
Scope
The scope of the two kinds of collective stress situations also varies. The
threat posed by large floods, tornadoes, hurricanes or earthquakes tends
to be a generalised one which affects or threatens the entire community.
A typical example is the Fairbanks, Alaska flood of 1967.
Transportation, communications, public services and most other
community functions were severely disrupted for several days; more
than 90 percent of the residents of the city were housed in public
shelters at one time (Warheit, 1968). Civil disturbances, by contrast,
have characteristically been confined to relatively small sections of the
cities in which they have occurred. This is true even when the riots are
defined as major ones. Although there may be perceived threat on the
part of those outside the site of disturbance, the burning, looting, and
snipping as the case may be is generally confined to very limited areas.
Ironically those most immediately affected by civil disturbances are
frequently residents of the same area as those actively involved in
creating and sustaining it.
Community Contexts
As noted, the origins of natural disasters and civil disturbances differ

markedly: natural disasters arise in the physical environment from
asocial causes, while the community crises caused by the civil
2
disturbances which occurred during the 1960s in the United States were
social acts which represented violations of the dominant norms of life
and property held by the wider society. These differing origins produce
two distinctively different normative contexts. Natural disasters create a
social context marked by an initial overwhelming consensus regarding
priorities’ and the allocation of resources. This consensus is so pervasive
that it frequently sweeps away, at least temporarily, long-established
hostilities and divisions (Wenger and Parr, 1969). Individuals, small
groups and community organisations unite in a common assault on the
problems created by the disaster event. Often the efforts of individuals
and informal, emergent groups are so pervasive that the primary tasks
associated with search and rescue are completed before the community’s
formal emergency organisations get mobilised. This outpouring of
citizen response is so extensive that it sometimes poses problems (eg.,
traffic control, the fragmentation of resources and overloaded
communications) for the official emergency organisations in the
community.
This is not to say that everyone in an affected community wishes to have

it returned to its former condition. Fritz (1961) has noted that even in
natural disasters, some groups may perceived the disruption of the social
situation created by the disaster as desirable and may attempt to use it to
effect changes in the social order. This desire was, of course, a
component of the community crises created by the civil disturbances.
This is however a basic difference between the latent aspects of social
change implicit in natural disasters and the manifest and explicit desire
for change associated with civil disturbances.
Civil disturbances, unlike natural disasters, reflect, intensify and

produce a basic dissensus in the communities in which they occur. Thus,
there are times such normative conflict inherent in civil disturbances
represents an impediment to the community’s recovery, since it militates
against the vast outpouring of individual and small group response from
the general public. And importantly, those officially responsible for
dealing with the emergency are harassed by persons and groups in the
disturbance area. Most often, the organisations (governmental and non-
governmental) functioning in the affected sections of the community
during civil disturbances are backed by the police, military and fire
departments.
The varying normative contexts which constitute the operational climate

within which a community’s emergency sub-system functions is perhaps
the most important differences between natural disasters and civil
disturbances. This is true because the differing social definition of the
event evoke dissimilar community responses.
21
Organisational Responses
Closely related to the problems associated with the differing normative

contexts in which community recovery takes place is the problem of
defining appropriate organisational behaviour. The task of defining the
collective stress situation and the response a community’s emergency-
relevant organisations ought to make is much simpler in natural disasters
than the civil disturbances. Following the onset of a natural disaster, the
community’s emergency organisations and public agencies have a clear
mandate: to rescue and treat the injured, locate, remove and identify the
dead, aid the victims and restore the community to a state of normality
as quick as possible.
Police and other social control agencies are also faced with a number of
highly ambivalent situations during civil disturbances. Probably the
most difficult decision confronting them is that of defining the
appropriate responses to crowd behaviour. Under normal conditions,
police would not hesitate to arrest or perhaps kill individuals engaged in
felonious activities; this not only within the province of their
organisational domain, but is sometimes expected of them. However,
when confronted with crowds of people, including women and children,
engaged in a wide spectrum of illegal activities ranging from
misdemeanours to felonies, it is sometimes difficult for police to define
their appropriate responses. For example does one shoot a looter
regardless of the value of the property being taken; and what about
arsonist? Does the age or the sex of the looter make a difference? What
about onlookers? These and similar questions plagued police officials
during major disturbances in Nigeria like any other society. In light of
these problems, which for the most part grew out of the unstructured
social situation created by the disturbance, governmental and other
organisational officials had to come to a definition of the emergency
situation which would enable police and other social control forces to
restore order. The declaration of a state of emergency and the
establishment of a curfew becomes the techniques of definition. Once
put into effect, these mechanisms clearly delineate the boundaries of
behaviour for both social control agencies and citizens; anyone on the
streets during certain hours would be subject to legal sanctions including
arrest, and under certain circumstances would be liable to be shot (for a
more vivid clarification read about the 1965 Watts disturbance, and
1967 Detroit disturbances).
The Evaluative Response
In both natural disasters and civil disturbances, there is always a period

after the crisis had passed, when community officials, high-ranking
officers in emergency organisations and public citizens evaluate the
2
causes and extent of the emergency, as well as the performance of those

organisations charged with the responsibility of dealing with it. This
period is marked with the assigning of blame and praise and by efforts
on the part of public officials and organisational personnel to justify
their actions or inactions.
4.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of the analysis in this unit, it is possible to conclude that

differing types of stressful agents produce contrasting kinds of
community responses. Moreover, these differential responses can be
attributed to the characteristics of the events, i.e., the amount of warning
given, their scope and duration, and to the normative context produced
by the emergency. Although these differences exist, there are also some
similarities present in both types of collective stress situations. Both
elicit organised context produced by the emergency. Although these
differences exist, there are also some similarities present in both types of
collective stress situations. Both elicit organised community responses
that is vigorous efforts are made to restore the community as quick as
possible to some semblance of its pre-crisis state and a period of
assessment follows the emergency at which time an evaluation is made
of what was done during the crisis.
5.0 SUMMARY
Civil disturbances occur when a group of individuals disrupt essential

functions, damage property, or threaten the well being of other
individuals. Large-scale civil disturbances rarely occur. Situations that
spawn civil disturbances include: Labour disputes with a high degree of
animosity between the dissenting parties; High profile or controversial
judicial proceedings; Implementation of controversial laws or other
governmental actions; Resource shortages because of catastrophic
events; Disagreements between special interest groups; Perceived unjust
death or injury of a person held in high regard by a particular segment of
society. Civil disturbances can expand to cover large portions of a
community and include individuals not associated with the initial
conflict. Areas particularly vulnerable to civil disturbances include
government buildings, military installations, universities, controversial
businesses, service providers, and critical service facilities such as
police and fire stations. Sports arenas and facilities for large gatherings
can also be vulnerable. Prison uprisings are also a form of civil
disturbance. Response to and recovery from civil disturbances involves
many community agencies and the general public corporations.
21
1. Succinctly elucidate the basic similarities and differences

between civil disturbance and disasters.
2. What are the basic assumption to be considered before embarking
on a response mission?
Abudu, M. (1972). Black Ghetto Violence: A Case Study Inquiry into

the Spatial Patterns of Four Los Angeles Riot-Event Types.
Social Problems, 19: 408-426.
Anderson, W. (1969). Disaster and Organisational Change, Disaster

Research Centre Monograph Series No.6. Columbus: Disaster
Research Centre, Ohio State University.
Barton, A. H. (1970). Communities in Disaster: a Sociological Analysis

of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday and Co.,
Inc.
Drabek, T., and Stephnson, J.S. (1971). When Disaster Strikes. Journal
of Applied Social psychology 1, 187-203.
Dynes, R.R. and Quarantelli, E.L. (1967). What Looting in Civil

Disturbances Really Means. Transaction (May), 9-14.
Fritz, C., and Marks, E.S. (1961). Disaster. In R.K Merton and R.A
Nisbet,( eds.)., Contemporary Social Problems: an Introduction to
the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour and Social Disorganisation.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
Geschwender, J., (ed.). (1971). The Black Revolt. Eaglewood Cliffs,

New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Gurr, T.R. (1968). Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative

Study of Civil Strife. American Behavioural Scientist 11, 50-55.
Parr, A. (1970). Organisational Response to Community Crisis and

Group Emergencies. American Behavioural Scientist 13. 423-
429.
WHO (1999). The World Health Report 1999. Geneva.
WHO (2000a). A Corporate Strategy for the WHO Secretariat. Geneva.
2
WHO (2000b). The World Health Report 2000. Geneva.
WHO (2001). General Programme of Work: 2002-2005. Geneva.
WHO/AFRO (2000a). The Priority Domains for WHO/AFRO. Harare.
WHO/AFRO. (2000b). Health-for-All Policy for the 21st Century in the

African Region: Agenda 2020. Harare.
WHO/AFRO (2001a). Blood Safety: A Strategy for the African Region.

Harare.
WHO/AFRO (2001b). Health Promotion: A Strategy for the African

Region. Harare.
WHO/AFRO (2001c) WHO Work in the African Region: Strategic

Frame work. Harare.
UNAIDS (2000). AIDS epidemic update: December 2000. Geneva.
UNDP (2000). Human Development Report 2000. Oxford: University of

Oxford Press.
21
UNIT 4 THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR

AND PRISON RIOT
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.2 Emergency Types
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Collective behaviour is “a type of social behaviour that occurs in crowds

and masses (Johnson 2000). Collective behaviour deals with the way
behaviours emerge as a response to problematic situations (Marshall,
1998). Collective behaviour includes crowds, riots, fads, disasters,
panics, and social movements. To better understand civil disturbances
such as these, it is therefore important to study collective behaviour,
because knowledge of crowd behaviour and social movements can
reduce loss of life and injury and help prevent conflict from rising in a
destructive way. Most of the loss of life during civil disorders is caused
by control agents who overreact because they lack experience in crowd
control.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• understand the term collective behaviour and the six predisposing

factors for occurrence of collective behaviour.
• comprehend major theories of collective behaviour.
• have a better understanding of prison riots.
• discuss factors that cause prison break.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Theories of Collective Behaviour and Social Disorder
Collective behaviour is “a type of social behaviour that occurs in crowds

and masses” Collective behaviour deals with the way behaviours emerge
2
as a response to problematic situations. Collective behaviour includes

crowds, riots, fads, disasters, panics, and social movements. There are
different types of collective behaviour that emerge from a crowd.
Collective behaviour can range from violent mobs and riots to harmless
fads and fashions. The type of collective behaviour examined in this
thesis is riots. A riot is “an outbreak of illegal violence against changing
targets committed by individuals expressing frustration or anger against
people or property” (Ballantine and Roberts, 2007). These outbreaks are
often noisy and full of confusion. Riots typically start because of a sense
of deprivation. Hunger, poor housing conditions, discrimination, or an
unfair government are all factors that can start a riot.
One theory of collective behaviour that is particularly relevant to an

understanding of prison riots is the Minimax Theory. The minimax
theory, also referred to as game theory, is based on the principle that
individuals try to minimize their losses and maximize their benefits.
According to this theory, people are more likely to engage in risky
behaviour if they feel that the rewards outweigh the costs. The Minimax
strategy is based on the principles of rational choice theory. The basic
idea of rational choice theory is that patterns of behaviour in society
reflect the choices made by individuals as they try to maximize their
benefits and minimize their costs. In other words, people make decisions
about how they should act by comparing the costs and benefits of
different courses of action (Scott, 2000). In 1921, French
mathematician, Emile Borel, had the original idea for the minimax
theory, which was developed further by John Von Neumann in 1928
(Heims, 2008). In a prison scenario, prisoners might become involved in
a riot if they believe that the perceived outcome of the riot will be more
satisfying than their current situation.
A second theory of collective behaviour relevant to understanding

prison riots is the Emergent Norm Theory, developed by Ralph Turner
and Lewis Killian in 1957. The emergent norm theory addresses the
breakdown of norms where collective behaviour occurs. According to
this theory, each individual in a crowd has different emotions and
attitudes that help influence their behaviour. In a crowd situation,
individuals tend to look to others for clues about how to act and what is
acceptable (Ballatine and Roberts 2007:499). According to Turner and
Killian (1991), when a crowd comes together, there is no norm and no
leader in control of the crowd. The attention of the crowd is instead
drawn towards those that act in a unique manner. This unique behaviour
slowly emerges as the norm. As time passes, the norm becomes well
accepted and there is pressure from the crowd to conform to the new
norm (Turner and Killian 1991). If similar interests draw people
together, distinctive patterns of behaviour will emerge in the crowd
(Aguirre et. al., 1998). In a prison scenario, unique actions such as
21
yelling and fighting become the norm. The crowd then conforms to the
norm and yelling and fighting become accepted behaviour. The third
theory of collective behaviour is the Value-Added Theory developed
by Smelser (1962).
According to the value-added theory, there are six necessary factors for
collective behaviour. The first factor is structural conduciveness. This
means that there must be an existing problem that creates a possibility
for change. The second factor is structural strain, which occurs when the
current social structure is not meeting the needs or expectations of the
citizens and there is widespread dissatisfaction with current
arrangements. The third factor is the spread of a generalized belief.
Common beliefs about the cause, effect, and solution of the problem
must spread through the population. The fourth factor is the
precipitating factor, or what pushes people over the line. A dramatic
incident occurs and it incites people to take action. The fifth factor of the
value-added theory is the mobilization for action. Leaders come forward
and set a path of action, or an emergent norm develops that stimulates
common action in a population or crowd. The final factor in the theory
is the failure of social control. If police, military, or leaders are unable to
stop the crowd, a social movement is likely to occur. According to the
value-added theory, when all six factors are present, some sort of
collective behaviour will occur (Smelser, 1962).
Describe how relevant collective behaviour theories are to the study of

social disorder
3.1.1 Prison Riot as a Form of Social Disorder
In a prison scenario, the above mentioned six factors must be present for
there to be a prison riot. Due to their intense structural conditions, total
institutions are a common site for collective behaviour. A total
institution is “a place where people are bureaucratically processed, while
being physically isolated from the normal round of activities, by being
required to sleep, work, and play within the confines of the same
institution” (Marshall 1998). A total institution keeps people away from
the public when they are considered not suitable to live in society. Some
examples of total institutions are mental hospitals, concentration camps,
boarding schools, monasteries, and prisons. Erving Goffman, arguably
one of the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century,
described prisons as a type of total institution that is organized to protect
the community against intentional dangers to the public (Goffman,
1959). Life in a total institution is very different than life outside the
institution. In a prison, inmates’ individual possessions are stripped
2
away and the feeling of one’s own identity is lost (Goffman, 1959).
Inmates’ clothes and possessions are taken upon entering the prison.
Nothing from the outside is allowed in. Any personal property that is
found therein leads to severe punishment. Prisoners are given new
clothing that matches every other inmate. In addition, these clothes are
clearly marked as belonging to the prison. Personal hygiene items are
also provided by the prison. Perhaps the most significant identity
possession taken is one’s name. Names are replaced by numbers.
Prisoners are then referred to as a number (Goffman, 1959).
Personal identity is not the only identity lost in a total institution. A

prisoner’s cultural identity is also restricted. One factor of cultural
identity that is restricted by prison rules is a prisoner’s religion. Religion
can protect values within the community and promote a sense of
belonging (Bhugra and Becker, 2005). In prisons, there is no preferential
treatment for inmates with specific religious beliefs. For example, the
Islamic faith has many religious duties and restrictions that are required
by Islamic law. It is forbidden for Muslims to eat ram or pork in any
form, even pork fat used in cooking (Ammar et. al., 2004). Prisons will
not cook food separately, so Muslims either have to eat it or go without.
Every Muslim is also required to pray five times each day at specific
times and to wash their hands, head, face, and feet before prayer. Also,
according to the Islamic faith, every Muslim should have access to the
Koran. In prisons, it is not practical to accommodate these requirements,
especially when outside material is not allowed inside.
Language and leisure activities are also significant to one’s cultural

identity and are restricted upon entering an institution. Immigrant
inmates’ cultural differences may be lost during the assimilation
process. For example, non-English-speaking Hispanic inmates in
American institutions must learn to speak English in order to fit in.
Leisure activities, including, sports, music, movies, and literature, are all
significant parts of one’s culture. Inmates in prison are very limited in
the activities they are allowed to take part in. Watching movies or
listening to music is a privilege that is not easily earned. Instead,
inmates are forced to live very boring lives. For example, inmates are
allowed only minimal time outside of their cells for exercise. Most
inmates’ days are spent locked in a cell. In a total institution, the entire
day is structured and the routine rarely changes. In the book, ‘The
Making of an Inmate’, Cordilia (1983) describes inmates in a total
institution: “The fact that they must constantly follow orders makes
some inmates compare themselves to robots. They also commonly
compare themselves to children. Like children, they lack freedom”.
There is a set time to wake up, a set time to eat, a set time for bathing, a
set time for recreation, if allowed, and a set time to go to bed. Inmates
feel great frustration at the powerlessness over their own lives.
21
Expressing those feelings, however, can come at a great cost. Inmates

who recognize the power the system holds over their lives tend to go
along with the situation, at least on the outside.
Inmates are completely at the mercy of those in charge; inmates who act
against the rules of the prison are subject to punishment. Prisoners are
often subjected to physical and verbal abuse from guards or other
members with power. For example, in 1967, Arkansas prison, in the U.S
officials were found guilty of crimes such as pushing hypodermic
needles under the fingernails of inmates, as well as beatings with
everything from fists to knotted ropes and shovel handles, to rubber
hoses and straps of leather five feet long. There was also torture with
pliers and burning with cigarettes (Goldfarb and Singer 1972). A less
extreme version of physical abuse includes inmates being forced to bend
over and hold their body in a humiliating pose or provide humiliating
verbal responses (Goffman, 1959:22). One form of physical abuse that is
frequently used today is confinement of inmates in isolation, or the
“hole.” A prisoner is sent to isolation for allegedly breaking the rules or
causing trouble. Isolation consists of a small concrete cell with very
little light and no ventilation. More common than physical abuse is
verbal abuse. Staff frequently call inmates obscene names, curse them,
point out negative attributes, and tease them.
In many cases, inmates do not report abuse because of the “prison

code.” The prison code, or convict code, is a formalized value system of
norms that emphasize group cohesion. Studies of inmate subculture in
the 1950s revealed increasing cooperation between inmates and the
staff. Stastny and Tyrnaur (1982) observe that studies of prison life
suggest that prison code can be classified into five major themes. First,
do not interfere with inmate interests. Basically, never tell on a prisoner.
Be loyal to your class, the convicts. Second, do not lose your head. Play
it cool and do your own time. Third, do not exploit inmates. Do not
break your word, do not steal from the cons, do not sell favours, and do
not be a swindler or a cheat. Fourth, do not show weakness. Do not
whine, and do not cry guilty. Be tough; be a man. Lastly, do not be a
sucker. Stay sharp. Do not commit to values imposed by guards (Sykes
and Messinger, 1975). Even though prisoners extremely dislike prison
guards, the two actually need each other and exist in a collaborative
reality. According to the inmate-balance theory, developed by Charles
Tittle in 1995, there is a mutual relationship between inmates and
authorities. Todd Clear, one of America’s leading experts in the study of
corrections, describes the inmate-balance theory as, “A prison system
where officials must tolerate minor infractions, relax security measures,
and allow inmate leaders to keep order, in order for the prison to operate
effectively” (Clear et. al., 2000:321). This relationship allows inmates
more freedom to engage in illegal activities, such as gambling and
3
sexual intercourse. In exchange, inmates will “police each other” to

ensure that the prison is free of any major disruptions. Conversely,
conflict occurs when prison officials break their unofficial contract with
the inmates by cracking down on the illegal activities. With prisoners’
reasons to maintain order gone, some type of conflict is likely to occur.
In contrast to the inmate balance theory, the administrative control
theory is a result of authorities’ neglect rather than their awareness. The
administrative control theory, created by John Dululio in the mid 1990s,
states that “prison disorder results from unstable, divided, or otherwise
weak management”, this theory argues that conflict results from the
poor management of correctional facilities. Poor management has three
central components: inadequate conditions, weak security, and the
emergence of group formations among inmates, such as gangs. In poorly
managed prisons, the more dissatisfied inmates are with the
management of the prison, the more likely they are to engage in
violence and collective action (Wood and Dunaway, 1997).
Examine riot as a form of civil disturbance and a collective behaviour
4.0 CONCLUSION
The importance of an understanding of the nature of social disorder

emanating from human actions is necessary, hence the need for theories
that explain collective behaviour and other prerequisite conditions
needed for social disorder to occur. Knowing fully well that most civil
disturbances are usually caused by groups and not by a single person;
even if the idea develops from a single individual, it will certainly take
the combination of people in groups to execute an action that can lead or
be termed social disorder/civil disturbance.
5.0 SUMMARY
This unit carefully examined key theories explaining collective

behaviour, a type of social behaviour that occurs in crowds and masses.
Emile Borel (1921) and John Von Neumann (1928) Minimax theory;
Emergent Norm Theory, developed by Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian
(1957); and Value-Added Theory, developed by Smelser (1962). These
theories collectively explain probable causes of social disorder with
particular emphasis on Prison riots. Searchlight was also placed on
activities of inmates and prison officials and how strains in terms of
deprivation and strict application of treatments on inmates could lead to
disorder in prison as a form of total institution.
31
Critically appraised the various theories of collective behaviour
Johnson, Allen G. (2000).Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology. Blackwell

Publishers.
Marshall, Gordon. (1998) Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford:

Oxford UP, 1998.
Scott, John (2000).Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of

the Present. Washington D.C.: Sage Publications.,
Smelser, Neil (1962). Theory of Collective Behaviour. New York: The

Free Press.
Stastny, C, and Tyrnaur, G. (1982). Who Rules the Joint? Lexington:

D.C. Health and Co.
Wood, P, and Dunaway, G. (1997). “An Application of Control Balance
Theory in Incarcerated Sex Offenders.” Journal of the Oklahoma
Criminal Justice Research Consortium Vol. 4.
Sykes, G, and Sheldon L. M. (1975). “The Inmate Social System.”
Deviant Behaviour and Social Process. 2 ed. Ed. William
Rushing, Nashville: Rand NcNally College PC. 195-203.
Turner, R. H, and Killian, L. (1991). “Challenging the Myth.” The Myth
of the Maddening Crowd (ed.). Clark McPhail. New York:
Walter De Gruyter, Inc. 82-85.
Goldfarb, R. and Singer, L. (1972). “Redressing Prisoners’ Grievances.”
Prisons, Protests, and Politics. Ed. Burton Atkins and Henry
Glick. Englewood: Prentice- Hall, 1972. 79-86.
Freeman, R. M. (1999). “Correctional Organization and Management:
Public Policy Challenges, Behaviour, and Structure.” Woburn:
Buttersworth Heinemann
Goffman, E. (1959). Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other Inmates. New York: Doubleday
Cordilia, A. (1983). The Making of an Inmate: Prisons as a Way of Life.
Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing.
Clear, T. R; George C. and Michael R. (2000). American Corrections.
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
3
UNIT 5 CAUSES OF PRISON RIOTS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.2 Emergency Types
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Prison is meant to be an ideal and comfortable environment for

reforming inmates. Recent developments arising from economic crisis in
many nations, the increasing number of individuals in crime leading to
the swell in the number of inmates - overcrowding, manpower shortage
and other forms of deprivations, psychological, social and medical.
These reasons have been attributed and linked as some of the causes of
prison riots worldwide.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, students should be able to:
• explain some of the causes of prison riots in the world

• proffer solutions to some of the identified problems in the prison
problems in Nigeria.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
While the purpose of prisons has changed over the years, the factors that
cause prison riots have not. There are many factors that cause prison
riots. One major factor is overcrowding. Overcrowding in prisons has
plagued many countries over the last thirty years. The massive influx of
prisoners began in the late 1970s and still continues. An increase in
prisoner population puts a strain on taxpayer’s money. Overcrowding is
a big problem in prison because it leads to unhealthy conditions. Prison
cells are typically built to hold two people. However, overcrowding is
such a problem that prisons sometimes put three or four people in a two
person cell. When there are more than two people in an 8x12 cell, living
conditions can be unhealthy. An overpopulated prison means that some
prisoners must sleep on the floor. Crowding can be associated with low
31
psychological well-being. For example, the rate of suicide in prison

increases with overcrowding (Lawrence and Andrews, 2004). Physical
conditions are also worse due to overcrowding. In addition to a lack of
facilities, there is a general overuse of plumbing. Overuse of equipment
that is built to operate under “normal” conditions leads to frequent
breakdowns (Freeman, 1999: 87). Hygiene is also difficult in
overcrowded situations because access to showers is limited to once a
day. Ventilation is especially crucial when temperatures outside rise.
Ventilation can be a problem in overcrowded prisons because of the
large number of people. In the summertime, inmates are living in hot
overcrowded cells. When the temperatures rise to a certain point,
inmates become agitated. Many become extremely violent (Cobb 1985).
The relationship between aggressive behaviour and crowding is well

established in the prison system. Lawrence (2004) studied the influence
of prison crowding on inmates’ perception of aggression. Lawrence
showed that environmental conditions can influence how inmates
interpret fellow prisoner’s behaviour. When individuals interpret others’
behaviour as aggressive, whether intentional or unintentional, they are
more likely to retaliate. According to Lawrence, “Those who are
subjected to crowded conditions, and who lack a social support network,
may become more prone to distress. That distress is linked to an
increase in aggression”. Overpopulated prisons also have a shortage of
security staff. The ratio of prison guards to prisoners is growing daily.
As a result, it is harder to monitor the prison as closely (Fong, 1990).
With overpopulation, there is a limited amount of resources. In prisons,
overcrowding leads to a fight for these limited resources. For one, the
numbers of inmate work programs are limited. Only about fifteen
percent of inmates have prison work jobs. These jobs offer inmates a
break from the boredom of prison life. Prison work jobs also offer a way
to rehabilitate prisoners by training them with job skills they might need
in the future. Inmates with work jobs feel like they have more of a
purpose in prison. Without correct rehabilitation, two-thirds of released
prisoners will find themselves back behind bars within three years.
Inmates in prison must also fight for medical treatment. Overcrowding

has stretched prison infirmaries’ supplies thin. Physical illnesses in
prisons are treated poorly. Prisoners needing dental work do not always
get adequate attention (Clark, 1972:17). In addition, conducting mental
health evaluations in overpopulated prisons is an overwhelming job for
psychiatrists. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics in America,
an estimated sixteen percent of adult prisoners report having a mental
disorder. However, only a fraction of those who need treatment actually
receive it (Pogorzeleski et al., 2005). In Nigerian cases figures are either
not available or unreliable. While overcrowding alone does not start
3
prison riots, the tension that results from the strains caused by
overcrowding may lead to violence (Cobb, 1985).
In America, race plays a significant role in prison riots. Racial tensions

cause constant uneasiness between prisoners. Since the colonial era,
racism has been a major issue in the United States. Discrimination
against minorities in the treatment of prisoners continues to exist in
virtually all prisons, especially in the South where racism was the
strongest before the Civil War (Goldfarb and Singer, 1972:83).
Hispanics now outnumber blacks in the United States and are now the
largest minority (Nesser, 2003). More recently, tensions between
Hispanics and African Americans have escalated, and are often rooted in
access to jobs and political empowerment. For many African
Americans, the “code of the street” is important in the understanding of
how prisoners relate to one another in prison.
The code of the street is a way to measure status among group members.
Ranking elements include the willingness to fight, protecting one’s
manhood, living on the edge, risking death, and showing no fear as
protection from being victimized by others. The basis of the code is
respect or being treated right (Anderson, 2001:80). Respect for most
African Americans is hard-won but easily lost. For that reason, blacks
refuse to be oppressed by any racial majority without conflict. If a
prisoner has the respect of other inmates, he can avoid “being bothered”
by other inmates. When dealing with an overcrowded, mixed-race
prison where cellmates are randomly assigned, tensions between
different races can escalate to a full fledged race riot. In 2006, a race riot
broke out among blacks and Hispanics at the Northern County
Correctional Facility in Los Angeles, a maximum security prison. The
fighting involved about two hundred inmates. One Black American was
beaten to death and over one-hundred inmates were injured. Prison
officials declared the riot a result of a feud between Hispanic and black
gangs (www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11180457/).
Prisoners join gangs in prison for protection from other inmates.

Typically, in minimum-security prisons, there are not going to be many
gangs. In larger prisons, including maximum-security prisons, there will
be much more gang activity. In more recent years, American prisons
have seen a rise in violent, race-based prison gangs. The Aryan
Brotherhood, a notorious and deadly white supremacist gang formed in
San Quentin in the 1960s, was the first of these race-based gangs. Since
then, gangs that are white, black, and Hispanic dominate in the prison
system (Pitcavage, 2002). Being a member of a gang gives inmates a
sense of belonging. When prisoners join a gang, typically they are in for
life. The gang turns into a “brotherhood” for inmates. Like prisoners and
the prison code, gang members must abide by a strict code of conduct.
31
The penalty for a violation of the code is most often death. A study by
some sociologists, Bert Useem and Michael Reisig, (1999) showed that
prisons that controlled the development and power of prison gangs
experienced fewer riots (Useem and Reisig, 1999).
Another major factor that causes prison riots is a violation of prisoners’

rights. Prior to the 1960s, the Supreme Court did not get involved in the
issue of prisoners’ rights. This period was known as the “hands-off”
period. During this time, criminals upon conviction lost virtually all
legal rights. Any rights they had were rights given to them by the state.
Modern prisoners’ rights cases began in the 1960s alongside the Civil
Rights movement (Angelos and Jacobs 1985:102). In the early 1960s,
courts demonstrated an increase in willingness to protect the rights of
prisoners as stated in the Constitution. This period was known as the
“rights period.” The change can be attributed to several factors. First of
all, prisoners began to be more aggressive in declaring their rights.
Second, there was an increase in lawyers who were willing to take on
prisoners’ rights cases, mostly as pro bono work. Third, judges were
presented with cases that involved such horrifying conditions that they
insisted something be done to protect prisoners’ rights.
Between 1960 and 1980, the courts began upholding two very important
amendments involving prisoners’ rights. The Eighth Amendment, which
states that “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” protects inmates
from cruel and unusual punishment (Patterson, 1971). The Eighth
Amendment also forbids punishment that is disproportionate to the
offence, or is excessive and unnecessary. Many prisoners believe that
isolation, or solitary confinement, violates their Eighth Amendment
rights. In 1969, the court case Holt v. Sarver was monumental in
changing the way prisoners could be held in isolation. The court found
that, “Confinement of inmates in isolation cells that are dirty,
overcrowded, and unsanitary constituted cruel and unusual punishment”.
The court also stated that prolonged confinement of men in the same cell
in unsanitary, dangerous conditions was “Mentally and emotionally
traumatic, hazardous to health, and is degrading and amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment”.
Another important amendment is the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868. According to this amendment,
“No state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law” (Patterson, 1971: 118). This meant that
governments must extend most of the rights in the first ten amendments
of the Constitution to all prisoners, such as freedom of speech, freedom
of religion, and the right against unreasonable search and seizures.
3
Prison administrators are also no longer allowed to censor outgoing mail

or prohibit visits from lawyers who were representing inmates.
The rights period started to collapse in the 1980s, when courts began
ruling against inmates. In 1982, the Federal court case Rhodes v.
Chapman found that double-bunking inmates in cells made for single
occupancy was unconstitutional and violated inmates’ Eighth
Amendment rights. However, the Supreme Court overturned the case,
ruling that “Double-bunking is not punishment and is therefore lawful,
and the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons” (Angelos
and Jacobs, 1985:104). During this time period, the Courts declared that
an inmate is to have no say in the decision to transfer an inmate, as well
as the decision to exclude visitors because of alleged misconduct on the
inmate’s part. The Court also ruled against search cases. In 1984, the
Court case Hudson v. Palmer ruled that, “The Fourth Amendment,
protection from unreasonable search and seizures, does not apply to cell
searches because inmates have no expectation of privacy in their cells”
(Call, 1995). The Court also ruled that “Inmates have no due process
right to observe the shakedown searches of their cell” (Call, 1995).
Presently, any violation of prisoners’ rights can lead to prison riots.

Putting inmates in isolation for alleged bad behaviour or slight rule
infractions makes prisoners angry. Forcing prisoners to live in
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions is unconstitutional and
intolerable. Denying prisoners medical attention increases tension
between inmates and guards. Furthermore, if prisoners are being abused
by guards, the inmates will eventually stand up for themselves, and
some sort of disorder will occur. Many prison officials live in constant
fear of riots. Prisoner uprisings frighten the warden, as well as the
public. The warden is afraid he might lose his job and his reputation for
good management, and the public worries about the loss of control.
Prison riots call attention to some aspects of breakdown in prisons. They
do not, however, call much attention to the real factors that provoke the
riot. Instead, officials call for stronger steel, heavier bars, and a need for
a more strict management of the prison (Meninger, 1972:52- 54).
What are the major causes of prison riot?
4.0 CONCLUSION
The need of adequate prison reforms and the rights of prisoners and
waders should be taken seriously by government and other necessary
parastatals, to avoid un-envisaged problems among inmates and prison
officials. The negative impact of prison riot on the general public is a
31
grave cause for alarm and to the nation as a whole, apart from the stigma
it places on government, it is also a sign that all is not well with the
government of the day.
5.0 SUMMARY
Due to the limited space and time we have on each of our lessons, in this
unit, we were only able to highlight some American based examples of
prison reforms and riots. Notwithstanding attempt was made to look at
the ideal nature of what the prison environment and facilities ought to be
and major causes of prison riots as well as probable solutions in
mitigating it.
Critically identify probable causes of prison riot and proffer some

solutions to nip in the bud.
Angelos, C, and Jacobs, J.B. (1985). “Prison Overcrowding and the

Law.” Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science: Our Crowded Prisons, 478 (1985) JSTOR. Lamar
Memorial Library, Maryville, Tennessee, 8 April 2008
<http://www.jstor.org/>. All Sociology Journals.
Fong, R. S. (1990). “The Organizational Structure of Prison Gangs: A

Texas Case Study.”Federal Probation, 54.1 (1990) EBSCO.
Lamar Memorial Library, Maryville, Tennessee, 15 April 2008
<http://web.ebscohost.com/>.
Freeman, R. M. (1999). “Correctional Organization and Management:

Public Policy Challenges, Behaviour, and Structure.” Woburn:
Buttersworth-Heinemann.
Lawrence, C. and Catherine Andrews, C. (2004). “The Influence of

Perceived Prison Crowding on Male Inmates’ Perception of
Aggressive Events.” Aggressive Behaviour, EBSCO. Lamar
Memorial Library, Maryville, Tennessee, 15 April 2008
<http://web.ebscohost.com/>.
McKelvey, B. (1977). American Prisons: A History of Good Intentions.

Montclair: Patterson Smith PC.
3
Menninger, K. l. (1972). “The Crime of Punishment: Awaiting Trial in

Jail.” Prisons, Protests, and Politics. Ed. Burton Atkins and
Henry Glick. Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 53-4.
Russo, F. D. (2008). “Reforming Our Prisons in (2008): Can California

Get Rational Sentencing and Parole Reforms in the Crucible of
the Budget Crisis?” 14 Jan. 2008. 15 April, 2008
<http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2008/01/reforming_our_p.ht
ml>.
Patterson, T. E. We the People. Boston: McGraw-Hill Co, (2008).

“People & Events: Attica Prison Riot - September 9-13, 1971.”
2000. 24 Apr. 2008.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/rockefellers/peopleevents/e_attica.htm
l>.
Pitcavage, M. (2002). “Dangerous Convictions: Extremist Recruitment

in America's Prisons.” 2 July 2002. 15 April 2008
<http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_Terr/dangerous_convictions.asp>.
Pogorzeleski, W., Wolff, N.; Pan, K, and Blitz, C. (2005). “Behavioral

Health Problems, Ex-Offender Reentry Policies, and the Second
Chance Act.” American Journal of Public Health 95.10 (2005)
EBSCO. Lamar Memorial Library, Maryville, Tennessee, 24
April 2008 <http://web.ebscohost.com/>.
Useem, Bert. “Disorganization and the New Mexico Prison Riot of

(1980).” American Sociological Review, 50.5 (1985) 25 Oct.
2008. All Sociology Journals.
Useem, Bert, and Michael D. Reisig, M.D. (1999). “Collective Action

in Prisons: Protests, Disturbances, and Riots.” Criminology 37.4:
735-59.
31
MODULE 2
Unit 1 Psychosocial Consequences of Disaster

Unit 2 The Stages of Psychological Response to Disasters
Unit 3 Community and Social Impacts of Disasters
Unit 4 Assessing the Psychological Impact of Disasters
Disasters
UNIT 1 PSYCHOSOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF

DISASTER
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 An Overview Of The Psychological Consequences Of
Disaster
3.2 The Prevalence of Adverse Psychological Effects
Following Disaster
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
People all over the world know the destruction produced by weather, the
devastation of geological disaster, the havoc of industrial and
transportation accidents. Many know, as well, the misery of terrorism,
chronic political violence, and war. Over the last quarter of a century,
more than 150 million people a year have been seriously affected by
disasters. The physical effects of a disaster are usually obvious. Tens or
hundreds or thousands of people lose their lives. The survivors suffer
pain and disability. Homes, workplaces, livestock, and equipment are
damaged or destroyed. The short-term emotional effects of disaster-fear,
acute anxiety, feelings of emotional numbness, and grief -- may also be
obvious. For many victims, these effects fade with time. But for many
others, there may be longer-term emotional effects, both obvious and
subtle. Some of the emotional effects are direct responses to the trauma
of disaster. Other effects are longer-term responses to the interpersonal,
societal, and economic effects of the disaster. In any case, in the absence
of well-designed interventions, up to fifty per cent or more of the
victims of a disaster may develop lasting depression, pervasive anxiety,
4
post-traumatic stress disorder, and other emotional disturbances. Even

more than the physical effects of disasters, the emotional effects cause
long-lasting suffering, disability, and loss of income.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, it is expected that students should be able to:
Know some of the psychological consequences of disasters

Provide some reliable solutions and responses to psychological
problems emanating from disasters
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 An Overview of the Psychological Consequences of

Disaster
Have an insight into a brief excerpt into some major disasters in Asia
On Thursday, March 5, 1987, two earthquakes occurred in Ecuador,

about 85 kilometres from the capital city, Quito. Heavy rains over the
preceding weeks had softened the soil in the surrounding area and the
earthquake caused massive landslides in the mountainsides. Debris
dammed up the rivers, causing flash floods and destroying villages
along the banks and polluting the water supply throughout the region.
The main highways linking the region with the rest of Ecuador, as well
as the secondary roads were destroyed. The oil pipelines linking the
country’s main oil fields with ports was shut off, cutting the nation’s oil
revenue by 50%. Thousands of people were put out of work Rivers, a
primary source of water, transportation, and food, and agricultural
land, the source of livelihood for thousands of people, became unusable.
Over 70,000 homes, as well as schools, hospitals, and public buildings
were levelled. A thousand people were killed and another five thousand
made homeless.
***
On the night of December 2/3, 1984, the city of Bhopal in central India
was covered by a cloud of methyl isocyanate, a poisonous gas which
had leaked from a tank at the Union Carbide India Ltd. factory. Around
midnight, people downwind of the factory woke up with feelings of
suffocation, intense irritation, and vomiting. Panic spread. People ran
desperately to escape the gas. Many died on the spot; others fell while
running to escape. Still others reached safety only after hours of
running. About 300,000 people were exposed to the deadly gas. About
2500 died.
***
41
Hundreds of squatters make their living by picking through the main

dump for the ten thousand tons of garbage produced in Manila, the
Philippines, each day. On July 17, 2000, after a week of monsoon rains,
the huge garbage mountain, fifty feet high and covering more than
seventy-four acres, collapsed. Although the complete toll may never be
known, at least eight hundred of them died, smothered to death.
Complicating the rescue effort were the poisonous fumes emitted by the
rotting garbage and the stench of decaying bodies1.
Imagine yourself and your family the victim of a disaster: an earthquake,

a tornado, a flood, an airplane crash in your community, the threatened
meltdown of a nearby nuclear plant, a terrorist attack.
Almost instantly, in response to the sights and sounds of the event itself,
our hearts pound, our mouths go dry, our muscles tense, our nerves go
on alert, we feel intense anxiety or fear or terror. If there has been little
or no warning, we may not understand what is happening to us. Shock, a
sense of unreality, and fear dominate. Long after the event the sights,
sounds, smells, and feelings of the event persist as indelible images in
our memories. As the immediate shock and terror dissipates, longer-
term effects appear. The disaster challenges our basic assumptions and
beliefs. Most of us, most of the time, believe that our personal world is
predictable, benevolent, and meaningful. We assume we can trust in
ourselves and in other people and that we can cope with adversity.
Disaster destroys these beliefs. We become aware of our vulnerability.
We feel helpless and hopeless. We despair in our inability to make
decisions and to act in ways that would make any difference to our
families and ourselves.
In the wake of the disaster, we grieve for the death of loved ones and we
marvel at own survival (and we may feel unworthy or guilty for having
survived). We also grieve for our home, for treasured personal
memorabilia, for lost documents, lost familiar neighbourhoods. If the
disaster has disrupted our community’s traditional subsistence activities
or our community itself, we may feel intense feelings of loss tied to our
cultural and social identity, as well. The loss of our personal world; of a
sense of safety, of belief in ourselves, in the trustworthiness of others; or
even in the benevolence of God are not just thoughts; they trigger deep
feelings of loss and grief. In the days and weeks following the disaster,
we may experience a wide variety of emotional disturbances. For some,
chronic grief, depression, anxiety, or guilt dominates. For others,
difficulties controlling anger, suspiciousness, irritability and hostility
1
The brief accoun ts of the Ecuador and Bhopal disasters are drawn from articles by L.K.
Comfort and by R.S. Murthy in the International Journal of Mental Health, 1990. The
accoun t of the Manila disaster is from the New York Times, July 18, 2000.
4
prevail. Yet others avoid or withdraw from other people. For many,
sleep is disturbed by nightmares, the waking hours by flashbacks in
which they feel as if the disaster is happening all over again. Not a few
begin to abuse drugs or alcohol. There may be cultural variations in the
precise patterns in which disaster-related symptoms appear, but reports
from countries as diverse as China, Japan, Sri Lanka, Mexico,
Colombia, Armenia, Rwanda, South Africa, the Philippines, Fiji,
Bosnia, England, Australia, and the United States, among others, show
that the emotional responses to disaster are broadly similar everywhere
in the world.
Secondary Traumatization: It is not only those who directly experience

the disaster (the “primary” victims) who feel its emotional effects.
“Secondary victims” – the families of those directly affected, onlookers
and observers, and relief workers (both paid and volunteer) who seek to
rescue the primary victims also may experience serious emotional
effects. Medical and mental health workers and relief officials who
subsequently work with the primary and secondary victims are
constantly exposed to the physical and emotional effects of the disaster
on others and may themselves be victims of “vicarious traumatization.”
Even those investigating the disaster – journalists, relief organization
workers doing needs assessments, human rights workers – may be
traumatized. The “Second Disaster”: The primary source of emotional
trauma is, of course, the disaster itself. But the sources of traumatization
do not end when the disaster is over (in a literal sense) and when the
victims have been rescued. After the disaster comes “the second
disaster”-- the effects of the response to the disaster. The rapid influx of
well-meaning helpers, who must be fed and sheltered, adds to the
confusion and the competition for scarce resources. In some instances,
poor people from outside the disaster area have flooded into a disaster
area seeking their own share of the food and other supplies relief
agencies are providing to disaster victims. This still further increases the
burden on disaster workers and on the already stricken community.
Those forced to take refuge in a shelter or a refugee camp for shorter or

longer periods of time are forced to confront the consequences of the
disaster in an ongoing, unrelenting way. To personal and material losses,
we now add loss of privacy, loss of community, loss of independence,
loss of familiarity with the environment, and loss of certainty with
respect to the future. Family roles and ordinary work roles are disrupted.
Poor sanitation, inadequate shelter, and contaminated water and food
may produce epidemics, with widespread illness and death resulting. In
the shelter, personal assaults and rapes may endanger women, the
elderly, and other vulnerable people. As the weeks and months go by,
anger at the slowness of reconstruction or at corruption that prevents
relief supplies from getting to victims may add to distress. In some
41
instances, such as Nicaragua after the 1972 earthquake and Mexico after
the 1985 earthquake, such dissatisfaction produced widespread political
unrest.
Delayed Effects of Disaster: Some emotional effects of the disaster may

not appear until after a considerable delay. For some victims, initial
relief at having been rescued and initial optimism about the prospects of
recovery may produce a “honeymoon stage.” Over a period of months or
even years, this may give way to a realization that personal and material
losses are irreversible. Loved ones who died will not return. Disruptions
in the family are permanent. Old jobs will not reappear. A long-term
reduction in standard of living has occurred. Depression and anxiety
may now appear for the first time in some victims, and the suicide rate
may actually rise.
Other victims of disaster appear initially to be “doing well.” This may

be illusory, however. To protect themselves, they may suppress or
inhibit the processing of the impact of the disaster upon them. After a
delay (considerable at times), stimuli associated with the disaster may
trigger memories, pulling previously suppressed material back into
consciousness. As a result, psychological responses to the disaster may
“suddenly” appear, months or even years afterward.
1. What happens to us when we go through a disaster?

2. What do we feel and experience under such circumstances?
3.2 The Prevalence of Adverse Psychological Effects

Following Disaster
Although the precise figures vary from situation to situation, up to

ninety per cent or even more of victims can be expected to exhibit at
least some untoward psychological effects in the hours immediately
following a disaster. In most instances, symptoms gradually subside
over the weeks following. By twelve weeks after the disaster, however,
twenty to fifty per cent or even more may still show significant signs of
distress. The number showing symptoms generally continues to drop,
but delayed responses and responses to the later consequences of
disaster continue to appear. While most victims of disasters are usually
relatively free of distress by a year or two after the event, a quarter or
more of the victims may still show significant symptoms while others,
who had previously been free of symptoms, may first show distress a
year or two after the disaster. Anniversaries of the disaster may be
especially difficult times for many survivors, with temporary but
unexpected reappearance of symptoms which they had thought were
4
safely in the past. Reports of widespread emotional distress ten years

and more after disasters such as the 1972 flood at Buffalo Creek (USA)
and internment in Nazi concentration camps have been well
substantiated.
The extraordinary prevalence of such strong physiological, cognitive,

and emotional responses to disasters indicates that these are normal
responses to an extreme situation, not a sign of “mental illness” or of
“moral weakness.” Nevertheless, the symptoms experienced by many
victims in the days and weeks following a disaster are a source of
significant distress and may interfere with their ability to reconstruct
their lives. If not addressed and resolved relatively quickly, such
reactions can become ongoing sources of distress and dysfunction, with
devastating effects for the individual, their family, and their society.
Factors Affecting Vulnerability to Adverse Psychological Effects
Not everyone is equally affected by a disaster, and not all disasters are
equally devastating in psychological terms. Several factors may increase
the risk of adverse psychological consequences:
• The more severe the disaster and the more terrifying or extreme
the experiences of the individual, the greater the likelihood
widespread and lasting psychological effects. In extreme cases
(e.g., the Nazi concentration camps, the Rwandan genocide, the
Cambodian “killing fields”), virtually everybody exposed to the
traumatic events suffers lasting effects.
• Some types of disaster may be more likely to produce adverse

effects than others. In general, the psychological consequences of
disasters which are intentionally inflicted by others (e.g., assaults,
terrorist attack, war) are likely to be greater than those of
disasters which may have been produced by human activities but
which are unintentional (e.g., airplane crashes, industrial
explosions). These in turn have a greater likelihood of producing
adverse effects than purely natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes,
tornadoes).
• Women (especially mothers of young children), children aged

five to ten, and people with a prior history of mental illness or
poor social adjustment appear to be more vulnerable than other
groups. Those with a prior personal experience of trauma,
whether individual (e.g., rape) or collective (e.g., earthquake,
genocide) are also usually more vulnerable.
41
• Several specific kinds of disaster experience are especially

traumatic. These include witnessing the death of a loved one,
losing an adolescent or young adult child, being entombed or
trapped or seriously injured as a result of the disaster, and being
seriously injured or hospitalized as a result of the disaster.
• In addition to the “psychological” effects of disasters, some of

the physical effects (e.g., head injuries, burns, crush injuries,
exposure to toxins, prolonged pain) can directly produce, through
physiological processes, adverse psychological effects such as
difficulty concentrating, memory difficulties, depression, and
emotional instability.
• Refugees from war, political oppression, or political violence are

also at high risk of adverse effects. In addition to the effect of the
events that may have driven them from their homes, negative
experiences in shelters and refugee camps (e.g., malnutrition,
widespread infectious disease, rape and other physical assaults)
may themselves produce adverse psychological effects and
psychological disorders.
• “Stigmatization” of the victims of a disaster makes healing more

difficult. One unfortunately common situation in which this
occurs is when part of the traumatizing experience has been rape.
In many modern wars, rape has been used as a weapon of war.
Rape is also a major hazard for women in refugee camps. Victims
may be unable to tell their families and friends what happened,
for fear of being blamed or even punished.
• Conversely, the availability of social support networks –

supportive families, friends, and communities – reduces the
likelihood of lasting adverse effects. And those who have
successfully coped with trauma in the past may withstand
subsequent disasters better, as if they had been “inoculated”
against stress. For a minority of victims, the challenge of disaster
may actually be positive and may lead to increased ability to deal
with future life challenges.
• The more severe the disaster, the less the characteristics of

individuals matter. In very severe disasters, virtually everybody
shows adverse emotional responses. In relatively mild disasters,
differences in vulnerability of different individuals may be of
greater importance.
4
What are the Factors Affecting Vulnerability to Adverse Psychological

Effects?
4.0 CONCLUSION
Considering the various factors affecting vulnerability to adverse

psychological effects of disasters already discussed in the above unit
you will definitely agree that knowing about some of the aftermath
effects of disaster is necessary in the study of emergency management.
With regards to all mentioned factors and consequences, this unit
concludes that Even more than the physical effects of disasters, the
emotional effects cause long-lasting suffering, disability, and loss of
income. And again it is important to state also that in any disaster: major
or minor; not everyone is usually equally affected by a disaster, and not
all disasters are equally devastating in psychological terms. Several
factors may increase the risk of adverse psychological consequences.
5.0 SUMMARY
In this unit we continued on our discussion on psychological

consequence of disaster, a general overview was given. Prior to this
some cases of disasters and their implication were discussed.
Consequently, the prevalence of adverse psychological effects following
Disaster was highlighted and explained as well the various factors
affecting vulnerability to adverse psychological effects of disaster.
Several factors may increase the risk of adverse psychological

consequences of disaster. Discuss.
Aptekar, L. (1994). Environmental Disasters in Global Perspective. New

York: G.K.Hall.
Danieli, Y., Rodley, N.S., & Weisaeth, L. (Editors). (1996).

International responses to Traumatic Stress. Amityville, NY:
Baywood.
Enarson, E., & Morrow, B.H. (Editors) (1996). The Gendered Terrain of
Disaster through Women’s Eyes. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Publishing Company.
41
Everly, G.S. & Lating, J.M. (Editors). (1995). Psychotraumatology: Key

papers and Core Concepts on Post Traumatic Stress. New York
and London: Routledge.
International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS).

http://www.istss.org. Retrieved 01/09/1999.
National Hazard Center, http://www.colorado.edu/hazards. Retrieved

17/05/2006.
4
UNIT 2 THE STAGES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL

RESPONSE TO DISASTERS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 The Stages of Psychological Response to Disasters
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
It is customary to conceptualize the aftermath of disaster in terms of a

series of stages or phases, each of which has its own characteristics. The
phases, we hasten to say, are not rigid. There is much variation at each
stage and the stages overlap.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• the various stages in psychosocial response to disasters

• discuss community and social impacts of disasters.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 The Stages of Psychological Response to Disasters
1. The “Rescue” Stage
In the first hours or days after the disaster, most relief activity is focused
on rescuing victims and seeking to stabilize the situation. Victims must
be housed, clothed, given medical attention, provided with food and
water. During the rescue stage, various types of emotional response may
be seen. Victims may shift from one kind of response to another or may
not show a “typical” response of any evident response at all.
• Psychic “Numbing”: Victims may seem stunned, dazed,

confused, and apathetic. Superficial calmness is followed by
denial or attempts to isolate themselves. Victims may report
feelings of unreality: “This is not happening.” They may respond
to helpers in a passive, docile way, or may be rebellious and
41
antagonistic as they try to regain a sense of personal control.

There may be an automaton-like carrying on of daily activities.
This response pattern is usually transient and may be followed by
(or preceded by) heightened arousal (see below).
• Heightened Arousal: Victims may experience intense feelings

of fear, accompanied by physiological arousal: heart pounding,
muscle tension, muscular pains, and gastrointestinal disturbances.
They may engage in excessive activity and may express a variety
of rational or irrational fears. This response pattern is likely to be
transient and may be followed by (or preceded by) psychic
numbing (see above).
• Diffuse Anxiety: Victims may show diffuse signs of anxiety: an

exaggerated startle response, inability to relax, inability to make
decisions. They may express feelings of abandonment, anxiety
about separation from loved ones, a loss of a sense of safety, and
yearning for relief.
• Survivor Guilt: Victims may blame themselves or feel shame at

having survived, when others did not. There may be a pre-
occupation with thoughts about the disaster and rumination over
their own activities: Could they have acted differently? They may
feel responsible for the unfortunate fate of others.
• Conflicts over Nurturance: Victims may be dependent on

others, yet suspicious, and may feel no one can understand what
they have been through. Some victims may feel a need to
distance themselves emotionally from others and to keep a “stiff
upper lip;” they may be irritable in the face of sympathy. Others
may feel a strong desire to be with others at all times.
• Ambivalence: Some victims may show ambivalence about

learning what happened to their families or possessions.
• Affective and Cognitive Instability: Some victims may show

sudden anger and aggressiveness, or, conversely, apathy and lack
of energy and ability to mobilize themselves. They may be
forgetful or cry easily. Feelings of vulnerability and illusions
about what happened are common.
• Occasionally, victims appear in an acutely confusional state.

Hysterical reactions and psychotic symptoms such as delusions,
hallucinations, disorganized speech, and grossly disorganized
behaviour may also appear. These may be isolated and very short
lived or may constitute a “Brief Reactive Psychosis.”
5
• Most victims act appropriately, to protect themselves and their

loved ones. In most disasters, despite mythology to the contrary,
victims show little panic and may engage in heroic or altruistic
acts. Many of these behaviours have an adaptive quality. The
behaviour of the majority of those affected by disaster, even
when they seem abnormally intense or entirely unfamiliar, should
be understood as normal reactions to abnormal or devastating
conditions or events. They ensure short term survival and permit
the victim to take in information at a controllable rate. But the
symptoms themselves may be perceived by the victims as
socially inappropriate, as a source of shame, guilt, and failure, as
an evidence of inadequacy. Caregivers and rescue workers, in
turn, may respond with irritation or withdrawal from the victims.
2. The “Inventory” Stage
Once the situation has been stabilized, attention turns to longer-term

solutions. Heroic rescue efforts give way to bureaucratized forms of
help. Over the next year or eighteen months, organized assistance from
outside gradually diminishes and the reality of their losses dawn on
victims. In the first weeks after the disaster, victims may go through a
“honeymoon” phase, characterized by relief at being safe and optimism
about the future. But in the weeks that follow, they must make a more
realistic appraisal of the lasting consequences of the disaster.
Disillusionment may set in. The effects of the “second disaster” are felt.
During this phase, any of a wide variety of post-traumatic symptoms
appears. Any of these symptoms may appear in isolation, but frequently
victims show a number of these symptoms. Several distinct clusters of
symptoms are common. Several of these - “Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder,” “Generalized Anxiety Disorder,” “Abnormal Bereavement,”
“Post Traumatic Depression” - deserve special attention. In addition,
many patterns restricted to particular cultures may appear.
Post-traumatic Symptoms. The easily identified symptoms after a

disaster are as follows:
1. grief, mourning, depression, despair, hopelessness

2. anxiety, nervousness, being frightened easily, worrying
3. disorientation, confusion
4. rigidity and obsessiveness, or vacillation and ambivalence
5. feelings of helplessness and vulnerability
6. dependency, clinging; or, alternately, social withdrawal
7. suspiciousness, hypervigilance, fear of harm, paranoia
8. sleep disturbances: insomnia, bad dreams, nightmares
9. irritability, hostility, anger
10. moodiness, sudden outbursts of emotion
51
11. restlessness
12. difficulties concentrating; memory loss
13. somatic complaints: headaches, gastrointestinal symptoms,
sweats and chills, tremors, fatigue, hair loss, changes in
menstrual cycle, loss of sexual desire, changes in hearing or
vision, diffuse muscular pain
14. intrusive thoughts: flashbacks, feeling one is “re-living” the
experience, often accompanied by anxiety
15. avoidance of thoughts about the disaster and avoidance of
places, pictures, sounds reminding the victim of the disaster;
avoidance of discussion about it
16. problems in interpersonal functioning; increased marital
conflict
17. increased drug and alcohol use
18. cognitive complaints: difficulty concentrating, remembering;
slowness of thinking;
19. difficulty making decisions and planning
20. feeling isolated, abandoned
21. “dissociative” experiences: feelings of being detached from
one’s body or from one’s experiences, as if they are not
happening to you; feeling things seem “unreal;” feeling as if
one is “living in a dream”
22. feelings of ineffectiveness, shame, despair
23. self-destructive and impulsive behaviour
24. suicidal ideation or attempts
25. the “death imprint”: pre-occupation with images of death
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: The characteristic symptoms of Post

Traumatic Stress Disorder include:
(a) Persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event: recurrent

and intrusive recollections of the events of the disaster; recurrent
distressing dreams in which the disaster is replayed; intense
psychological distress or physiological reactivity on exposure to
internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of
the traumatic event; or experiences in which the victim acts or
feels as if the event is actually re-occurring. In children, repetitive
play in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed may
occur; trauma-specific re-enactments of the events may take
place, and there may be frightening dreams without recognizable
content.
(b) Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma

and continued numbing of general responsiveness: efforts to
avoid thoughts or feelings or conversations about the disaster;
5
efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that remind the victim

of the trauma; inability to recall important parts of the disaster
experience; markedly diminished interest or participation in
significant activities; feelings of detachment or estrangement
from others; restricted range of affect; or a sense of a
foreshortened future, without expectations of a normal life span
or life.
(c) Persistent symptoms of increased arousal: difficulty falling or

staying asleep; irritability or outbursts of anger; difficulty
concentrating; hypervigilance; exaggerated startle response.
This general cluster of symptoms has been reported in every part of the
world. In less industrialized parts of the world and among people
coming from these areas, the avoidance and numbing symptoms have
been reported to be less common and dissociative and trance-like states,
in which components of the event are relived and the person behaves as
though experiencing the events at that moment, may be more common.
Generalized Anxiety Disorder: The characteristic symptoms of

Generalized Anxiety
Disorder includes the following:
(a) Persistent and excessive anxiety and worry about a variety of

events or activities (not exclusively about the disaster and its
consequences).
(b) The person finds it difficult to control the worry and the worry is
far out of proportion to reality. It interferes with attention to tasks
at hand.
(c) The anxiety and worry are associated with symptoms such as
restlessness or feeling on edge; being easily fatigued; difficulty
concentrating or the mind going blank; irritability; muscle
tension; and difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep.
Although individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder may not

always identify their worries as “excessive,” they report subjective
distress due to their constant worry and it may affect them in social,
occupational, marital, or other areas of function. Somatic symptoms
(e.g., cold clammy hands, dry mouth, nausea or diarrhea, urinary
frequency) and depressive symptoms are also commonly present.
There is considerable cultural variation in how anxiety is expressed. In

some cultures, it may be expressed more through somatic symptoms, in
51
others through cognitive symptoms. Children may reveal their anxieties

through concern about their competence. Examples may include
excessive concerns about punctuality, over-zealousness in seeking
approval, and a conforming, perfectionistic personal style.
Abnormal Bereavement: Normally, after the death of a loved one, a

sequence of stages of bereavement is expected. Often the first response
is disbelief and denial. Feelings of numbness may give respite and allow
the realization to seep in slowly. Then, as we begin to realize the reality
and significance of the loss, feeling of distress, yearning for the lost
person, anger at the loss, and anxiety at one’s ability to cope without
them may appear. A period of mourning ensues, as we review our
memories of the lost loved one, and then gradually reduce the
psychological bonds and free ourselves for life without the departed
person. All cultures have rituals that, however much they vary, seem
intended to facilitate this process.
Trauma may interfere with the ability to go through this process

normally, however. The victim’s own injuries, the loss of social
supports and familiar communities, survivor guilt, and the victim’s own
psychological trauma may interfere with both expected rituals and
internal grieving processes. Memories of the deceased may trigger the
victim’s own memories of the disaster. Post-traumatic rumination may
block the victim from confronting the memories and thoughts that are
central to grieving.
Posttraumatic numbing may interfere with the victim’s engaging in

supportive social interactions. There may be other, practical obstacles to
saying goodbye, as well. For instance, legal processes may delay funeral
proceedings or concerns about the bereaved seeing the body of the
deceased due to injuries it may have sustained in the disaster may lead
to the bereaved not having the opportunity to view the body. Most
studies have indicated that not seeing the body of the deceased may
contribute to abnormal bereavement and that seeing the body, even
when it is disfigured, is not inherently damaging. Few victims who have
been allowed to see the remains and have accepted the offer regret doing
so.
These psychological and practical obstacles to a “normal” response to

the death of a loved one may contribute to a feeling of lack of closure or
permit magical fantasies that the deceased person has not, in fact, died.
Any of several abnormal bereavement syndromes may appear. (Note:
Different cultures vary widely with respect to what is “expected” after
the death of a loved one. Among some peoples, open expression of
emotion is frowned upon. Among others, public displays of emotion are
expected and lack of overtly expressed emotion is suspect. In some
5
cultures, people are expected to publicly grieve only briefly and then to
return to normal activities. In others, a prolonged grieving period is
expected. Evaluation of the significance of the following patterns
depends on an awareness of what the cultural norms are in the
particular culture).
(a) Inhibited Grief: The bereaved exhibits a pattern characterized

by psychic numbing, over-control and containment of emotions,
little display of affect. They may be seen as “coping well,” yet
this pattern is associated with later depression and anxiety.
(b) Distorted Grief: The bereaved shows intense anger and hostility
which dominate over their sadness and guilt. This anger may be
directed at anyone the bereaved associates with the deceased’s
death. For instance, the bereaved may be hostile to workers.
(c) Chronic Grief: The feelings of sadness and loss do not dissipate.
Frequent crying, pre-occupation with the loss are unremitting.
(d) Depression: The bereaved lapses into depression, with prolonged

grief, despair, and a sense that life is not worth continuing. Sleep
and appetite disturbances may appear. The bereaved may have
active fantasies of being reunited with the deceased and suicidal
ideation or attempts may occur.
(e) Excessive Guilt: The bereaved may show excessive self-

recrimination and guilty pre-occupations, which eclipse their
sadness. Self destructive, yet not overtly suicidal behaviours,
such as frequent accidents or excessive drinking may occur.
Post Traumatic Depression: Protracted depression is one of the most

common findings in studies of acutely or chronically traumatized
people. It often occurs in combination with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder. Trauma can produce or exacerbate already existing
depression. Common symptoms of depression include sadness, slowness
of movement, insomnia (or hypersomnia), fatigue or loss of energy,
diminished appetite (or excessive appetite), difficulties with
concentration, apathy and feelings of helplessness, anhedonia (markedly
diminished interest or pleasure in life activities), social withdrawal,
guilty ruminations, feelings of hopelessness, abandonment, and
irrevocable life change, preoccupations with loss, and irritability. In
some cases, the person may deny being sad or may complain, instead, of
feeling “blah” or having “no feelings.” Some individuals report somatic
complaints, including widespread aches and pains, rather than sadness.
Suicidal ideation or attempts may appear. With children, somatic
complaints, irritability, social withdrawal are particularly common. In
51
some cultures, depression may be experienced largely in somatic terms,

rather than in the form of sadness or guilt. Complaints of “nerves”,
headaches, generalized chronic pain, weakness, tiredness, “imbalance,”
problems of the “heart,” feelings of “heat,” or concerns about being
hexed or bewitched may appear.
Culture-specific Disorders: The boundaries between anxiety,

depression, dissociation, and emotional disorders that have
predominantly somatic symptoms are very porous.
Victims often have symptoms running across these categories. In many

societies and cultural groups, traditional patterns of expression of
emotional distress take the form of combinations of symptoms that have
no exact equivalent in standard international categories of mental illness.
The intermediate term response to disaster may take the form of one of
these “culture-specific disorders.” These may include, for example,
susto andataques de nervios (Latin America and the Caribbean), amok
(the South Pacific), dhat (India), latah (Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific), and khoucheraug (Cambodia) 2. In many parts of the world, the
conventional idiom for expressing emotion may be somatic (e.g.,
chronic fatigue, generalized aches and pains, gastrointestinal
disturbances, feelings of “heat)” or fears of somatic illness (such as.
hypochondriasis, fears of infection. In some cultural groups, the distress
of a disaster may also take the form of a “trance disorder.” A “trance” is
a temporary, marked alteration in the state of consciousness or a loss of
the customary sense of personal identity, associated with either
stereotyped behaviours or movements that are experienced as beyond
one’s control or by a narrowing of awareness of one’s immediate
surroundings.
3. The “Reconstruction” stage
2
Susto is prevalent among some Latinos in the United States and among people in Mexico,
Central America, and South America. Typical symptoms include appetite disturbances,
inadequate or excessive sleep, troubled sleep or dreams, feelings of sadn ess, lack of
motivation, feelings of low self-worth, and somatic symptoms. Ataques de nervios is
recogn ized among many Latin American, Latin Mediterranean, and Caribbean Latinos.
Commonly reported symptoms include uncontrollable shouting, attacks of cr ying, trembling,
heat in the chest rising into the head, verbal and physical aggression, a sense of being out of
control, and sometimes dissociative experiences, seizure-like or fainting episodes, and suicidal
gestures. Amok is recognized in Malaysia and, under varying names, in the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, and elsewhere. It is described as a dissociative episode characterized by a period of
brooding followed by an outbur st of violent, aggressive, or homicidal behaviour directed at
people and objects, ending with exhaustion. Dhat is a term used in India to describe a
syndr ome of severe anxiety, headaches and body aches, loss of appetite, hypochondriacal
concerns associated with the discharge of semen, and feelings of weakn ess and exhaustion.
Latah, found under various names in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, involves
hypersensitivity to sudden fright, often with an apparently senseless and automatic repetition
of the words or actions of others and dissociative or trance-like behavior. Khoucheraug ,
found in Cambodia, includes excessive worry and rumination over past events.
5
A year or more after the disaster, the focus shifts again. A new, stable
pattern of life may have emerged. In any event, the distinction between
disaster relief and the larger pattern of national social and economic
development begins to diminish and eventually disappears. During this
phase, although many victims may have recovered on their own, a
substantial number continue to show symptoms much like those of the
preceding (“inventory”) stage. A significant number who were not
symptomatic earlier may now exhibit serious symptoms of anxiety and
depression, as the reality and permanence of their losses becomes
evident. The risk of suicide may actually increase at this time. Other
characteristic late-appearing symptoms include chronic fatigue, chronic
gastrointestinal symptoms, inability to work, loss of interest in daily
activities, and difficulty thinking clearly. The notion of “post traumatic
stress disorder” described earlier derives mainly from observations of
the symptoms of survivors of relatively circumscribed traumatic events.
A number of studies suggest that more complex syndromes may appear
in survivors of prolonged, repeated, intense trauma, such as those who
have been held hostage, who have been repeatedly tortured or exposed
to chronic personal physical or sexual abuse, who have been interned in
a concentration camp, or who have lived for months or years in a society
in a chronic state of civil war.
Among victims of such disasters, a “survivor syndrome” may appear.

People showing this syndrome have been described as walking through
life “without a spark.” Chronic depression, anxiety, and survivor guilt
appear, or, alternately, chronic aggression and an “addiction to hate.”
Social withdrawal, sleep disturbances, somatic complaints, chronic
fatigue, emotional liability, loss of initiative, and general social,
personal, and sexual mal-adaptatian are present. The “joy of life” is
gone, replaced by a “pervasive pattern of sluggish despair.”
Relationships with spouses and children are disturbed, often creating
significant disturbances in later generations.
Other victims of prolonged or repeated and severe traumas have been

described as exhibiting “complex post-traumatic stress disorder.”
Symptoms of “complex posttraumatic stress disorder” include:
a Difficulties in regulating affect (e.g., persistent depression,

suicidal preoccupation, self-injury, explosive anger)
b Alternations in self perception (e.g., shame, guilt, sense of

defilement, a sense of difference from others or helplessness)
c Alterations in consciousness (e.g., amnesia, transient dissociative

states, intrusive thoughts, ruminative preoccupations)
51
d Difficulties in relations with others (e.g., isolation, disruption in

intimate relationships, persistent distrust)
e Disruptions in systems of meaning (e.g., loss of faith, a sense of

hopelessness and despair)
f Alterations in perceptions of the perpetrator of the atrocities (e.g.,

a preoccupation with revenge, unrealistic attributions of total
power to the perpetrator, or, paradoxically, gratitude toward the
perpetrator).
1. Identify some culturally specific Post-traumatic Symptoms you

know.
2. Secondly, categorise them into different stages based on
occurrence.
4.0 CONCLUSION
There are various terminologies given to conditions of human behaviour

related to the aftermath of a major disaster, which in one way or the
order brings about setbacks which are sometimes permanent or
temporary. Apart from knowing these conditions it is important as
students also to know the various approaches needed in providing
solutions at different stages in the life of survivors.
5.0 SUMMARY
This study aims to provide basic knowledge about the basics and
characteristic features of psychosocial traumatization during rescue
stage in disaster management, various types of emotional response after
disaster among survivors. Issues relating to cultural specific trauma or
disorders were highlighted and discussed with relevant examples. The
nature of individual reactions to post traumatic and generalised anxiety
disorders as well as some culturally frowned reactions was examined.
What is the relevance of psychological response to disasters?
5
Middleton, N., & O’Keefe, P. (1998). Disaster and development: The

politics of humanitarian aid. London: Pluto Press.
Raphael, B. (1986). When disaster strikes: How individuals and

communities cope with catastrophe. New York: Basic Books.
Roberts, A.R. (Editor). (1990). Crisis intervention handbook. Belmont,

CA: Wadsworth
World Health Organization, (1996). Mental health of Refugees.
Walker, B. (Ed.) (1995). Women and Emergencies. Oxford: Oxfam.
Young, B.H., Ford, J.D., Ruzek, J.I., Friedman, M.J., & Gusman, F.D.
(1998). Disaster Mental Health Services: A Guidebook for
Clinicians and Administrators. White River Junction, VT:
National Center for PTSD. (Also available on-line at
http://www.ncptsd.org ).
David Baldwin’s Trauma Pages, http://www.trauma-pages.com National

Centre for PTSD, http://www.dartmouth.ed/dms/ptsd. Retrieved
09/05/2003.
Disaster Mental Health Institute, http://www.ncptsd.org International

Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS). Retrieved
14/01/2001.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 17,

Chemin des Crets, PO Box 372, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland.
Tel: (41) (22) 730-4222. http://www.ifrc.org. Retrieved
0209/2000
UNICEF, 3 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA. Internet

http://www.unicef.org
World Health Organization the Division of Mental Health, World Health

Organization, CH-1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland. Internet
http://www.who.org
51
UNIT 3 COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF

DISASTERS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Community and Social Impacts of Disasters
3.2 Effects of Disaster on Specific Groups
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF DISASTERS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Disaster as an event takes different shapes and affects individuals

differently. The effect is commonly based on age, gender and physical
and mental well being of individuals prior to and after a disaster. For
instance a lot of children, women, elderly, and the physically challenged
are found to be more vulnerable to disaster than others (male, able-
bodied and adult). Responses by individuals also has been discovered as
well as the various manifestation of symptoms to disasters.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this unit is for students to be able to:
Identify some community and social impact disasters create

Other objectives are to:
Examine the various impact on different social groups and
As well as other cross cultural issues.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
Disasters directly affect their individual victims. But beyond that

disasters create tears in the tissue of social life. Sometimes this is direct
and total, as when, as a result of disaster, people are forced to leave their
land and migrate elsewhere. In other cases, the rapid influx of helpers,
6
the presence of government officials, press, and other outsiders

(including mere curiosity seekers), the flood of poor people from outside
the disaster area into a disaster area seeking their own share of the food
and other supplies relief agencies are providing to disaster victims,
combine to further disrupt the community. Even when the formal
structure of a community is maintained, the disaster can disrupt the
bonds holding people together, in families, communities, work groups,
and whole societies. When those bonds are destroyed, the individuals
comprising the affected groups lose friends, neighbours, a community, a
social identity. These collective effects of disaster may ultimately be as
devastating as the individual effects. The consequences of disaster for
families, neighbourhoods, communities, and societies are many:
Family dynamics may be altered. Disaster-produced deaths or

disabilities, family separations, and dependency on aid givers may
undercut the authority of the traditional breadwinners, supplant
traditional activities in the home, and force people out of traditional
roles or into new ones. Symptoms of individual family members affect
their interactions with other family members. The intimate penetration
of a community by outsiders may upset or challenge traditional child
rearing practices and traditional patterns of male-female relationships. In
the wake of disaster, marital conflict and distress rises; increases in the
divorce rate in the months following disasters may occur. Parent child
conflicts also increase. Increases in intra-family violence (child abuse,
spouse abuse) have been reported. Disasters may physically destroy
important community institutions, such as schools and churches, or may
disrupt their functioning due to the direct effects of the disaster on
people responsible for these institutions, such as teachers or priests.
Traditional patterns of authority are disrupted along with customary
social controls on individual behaviour. Several studies have shown an
increase in the rates of community violence, aggression, drug and
alcohol abuse, and rate of legal convictions in the wake of disaster.
Disasters disrupt the ability of communities to carry out customary or

traditional activities central to people’s individual, community, and
social identity, ranging from work and recreational activities to
accustomed rituals. Some of these disruptions are temporary, but others
are hard to reverse. For example, a flood may permanently damage farm
land, making a return to traditional farming untenable, or an oil spill off
the coast may permanently alter traditional fishing grounds. With people
forced away from their homes and land for shorter or longer periods and
with personal and community records lost due to a disaster,
opportunities appear for looting. This may be limited to personal
possessions or may lead to permanent loss of tools, animals, and land.
The community, whose members can no longer farm their traditional
land, carry out traditional craft production activities, or hunt or fish in
61
traditional ways is disrupted and its sense of identity attacked. Disasters

place a strain on traditional community social roles, patterns of social
status, and leadership. Police, local housing agencies, local health
facilities are overwhelmed and face a new task of integrating their work
with that of volunteers, often from outside the community. There may
be anger at inequities in the distribution of post-disaster aid.
These inequities may exacerbate the gap between the rich and the poor.
Outside aid agencies may threaten the traditional roles of local agencies
and institutions. Outside experts may pose a threat to local professionals.
In the wake of disaster, new leaders may emerge in a community, due to
the role of these people in responding to the disaster. Conflicts between
these new leaders and traditional community leaders may appear.
Outside assistance may be necessary in the wake of a disaster, but it can
also promote a sense of community dependency. Insofar as the
necessities of life are supplied from outside, incentives to resume
traditional work activities are reduced. This is not just a matter of
psychological “dependency.” Provision of food and other supplies may
compete with local production, disrupting traditional pricing and wages
and damaging attempts to recreate the old productive patterns. Added to
this, the disaster itself may have destroyed the tools, workshops,
animals, or other necessities of production. Disaster may lead, directly
or indirectly, to permanent changes in productive patterns, especially
patterns of land ownership and use. Shifts from subsistence agriculture
to wage labour, land looting, migration and uprooting and resettlement
play a role.
Schisms may appear in a community, as cohesion is lost. One danger is

that of scapegoating, either of individuals or using traditional divisions
in the community (e.g., along religious or ethnic lines). In communities
with a history of past disaster, whether naturally caused or manmade,
the trauma produced by a new disaster may re-arouse old feelings.
Memories of genocide, civil war, social oppression, or racial or ethnic
division and of the feelings they produced, and feelings of
marginalization and helplessness may be exacerbated. In some
communities that have had to deal with repeated natural disasters such
as flooding, on a more or less regular basis, disaster and the response to
it may be integrated into community rituals and belief systems, as well
as into community structure and people may ascribe cultural meaning to
disasters. Communities may have traditional rituals for dealing with the
effects of disaster. Not only the disaster, but outside intervention may
interfere with these traditional rituals, responses, and attributions of
meaning and may be experienced as an ambiguous blessing or even as a
source of additional stress.
6
Disasters have impacts on individuals, families and communities. These

are not distinct, separable effects. The devastating effects of disaster on
the individuals making up a family or a community play a major role in
creating the family and community effects. Even more important, social
support systems play an extremely important role in protecting
individuals from the impact of the disaster and from the impact of stress
in general. Social disruption both reduces and interferes with the healing
effects of the family and the community and is itself an enormous source
of stress on the individuals who make up the family or community.
Disruption of the family or community may be more psychologically
devastating, both in the short run and especially in the long run, than the
disaster itself.
Describe Some Community and Social Impacts of Disasters.
Disasters do not affect everyone in the same way. At an individual level,

some may experience a disaster with few or no psychological
consequences, while others will go through the same disaster and be
emotionally devastated. Beyond individual variation, certain categories
of people are especially vulnerable or vulnerable in specific ways.
People’s responses to emergencies are grounded in their on-going
relationships with their community. Differences in power or access to
power and different pre-disaster stressors and pre-disaster social roles
affect how individuals experience a disaster. In general, those with the
least power and resources are most exposed to the adverse effects of the
disaster and its aftermath and have a harder time recovering from it. Pre-
disaster high levels of stress, lack of resources, lack of information, lack
of access to power, lack of access to transportation, lack of marketable
skills, lack of literacy, all take their toll.
For example, structural changes in the world economy have adversely

affected women in many societies, reducing their standard of living,
undermining their household based security, and intensifying their load
of paid and/or unpaid work. For the impoverished, uprooted peasants,
urbanization may mean less substantial housing, relocation to more
environmentally dangerous locales (e.g., flood plains, mudslide-prone
hillsides), and exposure to toxic materials. Ethnic tensions, manageable
before a disaster, may become the source of scapegoating and acute
ethnic conflict in the wake of disaster. To the degree that inequality in
the impact of disaster is rooted in the unresolved dilemmas of global
political, economic, and social development, issues of social justice and
61
sustainable development can be understood as disaster preparedness and

response issues.
In this unit, we focus on practical issues specific to each of several

groups – their health care needs, legal rights, compensation issues,
employment and self employment issues, and the like, as well as
psychological issues. This discussion should not be understood in too
rigid a fashion. Not everyone in a given category has the experiences
described, and an individual may fall into more than one group (e.g., be
female and aged). They are intended to alert the reader to some issues
that may apply. Goals, experience, and needs must be assessed on an
individual basis.
CHILDREN
Two myths are potential barriers to recognizing children’s responses to

disaster and must be rejected: (1) that children are innately resilient
and will recover rapidly, even from severe trauma; and (2) that
children, especially young children, are not affected by disaster unless
they are disturbed by their parents’ responses. Both of these beliefs are
false. A wealth of evidence indicates that children experience the effects
of disaster doubly. Even very young children are directly affected by
experiences of death, destruction, terror, personal physical assault, and
by experiencing the absence or powerlessness of their parents. They are
also indirectly affected through identification with the effects of the
disaster on their parents and other trusted adults (such as teachers) and
by their parents’ reactions to the disaster.
Another barrier to recognizing children’s responses to disaster is the

tendency of parents to misinterpret their children’s reactions. To parents
who are already under stress, a child’s withdrawal, regression, or
misconduct may be understood as wilful. Or, parents may not wish to be
reminded of their own trauma or, seeking some small evidences that
their life is again back in control, may have a need to see everything as
“all right.” In either case, they may ignore or deny evidence of their
children’s distress. The child, in turn, may feel ignored, not validated,
not nurtured. This may have long term consequences for the child’s
development. In the short run, feeling insecure, the child may inhibit
expression of his or her own feelings, lest he or she distress and drive
away the parents even more.
Most children respond sensibly and appropriately to disaster, especially

if they experience the protection, support, and stability of their parents
and other trusted adults. However, like adults, they may respond to
disaster with a wide range of symptoms. Their responses are generally
6
similar to those of adults, although they may appear in more direct, less
disguised form.
Among pre-school children (ages 1-5), anxiety symptoms may appear in

generalized form as fears about separation, fears of strangers, fears of
“monsters” or animals, or sleep disturbances. The child may also avoid
specific situations or environments, which may or may not have obvious
links to the disaster. The child may appear pre-occupied with words or
symbols that may or may not be associated with the disaster in obvious
ways or may engage in compulsively repetitive play which represents
part of the disaster experience. The child may show a limited expression
of emotion or a constricted pattern of play may appear. He or she may
withdraw socially or may lose previously acquired developmental skills
(e.g., toilet training).
Older children (ages 6-11 or so) may engage in repetitious play in which
the child re-enacts parts of the disaster or in repeated retelling of the
story of the disaster. The child may express (openly or subtly) concern
about safety and preoccupation with danger. Sleep disturbances,
irritability, or aggressive behaviour and angry outbursts may appear.
The child may pay close attention to his or her parents’ worries or seem
to worry excessively about family members and friends. School
avoidance (possibly in the form of somatic symptoms) may appear. The
child may show separation anxiety with primary caretakers, “magical”
explanations to fill in gaps in understanding, and other behaviours
usually characteristic of much younger children. Other changes in
behaviour, mood, and personality, obvious anxiety and fearfulness,
withdrawal, loss of interest in activities, and “spacey” or distractible
behaviour may appear.
As children approach adolescence, their responses become increasingly

like adult responses. Greater levels of aggressive behaviours, defiance of
parents, delinquency, substance abuse, and risk-taking behaviours may
be evident. School performance may decline. Wishes for revenge may
be expressed. Adolescents are especially unlikely to seek out
counselling. Children of all ages are strongly affected by the responses
of their parents or other caretakers to disaster. Children are especially
vulnerable to feeling abandoned when they are separated from or lose
their parents. “Protecting” children by sending them away from the
scene of the disaster, thus separating them from their loved ones, adds
the trauma of separation to the trauma of disaster.
61
Ehrenreich, J. H. (2001). Coping With Disasters. A Guidebook to

Psychosocial Intervention. http://www.mhwwb.org. Retrieved
10/09/2009
For an adult, although the effects of disaster may be profound and

lasting, they take place in an already formed personality. For children,
the effects are magnified by the fact that the child’s personality is still
developing. The child has to construct his or her identity within a
framework of the psychological damage done by the disaster. When the
symptoms produced by disaster are not treated, or when the disaster is
ongoing, either because of the destruction wrought (e.g., by an
earthquake) or because the source of trauma is itself chronic (e.g., war
or relocation to a refugee camp), the consequences are even more grave.
6
The child grows up with fear and anxiety, with the experience of
destruction or cruelty or violence, with separations from home and
family. Childhood itself, with its normal play, love, and affection, is
lost. Longer-term responses of children who have been chronically
traumatized may include a defensive desensitization. They seem cold,
insensitive, lacking in emotion in daily life. Violence may come to be
seen as the norm, legitimate. A sense of a meaningful future is lost.
WOMEN
Women’s roles and experiences create special vulnerability in the face

of disaster. In poorer countries, women are more likely to die in
disasters than men are. In richer countries, as well, women often show
higher rates of post disaster psychological distress – depression, PTSD,
and anxiety. Several aspects of women’s experience of disaster may
contribute to these results: Women are often assigned the role of family
caregivers. As such, they must stay with and assist other family
members. This may affect their willingness to leave their homes when a
disaster (such as a storm) threatens. While their own threshold for
leaving may actually be lower than men’s, their actual willingness to go
may depend on their being able to leave with their children. Women
may be more isolated and home-bound, due to their traditional roles and
occupations. As a result, they may have less access to information (both
before a disaster and after). They may also be more vulnerable to the
physical effects of a disaster on their house itself, both with respect to
their physical safety and to the integrity of their work areas.
In the aftermath of disaster, women may face another threat: violence.

This threat may take several forms. Within the immediate family,
disaster may initially lead all members of the family to unite in their
efforts to deal with the crisis. Over the course of weeks or months,
however, the continued strain may be divisive. As family stress mounts,
women may become more exposed to physical or emotional abuse from
their spouse. Other women, who have previously fled their marriage to
avoid beatings, may be inadvertently re-exposed to their abusers (e.g., in
shelters). Women may also be exposed to rape and other forms of
violence in shelters or refugee camps. In war situations, women and
girls may be specifically targeted.
Post-disaster, women often get less assistance. Their husband, as “head”

of the household, often becomes the conduit for assistance to the family,
which may or may not be equitably shared within the family. In some
instances of food shortage, women have been given the lowest priority
for getting a portion of what food is available. Discrimination with
respect to food and medical attention in shelters has also been a problem
in some instances. Health care facilities in shelters and refugee camps
61
often do not attend to women’s needs with regard to reproductive health,

and providing for relief of other sources of strain on women, such as
responsibilities for childcare, often get a low priority. In the aftermath of
disaster, women who have been widowed by the disaster may find it
harder to remarry than men. Lacking skills that are saleable in the paid
job market, they may be left destitute. Alternately, husbands may leave
the disaster community, seeking paid work elsewhere, leaving their
wives more dependent on outside assistance and more isolated. The
experience of women in disaster, it should be emphasized, can create
opportunities for women, as well. Women may have better social
networks and hence, more social support than men. They may emerge as
the leaders of grass-roots level organizations. They may be able to use
disaster aid to develop skills and acquire tools and take on non-
traditional roles. These changes are not without risk, however, since
they may lead to intra-family conflict.
THE ELDERLY
Reports on the responses of the elderly to disaster are inconsistent. In

some disasters, they seem no more vulnerable than younger people. In
others, they appear more vulnerable. Despite the inconsistency in formal
research studies, there are reasons to believe that the elderly are at
increased risk for adverse emotional effects in the wake of disaster.
They may live alone and lack help and other resources. Depression and
other forms of distress among the elderly are readily overlooked, in part
because they may not take on exactly the same symptom pattern as
younger people. For instance, disorientation, memory loss, and
distractibility may be signs of depression in the elderly. The elderly are
also more vulnerable to being victimized. In the context of increased
stress on the family and community, meeting their special needs may
take on a lowered priority. One particular issue that may appear is
feelings that they have lost their entire life (loss of children, homes, and
memorabilia) and that, due to their age, there is not enough time left in
their life to rebuild and recreate. The elderly are also more likely to be
physically disabled (see below).
THE PHYSICALLY, MENTALLY, OR DEVELOPMENTALLY

DISABLED
Although people who are physically disabled, mentally ill, or mentally

retarded have distinct needs from one another, all three groups are at
especially high risk in disasters. For those in each group, the normal
patterns of care or assistance that they receive and their own normal
adaptations to produce acceptable levels of functioning are disrupted by
disasters. For instance, supplies of medication, assistive devices such as
wheelchairs, familiar caretakers, and previously effective programs of
6
treatment may in turn, may exacerbate pre-existing mental illness. There

may also be special needs with regard to housing or food. Those who
were mentally ill or developmentally delayed may also have fewer or
less adaptable coping resources available and less ability to mobilize
help for themselves. The ongoing problems of the disabled may seem to
the other victims of the disaster to be of only minor importance in
comparison to their own acute and unaccustomed suffering. Their
disabilities may even seem like an obstacle to dealing with the disaster
itself. The disabled are especially vulnerable to marginalization,
isolation, and to “secondary victimization.” They are at greater risk of
post-disaster malnutrition, infectious disease (e.g., in a shelter situation),
and of the effects of lack of adequate health care.
REFUGEES FROM WAR AND OTHER FORMS OF POLITICAL

VIOLENCE
Most of the discussion in these units focuses on victims of “disasters” in

the usual sense. The experience of refugees from war and political
violence (and even from famine and other economic hardship) bears
many similarities to the experience of the victims of natural disasters,
however. Those who have been tortured or the victims of systematic
violent political terrorization are especially vulnerable to adverse
psychological effects (as well as lasting physical effects) from their
experience.
Many of the comments in this section apply directly to refugees. In

addition, even when “former” refugees have been “resettled” in host
countries far from home, although they may no longer be physically
separated out from others as identifiable “refugees,” they may continue
to bear the emotional consequences of their history. When new disasters
(earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.) hit, their previous experiences may
complicate their responses. At any given time in the last decade, some
fifteen million people were refugees. Another twenty million were
“internally displaced persons,” refugees who have left their homes but
have not crossed international boundaries.
Refugees have, typically, experienced personal terror or witnessed the

physical abuse or death of loved ones. They have suffered the
destruction of their homes and communities, the loss of their traditional
livelihoods and of material possessions. They may have been forcibly
detained or spent periods in concentration camps and may, prior to
arrival in the refugee camp, have been tortured, raped, or otherwise
physically abused. Their personal status, belief in themselves, trusts in
others, and hopes for the future have been shattered. They feel
vulnerable and mistrustful. They have become dependent on others for
the physical necessities of life. In refugee camps, they may experience
61
poor housing, disruption of personal networks, lack of medical care, and

interruption of their children’s schooling, uncertainty regarding their
rights and legal status and future. The refugee camp itself is likely to be
a source of ongoing stress, with overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor
sanitation, long periods of inactivity, noise, disrupted sleep, and dangers
of assault or rape.
Many of these experiences are especially problematic for women. Since

they are often the ones responsible for preserving their home and their
family, disruption of home and family may be especially distressing. As
“little” a thing as not being able to cook for their family may be a source
of stress. They may also suffer from changes in family relationships. If
their husband is dead, missing, injured, traumatized, or separated from
the family, the woman becomes the “head” of the family and must take
on unfamiliar and traditionally male roles. This may confuse the
children or lead to intra-family conflict. Alternately, an immature son
may be forced to take on age-inappropriate roles. There may not be any
socially accepted role for a female single parent or widow. The woman
may find herself victimized by relatives. Lack of education or
marketable skills may make reintegration into a new social environment
especially difficult.
Another danger for women, while fleeing and in refugee camps and
shelters is rape. Rape may be a source of shame, guilt, and denial of the
woman’s own needs. She may “escape” into illness or become socially
isolated. In war settings, rape may take the form or mass or repeated
rape. This may be a form of torture, aimed at extracting information
from the woman or from her family, or it may be part of a systematic
program of terrorization of a civilian population. Children, especially
those who have been separated from their families are also especially
vulnerable. One unique group is children who have served as soldiers. In
addition to being traumatized and brutalized by their experiences at a
developmentally sensitive time in their lives, they are a stigmatized
group, isolated from their former communities. For men and for women,
being a “refugee” may prolong the trauma and prevents self-healing.
The usual model of response to disaster assumes that once the disaster is
“over,” the victim is in a safe, peaceful, “post-traumatic” environment.
For refugees, this is not true. They remain in a highly stressful, even
repeatedly traumatic situation, and may have little prospect of escaping
it.
Just as with other forms of trauma, responses may vary from person to
person. A central theme that may emerge is mistrust. The experience of
many refugees has been that their trust has been repeatedly and violently
violated. They have been exposed to death, danger, and fear, often at the
hands of neighbours or government officials. Initially, the refugee camp
7
may seem like a haven, but after several weeks, with no permanent
refuge in sight, the refugee’s hopes seem once again to have been
betrayed. In this context, feelings of anger, betrayal, scepticism, and
hostility are both common and normal. Refugees may express or enact
distrust of camp officials, aid givers, mental health workers, and
relatives back home. Scapegoating, ostracizing others in the refugee
camp, victimization of individuals or ethnic minorities may also occur.
Apparently “irrational” fears for personal safety may dominate
behaviour. For instance, a visit to a medical facility may trigger
memories of torture experiences. Other common responses seen among
refugees are prolonged mourning, homesickness, prominent fears,
dissociative disorders, and prominent somatic reactions, even several
years after initial flight. In refugee camps, suicide attempts are relatively
common (especially among rape victims). Domestic violence, physical
and sexual abuse of women and children, apathy, hopelessness, sleep
disturbances, and learning difficulties may be endemic. Being a refugee
continuously distorts people’s reactions. What was useful or adaptive
before they became refugees (skills, beliefs, knowledge, relationships) is
no longer so. This poses many problems for assessing the needs and
responses of refugees. Is a child’s violence, for instance, a response to
traumatization? A means of assessing others in the context of the
refugee camp? A pre-existing personality pattern?
RESCUE AND RELIEF WORKERS (AND JOURNALISTS,

HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS AND OTHER OBSERVERS)
Disaster workers, including both those involved in rescue efforts
immediately following the disaster and those involved in longer term
relief work, are at very high risk of adverse emotional effects. Many of
the same factors affecting direct rescue and relief workers affect human
rights workers, officials of humanitarian organizations, reporters, and
others who investigate disasters and their aftermaths.
a They may themselves be primary victims of the disaster, with the
same burdens as other primary victims.
b They are repeatedly exposed to grisly experiences (e.g.,

recovering bodies), the powerful emotions and harrowing tales of
victims.
c Their tasks may be physically difficult, exhausting, or dangerous.
d The demands of their tasks may lead to lack of sleep and chronic
fatigue.
e They face a variety of role stresses, including a perceived

inability to ever do “enough.” Even if the limits of what they can
71
do are imposed by reality or by organizational or bureaucratic

constraints beyond their control (e.g., lack of supplies, lack of
manpower), they may blame themselves.
f They may feel guilt over access to food, shelter, and other
resources that the primary victims do not have.
g They may identify with the victims.
h They may feel guilt over the need to “triage” their own efforts
and those of others or may blame themselves when rescue efforts
have failed.
i They are exposed to the anger and apparent lack of gratitude of

some victims. In addition to post traumatic responses much like
those of the primary victims of the disaster, rescue and relief
workers may evidence anger, rage, and despair, feelings of
powerlessness, guilt, terror, or longing for a safe haven. These
feelings may be distressing and may make the worker feel that
there is something wrong with them.
Their sense of humour may wear thin, or they may use “black humour”
as a way of coping. Toleration for others’ failings is reduced and the
anger of other relief workers or victims may feel like a personal attack.
Belief in God or other religious beliefs may be threatened by a feeling of
“How could God let this happen?” After a prolonged period of time on
the job, evidence of “burn-out” may appear. Professional rescue
workers, such as policemen and firemen, have some unique sources of
vulnerability. Their professional identity may depend on a self-image of
themselves as strong and resilient. Allowing themselves to “feel” their
emotions about the situations to which they are exposed may challenge
their self respect or make them feel like they are letting down co-
workers or make them feel they are risking the ridicule of other workers.
In addition, professional rescue workers may have been exposed to
many previous traumatic situations. The new experiences may activate
unresolved feelings from past traumatic events.
7
Ehrenreich, J. H. (2001). Coping With Disasters. A Guidebook to

Psychosocial Intervention. http://www.mhwwb.org. Retrieved
10/09/2009
Those providing mental health services to disaster victims and to relief

workers and those investigating disasters (e.g., journalists, human rights
workers, officials of humanitarian organizations doing “needs
assessments”) also face special stresses. Their central role is as witness
to the sufferings of others. They may identify with their clients and
share their emotions. “Vicarious traumatization” is not uncommon. In
contexts of continuing conflict (e.g., civil conflict, political repression,
war refugee camps), health care workers of all sorts are themselves
increasingly targets of violence. Contact with survivors and providing
advice and support to the local population may be seen as a threat to the
state, to one or the other side in the conflict, or to powerful forces in the
refugee camp. They may face harassment, arrest, detention, or assault.
In some situations, they can not evoke the law for their own protection,
because the police or the army are “part of the problem.” The result may
be a heightened sense of powerlessness, anger, fear and anxiety, and a
pre-occupation with clients’ safety and one’s own safety. There may be
feelings of betrayal and loss, of vulnerability, of loss in a belief in an
orderly or just world.
Disaster workers of all kinds face additional stress when they complete
their tasks and return home, to their “regular” life. Their experience has
diverged in a variety of ways from the experiences of their families and
in the absence of preparation of workers and their families, a variety of
marital and parent-child conflicts and stresses may appear. Distressing
or problematic emotional responses are extremely common among relief
workers. For example, in one air crash, more than eighty per cent of the
rescue workers who had to deal with the bodies of victims showed some
post traumatic symptoms, more than half moderately severe symptoms.
71
Almost two years after the crash, a fifth of the rescue workers were still
symptomatic.
Rescue and relief workers are rarely prepared ahead of time either for
their own reactions or to deal with the reactions of primary victims.
Providing psychosocial assistance to these workers and providing them
with adequate shelter, food, and rest, even when these are not available
to the victims themselves, is a very high priority in disasters. It may
seem unfair, but if the rescue and relief workers are unable to function
efficiently, they can not help any one else.
What are the major problems a relief/rescue worker may face in the
course of discharging his/her duties?
What are the major problems an individual may face in a refugee camp?
4.0 CONCLUSION
The physical and mental effect of disaster cannot be overemphasised in

relation to the adverse physical and mental effect; this therefore has
clarified the doubt that various individuals in society are also affected if
not effected differently. Disasters effect varies from one individual to
another. Specifically the impact of disasters on children and women in
any society as shown by various evidences and statistics outweigh that
of adult and men. This is also evident among the physically challenged
and the elderly, as against able-bodied and youthful population. These
among other discussions in previous and subsequent units are important
in the study of disaster, emergency and management options.
5.0 SUMMARY
This unit examines the Community and Social Impacts of Disasters.

Relating to these are issues surrounding the direct and indirect effect of
disasters on individual victims, displacement of lives and properties
migration and resettlement problems and inherent lost familial bond and
inequality. The second part of this unit specifically dealt with the effects
of disaster on specific groups, the most vulnerable as reflected by
children, women, the elderly and physically challenged persons. Other
categories of less vulnerable were identified: men and adult population.
Lastly among others some assumptions about responses to disasters by
children were also discussed and symptoms identified.
7
1. Some individuals in society have been categorised as more

vulnerable than other. Identify and discuss some of reasons
behind this statement.
2. List and explain six likely post-disasters symptoms experienced
by school aged children.
Aptekar, L. (1994). Environmental Disasters in Global Perspective. New

York: G.K.
Hall. American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (1998).

Practice Parameters for the Assessment and Treatment of
Children and Adolescents with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, 37:10 (supplement).
Danieli, Y.; Rodley, N.S., & Weisaeth, L. (Editors). (1996).

International responses to
traumatic stress. Amityville, NY: Baywood.
Enarson, E., & Morrow, B.H. (eds.). (1996). The Gendered Terrain of
Disaster through Women’s Eyes. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Publishing Company.
Everly, G.S. & Lating, J.M. (eds.). (1995). Psychotraumatology: Key

Papers and Core Concepts on Post Traumatic Stress. New York
and London: Routledge.
Foa, E.B. & Meadows, E.A. (1997). Psychosocial Treatments for

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Critical Review. Annual
Reviews of Psychology, 48, 449-480.
Foeken, I. (1999). Confusing Realities and Lessons Learned in Wartime:

Supporting Women’s Projects in the former Yugoslavia. Women
and Therapy 22 (1), 91-106.
Hodgkinson, P.E., & Stewart, M. (1998). Coping with Catastrophe: A

Handbook of Post-Disaster Psychosocial Aftercare (2nd ed.).
London: Routledge.
71
UNIT 4 ASSESSING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

OF DISASTERS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Assessing the psychological impact of Disasters
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The importance of knowing various responses to be netted out in any

disaster situation goes a long way. In disaster situation, there is usually a
wide range of feelings during and after such a disaster, be it large scale
or small scale disasters, which are often categorized under physiological
and psychological needs. This section will explain some of these needs
and other cross cultural issues as we proceed
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• cross cultural issues in disaster management

• issues in the assessment of disasters.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Assessing the Psychological Impact of Disasters
In the wake of large scale disasters (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes,

refugee crises), identifying which individuals are most at risk of
becoming or remaining symptomatic is a high priority. Inquiries may
also be undertaken to determine exactly what happened (e.g., to help
prevent repetition of the disaster or to identify deficiencies in the relief
efforts or, in some situations, to reveal human rights violations).
Individuals affected by a disaster exhibit a wide range of reactions.
Some may require support or other services immediately and urgently,
others only after a delay, and still others not at all. Some victims may
experience initial relief at being safe; some refugees may go through a
several-week-long or several-month-long “honeymoon.” If people are
assessed too early and found not to be in need of services, it is easy to
7
miss these later reactions. Follow-up several days, weeks, or months

later may identify people in need who were initially passed by. For the
most part, victims and relief workers are unlikely to seek out assistance
on their own. Do not assume that, because a person has not sought out
assistance, they do not need assistance. Several approaches to
identifying those in need of services may be used:
a. By category: Certain groups are especially vulnerable. These

include relief workers, victims who have had a family member
die in the disaster, victims who were trapped or entombed in the
course of the disaster, victims who were severely injured in the
disaster (including those still in hospitals) or who continue to
experience pain or physical disability, children aged five to ten,
mothers of young children, and victims with a prior history of
poor adaptation at work or at school or of poor coping in previous
periods of high stress.
b. By specific behaviour patterns: Those who engage in

maladaptive behaviours, such as children who stay out of school
after the disaster or adults who absent themselves from work or
who fail to “bounce back” may be signalling difficulty. Similarly,
after the first few days following the disaster, those presenting
with vague “medical” problems such as sleep disturbances,
excessive fatigue, diffuse pain, unexplainable headaches or
gastrointestinal symptoms may be evidencing psychological
distress. Those expressing suicidal thoughts or making suicide
attempts or other attempts at self-harm are a high priority.
Victims who describe persistent re-experiencing of the trauma,
especially if they report that they feel as if they are re-living it, or
who persistently avoid sights, sounds, or locations associated
with the disaster, or who show marked restlessness, irritability, or
hyper-vigilance, or who present the appearance of “being in a
fog,” more than a day or two after the disaster, are also at risk for
ongoing difficulties.
c. By use of screening instruments: Symptom checklists can be

distributed in schools, churches, workplaces, or shelters or
refugee camps. The Symptom Report Questionnaire (SRQ) has
been used in many countries and has proven successful in
identifying adults and older adolescents in distress. The SRQ, two
forms of a Pediatric Symptom Checklist designed for use with
children, and a questionnaire aimed at detecting signs of
“burnout” among relief workers can be found in Appendix A.
d. By case finding: Outreach efforts, including distribution of

leaflets, announcements on radio and television, articles in
71
newspapers, public lectures, posters in the offices or headquarters

of the relief effort may stimulate self-referrals. Teachers,
religious leaders, medical workers, workplace supervisors, and
other local residents who may have contact with substantial
numbers of victims should be enlisted to help identify those in
distress.
Some Diagnostic Issues
• Recall that there are many reactions to trauma, including anxiety,

depression, somatic reactions, and culturally specific responses.
Do not over-focus on whether people meet specific diagnostic
categories such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
• Distinguish intense but understandable responses to concrete

situations from pathological responses. Intense grief should be
distinguished from depression. Aches and pains resulting from
injury should be distinguished from somatic symptoms
expressing anxiety and depression. “Paranoia” due to loss of
familiar cultural cues, miscommunications, ambiguities in
personal interactions, real or fancied discrimination (among those
from groups that have historically been discriminated against), or
as a consequence of torture should be distinguished from
psychosis. Even psychotic symptoms (hallucinations and
delusions) may be a brief reactive response to trauma, which will
resolve fairly quickly with support, or it may be part of a longer
term pattern. Obtaining a history from the victim or their family -
- when the symptoms first appeared, when the worsen and when
the lessen, etc. -- is the best guide.
• Be aware that some people may minimize their suffering, recent

or past, due to fear that their story will not be believed or fear that
letting their suffering be known will stigmatize them or will lead
to other adverse consequences. The stigmatization of victims of
rape represents a common situation in which a victim’s
experience may be presented in disguised form (e.g., concern
with physical symptoms) or not reported.
• Note that there are many different ways of coping with trauma.
Some of these ways may be adaptive. E.g.,
• Fatalism; belief in fate or “karma;” belief it was “God’s will” or

“It was meant to be”
7
• Beliefs that catastrophe and suffering are a normal part of life and
should be examined for their meaning (e.g., “bad precedes good”
or “It is God’s way of testing me.”)
• Use of family, community, church support
• Focusing on new dreams or priorities or a sense of mission
• Hard work (learning new skills, acquiring a new language;
helping others; working hard) as a source of renewed self worth.
Distinguish this from an flight into intense, unsustainable, and
sometimes pointless activity.
• Exerting self-control
• Other coping mechanisms are less adaptive and may indicate a
need for intervention. For instance,
• Expressing stress in somatic form
• Denial and silence
• Avoidance
• Projection; blaming; scapegoating
• Helplessness and dependency
• Dissociation, numbness
Distinguish an absence of marked distress that is the result of good

coping from that which reflects numbing, avoidance, denial, or other
less adaptive forms of coping. Absence of emotional responsivity may
be one indicator of the latter.
• Psychological responses to trauma may be confused with

physiological responses:
• Head injuries can cause brain damage. The victim of a brain

injury may experience headaches, dizziness, memory loss,
difficulty attending or concentrating, sudden outbreaks of crying
or anger or laughing, difficulties with vision or hearing or
movement, and may express worry that their mind is “broken.”
Any of these may occur in the absence of brain injury, as well,
but treatment needs of those with physical damage to their brain
are quite different from those or people without such injury. Ask
the victim and their family whether they experienced an injury to
the head in the disaster (usually involving at least temporary loss
of consciousness). Memory loss is a good, although not perfect,
indicator, as well. Ask the victim whether people say they are
forgetful, whether they have been having experiences such as
leaving the stove on or forgetting things. Memory can be briefly
tested by asking the victim to recall three words (e.g., “orange,
necktie, 1983) immediately after hearing them and after a delay
of three or four minutes. Most people have no trouble with this
task.
71
• Other disaster related injuries may also cause apparent mental

disturbances. These include metabolic disturbances due to burns,
exposure to toxins, crushing injuries, infection, or nutritional
deficiency. The victim’s history before and in the disaster
(obtained from the victim or from family) is the best guide.
• Pain may mask the reporting of psychological symptoms.
• Substance abuse may also mask or exacerbate emotional

responses to trauma.
Assessment can harm those being assessed
For instance a victim of a disaster may perceive assessment as a further

violation of their already tenuous sense of control over the traumatic
experience. In the period immediately after the disaster, the environment
may be chaotic and there may be immediate stressors and challenges to
deal with. Subjects may seem fragile as they strive for control over the
environment. Assessment may seem like a continuation of the traumatic
experience or revive feelings. Even after a delay of days or weeks,
evoking traumatic memories may lead to feelings of shame or
embarrassment or may trigger emotional turmoil or may activate images
of previous times in the victim’s life when he or she has been
victimized. It may activate defences, including denial and avoidance. It
may be resisted by victims or may lead to avoidant or hostile responses
directed at the counsellor or other inquirer.
• Pushing a victim to reveal what happened to them too fast or too

insistently may exacerbate the victim’s symptoms or even re-
traumatize the victim. Let the client control the pace of the
assessment. Ask gentle questions and listen. Let what the client
needs to tell you take precedence over predetermined notions of
what information must be gathered.
• Assure the victim that the assessment process is confidential and

that the interviewer will not reveal anything about the interview
without the victim’s consent. To ensure confidentiality,
interviews should be conducted in a safe, quiet, private place. If
translators are used, the same assurance of confidentiality must
be extended by the translator.
• Clarify to victims the reasons for the assessment or other inquiry

and give the person assessed as much control as possible over the
process. It may be helpful to start by explicitly noting that the
assessment may be distressing. Invite the person being assessed
to communicate if they are feeling distressed. Let them know that
8
they can stop the process at any time. Offer opportunities for
respite during assessment. Warn that in the hours or days
following the assessment, there may be an exacerbation of
symptoms and that this is normal, part of how people resolve
trauma.
Cross Cultural Issues
Usually, those providing disaster counselling in the wake of disasters are

the victims’ fellow countrymen and the counsellors are familiar with the
language and culture of the victims. At times, however, counsellors
from other countries are involved. (This may be the case in the wake of
large-scale disasters in poorer countries). I have already noted that
symptoms may be present in “culturally specific” ways (unit 3). In the
context of assessment, this implies that counsellors must learn local
symptom patterns and local idioms for expressing distressing or other
negative feelings. They must also beware of (a) historical animosities
between the national or cultural groups represented by client; and (b)
potential misunderstandings of the roles to be expected of a helper (the
counsellor) and the one being helped (the victim); and (c) potential
misunderstandings of the relationship between individual and family.
(With respect to assessment, in many “Western” cultures the family is
important primarily as a source of ancillary information about the
individual. In many other societies, however, a problem experienced by
an individual is shared by all in his or her family. The unit of assessment
may be the family rather than the individual). A few more specific
examples of cultural variants:
• In some cultures, focusing on negative experiences may be seen

as detrimental to your future well-being (in this life or in a future
one).
• A traumatic event may be understood as due to one’s own
actions. The “victim” should endure it, not seek help.
• A traumatic event may be understood as a result of fate, and it
may be seen as inappropriate to challenge or modify events that
have happened to you.
• Revelation of victimization (especially rape) may be stigmatizing
and may have serious consequences.
• In some cultures, children are protected from knowledge of death.
To “see” death can lead to the spirit of the dead entering the
child, and talk of death with a child is taboo.
• Cultural symbols vary in their meaning. (E.g., the owl, a symbol
of wisdom in some cultures, is a symbol of evil in others).
• The meaning of dreams differs dramatically across cultures. What
is a “re-experiencing of a traumatic event” in the eyes of Western
81
psychiatry may be a bridge to the spirit world or a portent of the

future in the eyes of other cultures.
• The meaning of an event may not be the same to a counsellor and

a victim from another culture. For instance, to a rape victim, not
only the rape itself but a resulting belief that she is infertile or
unmarriageable may be of central significance. Or the
stigmatization resulting from rape may lead to a need to keep it
secret, resulting in loss of social support and alienation from the
community. In each case, an ongoing stressor (the beliefs, the
alienation) may be as tormenting as the original event. There is
no simple formula to cover all the possibilities. The counsellor
must learn – from books, from informants, and, most of all, from
his or her clients. One particular issue that may arise when
counsellors from a foreign country are involved in disaster relief
is the need to use translators or to recruit local people (who may
or may not have relevant prior training or experience) to function
as co counsellors. Such use of co-counsellors or translators may
affect the assessment process. At best, it facilitates
communication. In other cases, some victims may mistrust an
outsider (especially if the outsider is from a nation that formerly
colonized the nation where the disaster has occurred), and the use
of a co-counsellor or a local translator may ease the relationship.
But in still other cases, victims, fearing shame or retribution, may
be less likely to share their experiences with someone from their
own community than with an outsider.
Even when these issues do not arise, use of translators may create some
other problems. The translator may lack the ability to translate
accurately. Even if there is no question of linguistic ability, other factors
may interfere with the accuracy of translations, however. These include:
(a) The translator’s own experience of the disaster or his or her own
reactions to it may interfere with his or her ability to translate
accurately. (b) The relation of the translator to the victim and to the
victim’s community may introduce distortions into translations. (c) The
translator may experience shame at what has happened to the victim and
may inaccurately report their experience. (d) The translator’s versions of
the victim’s story may be distorted by the translator’s and victim’s roles
in ethnic or political conflicts in the disaster community.
In any case, use of children as interpreters for their families is especially

problematic and should be avoided if at all possible. It may violate
traditional family roles. It may make children privy to information
normally considered inappropriate for them. It may violate cultural
expectations about the role of children with respect to strangers. There is
8
no simple solution to these problems. When local counsellors are not

available, use of a bilingual counsellor from outside the immediate
community may be the best alternative.
Risks to those doing assessment
Those assessing disaster victims place themselves at risk of adverse

emotional reactions. This issue has been discussed above (unit3) in
terms of burnout and “secondary traumatization.” Some of these
reactions (e.g., inability to concentrate, excessive fatigue, and avoidance
of tasks) can lessen work efficiency. Other reactions more directly
interact with assessment tasks. For instance, experiences recounted by
victims may trigger recollections or re-experiences of traumatic events
in their own history. This can lead to unconscious tendencies to avoid
asking about some issues or may produce subtle messages to those being
interviewed not to tell about certain experiences or feelings. Alternately,
the interviewer may distance himself or herself from those he or she are
interviewing, interfering with the emotional connection that facilitates
the assessment process. Interventions and self-help to respond to these
issues is discussed below, in unit 5
What are the cultural issues to guide against in the management of

disasters?
4.0 CONCLUSION
There are a lot of issues embedded in the management of disasters, from

the overt and covert issues, physiological and physiological items all
embedded in the culture of a people. This section concludes that cultural
issues are very necessary in the management of disasters so as not to
further heighten problems that are not intended, this is only possible
with a firm grip of various cultural issues highlighted.
5.0 SUMMARY
Emphasis was placed on risks in doing assessment on the field where

disasters have occurred and issues to bear in mind in other not to trigger
further conflict as a result of trauma on the part of victims on one hand,
on the other hand issues of emotional reactions from rescuers or
resource persons, such as burnout which can lessen efficiency on the
field.
81
List and explain some of the cultural issues to guide against in disaster
studies.
Raphael, B. (1986). When Disaster Strikes: How Individuals and

Communities Cope with Catastrophe. New York: Basic Books.
Roberts, A.R. (ed.). (1990). Crisis Intervention Handbook. Belmont,

CA: Wadsworth
World Health Organization (1996). Mental Health of Refugees.
Walker, B. (ed.). (1995). Women and Emergencies. Oxford: Oxfam.
Young, B.H.; Ford, J.D.; Ruzek, J.I.; Friedman, M.J. & Gusman, F.D.
(1998). Disaster Mental Health Services: A Guidebook for
Clinicians and Administrators. White River Junction, VT:
National Center for PTSD. (Also available on-line at
http://www.ncptsd.org ).
Internet Materials
David Baldwin’s Trauma Pages, http://www.trauma-pages.com
National Centre for PTSD, http://www.dartmouth.ed/dms/ptsd

Disaster Mental Health Institute, http://www.ncptsd.org. retrieved
14/05/1999
International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS).

http://www.istss.org. Retrieved. 08/02/2005
National Hazard Centre, http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/ Retrieved

23/06/1998
PILOTS Database, http://ncptsd.org/research/pilots/index.html.

retrieved. 07/03/2001
8
UNIT 5 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOSOCIAL

INTERVENTION FOLLOWING DISASTERS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Some of the emotional effects are direct responses to the trauma of

disaster. Other effects are longer-term responses to the interpersonal,
societal, and economic effects of the disaster. In any case, this unit seek
to explain the need for well-designed interventions, up to fifty per cent
or more of the victims of a disaster are usually found to develop lasting
depression, pervasive anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other
emotional disturbances. Even more than the physical effects of disasters,
the emotional effects cause long-lasting suffering, disability, and loss of
income. For these and other reasons this unit tries to throw more light.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• examine the major aspects to intervention with the direct victims

of disasters
• understand the various principles, phases of interventions as well
as the need for cultural knowledge to reactions and response to
disasters.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
There are two major aspects to intervention with the direct victims of
disasters: rebuilding the community affected by the disaster and
intervening with individual victims. (In addition, interventions must be
aimed at rescue and relief workers and others less directly affected by
the disaster).
81
Sometimes these two aspects have been seen as being in opposition to

each other. For instance, in the context of huge disasters (e.g., a major
earthquake, refugee camps for victims of ethnic cleansing), some
humanitarian aid workers have argued that to focus on the mental health
of individuals is a hopelessly large task. In any case, to focus on
individual recovery from the disaster deflects attention and resources
from the more urgent task of promoting broader social and economic
recovery. From this perspective, rebuilding informal networks of social
support, reuniting families and communities, and supporting the
physical rebuilding of the shattered community take precedence over
interventions aimed at individuals or families.
The individual and community approaches are not really in opposition to

one another. The healing and rebuilding of the community is an essential
underpinning for the healing of individuals and families, and the healing
of individuals and families is necessary for the successful reconstruction
of the community. In each case, the underlying principle is to encourage
healing processes, in individuals, families, and communities. In this
manual, the focus is on individual and small group interventions. A wide
variety of specific techniques have been used to provide immediate
relief to individuals in distress, to prevent or mitigate the longer-term
emotional effects of disasters. Later in this unit, a number of these
specific techniques will be discussed in detail. To be useful, the
techniques have to be adapted to the specific situation – the kind of
disaster, the human and material resources available, the specifics of
local culture and tradition. This section of the manual focuses on the
core principles that guide both specific techniques and their adaptations.
PRINCIPLE I: SAFETY AND MATERIAL SECURITY

UNDERLIE EMOTIONAL STABILITY
It is difficult for people to maintain a stable mental state, after a disaster

or in any other circumstances, unless certain basic needs are met. First,
they must be assured access to food, water, clothing, and shelter.
Second, their need for physical safety and security must be met. In the
case of disasters, this includes not only freedom from fear for one’s life,
due to the disaster itself, but security from banditry, from the fear of
looters, from fear of rape or other assault in shelters or refugee camps,
and from the fear that the disaster will lead to the permanent loss of
one’s land or one’s home. Third, the safety and integrity of their family
must be ensured. Fourth, their long term need for stable jobs, adequate
housing, and a functioning community must be met. This “hierarchy of
needs” has several implications:
a. In the early stages of disaster response, the mental health of the

rescue and relief workers is the highest priority. Their wellbeing
8
is essential in enabling them to continue their rescue and relief

work, which, in turn, is the basis for ensuring that the basic needs
of the direct victims of the disaster are met. A secondary need is
to ensure that the mental well being of the victims suffices to
enable their cooperation with rescue and relief efforts. After the
initial “rescue” stage is over, as relief work continues, responding
to other mental health needs of victims become important, but
continuing to respond to the mental health needs of relief workers
remains paramount.
b. Rapid physical and social reconstruction (e.g., restoring or

creating housing, creating jobs, reuniting families, rebuilding
communities) is essential to restoring emotional equilibrium and
maintaining mental health, at all stages of the response to
disaster. There is no sharp separation of physical and material
needs on the one hand, psychological needs on the other. At any
stage of the response to disaster, failure to maintain the
momentum towards meeting physical and material needs is a
direct threat to mental health.
c. Failure to provide for basic needs can be a potent source of

traumatization above and beyond the traumatization created by
the disaster itself. In particular, unnecessary evacuation, poor
conditions in a shelter or refugee camp (lack of food, water,
sanitation, shelter; threats to personal safety), failure to provide
adequate housing, uncertainty as to food and water supplies, and
separation of family members from one another are themselves
potent causes of subsequent mental health problems.
PRINCIPLE II: ASSUME EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO

DISASTER ARE NORMAL
A wide range of emotional responses to disaster are normal responses to

overwhelming stress. They are not, in themselves, signs of “mental
illness.” They do not signify that the person suffering from the
symptoms is “weak” or is “going crazy.” They are focuses of
intervention for two reasons:
(1) The symptoms themselves may be distressing to the person

experiencing them.
(2) The symptoms may interfere with the person doing things that are
important for his or her immediate safety or well being or taking
part in the recovery of their community.
Many of the symptoms described earlier can be understood as adaptive

mechanisms, by which people seek to protect themselves against the
81
overwhelming physical and emotional impact of the disaster. Both

individuals and communities have natural healing processes. The central
task of psychosocial intervention is to elicit, facilitate, and support these
healing processes and to remove the obstacles to their operation, in order
to prevent lasting dysfunction and distress. Interventions are aimed,
above all, at minimizing the number of people who will require later
“treatment.” One major implication is that it is essential to reassure
people, to help provide short term relief of symptoms which may be
alarming to them, and to act to prevent symptoms from becoming
entrenched. Education as to the kinds of reactions people may
experience may help people understand and “normalize” their feelings.
Victims do not usually see themselves as mentally ill and they may fear
or avoid involvement with “mental health” workers and the “mental
health” system. Many do not spontaneously reach out for the assistance
of mental health workers. Psychosocial assistance in the wake of
disaster is best presented in a form that does not require people to see
themselves as “ill” or “mentally ill.”
• Use non-mental health terms to describe services and those

providing them (e.g., “human service workers,” “community
counsellors,” “community services,” “disaster services”). Present
services as “extra help for difficulties anyone would have trouble
with” after being affected by a disaster.
• Aggressive outreach and case finding is necessary. Use local

residents, primary care health workers, teachers, religious leaders,
and community leaders as informants. Use door-to-door
canvassing, mailings, television and radio announcements,
leaflets distributed in schools and workplaces, and
announcements in churches to alert people to the availability of
services and the indications for using them. Do not neglect
informal gathering places (e.g., beauty parlours, cafes, day care
canters). In shelters, actively look for signs of distress (sobbing,
facial expressions, body language, aggressiveness, substance
abuse, etc.). Leaflets describing common responses to disasters,
signs of distress, and services available may be directed at
primary victims, parents and teachers of children affected by the
disaster, rescue and relief workers, and families of relief workers.
• Use existing, non-mental health institutions such as schools,

churches, community centres, and medical facilities as bases for
psychosocial services.
8
• Train and use non-mental health personnel (e.g., teachers, health

workers, social service workers, religious workers) to provide
psychosocial services.
• It is essential to seek the cooperation and explicit support of

community leaders, religious leaders, teachers, village elders, and
other leaders in the community. Because of their leadership roles,
it may be difficult for these people to acknowledge that they, too,
could benefit from psychosocial services. Educational sessions or
debriefing sessions may provide an avenue for providing
information about trauma and its consequences and enlisting
support for the provision of trauma services, while giving
services at the same time.
• For all those who participate in delivering services, discretion,

tact, respect for the confidentiality of those being helped and
ethical behaviour are essential.
PRINCIPLE III. INTERVENTIONS SHOULD BE MATCHED TO

THE DISASTER PHASE
The types of response that are offered should match the phase of
emotional responses and the needs of disaster relief operations.
The “Rescue” Phase
Immediately after the disaster, the highest priority for psychosocial

services is rescue and relief workers, whose continued effective
functioning is essential. This may involve crisis management, crisis
intervention, conflict resolution, assisting with problem solving, or
“defusing”. Many small concrete services may be emotionally useful as
well as practically helpful. Bring rescue workers coffee, lend a hand in
helping clean up, give a hug, express interest. Immediately after the
disaster, the most urgent needs of victims are for direct, concrete relief
(e.g., rescuing lives, ensuring physical safety, providing medical care,
providing victims with food, water, shelter, reuniting families).
Psychosocial interventions aimed at victims during this phase are
primarily directed at serving these ends. In doing so, they contribute to
longer-term mental health.
a. Provide “psychological first aid”: i.e., assistance for those whose

acute distress and difficulties functioning interfere with the
victim’s cooperation with rescue and relief efforts and ability to
help provide for their own safety. Look for signs of intense
anxiety or panic, continuous crying, depressive withdrawal,
81
disorientation, incoherence, difficulty complying with requests by

relief workers or with the rules of the shelter.
b. Provide short term interventions to reduce anxiety, assist the

rescue and relief process, and help prevent later maladaptive
responses. These include comforting and consoling victims (a
word or a hug); helping people reunite with family members or
get information about loved ones; helping people reconnect with
neighbours, work-mates, and others who make up their personal
“community;” helping defuse conflicts with other victims or
between victims and relief workers; supporting victims in such
“reality tasks” as identifying the dead or making decisions about
animals and other property. Let victims express feelings, but focus
on reducing psychological arousal and anxiety, restoring social
support systems, and helping victims regain a sense of control.
Seek to elicit competence and independence from the very
beginning.
c. Begin broad preventive activities and activities that set the stage
for later interventions: Provide accurate information as to what is
happening, using all available mechanisms (e.g., mass media,
meetings, leaflets). Reassure victims that acute reactions are
normal and should not be sources of fear or of feelings that one
has lost control.
d. Interventions that are cognitively complex (e.g., “debriefing”) are

premature when people are still in a stunned state. However,
helping to reduce anxiety may help prevent later distress, and
making contact with survivors even at very early stages after the
disaster may create positive feelings towards the counsellor that
can make later interventions more acceptable and effective.
Bringing water, blankets, toys for children, food to victims (i.e.,
providing “primary” services” helps counsellors make initial
contact and establish trust and enables clients to talk about what
they need.
e. One problem in the early stage of response may be a rapid influx

of people seeking to help, seeking to exploit the situation, or
seeking to satisfy curiosity. At the level of those organizing the
response to the disaster, immediate efforts to control the
potentially adverse effects of this influx is part of creating a sense
of safety for victims.
f. People who are indirectly affected by the disaster (families or

friends of victims, onlookers, even those watching repeated
reports of the disaster on television) may also show signs of
9
distress. Note that what is helpful to one person may not be

needed or appreciated by another. For example, one person may
find that talking about the event reduces distress, while another
needs to be quiet and introspective. If one of these people
depends on the other for support (as is often the case, for
example, with spouses), they may feel the other’s lack of similar
response to be a form of abandonment. Reassure people that there
is no “correct” response and that the other person’s differing
needs are not; in fact, abandonment, but the way that person
needs to deal with stress.
The “Inventory” Phase
Continuing to provide services to relief workers remains a high priority

during this period. The first days or weeks following the disaster may be
a “honeymoon” phase, in which people’s feelings of relief and optimism
about the future dominate. A spirit of generosity and mutuality may
appear, and individuals may be in a state of denial about their losses and
the problems of the future. During this stage many people will not be
receptive to psychosocial interventions or will feel they do not need
them. Others, however, may welcome the chance to talk through their
reactions within a few days of the disaster or to find someone who can
help them plan how to overcome the obstacles they are facing.
The bulk of psychosocial interventions directed at victims themselves

occur in this period. Discouragement and disillusionment with relief and
reconstruction efforts may set in. Anxiety, sadness, irritability,
frustration, and discouragement now combine with disaster-produced
losses and post-traumatic stress effects to produce a relatively high level
of need. Focusing on identification of those at risk and on interventions
to reduce the longer-term impact is essential.
• Provide broad outreach services aimed at providing education

about responses to disaster and information as to the availability
of services and guidance as to when to seek assistance. This may
include use of newspapers, radio, and television; arranging
community meetings or sending speakers to churches or schools;
distributing leaflets through shelters, schools, workplaces among
others.
• Seek to identify those most at risk or most in need of services and

focus services on these people, the principles of such
interventions are discussed later in this unit.
• Provide concrete support in specific situations, This may include

helping those who have lost a family member identify the victim
91
and make funeral arrangements; advocating for improvements in

the organization of shelters or for provision of specific supplies
or services; helping organize community rituals and memorial
ceremonies; helping prevent or combating scapegoating in a
shelter or in a community.
• Provide school-based services for all children, in addition to

individual or group services to children identified as showing
signs of distress. Provide services for teachers (who must interact
with and support the children). Teachers may be trained to
themselves provide ongoing services for children.
• Advocating for rapid progress in rebuilding homes, recreating

jobs, restoring community services (e.g., schools, churches) and
involving victims in themselves advocating for these both helps
ensure that the essential underpinnings of psychological recovery
are realized and helps restore a sense of mastery and control in
victims. In most circumstances, the number of people trained in
responding to the emotional consequences of disaster will be
insufficient to meet the demand. Training of auxiliary disaster
counsellors will, of necessity, be a high priority during this
period. Primary care health workers, teachers, religious leaders,
traditional healers, and others can be enlisted.
The “Reconstruction” Phase
Emotional consequences of the disaster may continue to appear for up to

two years or more post-disaster. In part this represents delayed reactions,
in part responses to a growing recognition of the irreversible
consequences of the disaster. The experience of several disasters
suggests that mental health assistance should remain available for
about two years or more after the disaster. Such services also permit
longer-term follow-up of those treated earlier. It may be helpful to
establish and maintain a telephone “hot line” or other ways for people to
contact counsellors if the need arises, for the period after counsellors
leave the site of the disaster.
9
PRINCIPLE IV: INTEGRATE PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSISTANCE

WITH OVERALL RELIEF PROGRAMS
It is difficult, if not impossible, to provide effective psychosocial

services without the cooperation and support of those directing and
providing medical and material relief efforts, at the local as well as the
regional or national level. Governmental officials (at local or national
level) often do not recognize or give much priority to the psychosocial
effects of disasters. Rescue and relief workers, who are necessarily
focussing on the urgent and concrete tasks of saving lives, protecting
property, ensuring the provision of food, clothing, and shelter, and
rebuilding the material infrastructure of the community may see
psychosocial services as unnecessary or even as getting in their way.
Educating both of these groups about the impact of psychosocial
processes on the relief effort itself and on the long run consequences of
not responding to the mental health effects is essential.
91
Early development of liaison with those directing relief works is

essential. Forming a task force made up of experts in psychosocial
intervention, formal community leaders (e.g., the heads of towns, wards,
villages), representatives of influential groups in the community (e.g.,
Mosques, churches, unions), leaders of the relief effort, and
representatives of the victims to guide and support psychosocial work
may be very useful.
One potential source of contention is that pre-existing social

stratification (by class, caste, gender, rural vs. urban, etc.) may lead to
certain groups (e.g., women, poorer people) being left out of the process.
Conforming to traditional patterns of stratification in the name of
efficiency or of “restoring community structure” reinforces those
patterns. Implementing programs along more egalitarian and
participatory lines may produce conflict and new forms of stress, but it
may also ultimately result in serving a far larger group of victims and
producing a more integrated, cooperative post-disaster community.
Several useful focuses of early liaison work are:
• Providing for education and training of rescue and relief workers

(before they begin work, if at all possible) as to the emotional
effects relief work may have on them and on the availability and
usefulness of supportive services for them. Advocate with those
directing the relief efforts that this should be part of the relief
worker orientation program.
• Providing for training of rescue and relief workers (before they

begin work, if possible) with respect to the nature of the
emotional responses of trauma victims that they can expect.
• Informing relief workers and officials of the importance of

providing adequate, accurate, and non-contradictory information
to survivors.
• Educating relief officials about the importance of keeping

services unfragmented.
• Educating or informing relief officials about several findings

which should influence rescue and relief operations:
a) The importance of keeping primary groups (families, work crews,

groups of people from the same neighbourhood or the same
village) together, if conceivably possible.
b) The importance of not separating children from their parents, if in
any way possible
9
c) The importance of having victims play a role in the relief and

recovery efforts
d) The importance of avoiding unnecessary evacuations and of
letting people return to their homes as rapidly as possible
e) The importance of allowing the bereaved to see the bodies of
those who have died, if they desire to do so.
f) The importance of pet rescue and maintenance of pets in special
animal shelters.
This is often neglected but is very important for the emotional well-
being of many people. One effective way of encouraging integration of
social assistance with overall relief programs is for those providing
psychosocial assistance to thoroughly integrate themselves into the relief
team. Go out with food distribution teams. Run a “play” centre for
children, which will also draw in mothers. Be part of the “briefing” or
“orientation” team for newly arriving relief workers. Attend early
morning or late night team meetings.
PRINCIPLE V. INTERVENTIONS MUST TAKE PEOPLE’S

CULTURE INTO ACCOUNT
People from different cultural groups (including different sub-cultural

groups within a larger society) may express distress in different ways
and may make different assumptions about the sources of distress and
how to respond to it. Techniques originally devised in industrialized
countries must be applied sensitively, if they are to be used elsewhere.
(Fortunately, there is a body of evidence suggesting that these
techniques can be successfully adapted to a wide variety of situations.
Some of the cross-cultural differences which may need to be taken into
account include the following:
• Some societies explain behaviour in “rational” or “scientific

terms, others in more spiritual terms. Where on this continuum is
the particular culture?
• What is the extent and nature of verbal interactions expected
between a person who is in distress and a person trying to help
them?
• Under what conditions is it socially appropriate to express
emotions such as shame, guilt, fear, and anger? How are various
emotions described and expressed?
• Is revealing feelings to others socially appropriate? What issues
are raised by discussing feelings or practical problems in the
presence of other family members?
• What are the social expectations with respect to the roles of
victim and counsellor? e.g., what is the appropriate social
distance between them? What deference is owed the helper?
91
• What are the cultural beliefs regarding the role of ritual in the
treatment? Are there expectations with regard to the sequences of
interactions between a person seeking help and the helper? Are
specific rituals expected in treatment?
• What are the cultural expectations with regard to the use of
metaphor, imagery, myth, and story telling in a helping
relationship?
• Is there an expectation that a helper will provide immediate
concrete or material assistance or direct advice or instructions?
• What are the traditional ways of understanding the sources of
disasters (e.g., witchcraft, the will of God, fate, karma)? What
does this imply about expectations and needs with regard to a
sense of personal control?
• What is the culturally expected way of responding to terrible
events? (E.g., it may be resignation; individual action, collective
action. “Depression” may or may not be seen as a problematic
way of understanding events.
• What are people’s expectations regarding the use of traditional
healers or rituals and regarding the role of “western medicine”?
• How are the symptoms of “mental illness” explained?
• What are people’s expectations with regard to authority figures
and especially to those seen as representing the government?
• What is the role of subsistence activities which the disaster has
disrupted in establishing cultural identity?
One path which helps create such sensitivity is to involve local people in
every phase of psychosocial services. Local health workers, priests,
traditional healers, union leaders, teachers, and local community leaders
should be educated about the psychosocial consequences of disaster and
enlisted to serve as psychosocial counsellors. In this context, differences
between men and women in coping styles and in what is deemed
socially appropriate can also be regarded as a form of “cultural
difference.” Interventions need to be sensitive to the possibly differing
expectations and needs of women (e.g., with respect to speaking about
emotional concerns in a family meeting or a public setting).
PRINCIPLE VI. DIRECT INTERVENTIONS HAVE AN

UNDERLYING LOGIC
A variety of specific intervention techniques may be useful in

responding to the emotional impact of disaster on individuals, families,
and other groups. In any particular disaster situation, these techniques
may have to be modified or adapted, and there are many other, less
formal interventions that may be useful. In what follows, the focus is on
the logic and underlying purposes of interventions, rather than the
9
details or specific mechanics of interventions. The latter is addressed for

a number of specific techniques in subsequent unit.
1. Talking: People need to make sense of a disaster, in the context

of their lives and their culture. Telling a story about what
happened is a way of creating a meaning for the events. Many
victims find that simply telling others about their experiences in
the disaster or about their experiences in the days and weeks after
the disaster is helpful.
Telling what happened to another person also permits the victim to

check that his or her perceptions of what happened are accurate. Telling
one’s story “externalizes” thoughts and feelings, subjecting them to
examination by oneself and others. Emitting feelings a little bit at a time
when the experience is safely in the past, by talking to others or by
crying, reduces stress. Public opportunities for mourning, celebrating,
and otherwise expressing feelings can also relieve stress and may allow
expression of feelings in a socially acceptable way in situations in which
one-on-one discussion with a disaster counsellor may be less acceptable.
Note: While talking about experiences is generally healthy,
“rumination” (repetitive, obsessive retelling of a story) is associated
with higher levels of anxiety and depression and should be discouraged
by engaging the victim in alternative activities or diversions. Helping
clients to focus on decisions and actions in the present can strengthen
their mechanisms for coping with their difficult emotions and
behaviours. For children, other means of communication, including
playing, art work, dancing, or role playing may play the same role that
talking does in an adult. For some adults talking about the events may be
painful, or talking about bad events may be culturally proscribed, and
similar non-verbal means of communication may provide a way to
express themselves.
2. Communication of information: Uncertainty increases victims’

level of stress. Incorrect information produces confusion, can
interfere with appropriate responses, and can lead to tensions
among victims or between victims and relief workers. Provide
victims with accurate and full information, as quickly as possible,
using both individual, direct forms of communication and general
public announcements (e.g., via the mass media). Combat rumour
mongering. It is essential to have a single source of information
which victims can rely upon (e.g., a posted, regular, reliable
schedule for information sharing by relief officials).
3. Empowerment: One of the most psychologically devastating

aspects of a disaster is the victim’s sense of having lost control
over his or her life and fate. Interventions that help those affected
91
by the disaster change from feeling themselves as “victims” (i.e.,

as passive, dependent, lacking control over their own lives) to
“survivors” (who have a sense of control and confidence in their
ability to cope) are central to preventing or mitigating subsequent
emotional difficulties. Discourage passivity and a culture of
dependency. Seek to engage victims in solving their own
problems. Victims should be encouraged to participate in making
decisions that affect their lives and to take part in implementing
those decisions. They should not be denied an active role in
solving problems, in the interests of “efficiency.” For adults, a
return to work (either their usual work or other productive or
personally meaningful activity) helps increase their sense of
control and of competence. For children, a return to school
performs the same function. Even when people must remain in a
shelter for prolonged periods, developing small scale income
generating productive activities, permitting victims to help run
the shelter and the relief administration, and providing skills
training are useful parts of psychosocial rehabilitation.
4. Normalization: While unfamiliar emotional responses are

normal following a disaster, victims may find their own reactions
distressing. The best antidote is education. Reassure victims that
their responses are not a sign that they are “going crazy.” Explain
the typical time course (i.e., that, in most cases, symptoms can be
expected to remit over a period of weeks or months). Warn
victims that the anniversary of the disaster, environmental stimuli
that remind them of the disaster and other events such as funerals
or legal actions growing out of the disaster may lead to a brief
return of symptoms that had faded. Victims should also know
that not everyone experiences the same symptoms or even any
symptoms at all. They are not condemned to have symptoms.
5. Social Support: Recovery from disaster is inherently social.

Restoring or creating networks of social support is essential in
dealing with the extreme stresses created by disaster. Avoid
breaking up existing communities. Combat isolation of individual
victims. Reuniting families has the highest priority. Reuniting
people from the same neighbourhood, work teams, and other pre-
existing groupings is helpful, and separating members of such
pre-existing groups (and especially members of the same family)
is harmful. Only in the most extreme situations should children
be separated from their parents (e.g., if the child’s parents are
abusive or rejecting because they are unable to cope with their
own trauma or that of their child). If separation of a child from its
parents is necessary (or if the parents are injured or killed),
keeping the child with another trusted adult known to them (e.g.,
98
a relative, a teacher) is urgent. Sending the children away “for

their own protection” is almost never advisable. Returning
children to school and adults to accustomed social environments
(e.g., work) is important. In some instances, no natural support
groups are available. In this situation, creating artificial networks
(e.g., creation of ongoing peer or self-help groups for treatment,
helping to reorganize and rebuild communities) is helpful. In
most instances, group treatment modalities should be a central
part of the psychosocial response to disasters. When possible, the
group that is the unit for treatment should be a naturally
occurring group, such as the family.
Note: While social support generally helps people deal with stress,
expectations that one should support others, if excessive, and feeling too
much empathy for too many people can exacerbate stress. Resistance to
involvement in social networks should be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.
6. Relief of symptoms: Anxiety, depression, exaggerated stress

responses, and other symptoms are both distressing to the
individual and may lead to difficulties in adapting to what is
intrinsically a stressful situation. While extensive intervention to
treat entrenched psychiatric difficulties is beyond the scope of
this manual, more time-limited interventions, such as brief crisis
intervention or relaxation and desensitization techniques may be
useful. Screening victims for unusually intense responses, using
instruments such as the SRQ (see Appendix A) if necessary,
helps identify individuals in need of more intensive services.
Those with pre-existing psychiatric conditions are also at risk.
Such victims should be referred for more extensive individual or
group counselling, or medication, if resources are available. For
those with pre-existing psychiatric disabilities, efforts should be
made to restore their previous treatment (e.g., therapy,
medication). For those without prior histories of psychiatric
disorder but who show acute distress, medication (e.g.,
anxiolytics for acute anxiety and panic, neuroleptics for psychotic
symptoms), when available, may be a useful short term response.
7. Build on community strengths, traditions, and resources

(without being a slave to tradition): Communities have strengths
and resources. These strengths and resources can be a powerful
tool for mitigating the effects of disasters in individuals. A sense
of community, a sense of social identity, and a network of social
support are essential underpinnings of mental health.
Interventions and advocacy to restore community morale,
99
traditional economic activities, pre-existing welfare and personal
keeping the child with another trusted adult known to them (e.g.,
98
services, schools, leisure and recreational patterns are useful.

Communities have a wealth of traditional strengths and
resources. Use indigenous healers and local residents, both
drawing on their traditional skills and training them in
psychosocial rehabilitation techniques. Identify traditional rituals
and ceremonies, such as healing rituals and purification rituals
used by the community to deal with crisis, and facilitate their use.
Where traditions don’t exist, new community rituals may be
created, such as a day of mourning or daily bell ringing or
processions.
There are potential pitfalls in efforts to rebuild the pre-disaster

community. Some of these are created, directly or indirectly, by the
disaster itself. For instance, conflicts may arise between emergent
leaders “created” by the crisis of disaster and traditional leaders or
between local leaders and outside experts and elites. Traditional elites
may use their traditional positions to monopolize post-disaster resources
or to further pre-disaster ambitions. The crisis created by disaster may
open long-dormant faults in societies or communities and may lead to
new relations within families or within a community. A crisis is an
opportunity for change to emerge in a community. “Building on
community strengths” does not mean automatically seeking to restore
the old structure of the community in the interests of “efficient” relief
efforts, nor does it mean pursuing one’s own beliefs in how
communities or families “ought” to be structured. It is engagement in a
community, rather than a particular structure of the community, that
represents an area of hope for victims.
What are the core principles of psychosocial intervention in disaster

management?
4.0 CONCLUSION
A wide variety of specific techniques have been used to provide

immediate relief to individuals in distress, to prevent or mitigate the
longer-term emotional effects of disasters. Some of the principles were
noted as important in the management of disaster especially in regards
to long term solutions. It is also important to know that this unit focused
on cultural differences as they contribute a lot to response management.
5.0 SUMMARY
The two major aspects to intervention with the direct victims of
101
intervening with individual victims were discussed and explain. After

which the various principles and phases of interventions were elaborated
with cultural emphasis, which need to be taken into account in the study
of emergencies.
1. List and explain some of the core principles of psychosocial

intervention in disaster management?
2. Explain the various stages in disaster management
Kasperson, Jeanne X. and Roger E. Kasperson, (eds.). (2005). Social

Contours of Risk. Vol. 1, Publics, Risk Communication and the
Social Amplification of Risk. London: Earthscan.
Laris, Michael. (2005). Responding with money and ammo; as

donations pour in, deputies and equipment set out for stricken
Gulf Coast. The Washington Post, September 2, sec. A.
Lindell, Michael K. and Ronald, W. Perry (1992). Behavioural

Foundations of Community Emergency Management.
Washington, DC: Hemisphere.
Mitchell, Jerry T.; Deborah S. K. Thomas; Arleen A. Hill and Susan L.

Cutter. (2000). Catastrophe in Reel Life versus Real Life:
Perpetuating Disaster Myth through Hollywood Films.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
18:383-402.
National Academy of Public Administration. (1993). Coping with

Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to
Meet People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters.
Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration.
disasters: rebuilding the community affected by the disaster and
100
MODULE 3
Unit 1 Social Capital Utilization and Preparedness for Natural

Disasters
Unit 2 Understanding Crisis
Unit 3 Crisis Intervention Goals and Steps
Unit 4 Crisis Intervention Assessment
Unit 5 Crisis Intervention Treatment Approaches and Techniques
UNIT 1 SOCIAL CAPITAL UTILIZATION AND

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATURAL DISASTERS:
THE BANGLADESH EXPERIENCE (CASE
STUDY)
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the disasters brought about in the United States by

Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, American social workers have
much to learn from countries that have faced similar tragedies, including
those in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh. Bangladeshis can expect a
major disaster every two years. Consequently, Bangladesh has
developed a successful mechanism that utilizes social capital to recover
and rebuild after each disaster hits the country. Students as well as
professionals can learn substantial lessons from the Bangladesh
experiences.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• the scope and prospect for effective utilization of social capital

such as social networks, social cohesion, social interaction
• solidarity in mitigating the consequences of natural disasters that
hit coastal regions.
102
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
The literature on disaster management reveals that vulnerable

populations tend to be the ones that suffer most. For this special
attention should be given to vulnerable populations, for example, the
economically disadvantaged, mentally challenged, older people,
children and those who are medically frail as explained in previous
sections. Vidal and Gittell (1998) have remarked that the creation of
programs like the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) will be
advantageous for both communities and their supporters. They further
note that at the community level LISC included increased
comprehension of community development; participation in community
development; organization of community development; and ultimately,
control of community development. This program also sought increased
financial, technical and political support for community development
from both private and public sectors. Scholars have called these the
support community. The enhancement of social development in
community organizing and development facilitated by social workers
and the community concerned allows for a stronger, more cohesive
response to disasters. The need for social capital there comes to bear in
disaster management as was evident in the Bangladesh case.
SOCIAL CAPITAL
This module/unit focuses on the effective utilization of human and

social capital in mitigating the consequences of natural disasters.
Snowden (2005) argues that community social capital reduces
community distress. But the reverse is also true: community distress
suppresses social capital. Snowden (2005) also states that in general,
events in the community and in the larger society can affect levels of
engagement, trust and reciprocity by supporting or undermining pro-
social norms and related social practices. Because conditions can
improve or deteriorate over time, these can facilitate or frustrate
normative belief and practices. Moreover, social capital is not static. The
effective utilization of social capital is crucial in the building of
community and institutional capacities in disaster management projects.
Social capital consists of such concepts as social networks, social
contacts, social cohesion, social interaction and solidarity. Loeffler et al.
(2004) define social capital as a process of building trust in
relationships, mutual understanding and shared actions that bring
together individuals, communities and institutions. They also claim that
the processes involved facilitate further cooperative action. These
generate opportunities and/or resources that are realized through
networks, shared norms and social agency. For example if people lack
money then they can give time strictly out of self-interest that can be
103
harnessed through social capital in communities that need help.

Putnam’s theory of social capital presumes that the more people connect
with each other, the more they will trust each other and the better off
they will be individually and collectively, because social capital has a
strong collective aspect. The social and economic system as a whole
functions better because there are ties among the actors that make it up
(Vidal and Gittell, 1998: 15). A model that emphasizes three steps to
building social capital based on the World Bank’s classification of social
capital from the poverty reduction, and community capacity building
perspective has been developed (World Bank, 2006) (see Figures 1, 2, 3,
4). These highlight bonds, bridges and links and were evident in the
post-Katrina commentary in the America. A crucial weakness in this
was the lack of well-coordinated preparedness, including the human
service professions, at the grassroots level. Therefore, there is a need for
some persuasive work in formulating policy directives that will
emphasize community collaboration, solidarity, coordination and
utilization of social networks as a vehicle for effective service delivery
before, during and after a disaster. The three stages involved in creating
and developing social capital are:
1. Bonding within communities: The utilization of social capital

starts with bonding within the community. Social integration,
104
social cohesion, solidarity, networking, two-way communication,

sustained interaction between and among the members, effective
coordination of community activities, collaboration on and
support of members’ activities, the fostering of leadership
qualities and giving a hand to other community members are all
useful attributes for this bonding. These attributes can be
cultivated through recreational activities, religious and spiritual
gatherings, political and institutional affiliations, economic and
business activities, the physical infrastructure and buildings, and
psychological and social supports.
2. Bridging between and among communities: The next level in

social capital formation is that of reaching out to other
communities in he society. At this point, groups and interested
citizens can form a coalition to identify the needs and joint
collaboration efforts required to meet them.
3. Linking communities through ties with financial and public

institutions Researchers have revealed that historic, longstanding
relationships that are developed among different elements of
communities, the government and other organizations, including
105
financial institutions and voluntmy agencies, have generally assisted in

mitigating the consequences of natmal disasters. Their effectiveness in
working together has proved crucial in mobilizing a community's
resomces, expertise, professionals and volunteers, before disaster strikes
and in the recovery work that takes place during and afterwards.
Figure 3 Bridging between and among communities
• Governmental ( \X \
organizations
• Scientific organizations
• Non-governmental
organizations
• United Nations
o -o
• International private
organizations
• National international
organizations
• Foreign voluntary
organizations
D 0
D
Figure 4 Linking through ties with financial institutions, including
international organizations
106
Natural disasters: the case of Bangladesh
Cyclones, storms and tidal surges often hit Bangladesh’s coastal areas.
The results of their impact have ranged from heavy losses of human
lives and cattle, to property damage causing enormous expense to both
individuals and governments. Table 1 below shows that 64 major
cyclonic storms buffeted Bangladesh during the period 1797–1997.
These killed 863,016 people and caused severe damages worth billions
of dollars to properties. Mortality from disasters is generally greatest in
areas having the poorest socio-economic conditions (Guha-Sapir, 1991).
This was the case for the last major cyclone in 1991 (Table 1 shows
major cyclones through 1997). The devastating cyclone and tidal wave
that struck the south-eastern coast of Bangladesh on 29 April 1991
killed nearly 138,000 people, left more than 10 million homeless and
destroyed property worth $2bn (Mathbor et al., 1993). Related deaths
were largely attributable to a lack of decent housing capable of
providing shelter during the cyclone. Research showed that
casualties were directly related to types of housing and shelter seeking

activities; no deaths occurred among individuals living in pucca houses
107
(made of brick and concrete) and the ones who sought shelter in these
buildings (Mathbor et al., 1993). People had heard cyclone warning
signals from three to six hours before the storm surge, but they did not
take refuge in shelters (Mathbor et al., 1993). A similar situation
occurred during the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina when
people were not evacuated in time due to a lack of coordinated plans
between and among relief organizations. People who live in the coastal
areas are poorly educated about disaster coping mechanisms and are at
risk of being uninformed, as was evident from the recent disasters in
America and Bangladesh. Buckland and Rahman (1999), studying the
Red River flood in Canada, found that communities characterized by
higher levels of physical, human and social capital were better prepared
and more effective in responding to natural disaster. Similarly, no deaths
occurred among the indigenous people of the Andaman Islands during
the tsunami devastation because they understood early warning systems.
It is evident from previous research undertaken in this area by Hossain
et al. (1992), Mathbor (1997), Mathbor et al. (1993) and UNICEF
(1991) that poorer people in such regions are more vulnerable than
richer during natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina exposed similar
dynamics. These situations call for community capacity building that
encompass considerations that cover housing conditions and income
generation while raising awareness and educating coastal people about
the consequences of cyclones. The idea of a Cyclone Preparedness
Program (CPP) started in 1965 when the National Red Cross Society,
now the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), requested that the
International Federation of the Red Cross/Crescent (IFRC), formerly the
League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, to support the
establishment of an early warning system for the population living in the
coastal belt of Bangladesh. In 1966 the IFRC and the Swedish Red
Cross began the implementation of a pilot scheme for cyclone
preparedness which consisted of both impersonal media outlets like TV
and radio and personal warning equipment.
The social capital of CPP volunteers
The CPP experience shows that proper guidance, transparency and

access to information is needed at all stages of a project, including the
proposal, planning, implementation and evaluation stages of
development initiatives and recognition of people’s worth in coastal
community development endeavours. Volunteers’ sincerity and firm
commitment to the fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality,
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality are
inherent in the Red Cross movement. These were cultivated through a
sustained training program and enhanced not only the effectiveness of
CPP, but also saved many lives in recent disasters that hit the coast of
Bangladesh. Many of the recent tsunami victims in south and South-east
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Asia could have been saved if there had been some kind of preparedness
programs in the areas affected. Local people come forward to join CPP
on a voluntary basis. CPP volunteers are well trained cadres in disaster
management activities. Their training consists of an ongoing training
program that runs throughout the year, to generate leadership qualities,
management skills, and a commitment to serve humanity and solidarity
among and between volunteers and the community concerned.
Volunteers are quite familiar with a local community and its resources,
including the location of safe shelters, relief and rehabilitation programs,
and evacuation plans to be followed in the event of a disaster. Ongoing
interaction among and between CPP members and the people the
projects are aimed to help avoids mistrust and misunderstanding in the
development process. CPP volunteers are grateful for the social
recognition of their relentless efforts in helping distressed people in
devastated communities and consider this as their net gain from society.
CPP operates through a wonderful chain of command using a
communication networking system which is very quick to respond to the
immediate needs of coastal communities. This communication system
comprises both direct personal contact and impersonal communication
through the recognized media. CPP sees its volunteers as magnetic
catalysts who convey the program’s messages to the mass of people. To
this end, CPP conducts a round-the-year training program for volunteers
and utilizes local folk media in disseminating program messages to large
numbers of people. Its volunteers engage in public awareness activities,
stage dramas, and show films and video shows and so on.
1. What is social capital?

2. What are the lessons one can learn from the Bangladesh
experience?
4.0 CONCLUSION
This unit has demonstrated the fact that some countries are more disaster
prepared than others. For instance the Bangladesh experience shows
expectations of major cyclone every couple of years, of which social
capital has been harnessed to develop an effective coping mechanism for
addressing such eventualities that other countries not necessarily at risk
can substantially learn from. Individuals, government and non
governmental organisations and social workers all need to be prepared
in anticipation of disaster rather than wait until disaster strikes.
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5.0 SUMMARY
This article examines the scope and prospect for effective utilization of
social capital such as social networks, social cohesion, social interaction
and solidarity in mitigating the consequences of natural disasters that hit
coastal regions citing examples from Bangladesh. Emphasis to social
capital at three levels: bonding within communities; bridging
communities; and linking communities through ties with financial and
public institutions. In this unit care was also taken to link the role of
personal, social, economic and political empowerment through direct
involvement and participation to the improvement and contribution to
the sustainable development of communities.
1. Define and explain social capital?

2. With diagrammatic examples explain the three stages involved in
creating and developing social capital?
Buckland, J. and M. Rahman (1999). ‘Community Development and

Disaster Management: A Case Study of Three Rural
Communities in the 1997 Red River Flood in Canada’.
Guha-Sapir, D. (1991). ‘Rapid Assessment of Health Needs in Mass

Emergencies: Review of Current Concepts and Methods’, World
Health Statistics Quarterly 44:171–81.
Hossain, H.; C.P. Dodge and F.H. Abed (1992). From Crisis to
Development: Coping with Disasters in Bangladesh. Dhaka:
University Press.
Light, P. (2005). ‘Lessons Learned: Hurricane Katrina and Wilma Hit

U.S. Gulf Coastal States’, Boston Globe (4 September).
Loeffler, D.N.; Christiansen, D.C.; Tracy, M.B.; Secret, M.C. Ersing,

R.L.; Fairchild S.R.; and R. Sutphen (2004). ‘Social Capital for
Social Work: Toward a Definition and Conceptual Framework’,
Social Development Issues 26(2/3): 22–38 (Lombard, IL:
Lyceum Books).
Mathbor, G.M. (1997). ‘The Importance of Community Participation in

Coastal Zone Management: A Bangladesh Perspective’,
Community Development Journal 32(2):124–32.
110
Mathbor, G.M.; Bern, C.; Sniezek, J.; Siddiqi, M.S.; Ronsmans, C.

Chawdhurry; Choudhury, A.M.R.; Islam, A.E. K.; Bennish, M.;
Noji, E. and Glass, R.I. (1993). ‘Risk Factors for Mortality in the
Bangladesh Cyclone of 1991’, Bulletin of the World Health
Organization (WHO) 71(1): 73–8.
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (1991). Health Effects of the 1991

Bangladesh Cyclone: Report of the UNICEF Cyclone Review
Group. Dhaka: UNICEF.
Vidal, A. and R. Gittell (1998). Community Organizing: Building Social

Capital as a Development Strategy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
World Bank (2006). ‘Social Capital’. Available online at:

www.web.worldbank.
org/wbsite/external/topics/extsocialdevelopment (accessed 18
August).
Snowden, L.R. (2005). ‘Racial, Cultural and Ethnic Disparities in Health

and Mental Health: Toward Theory and Research at Community
Levels’, American Journal of Community Psychology 35(1/2): 1–
8.
111
UNIT 2 UNDERSTANDING CRISIS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Family crises are not unusual events in the field of child protection. A
child’s disclosure of sexual molestation, the birth of a drug-addicted
infant, the discovery of a teenager’s dependence on drugs, a parent’s
arrest for violent behaviour, the threat of a family’s eviction from public
housing, or a parent overwhelmed with the needs of a child illustrate just
some of the crises experienced by families. Although the state of crisis
is short lived, generally lasting four to six weeks, it is a period of
heightened family vulnerability and imbalance that requires a carefully
planned response. This section provides an overview of crisis, its
definition, elements, and phases. In addition, the feelings and
psychological effects typically experienced by family members in crisis
are presented to increase awareness of the ramifications of crisis.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
• understand crisis, its definition, elements, and phases

• examines the feelings and psychological effects typically
experienced by family members in crisis situation
• increase awareness of the ramifications of crisis.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Definition of Crisis from /and Emergency
“A crisis,” as defined by (Parad and Parad, 1990), “is an upset in a

steady state, a critical turning point leading to better or worse, a
disruption or breakdown in a person’s or family’s normal or usual
pattern of functioning. The upset, or disequilibrium, is usually acute in
the sense that it is of recent origin.” A crisis constitutes circumstances or
situations which cannot be resolved by one’s customary problem-
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solving resources. A crisis is different from a problem or an emergency.

While a problem may create stress and be difficult to solve, the family
or individual is capable of finding a solution. Consequently, a problem
that can be resolved by an individual or a family is not a crisis. An
emergency is a sudden, pressing necessity, such as when a life is in
danger because of an accident, a suicide attempt, or family violence. It
requires immediate attention by law enforcement or other professionals
trained to respond to life-threatening events. If a situation can wait 24 to
72 hours for a response, without placing an individual or a family in
jeopardy, it is a crisis and not an emergency.
ELEMENTS OF CRISES
The three basic elements of a crisis—a stressful situation, difficulty in

coping, and the timing of intervention—interact and make each crisis
unique.
1. Stress-Producing Situations
Everyone experiences times when they feel upset, disappointed, or

exhausted. When such feelings are combined with certain life events or
situations, they often lead to mounting tension and stress. There are five
types of situations or events that may produce stress and, in turn,
contribute to a state of crisis:
a. Family Situations—a child abuse investigation, spouse abuse, an

unplanned pregnancy, a parent’s desertion, a chronically ill
family member, and lack of social supports are examples of
family situations that can create stress and crises.
b. Economic Situations—sudden or chronic financial strain is

responsible for many family crises, such as loss of employment, a
theft of household cash or belongings, high medical expenses,
missed child support payments, repossession of a car, utilities cut
off from service, money “lost” to gambling or drug addiction, and
poverty.
c. Community Situations—neighbourhood violence, inadequate

housing, a lack of community resources, and inadequate
educational programs illustrate some ways the community may
contribute to family crises.
d. Significant Life Events—events that most view as happy, such

as a marriage, the birth of a child, a job promotion, or retirement,
can trigger a crisis in a family; a child enrolling in school, the
behaviours of an adolescent, a grown child leaving the home, the
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onset of menopause, or the death of a loved one can also be very

stressful life events.
e. Natural Elements—crises are created by disasters such as

floods, hurricanes, fires, and earthquakes, or even extended
periods of high heat and humidity, or gloomy or excessively cold
weather.
2. Difficulties in Coping
An individual’s or a family’s ability to deal with a crisis situation is

influenced by their physical and behavioural characteristics and their
attitudes and beliefs. Even families with generally happy lives and
networks of support can become overwhelmed by stressful events. For
example, poor physical health, a low level of personal energy, an overly
sensitive temperament, and mistrust of community service providers set
the stage for difficulty in coping with a crisis. Families that have
problem-solved well in the past will be quick to benefit from crisis
intervention. With encouragement, support, and a focus on the problem-
solving process, they will soon regain their coping skills and stabilize.
For example, one case referred to Child Protective Service (CPS)
involved the neglect of a young child. The child’s mother was depressed
about her ex-husband’s threats of a custody fight. Feeling hopeless
about a legal battle, the mother began to blame and neglect her child. As
a result of crisis intervention, the mother quickly regained hope, secured
legal counsel, and realized that she could “stand up to the threats.”
Within a period of three weeks, the mother was appropriately parenting
her child again and finding joy in life.
Parents with Chronic Coping Problems
Many families in the CPS system (this peculiar to western world) do not
have experience in solving problems well. Rather, they seem to have
continual difficulties in several areas of their life. Indicators
distinguishing the two types of families—those in acute crisis and those
in chronic crisis—are presented in the table below. is not the task of
crisis workers (also known as crisis interveners) to “cure” every
dysfunction within “chronic crisis” families. Instead, it is more critical
to focus on one to four specific stresses which created the immediate
crisis. If a family can learn to focus on and find solutions to a limited
number of crisis-producing problems, then the family members will
have learned how to problem solve, and they will feel more in control of
their destiny.
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People with chronic coping difficulties tend to be constantly in stressful

situations and must cope with several major problems which occur
simultaneously, e.g., unemployment, inability to pay bills, problems
with the landlord, marital disharmony, and neighbourhood complaints
about their children or the appearance of the yard. Any new stress, such
as the utilities being disconnected, may be “the straw that breaks the
back” of these families. Instead of being supportive to each other, family
members try to place blame. Arguments or violence between the adults
may lead to child abuse or neglect or vice versa. Substance abuse,
adolescent gang activity, or a runaway or pregnant teenager may
indicate that the family has chronic coping problems. Once families
learn to solve problems, they have new hope for the future, giving them
the energy to address some of the antecedents to the current crisis.
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Again, crisis workers as well as students who have received lectures on

this topic must focus on restoring stability and teaching families how to
solve problems, rather than solving the problems for them. When crisis
workers assist families in solving a crisis, the families are also helped to
avoid future crises. Many of these families, however, need to be referred
to mental health or substance abuse counsellors for resolution of past
emotional traumas, such as childhood sexual abuse or for treatment of
addictions, depression, and other emotional disorders.
3. Timing of Intervention
As stated previously, crises typically last four to six weeks during which
time problem-solving is critical. A timely, therapeutic response is likely
to prevent a severe breakdown in family relationships and restore
adequate functioning. It is at this time that the family is most open to
intervention. By intervening in a timely manner and by assisting the
family in overcoming situational factors which led to the crisis,
stabilization is likely to occur within a few weeks. Initially, the crisis
worker may remain with the family for several hours, if needed. As the
situation progresses or becomes more intense, the crisis worker’s time
with the family is adjusted to fit the situation. As termination is
approached, fewer hours should be required. Throughout the process,
the crisis worker should be available at all times.
THE PHASES OF CRISIS
When individuals or families face certain levels of stress or

combinations of stress, crises occur. These crises are likely to have a
sequence, or series of phases, as described below. Although presented as
seven distinct phases, the phases of crisis may overlap or intertwine. The
following configuration of crisis phases is adapted and expanded from
the four interlocking phases found in Crisis Intervention Book 2: The
Practitioner’s Sourcebook for Brief Therapy (Parad and Parad, eds.,
1990).
Phase I: Precipitating Event—an unusual, unanticipated, stressful,

or traumatic precipitating event occurs, causing an initial rise in anxiety.
The individual and family respond with familiar problem solving
mechanisms.
– The precipitating event may be a report of child sexual abuse or

an investigation by authorities of drug-related activities in a family.
Another example is a parent who loses a job. Feeling hurt and
vulnerable, the parent may displace his or her anger by physically
harming a child. In turn, there is a new precipitating event, a child abuse
investigation with its own potential for creating a family crisis.
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Phase II: Perception—the individual or family perceives the event or

accusation as meaningful and as a threat to individual or family goals,
security, or ties of affection. For instance, a family may perceive a
complaint of abuse or neglect as a threat to family integrity and
interpersonal security (e.g., when there is the possibility of removing a
father who has been accused of sexually abusing his adolescent or the
possibility of removing an adolescent who has behaved in a belligerent
manner).
Phase III: Disorganized Response—unfamiliar feelings of

vulnerability and helplessness escalate as behaviours, skills, or resources
used in the past to solve problems fail. The family’s anxiety rises, and
members seek an immediate and original solution to the psychological
stress.
– In turn, the family’s response to the stressful crisis becomes

increasingly disorganized.
Phase IV: Seeking New and Unusual Resources—in their attempt to

decrease tension and resolve the emotional pain, family members begin
to involve other people. Since each family member has a different
perception of the threat and of who might be able to help, he or she may
seek validation for his or her viewpoint both within and outside the
family. Neighbours, relatives, and friends will offer both direct
assistance (alternative housing, transportation, food, money, etc.), and
advice (“call the police,” “be more submissive and your husband/father
will calm down,” “leave the abuser,” etc.). The family needs a non-
judgemental, well-trained crisis worker during this phase, rather than
conflicting advisors. While the family is feeling helpless, crisis
intervention can be quite effective because the family is open to help
that offers them some protection, security, or support. Compassion,
mixed with appropriately firm limits, can give the family a sense of
security or protectedness. This requires the crisis worker to listen
actively to what the family says it needs to become stable.
Phase V: A Series or Chain of Events—most crises set off a chain of

events which can create yet another crisis for the family. For example, a
crisis may begin with a parent experiencing a drug induced personality
change, becoming violent in the family, and spending the rent on drugs.
If crisis intervention services are not provided, eviction from housing
may ensue, setting off another crisis.
Phase VI: Previous Crises Become Linked to Current Crisis—crises

tend to spur memories of past traumatic or crisis events involving loss of
control. For instance, a mother who has suppressed her sexual
victimization by her father may become acutely aware of it when her
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intoxicated boyfriend makes sexual advances toward her daughter.

Likewise, when a child is physically abused by one parent, the other
parent may have flashbacks about beatings in his or her childhood.
Phase VII: Mobilization of New Resources, Adaptation—this phase

represents a turning point, when the tension and struggle evolve into
mobilization of new resources or ways of adapting. This can occur when
a family with a history of substance abuse attends Alcoholics
Anonymous and Al-Anon meetings, seeks different housing or job
training, or decides to listen when other family members are talking.
Since there is the possibility that an unresolved crisis may lead to further
maladaptive behaviours, such as more vicious fighting or a heavier
reliance on substance abuse, it is the job of crisis workers to help
families seek and implement acceptable crisis-resolution strategies.
FEELINGS DURING CRISIS
Howard and Libbie Parad (1990) describe the anxiety-ridden responses

of people in crisis as including “...upsets in eating, sleeping, dreaming,
lovemaking, feeling, thinking, and doing.” They believe that the
following nine emotional reactions of people in crisis, as discovered by
the Benjamin Rush Centre for Problems of Living, can help
professionals better understand and work with crises:
1. Bewilderment: Experiencing new and unusual feelings.

2. Danger: Feelings of tension, fear, and impending doom.
3. Confusion: Mind is muddled and not working well.
4. Impasse: Feeling stuck; nothing works.
5. Desperation: Need to do something, but what?
6. Apathy: Why try?
7. Helplessness: Need someone to help me.
8. Urgency: Need help right now.
9. Discomfort: Feeling miserable, restless, unsettled.
3.1 Psychological Effects of Crisis
While differences in coping abilities, stress-producing situations, and

timing of intervention make each crisis unique, individuals in crisis
experience some common psychological effects that affect assessment
and treatment. Forming a working relationship with the parents, when
responding to a crisis caused by child maltreatment or when dealing
with parents in any other child-rearing crisis situation, requires
anticipation of these effects. Generally, crisis events produce problems
in six broad areas as described below. Such problems are temporary,
however, and not indicators of mental illness. A crisis is transient, as are
the temporary responses of the family members. Anyone can have a
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crisis. Therefore, being in crisis is not synonymous with being mentally

ill.
1. Disorganized Thinking
People in crisis experience disorganization in their thinking process.

They may overlook or ignore important details and distinctions that
occur in their environment and may have trouble relating ideas, events,
and actions to each other in logical fashion. They may jump from one
idea to another in conversation so that communication is confusing and
hard to follow. They may not notice or may have forgotten exactly what
happened, or who did what to whom. Important details may be
overlooked in interpreting events. Fears and wishes may be confused
with reality, manifesting a general feeling of confusion. Some people in
crisis develop one-track minds, repeating the same words, ideas, and
behaviours which “worked” in the past, but are inappropriate in the
current situation. These people may seem unable to move on to new
ideas, actions, or behaviour necessary to solve the current crisis.
2. Preoccupation with Insignificant Activities
In an attempt to combat disorganized thought processes and anxiety,

people in crisis tend to become very involved in insignificant or
unimportant activities, such as worrying that someone will be
overwhelmed with bad air by keeping a window open. At the peak of
crisis, then, these individuals may need considerable help in focusing on
important activities, such as implementing the steps for productively
resolving the crisis.
3. Expression of Hostility and Emotional Distancing
Some people in crisis are so upset over their loss of control that they
become hostile toward anyone who intervenes in the situation. They
resent their need for help, feeling both angry and vulnerable. Other
crisis-ridden people react with extreme emotional distancing and
passivity, seeming not to be emotionally involved in the situation or
concerned with its outcome. For crisis workers, the issue is not how to
give directives, but to point out the choices for handling the crisis and to
reinforce strengths.
4. Impulsiveness
While some people are immobilized in crisis situations, others are quite
impulsive, taking immediate action in response to the crisis without
considering the consequences of their action. Their failure to evaluate
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the appropriateness of their responses may provoke further crises, thus

making an already complex situation even more difficult to resolve.
5. Dependence
Dependence on the crisis worker at a time of crisis is a natural response

and may be necessary before an individual can resume independence. In
cases of child abuse and neglect, protection of the children may require
the crisis worker to do for the parents what most other parents do for
themselves. For example, the crisis worker may need to call a creditor or
the utility company or help parents in structuring the basics of child
care. During a crisis, perceptions of the crisis worker’s power or
authority can have a stabilizing impact on a family. A family in crisis is
likely to welcome an objective, skilful, and kind authority who knows
how to “get things done.” Offers of help from a concerned, competent
crisis worker seem the answer to all the family’s difficulties. After a
brief period of dependency, most families are able to resume
independent functioning. For some families in crisis, however,
dependency may linger. The need to have someone else in charge makes
these families particularly susceptible to influence from others,
rendering them more vulnerable. In their need to find solutions, they
may not be able to discriminate between what is beneficial for them and
what could be harmful or, in the absence of a competent crisis worker,
to whom they should listen.
6. Threat to Identity
Identity is both an inner condition and an interactional process. When an

event, such as a child abuse report, threatens one’s self-concept and
family relationships, a crisis occurs. Because usual coping methods fail,
one’s sense of personal identity is impaired, causing disequilibrium.
One’s previous feelings of competency and worth may seem totally lost.
To counter a lowered self-perception, a parent in crisis may assume a
facade of adequacy or arrogance, claiming that no help is needed. Or,
the parent may withdraw from offers of help. In either case, it is
important to remember that the parent in crisis is probably very
frightened, rather than “resistant” or “unmotivated.” The crisis worker
has the opportunity to establish rapport by recognizing strengths that
help to restore a sense of goodness or individual worth. The crisis
worker cannot accept abuse of a child, but does acknowledge the
parent’s and family’s strengths.
With relevant examples, differentiate between crisis and emergency.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
During a state of crisis, individuals and families are usually quite

receptive to intervention. The anxiety produced by the crisis, coupled
with the realization that past coping and problem-solving strategies are
not working, spurs motivation to learn new strategies. If help is not
available during this critical period of openness to change, the individual
and family may become totally immobilized or resort to destructive or
maladaptive behaviours. Therefore, it is critical that practitioners of
emergency and disaster management and other associates and concern
authorities quickly identify crisis situations. In identifying a crisis
situation, it is important to consider its contributing elements: What
specific situations or events are creating the most stress for the
individual and the family? What difficulties in coping are evident? At
what point in time is intervention occurring?
The phase of the crisis must also be considered. Feelings and behaviours
that on the surface appear bizarre, may be, in fact, characteristic of the
crisis phase. Correct interpretation of the crisis phase is essential to
appropriate intervention. For instance, clients whose crises are chronic
or multiple may require referrals to follow-up clinicians who can further
address underlying issues. Finally, it is important to be aware of the
feelings people typically experience during a state of crisis. A crisis can
have a devastating impact on one’s senses and psychological
functioning. However, that impact is often short lived when interpreted
and dealt with correctly.
5.0 SUMMARY
This unit focuses on Crisis Intervention in Child Abuse and Neglect via
family crisis. A pragmatic definition of what constitute a crisis and
emergency was highlighted and discussed. Followed were the three
basic elements of a crisis; the various indicators of what differentiates
acute from chronic crisis in relation to phases that exist in the
development of crisis as well as the psychological effects on families,
parents and children.
Succinctly explain the five types of situations or events that may

produce stress and, in turn, contribute to a state of crisis?
121
Parad, H. J. and Parad, L. G. (eds.). (1990). Crisis Intervention Book 2:

The Practitioner’s Sourcebook for Brief Therapy. Milwaukee:
Family Service America.
Borgman, R.; Edmunds, M. and MacDicken, R. A. (1979). Crisis

Intervention: A Manual for Child Protective Workers, U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect (Washington, DC).
Dixon, S. L. and Sands, R. G. (1983). “Identity and the Experience of

Crisis,” Social Casework: The Journal of Contemporary Social
Work 64 (April), 224.
Blugerman, M. (1986). “Contributions of Gestalt Theory to Social Work

Treatment,” in F. J. Turner, (ed.). Social Work Treatment:
Interlocking Theoretical Approaches New York: The Free Press.
Rapoport, L. (1970). “Crisis Intervention as a Mode of Brief

Treatment,” in R. W. Roberts and R. H. Nee, eds., Theories of
Social Casework. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 297-
298.
122
UNIT 3 CRISIS INTERVENTION GOALS AND STEPS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 The Scope and Goals of Crisis Intervention
3.2 A Nine-Step Crisis Intervention Model
3.3 Crisis Intervention Teams
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Crisis intervention begins at the first moment of contact with

clients/victims. Consequently, community coordination in its planning
and implementation results in tremendous benefits to families. In a
matter of weeks, families may achieve progress that is the equivalent of
one or two years of traditional case management and treatment. It is
factual that, families are most ready to change their non-productive
approaches to problem-solving during a time of crisis. Crisis
intervention focuses on one to four goals that are chosen by the family.
Intervention is time limited, usually between 4 to 12 weeks, family-
centred, and occurs in the family’s home much of the time. Concrete
services, along with counselling and referral to community resources,
are provided by one or more crisis workers.
Using eclectic, solution-focused approaches, crisis workers are expected

to concentrate on family strengths, rather than weaknesses, believing
that families have the knowledge and skills to solve their own problems.
The major focus is on the here and now (the immediate), but linkages to
the past may be explored in order to break a repetitive cycle of
inappropriate problem-solving or self-destructive behaviours. All crisis
intervention programs emphasize safety for the children. Concern for the
safety of other family members and crisis workers is rapidly evolving as
a part of good practice. In addition to the scope and goals of crisis
intervention, this unit considers the following: a nine-stage model of
crisis intervention, crisis-intervention teams, crisis as an opportunity to
initiate change, and crisis intervention as a planned response.
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2.0 OBJECTIVES
• a nine-stage model of crisis intervention

• crisis-intervention teams, crisis as an opportunity to initiate
change
• crisis intervention as a planned response.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 The Scope and Goals of Crisis Intervention
A focus on limited goals and objectives is essential for crisis

intervention. This is particularly true with families in which
disorganization and lack of finality perpetuate chaos.
Six Goals of Crisis Treatment
As proposed by Rapoport (1970), crisis intervention is guided by six

primary goals, all aimed at stabilizing and strengthening family
functioning. These goals are to:
1. Relieve the acute symptoms of family stress;

2. Restore the family and family members to optimal pre-crisis
levels of functioning;
3. Identify and understand the relevant precipitating event(s);
4. Identify remedial measures that the family can take or that
community resources can provide to remedy the crisis situation;
5. Establish a connection between the family’s current stressful
situation and past experiences; and
6. Initiate the family’s development of new ways of perceiving,
thinking, and feeling, and adaptive coping responses for future
use.8
Since crisis intervention is time limited, an attempt to achieve too many

goals leads to disappointment and feelings of failure. While clients
should be encouraged to stretch their resources or abilities, they cannot
be expected to go in too many directions or too far beyond their basic
abilities. It is better to help clients view life as a “practice field” where
they practice repetitively to accomplish a goal, or as a “house” where
they put one piece of progress (building block) on top of the other until
the goal is achieved.
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3.2 A Nine-Step Crisis Intervention Model
The following model incorporates steps from a seven-stage model for

crisis intervention. This nine-stage model is slightly more
comprehensive.
Step 1: Rapidly Establish a Constructive Relationship
In the first step, the emphasis is on crisis worker sincerity, respect, and
sensitivity to clients’ feelings and circumstances. Crisis workers must
listen and observe for long periods of time. As Puyear (1979) states in
Helping People in Crisis, “Active listening entails listening for the
latent, underlying, coded message and then checking to see if one has
gotten it correctly.” Active listening gives clients a chance to develop
their own strengths. By assuming that clients are motivated, they are
supported in thinking through their solutions, which enhances their self-
respect. “The worker,” Puyear continues, “must assure that the client
feels that something useful has been accomplished in the first session
and that there is promise of something useful being accomplished in the
next.” Rapport is enhanced by showing respect and unconditional
positive regard for clients. Crisis workers need to start with the
assumption that people are basically good.
Step 2: Elicit and Encourage Expression of Painful Feelings

and Emotions
Anger, frustration, and feelings related to the current crisis are the focus
of intervention rather than issues in the past. Linkages to past crises and
repetitive, ineffective responses to problems can be explored at a later
time.
Step 3: Discuss the Precipitating Event
After rapport is established, the focus turns to the family perceptions of

the situation, the chain of events leading up to the crisis, and the
problem that set off the chain of events. Discussions examine when and
how the crisis occurred, the contributing circumstances, and how the
family attempted to deal with it.
Step 4: Assess Strengths and Needs
Family assessment of strengths and needs begins immediately and

continues throughout crisis intervention. The crisis worker draws
conclusions regarding the family’s strengths and needs related to the
current crisis and, with the family, evaluates the potential for recovery.
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Client strengths are tapped to improve self-esteem, while also providing

energy and skills for problem-solving.
Step 5: Formulate a Dynamic Explanation
This step looks for an explanation not of what happened, but why it
happened. This is the core of the crisis problem. The meaning of the
crisis and its antecedents as seen by the clients are explored. Why do
they ascribe that meaning or perceive it as they do?
Step 6: Restore Cognitive Functioning
In this step, the crisis worker helps the family identify alternatives for
resolving the crisis (i.e., reasonable solutions toward which the family is
motivated to work).
Step 7: Plan and Implement Treatment
The crisis worker assists the family in the formulation of short- and
long-term goals, objectives, and action steps based on what the family
chooses as priorities. With a concrete plan of action, the family feels less
helpless, more in control, allowing members to focus on action steps.
Objectives and action steps need to be simple and easy at first, assuring
client success. The family members are responsible for action steps or
homework, but the crisis worker continues to counsel them, seeks to
help find appropriate resources in the community, and becomes the
family’s advocate.
Step 8: Terminate
Termination occurs when the family achieves its pre-crisis level of

stability. Crisis workers review with the family the precipitating event(s)
and response(s) and the newly learned coping skills that can be applied
in the future. The crisis worker assures that the family is scheduled for
meetings with, and committed to, any necessary, ongoing community
services.
Step 9: Follow-up
Crisis workers arrange for continuing contacts with families and referral
sources on predetermined dates or by saying “I’ll be contacting you
soon to see how you are doing.” This puts appropriate pressure on
families to continue to work on issues in a positive way.
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3.3 Crisis Intervention Teams
In cases involving child abuse or neglect, there is frequent

misunderstanding about the differences among investigation,
psychological first aid, and rehabilitative crisis intervention. Each,
however, plays a critical role in a team’s response to child maltreatment.
Ultimately, rehabilitative crisis-intervention skills can significantly
enhance investigative or psychological first-aid approaches.
Investigation
The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether child abuse and

neglect exist within a family reported to the CPS agency, to interpret the
agency role, to determine whether the family will benefit from further
intervention, and to assess whether there is a risk that future
maltreatment will occur. As noted in an earlier user manual, Child
Protection Services: A Guide for Workers, “[investigative] intervention
should be timely, limited to required procedures, and terminated when it
is determined that continuation is unnecessary or when services are no
longer required.” Whereas emergencies should receive immediate
response, non-emergency situations can be contacted within 24 hours,
and can usually take place in the child’s current residence. On the basis
of the CPS investigation and case assessment, crisis workers must
decide if the case warrants continued intervention. At this point, crisis
workers may need to use crisis-intervention techniques. Removal of the
child is not the primary objective, but rather the alternative, if
intervention fails and the child cannot be protected in the home.
Psychological First Aid
Psychological first aid, or helping to reduce anxiety by listening and

reassuring the family, is critical to the establishment of rapport. This
requires hours of listening on the part of crisis workers. Psychological
first aid may also be a one-time intervention offered by neighbours,
relatives, churches, or helping agencies that provide money, food,
housing, or transportation. Although this support system is extremely
important in the overall crisis response, it does not teach clients to
problem-solve and, in fact, may leave the clients to struggle with
repetitive crises. If possible, crisis workers need to persuade community
support systems to stay involved with the family after the initial crisis
period, going well beyond the psychological first aid stage.
Establishment of consistent friendships and other community supports
can help avert future crises.
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Rehabilitative Crisis Intervention
As Slaikeu (1990) states in Crisis Intervention: A Handbook for

Practice and Research, rehabilitative crisis intervention aims to help
“the client deal with the impact of the crisis event in all areas of the
client’s life.”19 Through resolution of one crisis, the client can gain
skills for facing and solving future problems, rather than developing a
repetitive cycle of being “rescued” from similar crises. This does not
mean that the primary focus is on all areas of the client’s life. Instead, by
staying focused and being successful in problem-solving, clients learn
skills that are transferable to all areas of their lives and can be used to
resolve future crises. Even though the focus is on current problems,
many clients come to understand how past, unresolved trauma
contributed to maladaptive attempts to solve the present crisis.
OVERVIEW OF TEAMS RELATED TO CPS
Whenever a CPS investigator believes that a child’s safety in the home

is questionable, and that intensive, in-home intervention services are
needed to protect the child from harm, a crisis-intervention team should
be called in right away. CPS and specialized teams should always
cooperate, not compete, since investigation and treatment are separate,
equally important functions. The team concept is critical in shaping the
philosophy and vision of family preservation or other crisis-intervention
programs. The combined knowledge of a multidisciplinary team
provides for more accurate assessment and treatment approaches, and
more varied use of community resources. Furthermore, there is strength
in numbers, meaning that a team provides safety or protection for its
members as well as the families that are being helped. The likelihood of
violence, or even resistive behaviours, is reduced when a “team” is
present. A dysfunctional family system is also more likely to be
positively influenced by an intervention system, a team, that
demonstrates clear and honest communication, as well as respect,
among team members. Team members should have diverse knowledge
and skills. Those with highly specialized knowledge, such as child
development or substance abuse assessment, may serve as consultants to
other team members. When a multidisciplinary crisis team is
unavailable, as in small communities, close contact must be maintained
between the crisis worker and the supervisor or consultant, who work
together as a small team.
SPECIALIZED, MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMS
Multidisciplinary crisis-intervention teams bring specialized knowledge

to a crisis situation. To be effective, each crisis worker plays a distinct
role, with a coordinating supervisor providing support and overall
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direction. Team members may be in a direct service role or that of a

consultant to other crisis workers. Preferably, team members represent
both sexes and a range of chronological and professional development
stages. When more than one team member goes to a home or
multidisciplinary interview centre, a lead crisis worker needs to be in
charge to assure that goals for the visit or interview are accomplished.
Some crisis workers excel at using community resources or providing
concrete services. Others excel at assessing problems, helping families
communicate better, or listening in a way that makes families willing to
talk openly. Some crisis workers are especially good at accompanying
clients to a well baby clinic, to a physician’s office, to prospective
employment, or even the grocery store, thereby helping them feel
successful in accomplishing a task. Some crisis workers are better at
supportive confrontation or placing limits on inappropriate client
behaviours. Drawing on each team member’s strengths greatly enhances
service delivery. Time limits of service, 24-hour availability, and belief
that clients have the skills with which to solve their problems are
essential. Time-limited service requires advanced planning, specialized
knowledge, and specific skills if families are to benefit. The following
are areas that any program providing a team approach must address in
order to assure the team’s effectiveness:
1. clarity regarding crisis workers’ specialized, multidisciplinary

roles;
2. development of an eclectic base of theoretical and intervention
knowledge;
3. training and supervision to assure that crisis workers and clients
stay focused on the chosen goals;
4. specific training regarding crisis intervention theory;
5. consistent and timely supervision to enhance skills and provide
support;
6. debriefing by a supervisor and peers to prevent the team’s burn-
out; and
7. training which addresses crisis worker safety and vulnerability.
CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INITIATE CHANGE
If help is not available when a family is open to new ways of coping,

family members may sink deeper into maladaptive patterns such as more
violence, heavier substance abuse, deeper withdrawal, or more
destructive scapegoating. Under such circumstances, there is increased
risk of child abuse and neglect. When individuals and families are
highly stressed and anxious about dealing with unfamiliar problems,
such as a summons to appear in juvenile court, they may feel
overwhelmed, hopeless, and panicked. After attempting to use responses
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that have worked for them in the past, they are searching for new
responses to their dilemma.
If, in the past, they have responded to frustration by yelling, accusing,

hitting, feeling sick, withdrawing, or crying, it becomes evident to them
that these responses are not stopping the CPS or law enforcement
investigation. Finding no answer to the situation, while perceiving a
threat to their existence, families are open to new ways of processing
and resolving their problems. During the resolution of a crisis,
individuals and families tend to be particularly amenable to help.
Customary defence mechanisms weaken, usual coping patterns prove
inadequate, and the ego becomes more open to outside influence and
change. A minimal effort at this time can produce a maximum effect; a
small amount of help, appropriately focused, can prove more effective
than more extensive help at a period of less emotional accessibility.
If an immediate therapeutic response is made while the family is still

experiencing a high level of anxiety or emotional pain, the family is
more receptive to intervention. Therefore, the crisis worker must listen
closely and determine what the family wants to change. During this
emotional, rehabilitative, goal-setting period, crisis workers should:
1. respond to family members’ disorganized thinking and feelings

of guilt, fear, or anger by focusing on one to four critical issues
(goals), thereby increasing their ability to manage their feelings
and circumstances;
2. help families explore their coping mechanisms and identify
alternatives for coping with crises, thereby reducing
impulsiveness, feelings of vulnerability, and helplessness;
3. assist the family in using additional community supports, thereby
reducing isolation, enmeshment, dependence, and the complexity
of interrelated problems.
CRISIS INTERVENTION AS A PLANNED RESPONSE
Since there is a window of opportunity during which families can

change, effective crisis intervention is timely in its response and diligent
in assuring safety for the children and other family members. A helpful,
planned response includes:
1. providing immediate contact, within 48 hours or less;

2. staying with the family as long as necessary to stabilize the
immediate crisis;
3. being available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
4. providing assessment and services, at least in part, in the home;
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5. maintaining small caseloads, usually two or three and no more

than 13;
6. having daily contact with the family in the beginning and
decreasing the contact gradually;
7. setting a predetermined length of service, usually 4 to 12 weeks;
8. listening actively for long periods, focusing clients on one to four
critical problems or goals;
9. providing counselling, concrete services, and community
resources;
10. believing that a crisis makes people open to change for the better;
11. encouraging the family to set its own goals with limited guidance
from crisis workers;
12. maintaining time-limited intervention;
13. focusing on the total family system, but maintaining flexibility in
working with whoever is available; and
14. providing a team approach, even if some members are used
exclusively as consultants.
Presence Until Stress Is Reduced
It is important to note that the crisis worker must be present until family
stress is reduced and the child is safe. Seldom can only one visit provide
such safety. For resolution, most crises require several visits. Certainly
this is true in families where there are linkages to unresolve past crises
and where the child’s safety may be in doubt. Some families seem to be
crisis prone, always living on the brink of another crisis. At least one
author has referred to “exhaustion crisis,” in which persons under
consistent stress are finally overwhelmed by an additional internal or
external stress, and “shock crisis,” in which there is no forewarning
prior to a sudden change in the social environment. Chronically
dysfunctional families who are reported for child abuse and neglect
could fall into either category. “Stresses become traumatic through
repetition.” Consequently, some families are overwhelmed not only by
abuse or neglect but also by repeated inquiries into their abusive or
neglectful patterns. These families may need ongoing services for a
period of 2 to 5 years, or parental rights may need to be terminated when
sadistic and torturous abuse is present. It is possible that multiple crises
in families as a way of life may be an attempt to avoid emotional pain
from the past and to test crisis workers’ commitment and
trustworthiness. Crisis workers should not promise more than they can
deliver in the prescribed time limit, but arrangements for long-term
intervention can be part of the crisis intervention plan.
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1. How does crisis create opportunities for change?

2. What are crisis workers expected to do.
4.0 CONCLUSION
Crisis intervention begins at the first moment of contact with clients. It

focuses on one to four goals that are chosen by the family. Intervention
is time limited, usually between 4 to 12 weeks, family-centred, and
occurs in the family’s home much of the time. In addition to the scope
and goals of crisis intervention, this unit considers the following: a nine-
stage model of crisis intervention, crisis-intervention teams, crisis as an
opportunity to initiate change, and crisis intervention as a planned
response.
5.0 SUMMARY
In summary, a family is most likely to accept intervention from

“outsiders” during a state of crisis. In contrast to traditional casework,
crisis intervention is brief in duration, focused primarily on the “here
and now,” and supports family members in what they—not the crisis
worker—want to change. A skillful crisis worker or crisis-intervention
team involves the entire family in the problem-solving process,
reinforces the family’s abilities and strengths, and conveys a hopeful
attitude to the family about problem resolution. Concrete services are
provided to lessen pressures in the family and to free the family’s energy
for setting and achieving goals. Prior to termination of crisis-
intervention services, skillful crisis workers make sure the family is
linked to the resources it needs in the community and then formalize a
plan for follow-up. Many families known to CPS agencies have multiple
problems. It is important to remember that crisis workers are not
responsible for helping families solve all their problems. Rather, the task
is to help families stabilize and learn to focus and find solutions to a
limited number of problems. In that way, families gain a sense of
accomplishment and success, encouraging them to move on to solving
other issues, either on their own or with the help of resources in the
community.
Explain the nine-step crisis intervention model.
132
Blugerman, M. (1986). “Contributions of Gestalt Theory to Social Work

Treatment,” in F. J. Turner, (ed.). Social Work Treatment:
Interlocking Theoretical Approaches. New York: The Free Press
Rapoport, L. (1970). “Crisis Intervention as a Mode of Brief

Treatment,” in R. W. Roberts and R. H. Nee, (eds.). Theories of
Social Casework. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Puryear, D. A. (1979). ‘Helping People in Crisis’. San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass.
Dixon, S. L. (1987). Working With People in Crisis, 2nd ed. Columbia

Press.
DePanfilis, D. and Salus, M. K. (1992). Child Protective Services: A

Guide for Caseworkers U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Washington, DC:
Jenkins, J. L., Salus M. K., and Schultze, G. L. (1979). Child Protective

Services: A Guide for Workers. U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, National Centre on Child Abuse and
Neglect. Washington, DC.
Towle, C. (1965). Common Human Needs. National Association of

Social Workers. New York.
Slaikeu, A. (1990). Crisis Intervention: A Handbook for Practice and

Research. Boston.
Gentry, C. E. (1985), “Treatment of Child Physical Abuse,” in C. M.

Mouzakitis and R. Varghese, (eds.). Social Work Treatment with
Abused and Neglected Children (The Brown University Child and
Adolescent Behaviour Letter.
Duggan, H. A. (1984). Crisis Intervention: Helping Individuals at Risk.

Lexington.
Korner, I. N. (1973). “Crisis Reduction and the Psychological
Consultant,” in G. A. Specter and W. L. Claiborn, (eds.). Crisis
Intervention. New York: Behavioral Publications.
Golan, N. (1978). Treatment in Crisis Situations. New York: Free Press.
Norman, A. (1985). Keeping Families Together: A Case for Family
Preservation. New York: Edna McConnell Clark Foundation.
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UNIT 4 CRISIS INTERVENTION ASSESSMENT
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Total Family Involvement
3.2 Assessing Risk
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Different personalities of individuals, the divergent environments in

which they reside, the variety of psychological and biological make-ups,
and the varying family structures in which they live lead to a broad
range of responses to stress. Consequently, it becomes difficult to
predict human behavior.27 Yet it is necessary to make an attempt to
assess the risk of abuse within families in order to protect family
members. People in crisis need, and are more responsive to, immediate
intervention. (Rapport, necessary for family assessment, is more readily
established by offering immediate emotional first aid and support when
the family is frightened, confused, and experiencing emotional pain.)
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this unit is to comprehend family involvement in

crisis management.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Total Family Involvement
Since families are systems, what affects one member of a family affects
other members. Considering this dynamic, interactional pattern, it makes
sense to involve the entire family in crisis-intervention assessment. This
is especially true in child abuse and neglect cases where the interactional
pattern is dysfunctional, and change is critical to protecting the child.
Even in incest cases or illegal drug sales, in which the offender is
removed but reunification may occur, intervention is done with
remaining family members but coordinated with professionals who are
treating the offender. For an intervention to be most effective, all family
members require both individual and group attention. Each member
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needs to feel special and separate, yet an integral part of the family
group. Individual and family value orientations, communication styles,
and roles must be understood. It takes hours of listening for the crisis
worker to understand implicit family rules and beliefs, how messages
are communicated and received, and who relates to whom and how,
within the family. All family members need the opportunity to give their
opinions about the family’s primary problems. Different opinions help
the crisis worker get a picture of the antecedents to the crisis. The
involvement of the total family may facilitate the following intervention.
When family crisis intervention is implemented, the specific steps that
follow—similar to the generic stages of individual or group crisis
counselling—should be taken. Appropriate efforts should be made to
involve family members in each phase, which are to: (1) search for the
precipitating event and its perceptual meaning to the family members;
(2) look for the coping means used by the family and appraise the extent
to which these have or have not been successful; (3) search for
alternative ways of coping and the resources that might improve the
situation, while actively soliciting suggestions from family members; (4)
review and support the family members’ efforts to cope in new ways,
with evaluation of results in terms of day-to-day living experiences; (5)
move toward early termination that was planned in the initial contract
with the family; and (6) plan and conduct at least one follow-up or
“booster-shot” session. Throughout this process, the crisis worker
should actively define the goals of the family crisis session and the
means that can be used for goal achievement, while energetically
focusing on the relevant issues.
ASSESSMENT
While making an assessment, an crisis worker pays special attention to

the initial contact with the family, what events precipitated the crisis,
family interactions and conditions, and the family’s perceived needs.
With such understanding, crisis workers can more adequately assess risk
to the child or children.
Making the Initial Contact
Before making contact with families, crisis workers should not pre-
judge them, no matter what information is available from other sources.
By keeping an open mind, crisis workers may see and hear things never
perceived by other “helpers” and start afresh. The initial contact
capitalizes upon the family members’ search for answers to the crisis.
Intervention must occur before the family members find rigid,
maladaptive ways to defend themselves against the outside world. At
this point, they are ready to receive open-minded, honest, trustworthy
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crisis workers. Kinney, et al (1981), experienced crisis workers, suggest

the following approach during the initial contact:
1. We find it most helpful to plunge right into each client’s version

of his/her family’s problems. Clients become motivated if we
follow their agenda. They have the best knowledge of the
situation and of constraints that should be considered in
proposing treatment options. Clients can help organize the
information to suit their experience instead of relying on the
therapist to organize information to fit his/her idea of their
experience. They give enormous amounts of information when
they are really “hurting.”
2. We find the most useful tool in this process to be active

listening.... An active listener reflects feelings and content of
what the client is saying. He/she avoids questions, interpretations,
and advice giving. When therapists use this technique, clients
rapidly begin sharing more than superficial information. They
begin to like and trust the therapist. They will probably be more
likely to try options he/she suggests later.
3. In many cases, active listening is all that is needed for problem

resolution.
Careful listening will usually facilitate understanding without trapping

the crisis worker in initial judgments.
Identifying the Precipitating Event
Frequently in crisis intervention, the CPS investigation may be the

precipitating factor for a new crisis for the family. But, prior to that, the
precipitating factor, or presenting problem, was the physical abuse,
sexual abuse, or neglect of a child, or possibly a child’s observation of
violence between adults. The crisis worker from CPS or another crisis
intervention program needs to explain why he or she is there, what
information he or she has been given, and explain that he or she is there
to listen and help, not to blame or accuse. Consequently, the crisis
worker may get new information, both current and past, regarding the
crisis and its antecedents. The family can thereby set goals for resolving
the current crisis and preventing similar crises in the future.
Observing Family Interactions and Conditions
Observation skills are critical tools for the crisis worker. The most
important observational skill is that of seeing a crisis through the eyes of
the client. This means that the worker has objective, non-judgemental
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empathy. Much attention is given to nonverbal communication, and an

attempt is made to understand family members’ feelings toward each
other and toward the crisis worker. Good observers try to determine
more than surface appearance. For instance, the poorly kept house or
unkempt person may signify depression or even physical illness. An
orderly existence may be impossible for overworked parents who have
several young children. Such conditions do not indicate whether or not
there is appropriate affection between family members. A nurturing
attitude may be of greater value to children than a clean living room! A
hostile client may be reacting to negative experiences with social
agencies in the past.
The crisis worker must understand child care practices in various

cultures.31 Crisis workers from middle-class backgrounds must try to
understand the stresses of living in poverty, including the fear of
violence in the ghetto and the temptation to sell drugs to support the
family. A crisis worker’s being naive or not being “street wise” can
interfere with his or her observations. There may be signs of child
sexual abuse, drug dealing, spouse abuse, or mental illness that are
subtle or different from the crisis worker’s experience. For purposes of
getting supervision or consultation from other team members, the good
observer merely describes with detailed objectivity the what, when,
where, and how of the home visit. Good descriptive material is always
clear, whereas use of labels and conditions such as “rigid,” “resistive,”
and “paranoid” are subjective and potentially biasing. In fairness to
crisis workers, good listeners and observers are not able to recall every
important occurrence or statement that comes forth during several hours
of emotional intensity, but a good listener and observer does remain
objective.
Determining Family Needs
Traditional therapies and casework tend to determine what the family’s

problems are and what the family members must do to change. In
contrast, crisis intervention encourages families to determine what their
problems are, what they want help with, and how they want to go about
making changes. The family chooses a limited number of goals,
hopefully no more than four, from a more extensive number of
possibilities, and determines action steps for achieving the goals. The
crisis worker helps the family stay focused to achieve these goals. To be
successful in focusing families, crisis workers need to have a sense of
compassion, flexibility, and responsiveness to slight changes in focus.
Rigidly adhering to a course of action brings greater pain and
disappointment. For instance, a family member may have chosen to
search for employment outside the home but can only find minimum-
wage work that barely pays for transportation, clothing, child day-care,
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lunch, and other job-related costs. Consequently, the goal may need to
change, such as doing piecework at home, possibly arts and crafts, or
switching to a goal for part-time work when a spouse or relative can
provide child care.
Misperceptions of clients and what they need can create new crises. For
example, lack of understanding of Native American culture has created
unnecessary removal of children who, in turn, became disconnected
from their culture and yet not integrated into any other culture. With any
family, not just culturally different or minority families, an insensitive
crisis worker can make incorrect assumptions. Personal values and past
experiences can bias one’s perception of families and limit recognition
of possible interventions. Ultimately, crisis workers must listen closely
to the family members’ perceptions and respond to their needs, not their
own personal needs or wishes.
ASSESSING RISK
Risk is defined as the likelihood of maltreatment occurring in the future.

Safety is the determination regarding the immediacy and severity of the
risk. Therefore, crisis workers must first determine whether the
maltreatment is likely to occur again, and then determine if the child is
safe. Extensive information on risk assessment is provided in another
User Manual Series publication, Child Protective Services: A Guide for
Caseworkers. In evaluating a family, the child’s safety is of uppermost
importance. Can the child be protected while crisis intervention services
are being delivered? At the end of crisis intervention, will the child be in
imminent danger? Is the criminal behaviour in the family so prevalent
that the child can only identify with criminal activity? Is addictive
behaviour such that the child only sees immediate gratification through
drug use, sex, gambling, and other addictions? Are the addicted
members willing to enter drug treatment? Are the addictions, drug
dealing, and other criminal behaviours more important to the family
than the children are? Realizing that the children may be removed, do
the adults still refuse to cooperate in looking for mutually acceptable
goals for change? Can the crisis worker engage just one adult in the
assessment and planning? If so, there is still hope for change. If it is
determined that the child is not safe in the home, then it is incumbent
upon the crisis worker to determine first whether crisis intervention will
assure the child’s safety in the home. If it cannot be assured in the home,
then the child must be removed for his or her own safety. For instance,
removal of a sex abuser may not assure a child’s safety if the remaining
parent has been intimidated by the offender and will not protect the child
or other children. Non-offending parents who were sexually abused as
children may have low self-esteem, dependency, or even flashbacks that
reduce their ability to protect children or themselves.
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Another way to look at risk assessment is to see it as determining

whether the child is happiest with extra protection in the home or
removal from the home. Many children are reluctant to leave home or to
want removal of the abuser because they fear the unfamiliar. If a child
asks to be removed, careful assessment is needed. Is the child truly in
danger, or has the child learned to manipulate away from discipline,
believing there is less or almost no discipline in out-of-home placement?
In the latter instance, parents may need help in applying consistent, firm,
non-violent discipline such as time-out, grounding for short periods,
consequences for inappropriate behaviour, and other good behaviour-
management approaches. Nevertheless, when a child asks to be
removed, thoughtful consideration must be given. A more specific
criterion is that of sadistic or torturous maltreatment, which suggests
that parental rights may need to be terminated. This is true in other cases
with parents who have made no significant changes in 6 to 12 months of
intervention and treatment as well. Of course, these parents should not
be blamed for ineffectual therapy. From the beginning, they deserve,
and should have, well-trained, solution-focused professionals. If this
kind of effective treatment system is absent, the parents and children
may deserve a further chance to avail themselves of treatment.
From a practical standpoint, removal of a child does not always assure

safety. Some youths are physically or sexually abused in out-of-home
placements. Others are so distressed that they run away or act out in
other ways. Their hurt and their rage are misunderstood and require
careful evaluation. Most children and families just need better-trained
crisis workers. This suggests that only the most severe, most sadistic
abuse requires removal of the abuser or the victim, with the victim being
removed only when the severe abuser breaks court orders and returns
home or threatens to harm the child.
SCREENING INSTRUMENTS
Great caution and professional judgment are warranted in the use of any
risk-assessment protocol. Generally, a constellation of risk factors,
rather than only one risk factor, suggests that the child is not safe or that
vigilant monitoring is advised. When used properly, screening
instruments such as the Child Abuse Potential Inventory for parent
screening and treatment evaluation or the Child Maltreatment Interview
Schedule can be helpful. Training in the use of such instruments is
required, however, to assure that misinterpretations do not occur. There
are both general and specific forms and lists that have been developed
but require much further research. For instance, there is the Family
Assessment Form (FAF), designed to assist in-home workers in
determining what intervention is needed. The risk variables are
measured by the Family Risk Scales, a total of 26 scales with sub-
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variables, and “emphasize parental characteristics and family conditions

that are believed to be predictors or precursors of child maltreatment or
other harm to children.”38 It also incorporates six of the Child Well-
Being Scales, referenced below, which are believed to be most useful
for risk assessment. Even though general risk-assessment checklists
must be used with caution, they may be helpful as reminders of the great
variety of possibilities to be studied in determining risk in cases of child
abuse and neglect. They are of benefit in preparing for supervision and
consultation as well, assuming that the crisis worker’s listening and
observing take precedence over the rigid filling out of checklists.
Since checklists tend to identify weaknesses in families, crisis workers

are cautioned to work harder at finding strengths and building on those,
while seeing family weakness as potential goals or action steps in
reverse. An example is that of the parents’ lack of nurturing or quality
parenting skills. If parents feel that they want to improve in this area, a
goal becomes: “Parents will develop positive nurturing and parenting
skills.” Action steps may be: (1) “Attend child development sessions
once weekly” or “Spend 30 minutes daily with crisis worker learning
child development stages;” (2) “Learn and practice behavioural
management techniques with crisis worker;” (3) “Learn how to express
appropriate, nonsexual affection and practice in presence of worker.”
Parents’ desire to work toward such parenting goals is a positive
indicator during the assessment period.
Some authors emphasize tendencies of abusive parents. When assessing

the risk of maltreatment, they focus on parents who are more likely to
pose a danger to their child because they:
1. deny responsibility for their actions;

2. blame their victims;
3. do the opposite of what they advocate;
4. need to dominate their children;
5. deeply mistrust their children;
6. obsess about their needs, not their children’s needs; and
7. repeat abusive acts compulsively.
Child abuse and neglect assessment is an attempt to calculate the

probability of risk, knowing there is no foolproof approach to protecting
all children. But risks of harm are greater when certain factors come
together. For instance, Finkelhor (1990) “Eight Risk Factors for Sexual
Abuse” indicate that children in the following situations are vulnerable
to being sexually abused:
1. step-father in the home;

2. victim has lived without a mother at some point;
140
3. victim is not close to mother;

4. mother did not finish high school;
5. mother sexually punitive toward child, meaning hostile about any
of the child’s sexual issues;
6. no physical affection from father;
Crisis workers can assess whether the above factors are present and
whether offsetting safeguards are in place. Further examples of risk
scales are the “Child Well-Being Scales” for child neglect, and The
Wife Abuse Inventory,” and the “Substance Abuse Subtle Screening
Inventory.”
ASSESSMENT OF OTHER SPECIAL ISSUES
Crisis workers improve services to families by studying and assessing

the presence or absence of suicide potential, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and sex offenders’ amenability to treatment.
Suicide Potential
Both victims and abusers have been known to commit suicide when they
perceived no other appropriate solutions. Any past suicidal gestures or
current statements require careful consideration by the crisis worker.
Likewise, any family member who seems despondent or overwhelmed
by anxiety needs specific assessment of suicide potential. Individual
family members whose affect is inappropriate for the circumstances may
need evaluation as well. Because more children and adolescents are
committing suicide in this country than in the past, professionals need to
be sensitive to these tendencies during a crisis. There are various suicide
scales which should be part of the intervention team’s repertoire for
assessment.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Children who have been abused or have witnessed abuse in the family
often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which requires
a four-step approach to intervention:
1. recognize the symptoms of violence-related PTSD;

2. determine how the child has already tried to master the anxiety or
avoid its recurrence;
3. determine the influences or factors which are facilitating or
preventing trauma resolution; and
4. decide if the trauma resolution is interfering with normal
childhood tasks or propelling the child into more adult roles.
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Sex Offenders’ Ability to Change
Assessment of a sex offender’s honesty, remorse, denial, minimization,

use of force, premeditation, family enmeshment, substance abuse, past
victimization, empathy or motivation for change, and age is necessary in
determining the appropriate interventions for the offender, victim, and
family members. Total family involvement is required for successful
intervention. Chronic offenders need long-term monitoring and strict
supervision. Risk to the child is very high when the mother doubts the
child’s story of victimization.
When Assess ment Indicates a Lack of Safety for Children
When children cannot be protected in their homes, one solution is to

obtain a court order requiring that the adult leave the home. If other
family members and the abuser are likely to collaborate in defying the
plan, putting the children at risk, then removal of the children from the
home is necessary. Another option is to bring protective relatives to the
children’s home while their parent(s) leaves the home. In certain
instances, such as when both parents are on drugs and have to be
removed temporarily and protective relatives are not available, a 24-
hour homemaker and crisis worker may be needed in the home. Until a
decision is made about whether the parents have the potential and desire
to care for the children, it is best to keep the children in the familiar
environs of home. There are various options for accomplishing this,
such as asking the abuser to leave the home or bringing 24-hour
caretakers to the home.
Removing children from the home is traumatic for parents and children,
even when all agree it is best. In fact, removal creates a new crisis for
everyone involved. Techniques of crisis intervention, described in the
next unit, are beneficial in reducing the separation anxiety which
accompanies emergency placements. If the parents are available, try to
involve them in the decision to leave the home or to place the children in
emergency placement. Likewise, to the extent possible, children deserve
to be involved in the decision, based on their age and ability to assess
their situation. Many maltreated children can feel reasonably good about
being placed with caring and protective families, but will need a great
deal of support and reassurance about what the future appears to be.
Young children and severely intimidated youth may be unaware of their
rights. They may not understand that non-intimidating lifestyles are
possible. They may want to cling to the abusive family even when it is
chaotic and incapable of protection or nurturance. With the dramatic
increase in the number of children being placed with relatives, crisis
workers must exercise caution to assure children’s safety, as relatives
may have come from similarly dysfunctional backgrounds.
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Furthermore, children in kinship care deserve the same supports that are
afforded to children in the legal custody of the state. Children’s anxiety
and loneliness are greatly reduced when they can be placed along with
siblings, familiar toys, clothes, bed-clothing, animals, and other familiar
objects. Crisis workers can advocate for such consideration of the
children’s feelings. Because children are prone to blame themselves for
abuse and separation from the family, they need much reassurance that
they are not to blame. To the extent possible, the crisis worker should
review the anticipated happenings of the next few days and how the
child’s safety and protection will be managed. Children need
reassurance that they will return to their parents when, or if, it is safe. It
is important for crisis workers to find strengths in the parents even if
their behaviours are unacceptable. Crisis workers need to listen to the
parents’ frustrations and anger and help them choose reasonable goals
for reunification with their children. Plans for supervised visitation with
the children and an agreement for ongoing counselling are desirable
after the parents have expressed and learned to cope with their anger
toward the child placement agency.
What attention should any crisis worker pays to the initial contact with a
family in crisis?
4.0 Summary and Conclusion
Crisis-intervention assessment involves all family members, both

individually and as a group, to determine family interactions, conditions,
and events that precipitated the crisis. Having no preconceived notions,
the open minded crisis worker allows the family to determine their
needs and their goals for change. Immediately and longitudinally, the
safety of the children and other family members is considered. Although
there are no foolproof screening instruments or checklists, such tools
can assist in calculating the probability of risk for additional abuse or
neglect and the presence of individual and family strengths for change.
Define and explain what is meant by risk assessment.
Kotelchuck, M. (1982). “Child Abuse and Neglect: Prediction and

Misclassification,” in R. Starr, (ed.). Child Abuse Prediction
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 67-104.
143
Kinney, J. Haapala, D. and Gast, J. E. (1981). “Assessment of Families

in Crisis,” in M. Bryce and J. Lloyd, (eds.). Treating Families in
the Home: An Alternative to Placement. Springfield, IL: Charles
C. Thomas, 52-53.
Stevenson, K. M.; Cheung K. F. M. and Leung, P. (1990): “A New

Approach to Training Child Protective Services Workers for
Ethnically Sensitive Practice,” Child Welfare 71:291- 305.
Derezotes, D. S. and Snowden, L. R. (1990). “Cultural Factors in the

Intervention of Child Maltreatment Special Issue: Culture and
Clinical Social Work.” Child and Adolescent Social Work
Journal 7: 161-174.
Horejsi, C.; Craig, B. H. R. and Pablo, J. (1992). “Reactions by Native

American Parents to Child Protection Agencies: Cultural and
Community Factors,” Child Welfare Vol. 71. 329-342.
Gordon, T. (1990). Parent Effectiveness Training (New York: P. H.

Wyden, 1970); and S. J. Bavolek, Shaking, Hitting, Spanking:
What to Do Instead. Park City, UT.
Milner, J. S. (1992) “Applications of the Child Abuse Potential

Inventory,” Journal of Clinical Psychology 45(May 1989):450?
454; and J. N. Briere, Child Abuse Trauma: Theory and
Treatment of the Lasting Effects. Newbury, CA: Sage
Publications.
McCroskey, J.; Nishinola, R. and Subramanian, K. (1991). “Assessment

in Family Support Programs: Initial Reliability and Validity
Testing of the Family Assessment Form,” Child Welfare. Pp 19-
32.
Magura, S.; Moses, B. S. and Jones, M. A. (1987). Assessing Risk and

Measuring Change in Families (Washington, DC: Child Welfare
League of America,
McEvoy, A. and Erickson, E. L. (1990). Youth and Exploitation: A

Process Leading to Running Away, Violence, Substance Abuse
and Suicide (Montreal: Learning Publications.
Finkelhor, D.; Hotaling, G.; Lewis, I. A. and Smith, C. (1990). “Sexual

Abuse In a National Survey of Adult Men and Women:
Prevalence, Characteristics, and Risk Factors,” Child Abuse and
Neglect 1419-28.
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Gaudin, J. M. Jr.; Polansky, N. A. and Kilpatrick, A. C. (1992). “The

Child Well-Being Scales: A Field Trial,” Child Welfare 71 319?
328.
Lewis, B. (1990). “The Wife Abuse Inventory: A Screening Device for

the Identification of Abused Women,” Social Work 35 3234.
Miller, G. A. (1985). Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory

(Bloomington, IN: ASASSI Institute,
Walker, B. A. and Mehr, M. (1983). “Adolescent Suicide—A Family

Crisis: A Model for Effective Intervention by Family
Therapists,” Adolescence 18 285-292.
Maris, R. W.; Berman, A. L.; Maltsberger, J. T. and R. I. Yufit, (1974).

Assessment and Prediction of Suicide (New York: Guilford
Publications, 1992); D. J. Lettieri, “Research Issues in
Developing Prediction Scales,” in C. Neuringer, ed.,
Psychological Assessment of Suicidal Risk (Springfield, IL:
Charles C. Thomas.
Cull, J. G. and Gill, W. S. (1985). “Suicide Probability Scale,” in D. J.

Kaiser and R. C. Sweetland, (eds.). Test Critiques (Kansas City,
MO: Test Corporation of America, Westport Publishers, 649-655.
American Psychiatric Association, (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington, DC: APA, 424-429.
Levy, H. Sheldon, B. S. H., and Conte, J. R. (1986). “Special

Intervention Programs for Child Victims of Violence,” in M.
Lystad, (ed.). Violence in the Home: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives New York: Brunner-Mazel, Inc., 195-196.
Salter, A. C. (1988). Treating Child Sex Offenders and Victims: A

Practical Guide Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Mead, J. J. and Westgate, D. L. (1992). Sex Offender Case Management.

Chino, CA: R. C. Law and Company,
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UNIT 5 CRISIS INTERVENTION TREATMENT

APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Eclectic Knowledge Base
4.0 Summary
5.0 Conclusion
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The following sections on eclectic knowledge, staying focused,

treatment approaches, and techniques explain how to work with families
beyond the initial assessment phase. A team approach to crisis
intervention is desirable because each team member can develop some
expertise in one or more of the following theories and in the best
techniques to be used with differing client populations and crisis
situations.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The unit seeks to understand the various approaches to crisis

intervention.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Eclectic Knowledge Base
No one crisis intervention method will work with all clients or victims,
or even all the time with any one client. There are many different family
structures, compositions, and culturally related belief systems. The
eclectic crisis worker tries to understand and respect these diversities in
families. In this unit, various interconnecting theories are mentioned as
they relate to an eclectic practice base. Practitioners must be flexible and
willing to use any theoretical approach or technique that will work to
benefit and stabilize a family in crisis. Articles and books have been
written about the efficacy of eclectic practice in working with families.
Such a viewpoint is expressed by the following quote from Crisis
Intervention Book 2: The Practitioner’s Sourcebook for Brief Therapy:
“The crisis counsellor’s basic task is to help clients change those
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affective (feeling), cognitive (thinking), and behavioural (doing)

patterns that hinder effective value clarification and rule making and to
encourage constructive communication and appropriate role behaviour.
Thus, it is essential to develop a judiciously eclectic approach that
attends to these domains of human functioning (feeling, thinking, and
doing) in order to help persons in crisis mobilize the resources that will
unblock and enhance performance in these vital areas.” Concrete
services complement rational-emotive therapy, behavioural therapy, or
any theoretical approach. Environmental stresses and lack of resources
add to the family’s feeling of being overwhelmed. Concrete services,
which lessen the pressure in one area of the family’s life, can free
energy for setting and achieving other problem-solving goals.
ABILITY TO FOCUS SELF AND CLIENTS
Sometimes the major stressors in a family may be rather obvious, and it

is merely a matter of helping the family focus on one problem at a time,
such as applying for food stamps and looking for a better paying job
because family income is insufficient, perhaps contributing to these
quarrels and violence. In addition to focusing on food stamps and
employment, there must also be a focus on stopping the abuse, which
requires development of anger management skills, appropriate
channelling of anger, more open and respectful communication of
feelings in the family, and enhancement of the adults’ relationship. In
the above example, there may be only two goals: (1) Improve family
income resources and (2) enable parents to use disciplinary practices
that do not harm the child. Both of these goals require several action
steps, but the focus of intervention remains on the two goals. After the
intervention ends, additional anger-management work may be sought
through therapists who provide such individual or group treatment.
On the other hand, some families have a multitude of stressors, some

chronic and some acute, plus the accusation of abuse or neglect. The
family may bombard the crisis worker with medical, legal, financial,
housing, transportation, and school-related problems. The crisis worker
can easily feel overwhelmed and want to begin working on all problems
at once. That is a perfect formula for failure, because there will not be
enough time and energy to do everything.
Crisis intervention, like brief therapy, focuses on helping the family

choose their goals and how they will go about attaining them. The crisis
worker may feel that other problems are more important, and it is
acceptable to discuss them, but what is finally chosen as the primary
concern should be clearly the family’s choice. This approach empowers
the clients with the feeling that they can be in charge of their destiny.
For instance, if the family members complain about each other and
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various agencies, the crisis worker should encourage them to explain

what they would like to change that is within their control, as opposed to
changing the agencies. In other words, encourage them to redefine a
complaint as a goal. Many clients waste their energy trying to force
others to change, rather than concentrating on the one thing within their
control, themselves. Once the primary goal, and maybe one to three
others, is established, every meeting with the family will focus on the
goal. Homework between meetings should clearly focus on the goal as
well. It is essential to listen closely for what is important to the family.
What ideas do they have for finding solutions? This is a good predictor
of success since a focus on the family’s concerns can free new energy
for finding solutions to other problems, one or two at a time. The family
also learns to think flexibly in a problem-solving mode, thereby
increasing their confidence regarding ability to cope with future stress.
To assure this sense of mastery, the crisis worker should take time to
“celebrate” or enjoy each accomplishment with the family.
APPROACHES
Integration of various approaches is required to help families

accomplish their goals. These approaches, as described below, include:
community system and use of community resources; multiple impact or
multimodal; cognitive-behavioural or rational-emotive; task-centred;
family treatment; and eclectic.
A “Community Systems” and “Use of Community Resources”

Approach
Total family involvement is of paramount importance to crisis

intervention. Similarly, successful crisis workers find that coordination
and involvement of all available community agencies and resources are
of paramount importance to successful resolution of most crises.
System-centred or person-in-situation perspectives place less emphasis
on pathology and more on the interaction of the client with
environmental systems. When addressing the needs of families in crisis,
close cooperation between community services assures the maximum
benefit from utilization of resources. Poor communication and lack of
coordinated efforts between health, legal, social service, education,
volunteer, and church-related resources can create extreme frustration
for families who are in crisis. For instance, many clients have grown to
distrust agencies that promise cooperation from other organizations.
Often, they have been told that an agency would help, only to learn that
they are ineligible, must go on a waiting list, must subscribe to the
helper’s value system, or must accept a substitute service. Even worse,
some clients have been criticized and humiliated for not understanding
agency eligibility requirements. To provide stability and consistent
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support for families, crisis workers can guide them to appropriate

organizations and services, but it helps when crisis workers give the
name of a specific person rather than simply a telephone number.
During the initial crisis, crisis workers may even need to accompany the
clients to appointments. As the family begins to stabilize, members can
be expected to take more individual initiative. As a support system, the
crisis worker should always be available by phone or beeper. Advocacy
for clients, helping them access and use resources, dramatically
enhances the therapeutic relationship. Abusive families’ diverse needs
require services from a plethora of organizations, since no one agency
controls and delivers investigation, crisis intervention, concrete services,
long-term treatment, and the variety of health, social, legal, housing,
education, employment, mental health, spiritual, welfare maintenance,
and other necessary service components for successful crisis resolution.
So-called “wrap-around” services provide whatever the family thinks it
needs in order to stabilize. Obviously, this requires strong, collaborative
efforts among community resources. As Fandetti (1985) states in Issues
in the Organization of Services for Child Abuse and Neglect, “Children
at risk of placement because of abuse and neglect require tight rather
than confused and loosely organized networks of service, interlocked
rather than fragmented services and agency policies.” Respite child care
from a parent aide, day-care placement, a baby sitter, or recreational
agency placement may give the parents the free time needed for relief of
tension and time to focus on themselves. Medical attention, Alcoholics
Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings or a contact regarding

better housing may reduce day-to-day stress. Development of a joint
service treatment plan with the family, CPS, and other crisis workers
demonstrates how various resources can cooperate to everyone’s
satisfaction. Throughout crisis intervention, the crisis worker must make
repeated contacts with other providers. Division or disagreement
between agencies will feel like rejection to clients who experience chaos
and disorganization not only as emotionally hurtful but also as
irreversible. The crisis-intervention team, a child and family advocacy
organization, or a social service agency needs to assume leadership in
bringing community organizations together to develop trust and
exchange information on missions and programs. If possible, a
community committee should be developed to study gaps in services
and coordinate existing services. This is more a responsibility for
administrative personnel, but every person who is concerned about
families in crisis needs to advocate for coordination and collaboration
and participate in both formal and informal coordinating committees.
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The Multiple Impact or Multimodal Approach
The value of the multiple-impact approach, using many crisis workers,

has been recognized for the past several years and has the efficacy of a
generalist-specialist team for dealing with family and community-wide
dysfunction. The generalist-specialist team model incorporates
professionals with specialized training, such as child development,
sexual abuse assessment, or behavioural management, along with team
members who are broadly trained so that consultation is maximized for
all team members. Ultimately, to be effective, the team needs to
maintain strong relationships with public and community service
systems which address additional child and family needs. Several
programs have demonstrated that multiple impact and multimodal
interventions are effective with even the most chaotic families.
Multiple Impact Therapy (MIT) assigns therapists, students, or

volunteers to each family member for an hour or so of assessment and
on-going treatment. The initial session may be with the entire family and
with the many therapists assigned to each member, and there may be
some individual time spent with specific family members.
Ultimately, all family members and all therapists come together. Family
members may be asked to observe while each therapist role plays a
family member, who sits by the therapist, saying what the family
member feels and wants from other family members. If a family
member feels misrepresented, a timeout may be called for consultation
with the therapist who is representing him or her. The therapist uses “I”
messages to express how things in the family look from his or her
perspective as a family member. This process takes several hours since
family members are encouraged to say how they feel, what else they
want to clarify, and what they want to work on in the future. For crisis
treatment beyond the first day or two, only one crisis worker may be
assigned or, if it seems necessary, more than one. This is when well-
trained students or volunteers can be an extremely cost-effective part of
the continuing process. Even if only one crisis worker is assigned for
ongoing treatment with the family, there is now a cadre of consultants
who know the family from firsthand experience. Some authors find that
“the literature clearly indicates that multimodal interventions tailored to
the subjects’ deficits should be implemented rather than [provision of
one type of program (e.g., parent education)] that emphasizes one or two
factors for all abusers.” They add that family, community, and social
supports are part of adequate interventions.61
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Cognitive Behavioural Approach
Clients’ belief systems and their thought processes can contribute to

their abusive or victimized behaviour. Cognitive behavioural therapy
assumes that clients have irrational, maladaptive beliefs that require
cognitive restructuring. Behaviour therapy is effective in child
management, parenting, and parent training and, more recently, in
shaping adult behaviour. Many authors have outlined specifics of
behavioural assessment and treatment. Briefly, cognitive behavioural
therapy is designed to identify specific, undesirable target behaviours
through listening to the opinions of individual family members and the
family as a group. The listener attempts to identify the antecedents to
undesirable behaviour (what set it off). New instructions, or new
behaviour by other family members or a certain family member, replace
the antecedents. Desirable responses are agreed upon through a contract
with family members. Reinforcements are provided when family
members exhibit a desirable response, and consequences are provided if
behaviour is undesirable. Consistency is critical in both the approval
(reinforcements) and disapproval (consequences) of behaviour. Positive
results, or bonus reinforcements such as family outings or free meals,
can be given when behavioural objectives are achieved. Consistency and
follow through are essential to success.64
Task-Centred Approach
Task-centred methods of treatment seem to merge well with crisis

intervention theory and practice, with research indicating that these
methods are effective with a broad range of clients. Uncontrolled studies
on the effectiveness have been conducted in medical, family, child
guidance, psychiatric, school, corrections, and public welfare settings.
Controlled studies in a school system and a psychiatric clinic in
Southside Chicago rendered very positive results, as did a suicide
prevention study and group treatment of delinquent youth.65
Contracting, task planning, incentives, and homework assignments,
which keep families practicing communication and problem solving
tasks between meetings with the crisis worker, are effective in moving
the family toward independence and non-abusive behaviours.
The Family Treatment Approach
In conventional family treatment, therapists permit situations to develop

which demonstrate how the family interacts and functions. The therapist
then tries to engage the most influential members to assure their active
involvement in ongoing treatment. Just as in crisis intervention, active
listening comes first. As with crisis intervention the major focus is on
the family system rather than one individual. In no way, however, does
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this prevent the therapist from being aware of assigned family roles (“he
is the mentally ill one”), scape-goating (“he is the cause of our
problems”), or triangulation (“detouring” of parental problems through
the child) within the family. Family secrets, myths, enmeshment, dyads,
triads, and schisms give clues to why the family has become so
dysfunctional and what was brewing underneath the surface before the
crisis-precipitating event. Family treatment is inseparable from crisis
intervention, and, in addition to being more cost effective for most
children and families, family preservation is more desirable than
separation.
The Eclectic Team Approach
In an eclectic team approach, team members use their varied knowledge

and expertise to assess and manage the presenting crisis. Using their
different perspectives, team members work with the family during the
initial crisis response, developing a brief treatment plan with specific
strategies to foster crisis resolution and healthy family functioning. If
only one team member establishes direct contact with the family in
crisis, that member consults with other members to ensure that
assessment, treatment planning, and treatment techniques incorporate
the full team’s knowledge and experience.
Interdisciplinary teams, composed of individuals who are eclectic in

their training and perspectives, bring a plethora of possible resources
and resolutions to any crisis situation. The team’s varied perspectives, in
conjunction with the clients’ innate resources or strengths, are powerful
forces that support the clients in steadily lifting themselves out of the
crisis. Note that the intervention team strives to not do the work “for”
the clients. Instead, the eclectic knowledge is shared with the clients,
enabling them to choose problem-solving strategies that restore their
sense of well-being and ability to cope. Eclecticism allows crisis
workers to determine which theoretical approach, or combination of
approaches, fits the crisis situation best. For instance, the task-centred
approach draws from behavioural, communications, problem-solving,
and family-therapy models, and assigns “homework” to clients. On the
other hand, the cognitive behavioural approach is particularly effective
in changing behaviour of children and is one of the major theories for
work with adults as well. Cognitive theory encourages clients to think
through problems and to plan solutions thoughtfully, believing that
“emotions, motives, goals, and behaviour are conscious phenomena that
are usually the consequences of thought.”
Other approaches are considered, as well, by the eclectic team. For

example, the family-treatment approach focuses on failures of role
performance as a parent or spouse, and considers role confusion and role
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reversal to be present in sexual and physical child abuse cases.

Transactional analysis was founded on the belief that people have the
power to think, act, and make positive changes, allowing them to feel
OK about themselves and others. Systems theory is akin to ecological
and family-centred approaches in that it is concerned about the
individual and family in the social environment.
Existentialism emphasizes the uniqueness of each client and each

situation and allows for openness, empathy, and honest-but-respectful
feedback to clients. Existentialists use “provocative contact” in
assertively provoking “hard-to-reach” clients toward wanting change in
their lives. This offers clients an opportunity to at least consider the use
of behavior modification in making specific behavior or symptom
changes. Gestalt theory does not hypothesize about unobservable
systems in the client’s life, but may ask the client to reenact his or her
perceptions of them. Gestaltists look for patterns or descriptions of
interactions, which are not working, as opposed to diagnoses or labels.
Similarly, client-centered theory is opposed to diagnosing and labeling,
believing that families are capable of knowing and shaping what is best
for them.
TECHNIQUES
Special treatment techniques such as humour, generalization, self-

disclosure, storytelling, limit-setting, and instillation of hope are
effective in crisis intervention. By understanding client resistance,
treatment outcomes are further enhanced.
Use of Humour
It is imperative for crisis workers to set aside time for client social
activities and fun. Many clients have never had fun. Good professional
role models demonstrate a fun-loving sense of humour from time to
time. It is also helpful for crisis workers to respond to their own
mistakes with humour. When a verbal or tactical error is made in front
of clients, crisis workers need to demonstrate their comfort in laughing
at themselves. This helps clients relax and realize that professionals are
not perfect and that they may be able to laugh at their own mistakes
someday, too. Words of caution are warranted here, however. Some
clients are prone to concrete interpretation of humour. In other words, if
professionals laugh at themselves or encourage clients to, these clients
may feel emotionally degraded. Some clients are ultra-sensitive to
teasing and require months of addressing past trauma or verbal abuse
before they can understand the subtleties of humour.
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Generalization
Generalization is another good technique to use with clients in crisis.

Saying “we all get angry and don’t know how to express it sometimes”
is more effective than implying that clients get angry and professionals
never do.
Self-Disclosure and Storytelling
Clients need positive role models, but they are relieved to know that
professionals are human and sometimes struggle with emotions. The
caution here is for the crisis worker to focus on the clients’ needs, rather
than to vent personal frustrations. To tell a story or two on how the crisis
worker or someone else overcame similar problems, however, may be
helpful to clients. Crisis workers can test whether self-disclosure is
appropriate by honestly questioning, “am I doing this for my benefit or
is it for the clients’ benefit?”
Setting Limits
All models of crisis intervention emphasize respect for the clients’

culture and value systems. Every model also emphasizes the importance
of listening closely (for hours) to what the clients are saying. This helps
establish rapport but, more importantly, determines what the family is
motivated to do. It respects the family’s wishes rather than imposing the
crisis worker’s wishes or needs on the family. In respecting and being
accepting of clients, but not their inappropriate behaviour, it may be
necessary to say specifically that child abuse and neglect are never
acceptable. Many clients need that directive because proper family
values were not instilled during their childhoods. Certain clients
misinterpret crisis worker acceptance of them as full agreement with
their abusive actions. It may be necessary to state frequently that child
maltreatment is never an acceptable behaviour. If not clarified, clients
may assume that the crisis worker approves of such behaviour. When
encouraging clients to discontinue corporal punishment, for example, it
is best to give specific instructions on use of “timeout” for young
children, choices and natural consequences for older children, and the
need for parents to learn active parenting skills.
Instilling Hope
A crisis worker’s belief in self, personal enthusiasm, and ability to instil

hope are critical variables in crisis work. If the family senses that a crisis
worker believes positive resolution to the crisis is possible, then family
members begin to feel confident in their ability to bring about change.
Imparting hope requires crisis workers and clients to search for times in
154
the past when the clients almost succeeded, or did succeed, in finding
solutions to similar crises. Likewise, when clients are encouraged to try
a new approach, rather than being blamed for failure, hope springs forth.
Words such as “when” and “will” should be used rather than “if” or
“maybe” when discussing plans. When crisis workers keep their
promises, clients begin to trust and to believe in change. When clients
and professionals form a positive “team” that builds on client strengths,
change occurs.
Working through Resistance
By objectively, non-judgmentally, and respectfully focusing on family

strengths and the immediate crisis, crisis workers can minimize client
resistance during early intervention. For example, the crisis worker
should state the allegations of child maltreatment and ask the family to
clarify any discrepancies. Conveying hope that the allegations can be
worked through if the family cooperates is effective in moving the
family toward desired change. Family members need to know what they
are expected to do, what consequences they are facing, and what
services they will receive if they cooperate. Crisis workers must be
careful how they use their professional authority. If authority is misused,
parents may experience a double message: Parents should not misuse
power with their children, but professionals may misuse power with
parents. Such double messages create confusion and resentment. If crisis
workers expect clients to be effective parents, then they need to be role
models of behaviour for the parents. Anything less is likely to create
new crises, further weakening the family’s level of functioning. In
periods of crisis or disorganization, people may feel more inadequate,
alienated, or needy, thereby causing them to take on facades of
adequacy, arrogance, or dependency. They may withdraw or they may
attack, according to what they perceive as necessary for survival. They
may act as if they need no help, even when they need it desperately.
Whatever the clients’ facade, crisis workers must remember that
families in crisis crave respect, care, and compassion. They want to
regain some semblance of security and stability.
Often, CPS crisis workers complain that the “non-offending parent” in

sexual abuse cases is passive or defensive and refuses to become
involved in family treatment. Instead, crisis workers need to evaluate
whether the non-offending parent has always been defensive or passive.
If it is new behaviour, then the non-offending parent is merely
frightened and afraid the family will be destroyed. Such fears can be
honestly recognized by the crisis worker. If the defensiveness is typical
behaviour, the non-offending parent will need to observe positive role
modelling, have total honesty from crisis workers, and receive training
on how to respond more openly. In the meantime, crisis workers need to
155
realize that an accusation of abuse, the consequent investigation, and an

influx of various strangers into the home would make anyone defensive.
By assessing the reasons for clients’ recalcitrant behaviour, crisis
workers can then address the clients’ needs for answers or information.
They may have many remaining questions about the intervention. For
example:
1. What further consequences may they expect?

2. What happens next?
3. What is expected of the family and its members?
4. Is the crisis worker a non-judgmental, credible, honest, and
respectful professional?
5. What resources can the crisis worker and community offer that
can help the family?
6. Will the crisis worker listen to and respond to family needs?
7. Does the crisis worker see any strengths in the family?
8. Is the crisis worker implying that solutions to the crisis are
available?
9. Is there hope for the future?
Rather than believing that clients are resistant, do not want to change,
are denying their problems, or are being deceitful, crisis workers need to
believe clients when they express a desire to reach a solution. When
clients seem “resistant,” it is best to assume that they are merely
frightened and hesitant about trying new behaviours or the unfamiliar.
They need crisis workers to be patient and listen to how they are feeling
and what they suggest for relieving the crisis. If crisis workers convey
that clients are the experts on what they want, and if professionals are
honest with themselves about what they are feeling, then they will give
clients room to make the changes that they need.
For instance, a non-offending parent in a child sexual abuse case may be

fearful of losing her identity as a member of an intact family; her
identity as wife of a certain man; her identity as part of a neighbourhood
or a church; her identity as a member of a respected family; her identity
as part of a household which had a good income but must now accept
welfare benefits. A skillful crisis worker must be prepared to explore all
of these possibilities with the parent, rather than proposing “quick”
solutions, such as divorce.
If there is such a thing as resistance to change, some of the causes or

sources may be:
1. uncertainty about change or fear of failure;

2. fear of loss of the familiar;
3. lack of confidence in the crisis worker;
156
4. lack of participation in developing crisis resolution goals;

5. inability to see change as a viable alternative;
6. inappropriate timing on the part of the crisis worker;
7. disruption of important, existing family or social relationships;
and
8. belief that change equals criticism.
Some interviewing techniques which can be used to work through client

resistance include:
1. active listening and reflection;

2. universalizing (normalizing);
3. partialization (breaking into several smaller issues) of problems,
when the client presents numerous issues;
4. ventilation of feelings (with closure before the interview ends);
5. summarization of client feelings after extended listening;
6. acceptance of the client, but not the client’s abusive or neglectful
behaviours;
7. logical, not rambling and disorganized, discussion;
8. education or information about crisis intervention, forthcoming
events, community resources, etc.;
9. setting boundaries and limits on behaviours and contracting on
acceptable alternatives;
10. concrete services such as housing, homemaker services, and
respite care;
11. firm, but kind, confrontation regarding inconsistencies in the
clients’ statements or behaviours;
12. reframing client statements or behaviours to find the positive
aspects; and
13. joining client resistance by saying “why should you change?”
The crisis worker should not say this regarding acts of abuse or
neglect or any criminal behaviour.
Crisis workers that maintain non-judgmental attitudes, family

involvement, and no preconceived notions about a family’s motivation
have found that almost all families are open to change for the better. A
well-timed, quick response reinforces solutions to a crisis in a limited
period of time. Solution-focused crisis workers are optimistic about
substance-abusing, ghetto-residing, chronically disorganized, and even
criminally involved families. This means that they do not box families
in; they do not categorize or reject them based on their past behaviour.
Instead, a new, more-effective beginning is sought. Many of these
families welcome the opportunity to adapt in more socially acceptable
ways. They thought no one would ever give them the hope that they
could change. This is not to say that crisis workers should naively
proceed as if they see no drug dealing, prostitution, theft, sexual abuse,
157
child abuse or neglect, or spouse abuse in these families. It is rather a

matter of being honest but not condescending, being a role model but
not acting superior, being a bearer of hope but not bringing false hope,
and being a trustworthy person even if family members are not. Power
struggles accomplish nothing of value in crisis intervention. The least
cooperative families may become the most receptive to positive change
within a few days, particularly if professionals accept them and help
them find their strengths and their solutions to the crisis. Professional
commitment and positive attitude toward short-term resolution of a
crisis are sensed and appreciated by clients. They have a sense of self-
worth when crisis workers ask: “What do you want to happen?” “What
do you want to change?” “What do you want to do?” and similar
questions that respect clients’ competence. If crisis workers are
respectful of culture and empathetic with the predicament in which
families find themselves, new horizons may start to open up. For many
families, crisis workers will only have time to help them stabilize, but
can help them contact other therapists and agencies where client culture
is honored.78 Ultimately, crisis workers who are effective listeners are
so responsive to clients’ needs that there is no reason for clients to resist.
This, however, takes great patience and a willingness to meet clients’
needs rather than crisis workers’ needs.
List and explain some of the special treatment techniques in crisis

intervention.
4.0 CONCLUSION
When in crisis, families’ feeling, thinking, and behavioural patterns are

more likely to be positively impacted by a highly focused, eclectic team
approach that uses a multitude of coordinated, community resources.
Use of task-centred, cognitive behavioural approaches, along with a
flexible repertoire of other theoretical approaches and techniques, allows
professionals to tailor interventions according to a family’s chosen
goals. When clients choose their own goals, they do not resist making
changes. For instance, if clients want interventions to end and choose
ending the interventions as a goal, they may not resist modifying their
illegal behaviour. Professionals use special treatment techniques, such as
instillation of hope, generalization, and humour to elicit additional
cooperation from one or more family members.
5.0 SUMMARY
The above unit examined the various approaches through eclectic

knowledge, staying focused, treatment approaches, and techniques in
158
explaining how to work with families beyond the initial assessment

phase. A team approach to crisis intervention was highlighted as
desirable because each team member can develop some expertise in one
or more of the best techniques to be used with differing client
populations and crisis situations.
Special treatment techniques such as humour, generalization, self-

disclosure, storytelling, limit-setting, and instillation of hope are
effective in crisis intervention discuss.
Jayaratne, S. (1986). “A Study of Clinical Eclecticism,” Social Services

Review 52(December 1978):621- 631, and J. C. Norcross, (ed.).
Handbook of Eclectic Psychotherapy. New York.
Ellis, A. and Grieger, R. (1977). Handbook of Rational-Emotive

Therapy. New York: Springer.
Kinney, J.; Haapala, D. and Booth, C. (1991). Keeping Families

Together: The Homebuilders Model. Hawthorne, NY.
Perlman, H. H. (1957). Social Casework: A Problem-Solving Process

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Walter, J. L. and Peller, J. E. (1992). Becoming Solution-Focused in

Brief Therapy (New York: Brunner-Mazel Publishers.
Fandetti, D. V. (1985). “Issues in the Organization of Services for Child

Abuse and Neglect,” in C. M. Mouzakitis and R. Varghese,
Social Work Treatment with Abused and Neglected Children.
Springfield, IL.
Garrison, C. and Weber, J. (1981). “Family Crisis Intervention Using

Multiple Impact Therapy,” Social Casework. New York
Brown, J. H.; Finch, Jr.; Northern, W. A.; H. Taylor, S. A. and Weil, M.

(1982). Child, Family, Neighborhood: A Master Plan for Social
Service Delivery. New York: Child Welfare League of America,
Inc.
American Association for Protecting Children, AAPC’s (1989).

Frame work for Advocacy. Denver, CO: American Humane
Association.
159
Gentry, C. E. and Eaddy, V. B. (1980). “Treatment of Children in

Spouse Abusive Families,” Victimology: An International
Journal of Violence
Milner, J. S. and Chilamkurti, C. (1991). “Physical Child Abuse

Perpetrator Characteristics: A Review of the Literature,” Journal
of Interpersonal Violence. Ellis and Grieger, (eds.). Handbook of
Rational-Emotive Therapy.
Wolpe, J. (1980). The Practice of Behavior Therapy, (3rd ed.). (New

York: Pergamon Press, 1982); and J. Vincent, (ed.). Advances in
Family Intervention, Assessment and Theory Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press.
Thomlison, R. J. (1986). “Behavior Therapy in Social Work Practice,”

in F. J. Turner, (ed.). Social Work Treatment: Interlocking
Theoretical Approaches, (3rd ed.). New York: The Free Press.
Reid, W. J. (1980). The Task-Centered System. New York: Columbia

University Press) 1978; and J. Larsen and C. Mitchell, “Task-
Centered Strength-Oriented Group Work with Delinquents.”
Social Casework. New York Press.
Bowen, M. (1978). Family Therapy in Clinical Practice. New York.
Minuchin, S. (1974). Families and Family Therapy, (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, Thomlison, “Behaviour Therapy in
Social Work Practice.
Werner, H. D. (1986), “Cognitive Theory,” in F. J. Turner, (ed.). Social

Work Treatment: Interlocking Theoretical Approaches, (3rd ed.).
New York: The Free Press.
Lystad, M. (ed.). (1986). Violence in the Home: Interdisciplinary

Perspectives. New York: Brunner-Mazd, Inc.
Hallett, K. (1974). .A Guide for Single Parents: Transactional Analysis

for People in Crisis. Millbrae, CA: Celestial Arts,
Rodway, M. R. (1978). “Systems Theory,” in F. J. Turner, (ed.). Social

New York: The Free Press.
Krill, F. (1986). “Existential Social Work,” in F. J. Turner, (ed.). Social

New York: The Free Press, 181- 218.
160
Fagan, J. and Shepherd, I. L. (eds.). (1970). Gestalt Therapy Now:

Theory, Techniques, Applications. Palo Alto, CA: Science and
Behaviour Books.
Salus, M. and Alderson, J. (1984).Family Advocacy Officers: Clinical

Seminar I Washington, DC: Creative Associates, Inc.
Burant, R. J. (ed.). (1992). Families in Society: The Journal of

Contemporary Human Services. A Special Issue: Multicultural
Practice.
161
MODULE 4
Unit 1 The Role of Microfinance In Disaster Settings

Unit 2 Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences: a
Case Study of Hurricane Katrina
Unit 3 Domestic Threats and the Niger Delta Region Crisis
Unit 4 Hostage taking and Negotiation
Unit 5 Youths Poverty and Unemployment
UNIT 1 THE ROLE OF MICROFINANCE IN DISASTER

SETTINGS
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 The Role of Microfinance in Disaster Settings
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters occur in two forms: slow-onset disasters, such as

droughts and famines, and rapid-onset disasters, such as earthquakes,
floods, hurricanes, landslides, and volcanic eruptions. Rapid-onset
disasters are severe and difficult to predict well in advance but usually
are temporary. Slow-onset disasters develop slowly, can be predicted,
and last longer than rapid-onset events. Regardless of type of disaster,
the effects on the stricken populations are devastating.
Natural disasters are common in the developing world. In the first six
months of 1997 alone, 25 major natural disasters occurred in the world,
18 of which occurred in developing countries, with 11 resulting from
floods. In 1995, there were 123 major natural disasters, 84 of which
1
occurred in Asia. On average, injuries and the loss of human lives from
natural disasters involved approximately 129.5 million people per year
from 1970 to 1994. The cost of natural disasters can also be measured in
terms of economic damage. From 1990 to 1994, disasters resulted in
damages estimated at US$443 billion worldwide. Of this, Asia incurred
the greatest damages, primarily as a result of floods.
162
In addition to the extent of human and financial damage, the speed at

which rapid-onset disasters can strike is astounding. The great 1995
Hanshin Earthquake in Japan, for example, killed more than 6,000
people within 20 seconds and caused financial losses worth US$96
billion. The most recent natural disaster is that of Haiti which has
claimed over 50, 000 inhabitants of which damages as the time of
preparing this module are yet to be documented, however the gravity of
the earthquake has led to many clarion call by a lot of countries for
Haitians to be relocated to other countries. Developing countries
therefore hit by natural disasters are faced with devising multistage
recovery strategies for their populations, as well as developing active
disaster-mitigation programs to reduce the effects of future natural
disasters.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The modules and units give particular emphasis to the following

questions:
• what stages of the disaster-to-normalcy transition process provide

the appropriate conditions under which an MFO, whether
existing or newly established, can operate?
• is there room for new MFOs in post-disaster settings, or should
emphasis instead be placed on enabling established MFOs to
provide post-disaster services?
• can MFOs effectively provide social services immediately after
disasters but provide only financial services after normalcy
returns?
• what products or programs do MFOs use to manage and mitigate
natural disaster conditions to protect their clients and their
portfolios?
• what are the implications for MFO performance, especially for
loan repayments, of choosing different products and programs
during post-disaster situations?
• to what extent can an MFO’s program serve as a social safety net
for a community struck by disaster?
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 The Role of Microfinance in Disaster Settings
Many microfinance organizations (MFOs) now working in disaster-

prone countries have been caught up in natural disasters as they have
occurred and have become active players in post-disaster situations. In
other cases, programs originally developed as disaster-relief programs
have evolved into well-known microfinance organizations, such as the
163
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh.

Increasingly, new organizations that arrive following disasters are taking
a microfinance focus, designed to put poor and rural populations back
on their feet. Within the complex process of disasters management,
microfinance programs are but one mechanism of disaster recovery.
They have a role to play in all disaster-recovery stages, from relief to
development, as discussed below.
The flexibility inherent in microfinance: It can provide appropriate and

important services to those hit by disasters throughout the stages of
relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development. Furthermore,
microfinance has the potential to play a strategic role in risk
management before disasters strike, a characteristic particularly valuable
in disaster-prone areas. Disaster-oriented microfinance services range
from new and temporary services to those MFOs may undertake on an
ongoing basis. Temporary services include:
• Emergency loans (relief stage);

• Remittance services (relief stage);
• Loan rescheduling/restructuring (relief/rehabilitation stage);
• Loans to restore capital assets lost in disasters (rehabilitation
stage);
• Loans to rebuild housing and other infrastructure (reconstruction
stage); and
• Loans to start new economic activities (development stage).
Loans for new activities may also be part of an MFO’s ongoing services,
as would be loans for diversification of economic activities. Other long-
term financial services that are particularly relevant for disaster-prone
areas include:
• Insurance instruments to protect vulnerable populations against

future disasters (disaster mitigation); and
• Savings services to provide a personal safety net against future
disasters (disaster mitigation).
Unfortunately, although MFOs are increasingly being considered as

vehicles to jump-start a post-disaster economy, the challenges they face
in disaster situations are enormous and not well understood. In fact,
MFOs that predate a disaster are typically victims of the event along
with the residents of the disaster site. Disasters exact the following
immediate tolls on MFOs:
• Their clients are severely physically affected, whether injured,

killed, or displaced;
• Their clientele’s livelihoods are lost;
164
• MFOs’ normal operating conditions are disrupted

(communications, transportation, destroyed files, and so on);
• Clients cannot meet previous repayment commitments;
• Large numbers of clients may demand immediate access to
savings, which may cause liquidity shortages; and
• New services are demanded of MFOs with no or little time for
product development (including financial services, such as
remittance services and asset- and housing-replacement loans,
and nonfinancial services, such as shelter, food, and medicine).
Clearly, existing MFOs operating in a disaster context are both

organizations in distress as well as potential instruments of recovery.
New MFOs entering a post-disaster situation face a different set of
opportunities and constraints than existing MFOs but are also seriously
challenged by the same environmental conditions.
In responding to both the opportunities and the challenges posed by
natural disasters, most MFOs follow ad hoc mechanisms to protect their
clientele and their portfolio. A few organizations are experimenting with
ways to incorporate disaster-management and disaster-mitigation
mechanisms into regular MFO technologies so that they can deal with
natural disasters in a systematic and cost-effective way.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR MFOs IN

DISASTER SITUATIONS
Disasters generate a plethora of challenges for existing and new

microfinance organizations, but they also present opportunities that
should not go unnoticed. This unit identifies the unique opportunities,
followed by the challenges, that MFOs encounter in countries either
recovering from natural disasters or experiencing chronic disasters.
OPPORTUNITIES
Disasters open up several opportunities for MFOs at the macro,

institutional, and client levels that are not present during normal times.
They arise from both the supply side (program funders or sources within
the program itself) and the demand side (MFO clients and the larger
community of disaster victims).
a. Supply-Side Opportunities
At the macro level, existing MFOs are often approached by international

donors and governments to channel money — either loans or grants —
to the affected populations for relief and rehabilitation. This flow of
external funds, often as grants, increases the capital available to MFOs
during the disaster period and improves their image in their areas of
165
operation. The opportunity to coordinate with governments and

international donors can also provide a forum for lobbying for
microfinance-related issues so that these external agencies do not
undermine financial markets, especially during disaster times. At the
institutional level, when disasters strike, MFOs have a unique
opportunity to assess their vulnerability to disaster conditions and their
ability to manage under them. Although such learning occurs under
duress, the resulting lessons can pay off in future disaster situations. At
the micro level, disasters provide an opportunity to examine MFO
clients’ vulnerable areas and capacities. This information can be used to
develop new financial products or to work with client groups to develop
risk-mitigation strategies for the future.
b. Demand-Side Opportunities
Demand-side opportunities emerge from MFO clientele as they respond

to a disaster situation. The loss of or damage to income-generating
assets and workplaces creates an increased demand for credit, especially
for replacing assets and reconstructing buildings. Natural disasters also
generate an increased flow of remittances from overseas or unaffected
regions, leading to a demand for fast and efficient services to transfer
money. These demands may be placed on MFOs by existing clients or
by others in the community who find themselves in need of a financial
institution.
CHALLENGES
Listing challenges in post-disaster situations is a longer exercise than

listing opportunities, as MFOs face several challenges in providing
financial services under such conditions. Although many of these
challenges are similar during normal and disaster times, they may be
amplified by disaster conditions. Table 1 compares the challenges MFOs
face during post-disaster periods with the challenges they face under
normal conditions. The escalated challenges require special strategies to
protect an MFO’s portfolio and clients. This section identifies six of the
most difficult of these challenges:
1. Managing funds;
2. Performing staff administration duties;
3. Maintaining or changing program objectives;
4. Finding successful methodologies;
5. Meeting changing demand for services; and
6. Coordinating with other agencies and programs.
Some of these issues are common to both established and newly created
MFOs during disaster times. Others apply specifically to established
166
MFOs that continue to function when their steady state is disrupted. The
discussion below provides additional details on the scope of the
challenges for MFOs.
Fund Management Challenges
In normal times, MFOs are responsible for accounting for money

received from their creditors (whether donors, governments, or
depositors). They are challenged to service loans and depositors
efficiently, whereby the demand for loans and deposit services can be
predicted with some certainty. In contrast, disaster times generate an
outpouring of grant and loan funds from donors and governments that
require quick disbursement to provide relief and rehabilitation services.
TABLE 1: NORMAL AND NATURAL DISASTER PERIODS:

POTENTIAL CHALLENGES FACING MICROFINANCE
ORGANIZATIONS
Items Normal Periods Natural Disasters

Period
Fund management Account for money; Make grants and loans
serve depositors and that pour in from donors
loans that can be and governments for
predicted to an extent. relief and rehabilitation
services; account for
costs and socioeconomic
impact; service the
increased and highly
synchronized depositor
demand to withdraw
funds without causing
bank runs; and cope with
reduced funds from new
public deposits.
Administration: Recruit, train, and Prepare staff to predict
Program staff maintain efficient staff and deal with disasters;
who can screen, sort, encourage staff to work
monitor, enforce, and in disaster areas during
collect on loans so that relief and rehabilitation
program objectives in stages, which involves
terms of target clients more time and effort to
are met and loan collect on old loans and
default remains low to make and collect on new
ensure sustainability. loans; train staff to
sensitize clients to
understand the difference
167
between grant and loan

activity during
emergency and disaster
times so that the regular
loan program is not
undermined; train staff to
work under conditions
with less logistical
support and damaged
client records and
collateral; and minimize
mismanagement of grants
and leakage in terms of
servicing non-targeted
clients.
Methodology/design Choose between group Choose between group or
or individual, credit- individual lending
dominated or savings- programs when the
dominated, and demand for loans in
collateral-based or terms of size, terms, and
character-based lending purposes varies among
programs. members because of
differences in the extent
of damages. Determine
how to implement
collateral-based lending
when most
collateralizable assets are
damaged or lost and lives
of people who could
guarantee loans are lost.
Determine how to depend
on deposits to issue more
loans when demand for
withdrawal for deposits is
high. Determine whether
to have state-contingent
contracts
Program objectives Reach targeted Reach vulnerable
population and/or populations and protect
achieve financial, the portfolio of the
organizational institution in a way that
sustainability. avoids losses; address
conflicts of interest in
terms of social and
financial objectives
168
(donors may insist on

relaxed terms and
conditions based on
humanitarian
considerations, which can
undermine the program).
Sustainability Reach financial and Determine how to protect
organizational the portfolio, minimize
sustainability through losses, and maintain staff
steady growth and a integrity so that at least
strong portfolio. the status quo is
maintained and the MFO
remains viable.
Outreach Target creditworthy Reach vulnerable clients,
clients. who may be less
creditworthy than usual
clients, with less leakage
and under-coverage.
Client selection Screen applicants using Determine how to select
different indicators, clients when the
and select clients who indicators normally used
serve the program for screening are not very
objectives. Provide useful, many applicants
these clients with the are in similar situations,
required services. and opportunities for
immediate income-
generating activities are
dismal.
Contract Address information Manage aggregate shock,
enforcement problems; manage widespread collateral
idiosyncratic shocks damage/loss, and client
affecting repayment; death or migration.
and address collateral
foreclosing problems
resulting from legal
and social barriers that
increase transaction
costs.
Demand for Meet demand for Meet the increased
financial services income- generating demand for consumption
activities and some loans and loans for
consumption loans. replenishment of assets
lost or damaged. Meet
the demand for several
social services that affect
the ability to generate
169
income.
Coordination with Avoid duplication of Avoid duplication of
other agencies efforts by other efforts and undermining
financial service of relief and
providers and rehabilitation efforts by
undermining of the several heterogeneous,
program by negative short-time, inexperienced
externalities. actors to provide finance
and other services for the
overall development of
the disaster area. Avoid
undermining financial
programs through doles
and by creating a
dependency syndrome.
Coordinate with
insurance and credit
guarantee programs to
cover losses.
Products and Develop programs and Develop special products
programs products for a viable, and programs to protect
competitive competitive operation. the clientele and
operation. portfolio; quickly learn
by doing and find
products and programs
developed for normal
periods that can be
adopted/adapted for
disaster situations.
Demand assessment Predict demand. Assess the magnitude of
and rapidness in the damage and demand
response for services in a short
time so that programs
will be effective and
timely.
For established MFOs that choose to avail themselves of disaster-time

funds, these resources come in addition to the regular funds available for
MFO operations, and they require additional management in terms of
accounting for costs and socioeconomic impact. A clear separation of
accounts is necessary to protect the MFO’s reputation as a serious
provider of financial services and to properly track the costs of the
different services. Maintaining separate accounts, however, increases the
cost of the MFO’s operations and increases the duties of its trained staff.
For MFOs that mobilize savings, disasters cause other types of
disruption to fund management. Established MFOs are expected to
170
service the increased and highly synchronized demand by depositors to

withdraw funds, which can cause bank runs if not handled carefully.
MFOs also face difficulties in mobilizing new savings from the public
until normalcy returns, thus leaving them increasingly dependent on the
availability of donor and/or government funds and internal funds.
Staff Administration Challenges
In normal times, MFOs encounter problems in recruiting, training, and

maintaining efficient staff who can screen, sort, monitor, enforce, and
collect loans so that program objectives in terms of target clients can be
met and loan defaults can be reduced to ensure sustainability. During
disaster times, MFOs are further required to do the following:
1. Prepare their staff to predict and deal with disasters;

2. Encourage staff to work in disaster areas during relief and
rehabilitation stages, which involve more time and effort to collect
on old loans or make and collect on new loans;
3. Train staff to sensitize clients to the difference between one-time
grants and loans so that the regular loan program is not
undermined by relief efforts;
4. Prepare staff to work under conditions with less logistical support
and damaged client records and collateral; and
5. Train staff to minimize mismanagement of grants and servicing of
nontargeted clients
Newly established MFOs are challenged to find the appropriate balance

between financial and social objectives. The question remains, Can new
MFOs that begin operation during disaster times with social objectives
later move on to become financial organizations pursuing economic
goals?
Methodological Challenges
Microfinance methodologies are challenged continuously under disaster

conditions. Four methodological issues deserve specific mention here:
financial technology, client selection, programs and products and their
terms and conditions, and contract enforcement.
Financial technology: In normal times, MFOs tend to make well-

justified choices between group or individual lending, collateral-based
or character-based lending, and credit-dominated or savings-dominated
programs. During disasters, however, such choices may have
unexpected side effects. After a disaster occurs, group lending programs
that require equal loan sizes may be difficult to sustain when demand
varies among members in terms of loan size, terms, and purpose. Such
171
variability can occur because of differences in extent of damages,

insurance availability, and vulnerability to disasters. Even if groups
permit unequal loan sizes, members of the group may be reluctant to
provide joint liability, or they may have less time to perform monitoring
activities or to meet regularly. Individual lending programs also face
problems during disasters: They involve high transaction costs for the
institution that become even higher when logistical support is disrupted.
In post-disaster situations, collateral-based lending programs may be

undermined when most of the collateralizable assets are damaged or
lost. In character-based lending, the lives of individuals who provided
personal guarantees for loans may be lost. Even if the individuals
survive, their income-generating activities may be so badly damaged
that they cannot pay back their loans. For savings-based programs,
crises arise when depositors generate a sudden demand to withdraw
deposits to cope with disasters, undermining the institution’s ability to
maintain the liquidity necessary to issue new loans.
All in all, following a disaster, established MFOs are challenged to meet

new circumstances by adapting technologies they chose prior to the
disaster. New MFOs, on the other hand, are challenged to choose the
appropriate technology to provide services that not only operate
immediately after disasters but can continue to operate successfully in
normal times. This leaves MFOs with the dilemma of whether to
develop dual methodologies, one each for post-disaster and normal
times, which are called “state contingent methodologies.”
Client selection: Client selection is a challenge in normal times as well

as disaster times. However, during disaster times, MFOs face the
dilemma of whether to expand services to the vulnerable population to
respond to obvious pressing needs, or to service only creditworthy
clients. If the MFO decides to extend services to the vulnerable
population, the institution may have to develop indicators that allow it
both to serve the program’s objectives and effectively screen and select
the targeted population.
Products and programs and contract terms and conditions: In

normal times, MFOs design their programs and products and related
terms and conditions for viable and competitive operation. In disaster
times, MFOs must adapt products and programs developed for normal
periods to disaster situations, but in ways that do not conflict with their
long-term objective of sustainability. The important challenge is to
establish clear guidelines and cut off dates for special products and
programs used during post-disaster stages.
172
Contract enforcement: Given the incomplete information inherent in

financial markets, MFOs are always challenged by problems related to
contract enforcement. In normal times, MFOs’ main contract
enforcement issues deal with repayment and collateral foreclosure on an
individual or group borrower basis. Disaster times exacerbate the
situation, requiring MFOs to manage widespread collateral damage or
loss; widespread default resulting from client injury, death, or migration;
and losses to guarantors. The challenge is especially intense for
established MFOs that have minimal geographic and enterprise
diversification and for new MFOs, which may have a less diversified
clientele than established organizations. Even when transactions are not
based on collateral, contract enforcement becomes difficult during
disaster times because group pressure cannot be used effectively;
members may have less time and inclination to insist on timely
repayments.
Changing Demand for Services
During normal periods, MFOs lend primarily for income-generating

activities and secondarily for consumption. During disaster periods,
demand increases for loans for consumption purposes, loans to replenish
assets lost or damaged, and social services (such as emergency food or
shelter) that precede income generation. Although social services
usually are outside the realm of microfinance services, MFOs recognize
that access to them affects households’ ability to return to productive
activities and generate income in the future. Demand may be both short
and medium term in nature. Once MFOs decide what services they are
prepared to offer, they are challenged to predict accurately the demand
for those services by assessing the magnitude of the damage so that
programs will be effective, timely, and of the appropriate duration.
Coordination with Changing Suppliers
In normal times, MFOs are expected to coordinate with other financial

and developmental agencies to avoid duplication and ensure
compatibility of efforts. Disaster times make such coordination both
more necessary and more difficult. Several suppliers of social and
financial services enter the market simultaneously during the post-
disaster relief and rehabilitation stages. Many of these actors tend to
enter quickly with diverse experience and objectives. Those deciding to
provide financial services (often on a grant or soft-loan basis) may have
little experience in microfinance, expect to stay only a short time, and be
unaware of the dangers of creating a “dependency syndrome.” It is
challenging for existing MFOs to educate and coordinate with such new
suppliers in post-disaster settings. In addition, new MFOs may have to
coordinate with established MFOs to learn from their experiences and
173
avoid duplication of efforts. On a different level, MFOs also need to

coordinate with insurance and credit guarantee programs (if they exist)
to cover losses to their portfolio and clientele.
Why is microfinance seen as a logical mechanism for disaster relief as

well as for reconstruction and development?
4.0 CONCLUSION
The challenges posed above (and distilled in Table 1) only begin to

indicate the complexity of providing microfinance services in post-
disaster contexts. Microfinance, though faced with quite a number of
challenges in developing nations, the fact still remains that it can
provide appropriate and important services to those hit by disasters
throughout the stages of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
development. Furthermore, microfinance has the potential to play a
strategic role in risk management before and after disasters strike, a
characteristic particularly valuable in disaster-prone areas and in
developing nations as well. Disaster-oriented microfinance are limited in
developing countries generally except in disaster prone areas where
services range from new and temporary services to those which are or
may be undertake on an ongoing basis.
5.0 SUMMARY
The study focused on the various opportunities and challenges therein

for Microfinance Organisations (MFOs) in disaster situations. No doubt
disasters have been found to open up several opportunities for MFOs at
the macro, institutional, and client levels that are not present during
normal times. They arise from both the supply side (program funders or
sources within the program itself) and the demand side (MFO clients
and the larger community of disaster victims). So also are they faced
with quite a number of pressing challenges in post-disaster situations
which most times longer exercise than opportunities, as MFOs face
several challenges in providing financial services under such conditions.
What are the opportunities and challenges inherent in disaster

situations?
174
Mustafa, K. (1992). “Causes of Default in Microcredit,” A Study on the

Impact of ASA Activities. Dhaka: ASA Publishing.
Kirkby, J.; O’Keefe, P.; Convery, I. and Howell, D. (1997). “Disaster

Cycle,” Disasters, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 177-180.
Mustafa, S. (1996). “Beacon of Hope: An Impact Assessment Study of

BRAC’s Rural Development Program,” Dhaka: BRAC Research
and Evaluation Division,
Nagarajan, G. (1998). Microfinance in the Wake of Natural Disasters:

Challenges and Opportunities. U.S. Agency for International
Development, Global Bureau, Economic Growth Section,
Paxton, J. (1997). The World Bank, Sustainable Banking with the Poor,
Microenterprise Development Office Development Alternatives,
Inc. Case Study Washington, D.C.
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disaster Report, (1996).
Oxford University Press.
Smillie, I. (1996). “Rural Finance in the Northern Province: Survey

Results”. BRAC Centre, Strauss Commission, Johannesburg.
Todd, H., (1996).Women at the Centre: Grameen Bank Borrowers after

One Decade, Dhaka: University Press Limited.
USAID, (1986). “Rural Credit Forgiveness Program of 1984 and 1985

in Bangladesh,” Dhaka: USAID, A.I.D. report no. 4980249.
175
UNIT 2 DISASTER MYTHS, MEDIA FRAMES, AND

THEIR CONSEQUENCES: A CASE STUDY OF
HURRICANE KATRINA
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences:
A Case Study of Hurricane Katrina
3.2 Media Influences on Disasters Reporting
3.3 Media Reporting and the Social Construction of Looting
and Violence: A Focus on Hurricane Katrina
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the field of social science disaster research in the
United States, research has focused on public responses under disaster
conditions. Initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s, disaster research
in the United States was strongly associated with cold war concerns
regarding how the general public might react in the event of a nuclear
attack. Federal funding agencies believed that social science research on
group behaviour following disasters might shed light on such questions
as whether people would panic and whether mass demoralization and
social breakdown would occur following a nuclear weapons attack. As
studies on public responses in disasters continued, it became
increasingly evident to researchers that endangered publics and disaster
victims respond and adapt well during and following disasters. By the
1960s, a body of work had accumulated indicating that panic is not a
problem in disasters; that rather than helplessly awaiting outside aid,
members of the public behave proactively and pro-socially to assist one
another; that community residents themselves perform many critical
disaster tasks, such as searching for and rescuing victims; and that both
social cohesiveness and informal mechanisms of social control increase
during disasters, resulting in a lower incidence of deviant behaviour than
during non-disaster times. Early research on disasters discussed such
common patterns as the “expansion of the citizenship role” and “social
levelling” to explain public responses to disasters.
176
2.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit seeks specifically to examine the Influence of Media on

disaster reportage, Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and their
consequences. In an attempt to full comprehend media reportage other
related issues such as panic myth and looting related behaviour will be
examined.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences:

A Case Study of Hurricane Katrina
This unit identified strong situationally induced influences, such as

emergent pro-social norms, as factors leading to greater community
cohesiveness during disasters. Research indicated that during the
emergency period following disasters, earlier community conflicts are
suspended as communities unite under conditions of extreme stress.
Earlier research also documented the emergence of “therapeutic
communities” within disaster-stricken populations, involving victims
coming together to provide mutual support to one another. Classic
research in the disaster field also highlighted contrasts that exist between
the realities associated with disaster responses and myths concerning
disaster behaviour—myths that persist despite empirical evidence to the
contrary. Since the prevalence of disaster myths was first documented,
more research has been conducted focusing on such topics as the extent
to which the public believes disaster myths; the manner in which
popular culture—specifically the disaster film genre—both reflects and
perpetuates erroneous beliefs about disaster-related behaviour; and the
incidence of media accounts featuring disaster myths, relative to other
themes. Some studies have focused on how the belief in myths
influences individual and organizational decision making in disasters.
Other research has pointed to the manner in which media reports can
affect public perceptions by amplifying and distorting risk-related
information. Outside the field of disaster research, media scholars have
also analyzed patterns of reporting in disasters, as well as how media
accounts help to shape public opinion
More recent analyses document how mythological beliefs have

experienced resurgence in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. Focusing, for example, on the panic myth, the
assumption that the public will panic in the event of another terrorist
attack, especially one involving weapons of mass destruction, has been
taken for granted in media and public policy discourses and is now even
reflected in discussions among public health, state security, and
emergency management professionals. These discourses often conflate
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the concept of panic with entirely normal and understandable public

responses to risk and uncertainty, such as the upsurge of public
information seeking in the 2001 anthrax attack. Intensified information
seeking under conditions of threat, or actual disaster impact which can
give rise to rumours of all types has long been recognized as an
extension of everyday interpersonal communicative practices and is
readily explained by theories of collective behaviour. Although such
behaviour does create challenges for those who must respond to public
inquiries, it does not indicate panic. Similarly, it is well understood that
under impending threats, many people who are not directly at risk will
try to move out of harm’s way, either because they are risk averse or
because they do not fully understand or trust the warning information
they have received. This sort of behaviour, which researchers term the
“evacuation shadow” effect, is quite common in threat situations of all
types.
Despite the fact that they are common, and despite the fact that why they
occur is well understood, “inappropriate” efforts to seek safety on the
part of people whom authorities do not consider at risk have also been
seen as indicative of panic. The panic myth has been consistently
reinforced in various ways in the aftermath of 9/11. For example, the
American Red Cross is widely viewed as a trusted source of information
on disaster preparedness. Yet in 2005, the Red Cross took many
researchers and disaster management professionals by surprise by
launching a print and electronic media campaign whose theme was “I
can’t stop a (tornado, flood, fire, hurricane, terrorist attack, etc.) but I
can stop panic.” The campaign, which was intended to promote
household preparedness for extreme events, erred in two ways. First, it
conveyed the notion that there is nothing people can do to prevent
disasters, which is patently false; and second, it sent a message that
panic will invariably break out during disasters and other extreme events
and that avoiding panic should be a top priority for the public when
disasters strike. As the panic example shows, messages contained in the
mass media and even in official discourse continue to promote ideas that
have long been shown to be false in actual empirical research on
disasters. Moreover, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
these types of messages, which continue to be vigorously challenged by
experts, now seem to ring true to many audiences, in part because of the
unsubstantiated and arguable but still widely accepted assumption that
terrorism-related extreme events are qualitatively different from other
types of emergencies and, thus, generate qualitatively different socio-
behavioural responses. Researchers have long pointed out that the belief
in myths concerning disaster behaviour is not problematic merely
because such beliefs are untrue. Rather, these erroneous ideas are
harmful because of their potential for influencing organizational,
governmental, and public responses during disasters. It has been noted,
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for example, that incorrect assumptions about the potential for looting
and social breakdown can lead to misallocations of public safety
resources that could be put to better use in providing direct assistance to
victims. Concerns with public panic can also lead officials to avoid
issuing timely warnings and to keep needed risk-related information
from the public (Fischer 1998). Such actions only serve to make matters
worse when threats actually materialize.
At this juncture let us examine the substance of this article, which

concerns the promulgation of disaster myths by the media during and
following Hurricane Katrina in America. Because analyses on data
collected in Katrina’s aftermath are still ongoing, the article contains
only preliminary observations, presented primarily in the form of
examples from major press outlets that illustrate key points. We note
also that at this time the media, the research community, and the nation
as a whole still do not know with any degree of certainty what actually
did happen during the hurricane and in the terrible days that followed.
However, we emphasize that even though many questions till remain
unanswered, and indeed may never be definitively answered, the images
conveyed by the media during that turbulent period left indelible
impressions on the public and also provided the justification for official
actions that were undertaken to manage the disaster. Moreover, the
media vigorously promoted those images even though media
organizations themselves had little ability to verify what was actually
happening in many parts of the impact region. As the sections that
follow show, initial media coverage of Katrina’s devastating impacts
was quickly replaced by reporting that characterized disaster victims as
opportunistic looters and violent criminals and that presented individual
and group behaviour following the Katrina disaster through the lens of
civil unrest. Later, narratives shifted again and began to metaphorically
represent the disaster-stricken city of New Orleans as a war zone and to
draw parallels between the conditions in that city and urban insurgency
in Iraq. These media frames helped guide and justify actions undertaken
by military and law enforcement entities that were assigned
responsibility for the post-disaster emergency response. The overall
effect of media coverage was to further bolster arguments that only the
military is capable of effective action during disasters.
3.2 Media Influences on Disasters Reporting
Discussions on why media portrayals of disasters and their victims so

often deviate from what is actually known about behaviour during
emergencies highlight a number of factors. Some explanations centre on
reporting conventions that lead media organizations, particularly the
electronic media, to focus on dramatic, unusual, and exceptional
behaviour, which can lead audiences to believe such behaviour is
179
common and typical. Other explanations focus on the widespread use of

standard frames that strongly shape the content of media messages.
Although based on myths about disaster behaviour, one such frame, the
“looting frame,” appears almost invariably in disaster-related reporting.
As Fischer (1998) noted in his book on disaster myths, Looting is
perhaps the most expected behavioural response to disaster. Both print
and broadcast media personnel report on the alleged looting incidents,
on steps being taken to prevent it, and, alternatively, on how unusual it
was for the community in question not to be preyed on by looters. (p.
15).
It is common for both print and electronic media covering disasters to

include content indicating that “the National Guard has been brought
into (name of community) to prevent looting”—implying that looting
would otherwise have been a serious problem without the use of strong
external social control. Following circular reasoning, the fact that
looting does not occur during a particular disaster event is then
attributed to the presence of the National Guard and public safety
agencies, even though it is highly likely that looting would never have
been a problem in the first place. These types of frames, themes, and
content make such a strong impression on audiences in part because
they reflect and are consistent with other popular media portrayals of
disaster behaviour, such as those that appear in disaster films and made-
for-TV movies. Noted also is the fact that while many media outlets
often do have entertainment and science reporters, the media almost
universally lack specialists in disaster- related phenomena, particularly
those involving individual, group, and organizational behaviour. This
accounts for one of the reasons why disaster myths and their associated
frames have had such a strong influence on media disaster reporting.
Disaster reporting is also linked to what is judged to be newsworthy

about particular events. Decisions about what and how much to cover
with respect to specific disaster events are often rooted in judgments
about the social value of disaster victims and on conceptions of social
distance and difference. Thus, the vast outpouring of generosity
following the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of December 2004
was driven both by the catastrophic nature of the disaster and by the fact
that so many Western tourists happened to be in the impact region when
the disaster struck. There was no comparable compassionate response
from the West for the victims of the 2005 Pakistan-Kashmir earthquake,
despite the fact that the death toll exceeded eighty-six thousand and
many more victims who later died of starvation or freeze to death when
winter grips the impact region. Hurricane Wilma battered Cancun for
two days and caused widespread devastation, but most U.S. reporting
focused on American tourists who were stranded in the region, rather on
the challenges faced by Cancun’s residents, and reporting on the tragedy
180
in Cancun and its catastrophic aftermath dropped off within a few days
after the event, when the tourists had come home safely.
Since the media have a long record of portraying non-mainstream

groups, especially minority group members, in stereotypical ways, it
should come as no surprise that these same framing conventions would
influence reporting on disaster victims in New Orleans following
Hurricane Katrina. Indeed, in Katrina’s aftermath, among the most
widely circulated media images was a set of photographs in which
African Americans were consistently described as “looting” goods,
while whites engaging in exactly the same behaviours were labelled as
“finding” supplies. Media practices and judgments regarding
newsworthiness, as well as media stereotyping, are undeniably
important factors in the production of disaster news. At a more macro
level, however, media treatments of disasters both reflect and reinforce
broader societal and cultural trends, socially constructed meta-
narratives, and hegemonic discourse practices that support the status quo
and the interests of elites. Thus, myths concerning the panicky public,
the dangers presented by looters, and the threat disaster victims pose to
the social order serve to justify policy stances adopted by law
enforcement entities and other institutions concerned with social control.
We argue here that media reporting surrounding the Katrina disaster can
best be understood from this last-mentioned perspective. In addition to
reflecting both standard media reporting conventions and long-standing
media biases regarding people of colour/race, disaster reporting also
serves broader political purposes.
3.3 Media Reporting and the Social Construction of Looting

and Violence : A Focus on Hurricane Katrina
The preliminary analyses presented here are based on a variety of media

sources. News stories focusing specifically on the behaviour of victims
and the official response to the hurricane were collected from three
newspapers: The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the New
Orleans Times-Picayune. The period covered spanned the impact period
itself and the two weeks following the disaster, from August 29, 2005,
to September 11, 2005. In extracting frames and themes from these
reports, qualitative analytic techniques, rather than quantitatively
oriented analytic approaches was used. There is no argument that “civil
unrest” and “war zone” frames were the only ones employed by the
media. Rather, it is argued that these frames and their associated
discourses were among the most prominent and that they achieved
prominence because they were congruent with post-9/11 official
discourses regarding how disasters and other extreme events-including
in particular those associated with terrorist attacks should be managed in
the United States.
181
The media in most countries continue to assume that looting and

lawlessness are significant elements in the public response to disasters.
Media coverage of the behaviours of disaster victims following the
hurricane mirrored this assumption. Moreover, particularly in the early
days after the hurricane, reports referred to disaster looting behaviour in
ways that would usually be reserved for describing behaviour during
episodes of civil unrest. The distinction between disasters and urban
unrest is an important one. A substantial social science literature points
to the marked distinction that exists between how individuals and groups
behave during periods of civil unrest and how they behave following
disasters. When civil disorders occur, looting does break out; indeed, the
taking of consumer goods and the destruction of property are hallmarks
of modern U.S. “commodity riots,” such as the urban riots of the 1960s,
the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, the 1985 SAP riots,. Such looting is
typically carried out by groups from within the riot area (including
family groups) and in full view of the media, local residents, and even
law enforcement agencies.
Riot-related looting behaviour develops under the influence of emergent

norms that not only permit but actually encourage the taking and
destruction of property. However, research also indicates that even
during riot situations, looting is selective and usually confined to
particular types of stores, such as those carrying retail goods, liquor, and
groceries (Tierney 1994). Moreover, studies show that individuals who
loot and engage in property violence during episodes of civil unrest do
so sporadically, mixing their unlawful behaviour with other routine
social behaviour such as gathering with friends and going home for
meals. Looters may or may not share common grievances or reasons for
looting; some may see looting as an act of protest or retaliation, while
others may view unrest as simply an opportunity to obtain goods for
free.
In contrast, research has shown repeatedly that looting is highly unusual

in U.S. disasters. When it does occur, it tends to be transient, to be
carried out in secret, and to involve isolated groups rather than large
numbers of people. Unlike looting during civil disorders, actual and
potential disaster-related looting behaviour is widely condemned by the
residents of affected communities. Signs bearing messages such as “you
loot, we shoot,” which are often shown in the media following disasters,
are not so much indicative of the actual occurrence of looting as they are
of strong community norms against looting (Fischer 1998). Community
residents also believe looting myths and act accordingly, arming
themselves in an effort to prevent looting, even if such behaviour has
not been reported or verified by official sources. After disasters,
individuals returning to their damaged homes and businesses to retrieve
items may be mistakenly labelled as looters, as may those who go to
182
others’ homes to check to see whether occupants are safe. Over concern
with the possibility of looting often leads community residents to ignore
evacuation warnings and remain in their homes to ward off looters—this
another example of how the belief in myths may actually increase the
risk of death and injury in disasters .This is not to say that there have
never been instances of large-scale collective looting in U.S. disasters.
While vanishingly rare, such episodes have occurred. Perhaps the most
notable recent example is the looting that occurred on the island of St.
Croix following Hurricane Hugo in 1989. Hugo was a huge storm that
caused serious damage and social disruption in many parts of the
Caribbean and the southeast, including parts of Puerto Rico and North
and South Carolina. However, looting only emerged on St. Croix, not in
other hard-hit areas. Because this was such an unusual case, disaster
scholar E. L. Quarantelli spent considerable time investigating why
looting was a problem on St. Croix but nowhere else Hugo had affected.
Based on his fieldwork and interviews, Quarantelli attributed the looting
to several factors. First, the hurricane devastated the island, completely
destroying the vast bulk of the built environment. Second, government
institutions, including public safety agencies, were rendered almost
entirely ineffective by the hurricane’s severity, so the victims essentially
had no expectation that their needs would be addressed by those
institutions. Third, victims had no information on when they could
expect help to arrive. Equally important, according to Quarantelli, was
that the lawlessness that followed Hugo was in many ways consistent
with the high rates of pre-disaster crime on the island and also a
consequence of pre-existing social inequalities and class and racial
resentments, which had long been exacerbated by the sharp class
distinctions that characterized the tourist economy on St. Croix
(Quarantelli 2006).
It can be argued that the post-Katrina conditions in New Orleans in

many ways paralleled the situation on St. Croix following Hugo. Those
who were unable to escape the city or find refuge after Katrina struck
may well have reached the same conclusions as those who were trapped
on St. Croix after Hugo. With homes, property, and livelihoods gone,
with no evidence of a functioning governmental system, facing severe
danger and hardship, and without having any idea of when help would
arrive, many residents might have understandably concluded that they
were on their own and that they had best fend for themselves. Given the
utterly miserable conditions the hurricane produced, looting might well
have been collectively defined as justifiable by some of those who were
forced to remain and await help in New Orleans. Many news reports
featured images of desperate residents fanning out through
neighbourhoods in search of basic necessities such as food, water,
diapers, and clothing (Barringer and Longman 2005; Coates and Eggen
2005). However, as of this writing, no solid empirical data exist
183
regarding how widespread (or rare) looting actually was, who took part
in the episodes of looting that did occur, why they were motivated to
take part, whether the goods people took could have been salvaged, or
how much damage and loss looting actually caused, relative to other
losses the hurricane produced. Equally important, whatever lawless
behaviour may have occurred has not yet been systematically analyzed
in the context of “normal” rates of lawbreaking in New Orleans. What
do exist are volumes of information on what the media and public
officials believed and communicated about looting in New Orleans. As
discussed below, these reports characterized post-Katrina looting as very
widespread, wanton, irrational, and accompanied by violence—in short,
as resembling media characterizations of riot behaviour. Moreover, the
media confined their reporting to the putative lawless behaviour of
certain categories and types of people—specifically young black
males—to the exclusion of other behaviours in which these disaster
victims may have engaged during the disaster, producing a profile of
looters and looting groups that overlooked whatever pro-social, altruistic
behaviours such groups may have undertaken.
More systematic analyses of media looting reports will come later. In

this article, we offer a series of representative reports that appeared in
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the New Orleans
Times-Picayune as well as from the Department of Defence’s American
Forces Information Service. We stress that these are typical comments
that were made in these media outlets, not unusual ones. The material
presented below focuses mainly on the first few days after the hurricane.
From The New York Times:
August 31: “These are not individuals looting. These are large groups of
armed individuals.” . . . “Looting broke out as opportunistic thieves
cleaned out abandoned stores for a second night. In one incident,
officials said a police officer was shot and critically wounded.” (Treaster
and Kleinfield 2005).
September 1: “Chaos gripped New Orleans on Wednesday as looters ran

wild . . . looters brazenly ripped open gates and ransacked stores for
food, clothing, television sets, computers, jewellery, and guns.”
(McFadden and Blumenthal 2005).
From The Washington Post:
August 31: “Even as the floodwaters rose, looters roamed the city,
sacking department stores and grocery stories and floating their spoils
away in plastic garbage cans. . . . Looting began on Canal Street, in the
morning, as people carrying plastic garbage pails waded through waist-
184
deep water to break into department stores. In drier areas, looters raced
into smashed stores and pharmacies and by nightfall the pillage was
widespread.” (Gugliotta and Whoriskey 2005)
September 2: “What could be going through the minds of people who

survive an almost biblical tragedy, find themselves in a hellscape of the
dead and the dispossessed, and promptly decide to go looting?
Obviously not much: Stealing a rack of fancy clothes when there’s no
place to wear them or a television when there’s no electricity does not
suggest a lot of deep thought.” (Robinson 2005).
From the New Orleans Times-Picayune:
August 30: In the midst of the rising water, two men “were planning to
head out to the levee to retrieve a stash of beer, champagne, and hard
liquor they found washed onto the levee” (MacCash and O’Byrne 2005).
August 30: “Mid-afternoon Monday, a parade of looters streamed from

Coleman’s retail store. . . . The looters, men and women who appeared
to be in their early teens to mid-40s, braved a steady rain . . . to take
away boxes of clothing and shoes from the store” (Philbin, 2005).
August 31: “Officials watched helplessly as looters around the city

ransacked stores for food, clothing, appliances, and guns.” The looting is
out of control. The French Quarter has been attacked,’ Councilwoman
Jackie Clarkson said” (McGill 2005).
Beyond property crime, not only were the crowds engaging in the
collective theft of all types of goods, but their behaviour was also
violent and even deadly. Media accounts made it seem as if all of New
Orleans was caught up in a turmoil of lawlessness.
From The New York Times:
September 2: “Chaos and gunfire hampered efforts to evacuate the

Superdome, and, the New Orleans police superintendent said, armed
thugs have taken control of the secondary makeshift shelter in the
convention centre. The thugs repelled eight squads of eleven officers
each he sent to secure the place . . . rapes and assaults were occurring
unimpeded in the neighbourhood streets. . . . Looters set ablaze a
shopping centre and fire fighters, facing guns, abandoned their efforts to
extinguish the fires, local radio said.” (Treaster and Sontag 2005)
September 3: “America is once more plunged into a snake pit of

anarchy, death, looting, raping, marauding thugs, suffering
185
infrastructure, a gutted police force, insufficient troop levels and

criminally negligent government planning.” (Dowd 2005)
From The Washington Post:
September 1: “Things have spiralled so out of control [in New Orleans]

that the city’s mayor ordered police officers to focus on looters and give
up the search and rescue efforts.” (Coates and Eggen 2005)
September 3: A fire-fighter from Long Beach is quoted as saying,

“People are taking clothing, liquor, things that aren’t life-surviving,
material items. I don’t have a problem if someone is trying to get food
and water, but beyond that, we’re busting them. . . . What we’re getting
worried about is people are starting to shoot at us now. . . . That’s the
lowest form of human being haunting the earth.” (Vedantam and Klein
2005)
From the New Orleans Times-Picayune:
August 31: According to the New Orleans homeland security chief,

“There are gangs of armed men in the city, moving around the city.”
(Times-Picayune 2005a)
September 2: “Governor Kathleen Blanco called the looters ‘hoodlums’

and issued a warning to lawbreakers: Hundreds of National Guard
hardened on the battlefield in Iraq have landed in New Orleans. ‘They
have M-16s, and they’re locked and loaded,’ she said.” (Breed 2005)
Another graphic Times-Picayune story, published on September 1,

exposed gangs looting houses and businesses, robbing people in the
street, looting gun stores, stealing guns from Wal-Mart, and assaulting
disaster victims (Anderson, Perlstein, and Scott 2005). These media
stories, along with stories passed through rumour networks, clearly
influenced disaster management decision making. Immediately
following the New Orleans levee breach, for example, Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco emphasized that search and rescue should
take priority over all other emergency activities. However, as the
September 1 story above in The Washington Post indicates, within three
days of the hurricane’s impact, she and the mayor of New Orleans
ordered public safety officers to pursue lawbreakers, rather than
concentrating on lifesaving activities (Coates and Eggen 2005). This
decision directly influenced the survival chances of stranded and dying
disaster victims. The material presented above comes from print media.
While we have not attempted to undertake the Herculean task of
analyzing electronic media, the Internet, or postings that appeared in the
blogosphere, anyone who watched or read these media in the aftermath
186
of Katrina can only conclude that the images of looting and looters these
media conveyed were even more extreme. While television news did
report extensively on the suffering of Katrina’s victims, the
intergovernmental disaster response debacle, and other topics, it also
featured numerous stories of looting, rape, and lawlessness,
continuously “looping” video of the activities of groups that had already
become “armed, marauding thugs” in the minds of viewers. Video
images also conveyed more powerfully than print media could that the
“thugs” who had taken over New Orleans were young black men. As the
emergency continued, all manner of rumours were reported by the
media as truth. Readers and viewers were told, for example, of multiple
murders, child rape, and people dying of gunshot wounds in the
Superdome. These reports were later found to be groundless, but they
were accepted as accurate by both media organizations and consumers
of news because they were consistent with the emerging media frame
that characterized New Orleans as a “snakepit of anarchy,” a violent
place where armed gangs of black men took advantage of the disaster
not only to loot but also to commit capital crimes. More thoughtful
analyses of looting and other forms of disaster-related collective
behaviour would later emerge in the media (see, for example, an article
titled “Up for Grabs; Sociologists Question How Much Looting and
Mayhem Really Took Place in New Orleans,” which ran in the Boston
Globe on September 11, 2005; Shea 2005). But before these kinds of
balanced reports appeared, the “armed thug” frame was already well
established. Reports seemed to clearly show that the activities of armed
thugs, “the lowest form of human being haunting the earth,” had gone
well beyond looting for necessities and had spilled over into murder,
rape, and acts of random violence (Vedantam and Klein 2005). This
frame provided part of the justification for the subsequent governmental
response to the Katrina disaster.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE:
What are the probable things that should be expected in the event of
civil unrest?
4.0 CONCLUSION
Myths and their consequences as the foregoing discussion shows, both

media reporting and official discourse following Hurricane Katrina
upheld the mythical notion that disasters result in lawlessness and social
breakdown. This is not to say that media coverage following Katrina
provided nothing helpful or useful to victims, the American public, and
audiences around the world. That was certainly not the case. The media
devoted enormous resources to covering Katrina and also to performing
such services as helping to locate and reunite disaster-stricken
187
households. Reporters worked tirelessly to provide up-to-date

information on all aspects of the hurricane. However, even while
engaging extensively in both reporting and public service, the media
also presented highly oversimplified and distorted characterizations of
the human response to the Katrina catastrophe. Ignoring the diversity
and complexity of human responses to disastrous events, media accounts
constructed only two images of those trapped in the disaster impact area:
victims were seen either as “marauding thugs” out to attack both fellow
victims and emergency responders or as helpless refugees from the
storm, unable to cope and deserving of charity. Hurricane Katrina
showed that the potential for catastrophe is present wherever extreme
events—natural, technological, or wilful-intersect with vulnerable built
environments and vulnerable populations.
5.0 SUMMARY
It has long been understood by disaster researchers that both the general
public and organizational actors tend to believe in various disaster
myths. Notions that disasters are accompanied by looting, social
disorganization, and deviant behaviour are examples of such myths.
Research shows that the mass media play a significant role in
promulgating erroneous beliefs about disaster behaviour. Following
Hurricane Katrina, the response of disaster victims was framed by the
media in ways that greatly exaggerated the incidence and severity of
looting and lawlessness. Media reports initially employed a “civil
unrest” frame and later characterized victim behaviour as equivalent to
urban warfare. The media emphasis on lawlessness and the need for
strict social control both reflects and reinforces political discourse
calling for a greater role for the military in disaster management.
Explain Riot-Looting Behaviour with relevant examples
Anderson, E.; Perlstein, M. and Scott. R. T. (2005). We’ll do what it

takes to restore order. Times-Picayune, September 1.
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/
nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_09.html.
Barringer, Felicity, and Jere Longman (2005). Owners take up arms as

looters press their advantage. New York Times, September 1.
Breed, A. (2005). National Guardsmen pour into New Orleans. Times-

Picayune, September 2.
188
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola
_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_09.html
Coates, S. and Eggen D. (2005). A City of Despair and Lawlessness.

The Washington Post, September 2.
Dowd, M. (2005). United States of shame. The New York Times,

September 3,
Fischer, H.W. (1998). Response to disaster: Fact versus fiction and its
perpetuation: The sociology of disaster. 2nd ed. New York,
University Press of America.
Philbin,Walt. (2005).Widespread looting hits abandoned businesses.

Times-Picayune, August 30. http://www
.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-
Picayune/archives/2005_08.html.
MacCash, D, and O’Byrne, J. (2005). Levee Breech Floods Lakeview,

Mid-City, Carrollton, Gentilly, City Park. Times-Picayune,
August 30.
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/
nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_08.html
McFadden, R, and Blumenthal, R. (2005). Bush Sees Long Recovery for

New Orleans; 30,000 Troops in Largest U.S. Relief Effort;
Higher Toll Seen; Evacuation of Stadium—Police Ordered to
Stop Looters. The New York Times, September 1.
McGill, K. (2005). Officials Throw Up Hands as Looters Ransack City.

Times-Picayune, August 31.
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Time
s-Picayune/archives/2005_08.html.
Shea, C. (2005). Up For Grabs; Sociologists Question How Much

Looting and Mayhem Really Took Place in New Orleans. Boston
Globe.
Times-Picayune. (2005). Blanco Says Evacuation Buses on the Way to

N.O. August 31. http://www.nola.com/
newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-
Picayune/archives/2005_08.html.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1987). Disaster Studies: An Analysis of the Social

Historical Factors Affecting the Development of Research in the
189
area. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 5

(3): 285-310.
Quarantelli, E. L. (2006). Looting and Other Criminal Behaviour in

Hurricane Katrina: Atypical and Complex but seen before in
other Catastrophes. Preliminary paper, University of Delaware,
Disaster Research Centre, Newark. http://www.udel.edu/DRC
Retrieved 16 December, 2009.
Robinson, Eugene. (2005). Where the Good Times Haven’t Rolled.

Editorial. The Washington Post, September 2,
Havidán, R., Trainor, J. and Quarantelli, E. L. (2006). Rising to the

Challenges of a catastrophe: The Emergent and Pro-social
Behaviour Following Hurricane Katrina. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 604:82-101.
Treaster, J, and N. R. Kleinfield. (2005). New Orleans is Inundated as 2

Levees Fail; Much of Gulf Coast is Crippled; Toll Rises. The
New York Times, August 31.
Treaster, J, and D. Sontag. (2005). Despair and Lawlessness Grip New

Orleans as Thousands Remain Stranded in Squalor. The New
York Times, September 2.
Shankar, V. and Klein, A. (2005). You Wonder Why It Didn’t Kill a

Million; Officials Upbeat In View of What Might Have Been as
Survivors Recount Horror of What is. The Washington Post,
September 3,
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UNIT 3 DOMESTIC THREATS AND THE CRISES IN

NIGER DELTA
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
For sometime now Nigeria as a country has been faced with quite a
number of problems of which crises in the Niger-Delta are prominent
internal security threat. At a more general level the threat has social,
economic, political and environmental dimensions. Each of these
dimensions, singly and conjointly, greatly affects the nation’s stability
and well-being. Threats to human and national security ranges from the
menace of separatist demands, illegal militia armies, ethnic and religious
conflicts, armed robbery, corruption and poverty to sabotage of public
properties, economic sabotage and environmental degradation. Among
these, ethno-religious fighting and violent attacks in the oil-rich Niger
Delta forms the major security dilemma. The predominant threats and
security challenges in the area are emanating from un-abating attacks on
oil installations, arm proliferation, sea piracy, youth restiveness,
bunkering, kidnap and hostage taking.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit seek to examine the menace of domestic threats in the Niger
Delta region of Nigeria, its security implications and the effort of the
state to short-circuit the crisis.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Domestic Threats and Crises in the Niger Delta
In the last three decades, the Niger Delta, the centre of Nigeria’s oil
wealth has been the scene of protest, sometimes violent, against the
repressive tendencies of the Nigerian state on the one hand and against
the recklessness, exploitative and environmentally unfriendly activities
of oil Multinationals on the other hand. Such violent agitations have
claimed thousands of lives, other thousands displaced and inestimable
191
properties have been destroyed. In economic term, millions of dollars

have been lost to youth restiveness, disruption of production, pipeline
vandalization, hostage-taking, assault and bombing of oil installations to
mention a few. Violent political agitation by the people of the Niger
Delta for improved and equitable resources allocation and involvement
in the petroleum industry has constituted the most serious threat to the
economy, human and national security in Nigeria. Not only that,
because of the nature, dimension and strategies employed by the
militants the country has been named among the terrorist trouble spots
around the world (http://www.factmonster.com/spot/terrorism7.html ).
Since 1998, the Niger Delta has seen a rise in the incidence of hostage
taking of oil and oil related multinational company staff (both foreign
and local) sabotage of company property; pipeline vandalisation;
bombing of oil installations; kidnapping for ransom, sea piracy and
robbery on the waterways. It was reported in the Financial Standard of
January, 2006 that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
recorded 1,306 cases of line breaks, majority of which took place in the
Niger Delta) of petroleum products pipeline across the country in 2005.
This figure is considered too high when compared with 88 cases
recorded in 2003. It also represents an increase of 40.5 percent over the
929 cases recorded by the corporation in 2004. The situation remains
unabated. There is no passing day without a reported case of kidnap,
hostage taking or pipeline destruction in the Niger Delta. Balogun
(2006) observed that:
Kidnap and hostage taking particularly of foreign oil workers, by

militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria is assuming an
alarming rate. Before youths militants became daring in 2006, they had
limited their exuberance to just disrupting operations of oil producing
companies, blowing up oil pipelines and invading oil fields with the aim
of collecting ransom.
Prior to the recently granted amnesty life in the Niger Delta area was
characterised by fear. More worrisome is the fact that the legitimacy and
the survival of the Nigerian state is under considerable threat. Table 1
gives a graphic picture of the situation in the Niger Delta.
192
Table 1: Some incidence of threats in recent years prior to the

Amnesty
It is important to note that this table only shows a few incidents of acts
of threat in the Niger Delta region. Indeed, kidnappings in Nigeria’s oil
producing Niger Delta have become an almost daily occurrence. For
instance, nearly 100 foreign oil workers have been kidnapped in the first
quarter of 2007. Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Deltans
(MEND) the most active and violent militant group have been
responsible for most of the destruction of oil facilities and the kidnap of
oil workers. In short, the Niger Delta region could be said to be in a state
193
of war- a war of low intensity between the militants and multinational

oil companies on the one hand and the militants and the Nigerian state
on the other hand. MEND in its non-compromising stance vowed to
cripple the nation’s economy. Truly, the damage youth restiveness has
done to the Nigerian economy is huge. Shell, for example produced only
700,000 barrels per day from August to December 1998 falling short of
its production quota of 830,000 barrels per day in July 1998 (SPDC
Report, May 1999:2). The confrontation has also had its toll on human
lives. In 1999 for instance, the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the Ogoni rebellion resulted in deaths
and destruction of the community, producing refugees estimated to be
5,400. In another instance, in a military operation in December 30 and
31 1998, about 26 civilians were killed and about 200 wounded. On the
other hand 80 soldiers were reported missing. The effects of the
confrontation on the economy have been enormous. The oil industry is
estimated to have lost 117 working days in 1997. In the first eight
months of 1998 Shell, the largest oil company lost about 11 billion
barrels of crude oil estimated at $3.2 billion. Appreciating the damaging
effect on the economy, General Abdusalam Abubakar in 1999 budget
speech to the nation as cited in the Guardian newspapers of January 2,
1999, confessed; “… the temporary closure of wells in the Niger Delta
led to a sharp reduction in government foreign exchange earnings”,
resulting in the non-realization of “the budgeted 1998 revenue of
N216.336 billion from oil. The situation has gone worse since then. In a
period of seven months in 2006 (between February and September) the
Business Day of September 4, 2006 reported that the country lost about
12 billion US dollars to the Niger Delta militants. By May 2007, it is
estimated that militant activities and protest have reduced oil production
from a total capacity of 3million barrels per day to about 2million
barrels. At an average of 65 dollars a barrel, this loss translates to $65
million per day. Expectedly, this is damaging to the economy of the
nation- an economy that is significantly driven by oil. Therefore, if
security derives from the commonsensical fact that a person’s first
interest is survival, the Niger Delta region’s environment (socially,
economically, politically and in strict environmental sense) is far from
been secured. More worrisome is the threats it constitute to Nigeria’s
global image, as most nations including United States, Britain, Australia
among others, instructs their citizens against doing business in Nigeria
(British High Commission, Nigeria 2005; Australian High Commission
2005). For example Australian High Commission warned; Australians in
Nigeria should exercise a high degree of caution. The risk of militants’
attacks against Western interests remains…Australians are advised to
defer non-essential travel to the riverine area in Bayelsa, Delta and
River States in south-eastern Nigeria…Unrest and violence can occur
without warning throughout Nigeria. Cult or street youth gang violence
194
occurs regularly and can result in fatalities. The image of Nigeria abroad
is that of a state that is engrossed in war.
3.2 Measures to End Domestic Threats in the Niger Delta
It is grossly disingenuous to say that the approach of the Nigerian state

to resolve the recurrent problem in the Niger Delta is completely
repressive. Occasionally, soft measures are applied while at times hard
measures are inevitable in order to maintain peace or protect the
corporate existence of the country. Three forms of state responses to the
claims and activities of ethnic minority oil producing communities can
be identified. These are redistributive, reorganization and regulatory/
repressive state policies and responses. Redistributive policies are state
decisions that consciously dispense value resources to one group at the
expense of other claimants to state resources. Re-organizational policies
refer to state effort to restructure or reconfigure political or
administrative institutions and relationship in order to accommodate
group demands or strengthen the efficacy of centralized state power.
Regulatory policies on the other hand entail the mandatory imposition of
sanctions or restrictions of individuals or groups that are perceived to
pose a threat to state cohesion and order. A brief discussion of these
policies is necessary.
Redistributive Policies: Revenue sharing or resource distribution has

been at the centre of ethnic agitation in Nigeria. The exceptional
political sensitivity of resource allocation is worsened by the lack of
consensus on the criteria of distribution, the absence of reliable
socioeconomic data, and political change, and the extent to which
revenue distribution is tied to perceptions of regional ethnic dominance
(Suberu 2001). Revision in Federal revenue sharing arrangements have
been the most important redistributive policies designed to contain
ethnic minority agitation in Nigeria. The irony however is that, the
various review exercises have been done at the disadvantage of the oil
producing communities. Before oil assumes a prime position in the
Nigerian economy derivation principle occupied the centre stage of
revenue sharing practices. The percentage allocated to derivation stood
at 50% before the promulgation of the Distributable Pool Account (DPA
Decree 13 of 1970) which slashed it down to 45%. The 1979
Constitution revised the Petroleum Act of 1969 by declaring Federal
Government’s ownership of all mineral resources both onshore and
offshore and the derivation share of oil revenue slashed to 5% by the
Second Republic government of Shehu Shagari. By 1985 the derivation
principle as an index of revenue allocation has been partially eliminated.
For example, the Babangida administration (1985-93), at its inception
inherited a revenue sharing arrangement which assigned 2 per cent and
1.5 percent of oil mineral revenues to the oil producing states and oil
195
producing areas respectively (For detail see Suberu 1996). This was
later slashed down to 1 per cent in order to provide fund for the
development of Abuja, the Nigerian new capital city. Following
intensive agitation, the statutory allocation for the mineral producing
areas was increased from 1 to 3 per cent of federally collected revenue.
This remained so till the end of 1993. Now according to the 1999
(Section 162 subsection 2 and 3) Nigerian Constitution the derivation
formula for sharing revenue stands at 13 per cent. Nonetheless, the
increase has not doused the flame of the struggle for equity and justice
in the Niger Delta region as communities demand for total control of
what they feel is their God-given resources or at least a return to the pre-
1970 period when other formulae like population, equity, and need were
peripheral. Though the revision in Federal revenue sharing arrangements
have been the most important redistributive policies, this has been used
to the advantage of the major/dominant ethnic groups. Thus, the major
ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) have been accused of
internal colonialism. Indeed, this forms a major crisis that the National
Political Reform Conference (NPRC), inaugurated by President
Olusegun Obasanjo in 2005, had to contend with (NPRC Minority
Report of the Committee on Environment and Natural Resources).
Other measures include the establishment of special commission and

federal agencies to address the peculiar developmental needs of the
region. For example Shagari administration (1979- 83) set up a
presidential task force in 1980 known as the 1.5 Per Cent Committee to
see to the developmental peculiarities of the region. 1.5 per cent was
allocated to the Committee to carry out its mandate. The task force
recorded nothing of note on the sands of time. Later, the Oil Mineral
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was
established by General Ibrahim Babangida, the then military head of
state. He gave OMPADEC the mandate of turning around the situation
in the region. It was a glaring fact that the Commission like the previous
ones failed to achieve its founder’s vision. It was widely believed that
inefficiency, lack of focus, inadequate and irregular funding, official
profligacy, corruption, and excessive political interference, lack of
transparency and accountability and high overhead expenditure in the
organization ensured that people largely got disappointed. The failure of
OMPADEC accounted for its dissolution by Obasanjo’s civilian
administration upon inception in 1999 and its replacement by Niger
Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The NDDC was set up with
the mission of facilitating ‘the rapid, even and sustainable development
of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially
stable, and environmentally regenerative and politically stable. President
Obasanjo in his speech also charged the commission to make the people
of the Niger Delta feel a sense of belonging by uplifting their standard
of living through the implementation of life-touching projects. The
196
persisting crisis of development in the region is a testimony to the fact

that little has been achieved by the Commission due to pandemic
political and bureaucratic corruption.
Reorganization Policies: A common feature of ethnic politics in

Nigeria is the unrelenting agitation for administrative autonomy. This
has resulted in incessant state and local government creation exercises.
The philosophical basis for such agitation is the underlying assumption
that such administrative unit enhances access to national wealth;
facilitate equitable inter-ethnic power sharing and as well local
community development. Suberu (1996) writes;
A key feature of Nigerian federalism is the decisive role that state and
local government play in facilitating the access of territorial
communities to federal developmental patronage. This role has arisen
from the virtually complete dependence of the states and localities on
federal oil revenues, but also from the continuing emphasis on the
standard of inter-unit equality in distributing federal financial resources
and infrastructural opportunities to the nation’s constituent communities
and segments.
Therefore, the Nigerian state has responded to intense clamour for

additional constituent units in the Delta region. Presently, the Niger
Delta comprises nine states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River,
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. In order to pacify the people of the
region, the ruling Peoples Democratic Party has conceded the post of the
Vice Presidency of the country to the region. However, it is significant
to note that the creation of states and constituent units have also failed to
serve as a panacea to the crisis. A number of factors explain this- the
poor relationship between the host communities and the multinational
oil companies; the devastating impact of the activities of the oil
companies on the environment; competition among the various
communities for recognition and access to resources; crass poverty and
poor management of the available resources by the states and local
government within the region. More important is the fact that most
policies designed to short-circuit the crisis are formulated at a level far
removed from the communities.
Regulatory/Repressive Policies: Successive governments in Nigeria

have used regulatory and repressive instruments to contain the crisis in
the Niger Delta. These include promulgation of Decrees during the
military era and Acts of Parliament during the Civilian administration.
For example, Babangida military regime promulgated Decree No 21 of
May, 1992 among other Decrees as a sanction against ethnic minority
agitation. Decree N0 21 (Cited in Suberu 1996: 41) for instance,
empowered the President of the Federal Republic to:
197
dissolve and proscribed any association of individuals of three or more

persons … which in his opinion is formed for purposes of furthering the
political, religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural or social interest of a group of
persons or individuals contrary to the peace, order and good governance
of the Federation…”.
Other measure that is being proposed to address the terror dimension is

constitutional engineering. Recently, the legislative arm of the
government has received two bills entitled (1) “An Act to Prohibit
Terrorism” and (2) “Prevention of Terrorism Act”. The first bill
sponsored by one of the Senators prescribes life imprisonment for those
involved in hostage-taking, kidnapping and related activities while the
second bill sponsored by the president prescribes a maximum of 20
years jail term for offenders of such terror actions. The bills also
recommend the establishment of antiterrorism agency in the country.
Another regulatory approach is the deployment of the law enforcement
agents and the military to the troubled zone to suppress the agitators and
enforce order.
This approach often further aggravates the crisis. In certain

circumstances, the police and the soldiers have overreacted, killing
innocent citizens and renders thousands homeless. This is inevitable
because the police and the soldiers deployed to such scene are often
poorly equipped and as well poorly trained in weapon handling and
crowd control. For instance, when the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC)
leading other groups in the historic Kaima declaration asked all
multinational oil companies to leave the Ijaw land in December 1998,
General Abdulsalami Abubakar dispatched several warships to the Delta
Region to quench the riot and enforces order. When Ijaw Youths went
out in the street of Yenagoa, the Bayelsa state capital in peaceful protest
about three hundred of them were shot down by soldiers in cold blood.
The soldiers also invaded the city of Kaima and murdered several
people including the son of the king. The story is not different when the
civilian government of Olusegun Obasanjo sacked the Odi community
in 1999. Hundreds of people lost their lives in an operation that reduced
the whole community to rubble.
Other palliative measures include negotiation and dialogue with the oil
producing communities. Before the exit of Obasanjo’s administration,
the president organized meetings at regular interval with all the
stakeholders. This forum provided the oil communities to table their
grievances in a legitimate manner. It also provided the opportunity for
the government and the multinational corporations to assess their
activities on the one hand and ensure corporate social responsibilities on
the other hand. Furthermore, the Federal Government charged the
NDDC to produce an all-inclusive Niger Delta Development Master
198
Plan. The Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan was launched
by President Obasanjo on Tuesday, March 27; 2007. The broad goals of
the master plan with mutually reinforcing components include poverty
reduction, industrialization and socio-economic transformation to
prosperity. Therefore the plan focuses on five major themes: Economic
Development, Community needs the natural environment, Physical
Infrastructure, and Human and Institutional Resources. The 15-year Plan
clearly enunciates the role of all the stake holders- Local Government,
State Government, Federal Government, Multinational Oil Companies
etc. - in tackling the problem of development in the Niger Delta. Only
recently, President Umaru Yar’Adua’s Amnesty Programmes/plan for
the Niger-Delta and the militants, has brought about relative peace so
far. The problem however, remains whether the new Amnesty Plan will
not suffer the same faith that befell the previous policies.
What were the various measures put in place by government to

ameliorate the Niger-Delta crisis prior to the Amnesty plan?
4.0 CONCLUSION
It has been argued in this unit that domestic threats and violence in the
Niger Delta region is a consequence of the long years of negligence, real
and perceived marginalization of the oil producing communities and the
nonchalant attitude of the oil companies to environmental safety. It is
directed at the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies rather
than against the national interest of any nation. Therefore, the Niger
Delta question in Nigeria is peculiar and domestic though it may have
international implications. From all sides of the divide, it calls for a
careful understanding of the issues involved, and the strategies being
applied. The problem is for the Federal Government to solve. Repressive
state policies or military solution cannot be the right panacea but a
determined effort, devoid of rhetoric, to promote social justice and
equity; to stem the tide of environmental devastation and ecological
destruction going on in the Niger Delta.
5.0 SUMMARY
In the last three decades, the Niger Delta region, the centre of Nigeria’s
oil wealth has been the scene of protest, sometimes violent, against the
repressive tendencies of the Nigerian state on the one hand and against
the recklessness, exploitative and environmentally unfriendly activities
of multinational oil companies on the other hand. The violence has taken
terror dimensions. Such violent agitations have claimed thousands of
lives, other thousands displaced and inestimable properties have been
199
destroyed rendering the region one of the most dangerous zones to live
in Nigeria today. This unit discussed the genesis of the crisis, the threats
it poses to human and national security and the policies that have been
adopted by the Nigerian state to curtail and control the crisis. This unit
shows that repressive tendencies and military solutions are not the best
panacea but a policy, devoid of rhetoric, that will promote social justice
and equity, reduce poverty and regulate the activities of the
multinational oil companies in such a way that their activities will
conform with best practices around the world.
Discuss at a more general level the Niger-Delta crisis as an emergency

with special emphasis on the social, economic, political and
environmental dimensions.
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September 3, 2005 from http://www.
nigeriavillagesquare1.com/Articles/Abidde/2005/01/ redefining-
nigerias-national-security.html.
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Onwudiwe (Eds.): The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath.
Ibadan: John Archers Ltd., pp. 191-206.
Agbo, A. (2007). A New Dawn in the Delta. Tell Magazine, Weekly,

June 4, 2007, pp. 30-41.
Anyaegbunam, A.O (2000). Niger Delta: A Case for Regional

Contingency Plan. In: A. Osuntokun (ed.). Environmental
Problems of the Niger Delta. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation,
pp. 140-149.
Australian High Commission, (2005). Travel Advice: Nigeria. Official

Homepage of Australian High Commission Retrieved June 24,
2005, from http:www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/
Nigeria.
Ayoob, M. (1995). The Third World Security Predicament: State

Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System.
Bouilder Co: Lynne Rienner.
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Balogun, S. (2006). Hostage Taking to Continue: Those behind

Renewed Wave. National Mirror Newspaper, June 4, P. 1
Beiner, R. (2008). Theories and Ideologies of Terrorism. Retrieved on

May 3 2008 from http://www.apsu.edu/
oconnort/3400/3400lect02.htm.
British High Commission, (2005). Travel Advice, Official homepage of

British High Commission. Retrieved on June 24 2005 from
http://www.britishhighcommission.gov.uk/servelet/Front?pagena
m…/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=110139947416.
Business Day, (2006). Nigeria Loses $12bn to Niger Delta Crisis in 7

Months. September 4.
Cayford, S. (1996). The Ogoni Uprising: Oil, Human Rights, and a

Democratic Alternative in Nigeria. Africa Today, 43(2): 183-198.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics,

13(4): 379-399.
DeGregory, T. R. (1992). Ecology of Natural Resources in Nigeria.

Africa Today, 39(4): 72-77.
Editorial Comment, 2006. Way Out of the Niger Delta Crisis. Financial
Standard, February 6, 2006, P. 1.
Ejobowah, J.B. (2000). Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in
the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Africa Today, 47(1): 28-49.
Ekeng, A, (2007). Why Men Rebel in the Niger Delta. Retrieved May
10, 2007 from http://www.indepen
dentonline.com/?c=758a=2309 Fact Monster, Official homepage
of Fact Monster 2007. Terrorist Trouble Spots Around the World.
Retrieved May 10, 2007 from http://www.factmonster.com/
spot/terrorism7.html.
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Conference, Report of the Committee on the Economy, May.
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UNIT 4 HOSTAGE TAKING AND NEGOTIATION
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Hostage Taking and Negotiation
3.2 Negotiation in Hostage Taking – Specific Techniques
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The use of hostage taking as a method of securing concessions in

negotiation is a tactic nearly as old as civilization. In fact, until the early
20th century, the practice had a measure of societal and governmental
support as a quasi-legitimate means by which countries negotiated with
one another. The latter half of the 20th century has witnessed a near
universal rejection of hostage taking as an acceptable adjunct to lawful
dispute resolution. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, the popularity of
hostage taking as a terrorist or criminal tactic has far from waned.
Recent history abounds with examples of high profile incidents across
the world, wherein individuals and groups have taken hostages in an
attempt to level the bargaining field when negotiating for concessions
with more powerful adversaries. The recent spate of videotaped
executions of non-combat hostages in Iraq serves as a chilling reminder
of the power of this tactic when utilized as a technique in the context of
a terror campaign.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The current unit explores the phenomenon of negotiation within the

context of hostage taking. The development of negotiation procedure is
first traced through early models of suppression and tension reduction.
A variety of techniques peculiar to hostage taking negotiation are then
explored, in an effort to develop a thorough understanding of the issues
faced by those bargaining for the lives of hostages.
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3.0 MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Hostage Taking and Negotiation
The phenomenon of kidnappings in the Niger-Delta and other regions of

the world and murders of foreign nationals and citizens alike in Iraq
would appear to signal a resurgence of interest in the ancient technique
of hostage taking. However, despite the intense media scrutiny such
contemporary events garner, hostage taking has been used as an
effective negotiation tactic since at least the 3rd century B.C. Needham
notes that ransom was the primary motivation behind the kidnapping of
Richard the Lionhearted in 1193 A.D.; the Soviet Union’s motive in
taking a number of German citizens hostage in 1920 was to secure the
release of Karl Radek, a Soviet agent being held in German custody. As
media technology developed over the course of the 20th century,
hostage taking became even more of an internationally recognized
practice. Perhaps no better example of the global flavour of hostage
taking can be cited than that of the “Munich Massacre” orchestrated by
the Palestinian terror organization Black September. On September 5,
1972, the day before the Munich Olympic Games commenced, nine
members of the Israeli Olympic wrestling team were taken hostage by
eight Arab terrorists. The terrorists’ demands were not met, and a
disastrous rescue attempt by German police led to the deaths of all the
nine athletes, five terrorists and one police officer. The high profile
nature of the Munich incident, coupled with the fact that the event
unfolded while virtually the entire world watched on television,
provided the impetus for increased study into the phenomenon of
hostage taking. It further punctuated the powerful effect that media
coverage has on hostage taking incidents.
The Rise of Negotiation on Hostage Taking Incidents
Negotiation as a method of securing the safe release of hostages has

become increasingly more common. The development of the
phenomenon of negotiation can be well understood by examining to the
strategies utilized by the United States to cope with prison riots over the
last century. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States
supported an approach to riots that advocated for complete suppression
of anti-establishment behaviour. Rapid, overwhelming force intended to
defeat all resistance was viewed as a required and somewhat
paradoxically humanitarian way of dealing with public unrest. Quick
containment of aggression was viewed as the best way to keep violence
from negatively impacting law-abiding members of the community.
Prison riots that took place in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th
century were managed almost exclusively by use of force. Negotiation
was not seriously considered as a legitimate option during this time
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period. As the century reached its midpoint, however, law enforcement

personnel began to show more restraint in riots where people had been
taken hostage. Those incidents in which hostages were not taken
continued in general to be resolved by use of force.
Needham (1997) notes that, up until the 1960s this suppression-based

model of public confrontation characterized law enforcement’s approach
to dealing with prison riots in the United States. However, as violent
showdowns in prisons continued to develop despite the state’s use of
(sometimes overwhelming) force to suppress them, a new model
emerged that advocated for a less aggressive approach. Indeed,
confrontation management was thought to have tremendous potential to
resolve conflicts without violence. Considered a precursor to modern
day crisis intervention strategies, conflict management’s primary goal
was tension reduction rather than forceful suppression. The theory
postulated that, by engaging in dialogue with hostage takers, law
enforcement officials could buy time to develop more effective
strategies while providing at least a veneer of interest in exploring the
hostage taker’s cause. It was further thought that the passage of time
would allow for initial tensions to reduce, thus making it less likely that
a decision to harm hostages would be made in haste.
Categorization of Hostage Takers
Clearly, not all hostage takers have the same agenda. Prisoners who
have taken prison support staff hostage may wish to bargain for better
living conditions, whereas a jilted husband barricaded in a house with
his estranged spouse may be less clear what his demands are in the heat
of the moment. Terrorists, on the other hand, may view hostage taking
as a vehicle through which they can garner international attention for a
political cause. In order to determine how best to negotiate a peaceful
resolution to a hostage taking incident, therefore, it is important to
understand the motivations of the particular hostage takers. This initial
assessment allows negotiations to be tailored to meet hostage taker’s
needs, and enhances the possibility that a non-violent solution can be
reached. It is widely accepted that it is possible, and indeed useful, to
categorize hostage takers into three distinct groups, based on the
motivations underlying a hostage taking incident. While the
nomenclature used to define these groups varies, the units attempts to
divide hostage takers into the general categories of mentally ill, criminal
and terrorist.
1. Mentally Ill
Though not common in Nigeria, Mentally or emotionally disturbed

individuals account for the bulk of hostage incidents encountered in
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most advanced countries. For example the New York City Police
Department’s Hostage Negotiation Team, statistics shows that it is likely
true for most urban centres in North America. This category refers to
disturbed people that may take hostages as a method of calling attention
to themselves or their situation. These individuals may experiences
difficulty with reality testing or may suffer from a host of personality
disorders, persistent non-adaptive coping patterns that lead them toward
this extreme behaviour. Alternatively, their behaviour may be an acute
response to a stressor or series of stressors in their environment, such as
the loss of employment or interpersonal or domestic difficulties. The
mentally ill hostage taker is more likely to make demands that are
unrealistic or impossible; in these situations, negotiation is more likely
to be viewed as a preliminary tactic to allow time for other strategies to
develop, rather than a strategy to resolve the conflict.
2. Professional Criminal
The professional criminal may take hostages if surprised by law

enforcement during the commission of a crime. Hostages are viewed as
a vehicle through which a criminal is able to barter for escape. This type
of hostage taking is relatively rare, although its sensationalistic nature
may lead to increased media coverage. This type of hostage takers are
just criminals who want to minimize their losses, those who do not want
to get hurt and do not want to go to jail forever.
3. Terrorist/Revolutionary
Terrorists/Militants tend to view hostage taking as a means to further a

political agenda; the highly publicized nature of these incidents allows
the terrorist to reach a large audience, often bringing international
attention to his or her cause. This is because of the theatrical aspects of
terrorism; specific acts lend themselves to sensational reporting. The
terrorist is aware of this and tends to play to his audience. Terrorist
hostage takers differ from the other categories in several important
ways. Firstly, the groups themselves tend to be organized into highly
structured cells that carry out a carefully planned siege. Victims may be
specifically selected, based upon the magnitude of effect their abduction
will generate. The specific details of the operation itself may be
orchestrated and rehearsed well in advance. Those chosen to take part in
the siege itself are often young, educated, politically aware individuals
who are willing to give their lives for the cause; further, they are often
well trained in combat and military tactics.
Secondly, terrorist hostage takers deliberately recruit media coverage of

the hostage-taking event. Media coverage is an essential element behind
the hostage taking exercise; the terrorist relies on the media to reach a
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wide audience, in effect making the world a stage for his or her political
agenda. It is such that a sacrifice without the cooperation of the press
would be useless. The motivation behind a particular hostage-taking
incident, as discussed above, will vary based on the circumstances of the
hostage taking. Similarly, the strategy utilized to negotiate a peaceful
solution will depend largely on the specifics of the particular incident.
Despite the case-specific nature of any given hostage taking incident,
parallels can be drawn across virtually all hostage-takings.
3.2 Negotiation in Hostage Taking – Specific Techniques
Law enforcement or government personnel faced with a hostage-taking

incident have a range of options available to them in responding to the
crisis. The hostage takers can be ignored completely, or the law
enforcement personnel can choose not to communicate with the hostage
takers. An all out assault can be initiated, with the intention to end the
incident by overwhelming use of force. Alternatively, the demands of
the hostage takers can be met without negotiation. However, the
particulars of a given hostage taking incident may preclude the use of
any of these tactics. If hostage takers issue demands, and threaten to
start harming hostages if those demands are not met, a strategy of non-
communication will likely lead to disaster. Similarly, if the hostage
takers are barricaded, well-armed or willing to die for their cause, an
assault cannot be seriously considered unless the situation is sufficiently
dire that the risks in allowing it to continue are greater than those
inherent in an assault. More often, some form of negotiation will be
considered as part of an overall hostage incident management strategy.
It is important to indicate at this point that, negotiation is sometimes
adopted because no other strategy is available to end a crisis. A typical
example is the recent hostage taking activities in the Niger-Delta in
Nigeria. As other strategies develop, negotiation may become less a key
feature of crisis management, and more a method of delaying until those
strategies can be properly implemented. The following section examines
some common negotiation techniques used to resolve hostage-taking
incidents.
Tension Reduction and Hostage Taking
Stalling for Time
Modern day hostage taking management is largely informed by the

theory of tension reduction, described above. To that end, a primary
strategy in hostage taking negotiation involves stalling for time. Stalling
for time can have a variety of useful effects upon a hostage-taking
incident, from allowing the initial crisis of the hostage-taking incident to
pass, to garnering time to develop a more effective resolution strategy.
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The passage of time is critical in giving the hostage taker the

opportunity to consider his actions rationally, rather than reacting in the
crisis of the moment. Regardless of the intention of the hostage taker,
hostage situations are inherently emotionally charged events for all
involved. As time passes, a measure of tension reduction results because
it is not physiologically possible to maintain indefinitely the heightened
sense of alarm that accompanies emergency situations; it is pretty much
agreed that time is our ally. With the passage of time, the emotions de-
escalate. Stalling for time may allow for the hostage taker to feel a sense
of complacency. If an assault is not deemed to be imminent, the hostage
taker may fall into a pattern of predictable behaviour that can be used in
planning a rescue attempt. Alternately, exhaustion may set in over time,
affording hostages the opportunity to contact rescuers, or even plan an
escape.
Transference
It is widely recognized that, as time passes in a hostage taking incident,

it becomes less likely that captors will harm their hostages. The highly
charged environment that captor and hostage share appears to be
conducive of the development of a measure of interpersonal
relationship. This theory, well known within therapeutic circle, is called
transference. The Hostage Negotiation Study Guide (2003) indicates
that transference is viewed as a function of shared experiences,
dependency, proximity and tension of the situation. Transference
experiences can be divided into positive and negative transference.
Positive transference may result in the hostage taker being less inclined
to harm the hostage, despite initial intentions to do so. Positive
transference may take one of two forms. A hostage taker may develop
an attachment to his or her captors such that it becomes difficult to harm
them; this can become an important protective factor for hostages.
Alternatively, hostages may align themselves with the hostage taker’s
cause, and begin to suspect law enforcements’ motivation in ending the
siege. This latter phenomenon is generally known as the Stockholm
Syndrome, so named after a particular hostage taking incident in
Sweden.
It is not surprising that hostages develop a measure of understanding

and even support for their captor’s cause. Hostage taking incidents are
highly charged affairs, wherein the decisions of any individual could
have life and death consequences for the others. Hostages are thrust into
a powerless, submissive role wherein their survival is largely dependent
upon the choices of others. At the same time, they are cut off from
ordinary sources of support. Both hostage taker and hostages are under
threat from outside; the hostage taker faces a deadly assault by rescue
forces, while the hostages may be executed during an assault, or fall
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victim to friendly fire from rescuers. This leads the hostages to identify
with their captor. This identification has been noted, to be borne out of
fear, rather than admiration. Hostages appear to deny the threat created
by the hostage taker, focusing instead on the fact that they have not yet
been physically harmed or killed. Negative transference, or counter
transference, on the other hand, may place a hostage at increased risk of
injury or death. It may be easier to execute a hostage that either fails to
identify with his or her captor or is argumentative or difficult.
Communication
Communication is the essence of negotiation; without it, negotiation

cannot take place. In fact, containment of a hostage situation without
communication may lead to increased anxiety that might erupt in
violence. Indeed, communicating with hostage takers allows the tension
and anxiety inherent in the event to be released. The hostage taker is
forced to articulate in a rational way his or her demands, in effect
putting his or her fears and anxiety into words. Such a process results in
slowed thinking, and requires the hostage taker to utilize a modicum of
rational thought in appraising the situation. Various communication
techniques lend themselves to hostage negotiation situations.
Therapeutic listening allows the hostage taker to express his or her
concerns. The goal is to lead the hostage taker to believe that they are
being actively listened to, that the negotiator is concerned about their
well being and is committed to resolving the incident in a peaceful
manner. Tactics like the Salami technique, used by the Viennese Police,
focus more upon distraction and diversion while at the same time
developing the relationship between hostage taker and negotiator. The
extent of a particular negotiation effort will in large part be determined
by the reasonableness of the hostage taker’s demands, and will establish
whether or not negotiation will take place in good faith or will be
relegated to the role of a tactic. The use of concessions as a technique in
bargaining ensures that no demand is met without something being
given in return.
Therapeutic Listening
Hostage taker’s demands have been categorized into one of two types of
behaviour: Instrumental and Expressive behaviours. Instrumental
behaviour consists of demands and objectives that are meant to meet the
objectives of the hostage taker. These are best dealt with by direct,
objective problem solving. Expressive behaviour refers to
communication by a hostage taker that describes his or her emotional
state. Therapeutic listening is meant to address the second of these two
elements, and consists of the efforts made on behalf of a negotiator to
allow the hostage taker the opportunity to vent his or her feelings. Its
208
goal is to reduce tension by allowing a measure of verbal, and thereby

emotional, release. At the same time, by employing therapeutic listening
skills the negotiator is able to gain a measure of control over the
direction of the negotiation. The negotiator utilizing therapeutic
listening skills has a variety of tools s at his or her disposal. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to inventory the arsenal of techniques used to
bring a particular hostage taking to a peaceful conclusion. However, the
theory behind therapeutic listening requires the negotiator to develop a
rapport with the hostage taker, so that the latter does not view the former
as a threat. By breaking down the barriers characteristic of a high
intensity hostage-taking situation, the negotiator hopes to effect positive
changes in behaviour by removing him or herself as a source of threat;
reflecting back feelings in an empathic manner; paraphrasing the
hostage taker’s words; and suggesting non-violent alternatives.
The Salami Technique
An offshoot of stalling for time, the Salami technique has been used
effectively by Viennese Police to reduce the tension inherent in hostage-
taking situations. The negotiator approaches the hostage taker in a
friendly, non-confrontational manner, and purports to be working to
meet all of his or her demands. A series of setbacks and inconveniences
present, but both hostage taker and negotiator work together to
overcome them. Because the negotiator appears willing to submit to the
orders of the hostage taker, and appears helpful, a measure of
transference takes place. Over time, the hostage taker loses the
motivation necessary to make good on his or her threats toward the
hostages. Boredom and frustration eventually take hold, and as the
impetus for violence is lost, the hostage taker is more willing to
surrender to law enforcement, who have appeared willing to do their
best to submit to the hostage taker’s demands. According to Clyne
(1973), no hostages have ever been injured by hostage takers when the
Salami technique has been allowed to continue for any length of time.
Communication as a Bargaining Tactic
In any negotiation, it is important that the parties involved consider the

costs and benefits of engaging in negotiation as a form of dispute
resolution. As Pirie (2000) notes, one must consider whether or not
one’s goals can be met better, faster or easier by using a different
method to resolve a particular dispute: “put simply, will negotiation
produce something better than, or good as, the results you can obtain
without negotiating. Within the context of a hostage taking incident,
communication with hostage takers may be viewed either as a way of
achieving a peaceful end to a standoff or as a method of delaying while
other more feasible strategies are developed. That decision is a function
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of context, and cannot be separated from the specifics of the crisis

situation itself. Whether or not negotiation is considered a legitimate
source of dispute resolution depends on several variables. Yale
University sociologist Albert Reiss (1976), suggest six factors that
determine whether negotiation will be utilized to resolve a hostage-
taking incident. Firstly, the value a society places on human life will
determine the extent to which negotiation is considered. Clearly, if one
views the safety of hostages as a paramount concern, one is more likely
to be willing to negotiate a resolution that allows for the safe return of
hostages. Western liberal democracies tend to view human life as
sacrosanct, something to be protected at all costs. The Western world’s
preference for solving problems via rational discourse rather than
resorting to raw emotion or revenge makes it an ideal environment in
which to develop hostage negotiation strategies. Conversely, societies in
which human life is not as highly valued are more likely to depend on
tactics other than negotiation, such as doing nothing or mounting a full
scale assault on hostage takers. If negotiation is viewed by a particular
society as capitulation to the demands of violent individuals, it is less
likely that members of that society will support a negotiated settlement
to a confrontation.
Secondly, media plays an important role in the decision to negotiate a

hostage taking crisis. Leaders are likely to be judged harshly if they
appear incompetent in resolving a particular hostage-taking incident.
Negotiation signals a willingness to respect the value of human life; by
attempting to resolve a dispute peacefully, the general public is assured
that it can trust its leaders not to resort to violent confrontation as a
method of dispute resolution unless all other avenues are exhausted. The
extent to which a government possesses a specialized negotiation team
is a third important factor in determining whether or not it will negotiate
a standoff. Systems that retain personnel specifically trained to resolve
disputes without the use of force will be expected to use them as part of
any negotiation. Many major urban centres in North America have
negotiation task forces that consist of various parts, including command,
support, tactical and negotiation units. A government’s resources in this
regard will largely inform its decision to engage in negotiation.
Fourthly, the tactical situation will influence the extent to which
negotiation is used. If assault is not feasible due to the logistics of a
particular incident, negotiation strategies are likely to be utilized, at least
initially. A fifth factor affecting hostage negotiations involves the power
imbalance between hostage taker and law enforcement. Despite the fact
that hostages are people, and thus are inherently valuable, some are
deemed to have more value than others. For example, a foreign
government is likely to engage in good faith negotiations when
government personnel are being held hostage. Conversely, it would
make little sense for a hostage taker to expect government officials to
210
attach the same value to a death row inmate, or fellow hostage taker.
Finally, Reiss punctuates the fact that the extent to which a government
will negotiate in good faith depends largely on the reasonableness of the
hostage takers’ demands. As a general rule, if the demands are deemed
to be realistic, negotiation will be considered in earnest. However,
where hostage-takers’ requirements are beyond the scope of
reasonableness, negotiation is likely to be relegated to tactical status, a
technique used to distract or stall for time until other options can be
developed.
Management of the Hostage Taker’s Environment
The extent to which a hostage taking setting is controlled by negotiators

will have a significant effect on the negotiation. Containment of the
hostage taker’s environment accomplishes several goals. Firstly, it
provides an essential component of security. Control of the perimeter of
the hostage taking area ensures that negotiators are able to manage who
has contact with the hostage takers. Secondly, in the case of terrorist
hostage taking incidents, management of the physical area allows law
enforcement officials to have some control over the broadcast of a
terrorist’s message. The extent to which a terrorist is allowed access to
media will often influence the course of negotiations; a positive outcome
will be difficult to obtain if negotiators are made to compete for
terrorist’s attention with outside influences such as media.
Control of Utilities
Wind (1995) offers some suggestions on how best to contain and control
the hostage-taking environment. He notes that one of the first tasks of
negotiators is to deny access to outside telephone lines. This cuts off a
key communication avenue, especially for terrorists, thus ensuring
control over the extent to which a terrorist’s political message or
demands are broadcast to the media. Further, it denies access to
sympathetic parties on the outside who may be charged with gathering
intelligence and communicating it to the hostage takers inside the
perimeter. Similarly, Wind suggests that utilities should be controlled
from the outside. Cutting off heat, running water and electricity may
have several beneficial effects. It necessarily limits hostage taker’s
access to television coverage of the incident, thereby preventing them
from monitoring the effectiveness of their action or gauging popular
support for their cause. The removal of such comforts as heat, hot water
and toilet facilities has the effect of creating a less comfortable
environment within which the hostage takers must operate. Once the
hostage taker’s environment has been impoverished by removal of basic
utilities, these comforts can be restored in response to concessions made
by the hostage taker. The resumption of heating, for instance, can be
211
bargained for in exchange for the release of a number of hostages, or a

reduction in the demands made by hostage takers. Indeed, as a norm, no
concession should be made in the context of a hostage taking incident
without the receipt of something in return.
Separation of Decision Maker from Negotiator
Generally, it is disadvantageous to have the hostage-taking incident

negotiated by the person who is ultimately responsible for deciding
whether the hostage takers’ demands will be met. The potential
ramifications of this dangerous move involves: firstly, if negotiations
take place face to face, the decision maker runs the significant risk that
he or she will be taken hostage, as the decision maker often represents a
more powerful bargaining chip than the hostages themselves. More
importantly, the separation of negotiator from decision maker allows for
greater flexibility in the negotiation process. The negotiator is more able
to deny the hostage takers’ demands without appearing inflexible, as it is
not he or she who is saying no, but rather the decision maker.
Conversely, the negotiator is able to consider demands that the decision
maker would reject outright. His or her role in such an instance is to
deliver demands to the decision maker, and vice versa, not to decide the
appropriateness of those demands.
Non-Negotiable Issues
Regardless of the threat that hostages face from their captors, it is

widely recognized that some issues are beyond negotiation. Guns or
other weapons are not considered negotiable items, as it is clearly
counter-productive to supply hostage takers with the means to amplify
their potential for violence and destruction. Negotiators will typically
not allow non-prescription drugs to be demanded; the introduction of
mind or mood altering substances adds an intolerable degree of
unpredictability to the negotiation.
Negotiators will rarely allow hostages to be exchanged. Two reasons

have been suggested why this is the case. Firstly, by supplying
replacement hostages, the positive effect of transference process is
interrupted. Hostage takers will not have the same regard for new
hostages as they would for those with whom they have spent a period of
time, thus making it easier for them to harm the new hostages. Secondly,
negotiators run the risk that, during a hostage exchange, hostage takers
will receive individuals in return who have more value as hostages. This
may lead hostage takers to try to “trade up” their hostages for more
influential personnel, thereby derailing negotiation efforts altogether.
The willingness of governments or individuals to pay ransom in
exchange for hostages remains an issue of some debate. Many nations
212
(including the United States and Israel) refuse to consider payment of a

ransom, as it is thought that doing so only serves to reward the hostage
takers, thereby increasing the frequency of attacks.
Conversely, private companies may be more willing to pay for the

release of executives held as hostages. Convinced that payment of
ransom destroys the deterrent effect of their no ransom policies, some
governments have gone as far as to try to enact legislation that prohibits
the payment of ransom by family members of hostages. In sum, the
negotiator facing a hostage-taking incident has a variety of tools upon
which to draw in order to secure the safe release of hostages. Within this
context, communication of any kind can be viewed as a form of
negotiation; the latter cannot take place without the former. Whether
negotiation is used as a legitimate attempt to find a peaceful solution to
the incident or whether it is relegated to the role of a bargaining, stalling
or distraction tactic is largely dependent upon the context of a particular
hostage taking event.
What are the six factors that determine whether negotiations will be
utilised to resolve a hostage taking incidents?
4.0 CONCLUSION
Negotiation as a method of modern dispute resolution represents an

outgrowth of the theory of tension reduction, which informs negotiation
within the context of hostage taking. The tension reduction model,
largely a response to the ineffectiveness of the suppression theory in
reducing violent outbursts in the prison population, led to the
development of a variety of procedures unique to hostage taking
incidents. Many of these hostage specific techniques were reviewed in
the current paper, with the intention of providing a backdrop for
discussion of a particular hostage taking incident.
5.0 SUMMARY
The use of hostage taking as a method of securing concessions in

negotiation is a tactic nearly as old as civilization itself. In fact, up until
as late as the early 20th century, the practice had a measure of societal
and governmental support as a quasi-legitimate means by which
countries negotiated with one another. The latter half of the 20th century
has witnessed a near universal rejection of hostage taking as an
acceptable adjunct to lawful dispute resolution. This unit looked at The
Rise of Negotiation on Hostage Taking Incidents, Categorization of
213
Hostage Takers and some common negotiation techniques used to

resolve hostage-taking incidents.
List and discuss the broad categories of hostage takers and explain one
in the context of hostage taking in Nigeria.
Highlight and discuss some strategies employed by hostage takers in

their operation.
Bahn, C. and Louden, R. J. (1999). “Hostage Negotiation as a Team

Enterprise” 23 Group 77.
Cambria, J.; DeFilippo, L.; Robert J. and McGowan, H.

(2002).“Negotiation under Extreme Pressure’’: The “Mouth
Marines” and the Hostage Takers” 18 Negotiation Journal.
Campbell, J. P. (1992). .Hostage: Terror and Triumph. Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press.
Clyne, P. (1973). An Anatomy of Skyjacking. London: Abelard-

Schuman Limited.
Crelinsten, R. B. and Szabo, D. (1979). Hostage-Taking. Toronto:

Lexington Books.
Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement

Without Giving In, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Garrison, S. (2002). “A Man Between Two Countries: President

Fujimori and the Japanese Ambassador’s Residence Hostage
Crisis” (Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, March.
Hassel, C. V. (1975). “The Hostage Situation: Exploring the Motivation

and the Cause” (September, The Police Chief at 55, supra note 1
at 10.“Hostage Negotiation Study Guide”, online: Learning for
Life <http://www.learning-forlife. org>. “In the Spotlight: Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement”, online: Centre for
DefenseInformation <http://www.cdi.org>.
Macko, S.; “Japan’s Lack of Crisis Management Expertise”, online:

Emergency
214
Response Research Institute

<http://www.emergency.com/peruhos7.htm>.
Macko, S. “Peru Hostage Crisis comes to a Violent End”, online:

Emergency
Response and Research Institute
<http://www.emergency.com/peruhos7.htm>.
“Munich massacre”, online: Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_massacre>.
215
UNIT 5 YOUTHS POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
A high population growth, coupled with a worrisome rural-urban

migration rate, has combined to give Nigeria the fastest growing cities in
Africa. Nigerian’s urbanization rate, about 5.3 % a year is one of the
fastest in the world (National Planning Commission 2004). Also an
urban bias in the provision of infrastructure, led to the rapid growth in
the urban areas. Work opportunities and wage differentials provided the
incentive for rural exodus of unskilled labour that swelled the ranks of
the urban poor. Poverty reduction is the most difficult challenge facing
Nigeria and its people and the greatest obstacle to the pursuit of
sustainable socio-economic growth. Although Nigeria is well endowed
with natural resources, the institutional structures are poor, thus creating
new types of poverty and deviant survival strategies that are more
evident in the urban areas. For example, there are young unemployed,
secondary school and university graduates, large numbers of under-
employed, unskilled informal workers and people suffering from
different sorts of deprivation leading to substance and alcohol use\age
which further create unrest in cities..
2.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit seek to examine the youth’s poverty situations and some of
their contributive factors, as well as develops a conceptual model,
succinctly discusses the survival strategies identified.
3.0 MAIN CONTENT
Youth in different Nations of the world have their common problems

ranging from high poverty level, lack of opportunity, unemployment,
family problems, drug and substance abuse, lack of education and early
marriage and child bearing. Rural poverty has been perceived by the
International Fund for Agricultural Development as a dominant feature
of life in all regions of the world. The percentage of the rural population
216
(including the youths) whose income and consumption fall below the
nationally defined poverty line is estimated to be 60 percent in sub-
Saharan Africa. Majority (70 %) of the youths in this region (sub-
Saharan Africa) are estimated to live in rural areas. This worsening
standard of living has inspired studies into poverty situation in Nigeria,
which have revealed that it exists at both micro and macro levels.
Perhaps, the problems faced by these youths are more severe partly due
to high level of unemployment or underemployment and poverty
situations engulfing their communities. Since gainful employment is
fundamental to economic progress, it may be necessary to study the
survival strategies employed by the youths to overcome their poverty
and unemployment situations.
Poverty and the Metamorphosis of Street Children in Nigeria
The existence of street children in the large metropolitan areas of Africa

and other developing countries is not particularly new. The international
media began to document the condition of large numbers of street
children as early as the 1970s. Despite the significant media attention
over the past three decades, however, much remains unknown about
their daily lives and activities. Also approximating the actual size of the
population of street children has proven difficult. Estimates of their
numbers in Nigeria is unreliable, though that of Brazil is estimated to be
from 7 to 17 million, but more informed assessments suggest that
between 7 and 8 million children, ages 5 to 18, live and/or work on the
streets of urban Brazil. While the vast majority of street children are
boys, Brazilian government estimates put the number of street girls at
approximately 800,000, with almost two-thirds of them working as
prostitutes in various parts of the country. Part of the problem in
estimating the number of street children lies in the distinction between
what are known as "children on the street" and "children of the street".
Children on the street work in informal sector occupations in order to
supplement the family income, but return home at night to sleep. These
children typically reside in households headed by impoverished, single
women and spend most of the day and night in the street selling candy
or gum, guarding cars, shining shoes, or carrying groceries and wares of
traders and travellers around shopping malls, motor parks and bus stops
and other transports and business corridors.
By contrast, children of the street have oftentimes completely severed

ties with their families, and that they seemingly choose to leave homes
where hunger, neglect, and exploitation are commonplace, making life
on the street preferable. A very small number of children actually live
full-time in the streets, often engaging in illegal activities in order to
survive. Creating what is called the ‘absence of childhood’ a situation
where children at an early age, were expected to be economically active-
217
to earn their keep and contribute, if they could to a family income; the
problem here of course was the absence of schooling – low rates of
literacy were common among the poor as most children in the street of
Lagos involved in entrepreneurship were observed. It is pertinent to
state here that since education is one of the main (long-term) routes out
of poverty, inadequate/lack of it will effectively (and unknowingly)
perpetuate their poverty. Children of the street are more typically
associated with theft, drug sales, petty theft, prostitution, as in the case
of young girls, and gang activity. Younger children often begin their
careers on the street by begging, and if not checked as they age some of
these children rely increasingly on crime to support themselves and
become less successful at panhandling and scavenging. For young street
girls, apart from hawking and petty trading, prostitution is commonly
use as a way of supporting themselves.
As the number of street children and their related criminal activity

continue to grow, so does public opposition to their presence. Over the
past decade, public opinion has shifted dramatically. Youngsters who
were once looked upon as deserving compassion and sympathy are now
viewed at best as a nuisance and at worst as a danger to public safety --
future criminals who ought to be locked up. Although popular views
characterize these children as delinquents and thieves, nevertheless few
scholars among others have championed the course to view child labour
and street children from a rational viewpoint as they most accurately
described street youths as simply "Poor children in the wrong place".
This sentiment enabled the Brazilian National Congress to pass the
Child and Adolescent Act. The act was designed to reform the legal
status of children in Brazil and to create councils that would act as
children's rights advocates, with an eye toward integrating impoverished
children into the larger society. However, negative attitudes toward
street children by the Brazilian people still prevail.
Till date street children is constituting the leprous arms of the same
alarming social problem that most times lead to the production of adult
social delinquents in the form of the “alright sir boys” or “area boys” or
touts, from which some eventually mature and start working with
National Union of Road Transport Union while others take to armed
robbery, prostitution and so on. According to Fakoya (2009),
They represent the face of hunger, insecurity and social neglect. Like in
Mumbai-India they roam the street and abound in thousands in most
cities of many Third world countries. And here in Nigeria, roaming in
their thousands and portraying the decadent social order are the street
children of Nigeria.
218
The phenomenon of Street children is increasingly recognized by

sociologists and anthropologists to be a socially constructed category
that in reality does not form a clearly defined, homogeneous population
or phenomenon. ‘Street children’ covers children in such a wide variety
of circumstances and characteristics that policy-makers and service
providers find it difficult to describe and target them. Upon peeling
away the ‘street children’ label, individual girls and boys of all ages are
found living and working in public spaces, visible in the great majority
of the world’s urban centres (www.streetchildren.org.uk). The definition
of ‘street children’ is contested though, but many practitioners and
policymakers use UNICEF’s concept of boys and girls aged under 18
for whom ‘the street’ (including, motor parks, unoccupied dwellings and
wasteland) has become home and/or their source of livelihood, and who
are inadequately protected or supervised.
It has been estimated that there are about 300 million children less than
15 years of age in Africa, representing almost half of Africa’s
population. There are no known statistics for street children in Nigeria,
but it is known that children of under 18 years of age made up nearly
48% of the estimated country’s population of 120 million in 1996
(World Bank). This estimate remains undiminished with the passage of
years and associated increase in Nigeria’s population. Massive
corruption coupled with legendary mismanagement of natural resources
has made the provision of social amenities impossible in Nigeria. Not
exempted is the faithful provision of compulsory education to Nigerian
children. The United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported in
May 2005 that over 7.3 million Nigerian children of school age were not
in schools. This ugly trend has its own social consequences, one of
which is the spiralling proportion of street urchins in the major towns
and cities of Nigeria.
The phenomenon has transcended the urban exception, being both an

urban and rural phenomenon in present day Nigeria. While it might be
difficult to assume a reflective figure for the dimension of this problem,
suffice it to say that the phenomenon was rare in the mid eighties. There
were an “estimated” 8000 of them by the early 1990s. By 1999, children
were reported in over a hundred street locations in Lagos alone. The
problem, rather than abating, is worsened by the persisting social
climate of poverty subsisting in ignorance and political mismanagement.
The aetiology of this phenomenon appears multifactorial. Socio-political
view shows that Nigerian children were caught up in the struggle for
survival occasioned by the dearth of technological and infrastructural
development in Nigeria leading to mass urban migration with resultant
emergence of the urban poor. This situation is partly enhanced by the
disintegration of the extended family system which hitherto had
promoted the concept of brotherhood and shared responsibility. The
219
resultant chaos has led to the balkanisation of the sacred ethos of the
value of children to the average Nigerian.
Other causative factors include marital problems or instability in the

home, poverty, hunger, insecurity, abuse and violence from parents,
displacement caused by clashes in the community, insufficient parental
care, death of one or both parents, inadequate family income,
unemployment of one or both parents, lack of (or limited) opportunities
in education, abandonment by parents, housing difficulties, drug use by
children, and peer influence (UNICEF, 2006). UNICEF accepted that
physical abuse accounted for greater that 27% of children forced into the
street, 24% by family financial problems, 8% by family
misunderstandings and 5% by emotional trauma. Children living and/or
working on the streets experience harsh and hazardous conditions. They
are unprotected from extremes of weather conditions and also prone to
various forms of abuses such as sexual abuse, vagrancy and kidnapping.
Life on the streets is far from pleasant, necessitating ability to cope with
and an unwritten pact with dangers and vicissitudes of life. Children
work as vendors or hawkers, beggars, shoe shiners, car washers and
watchers, head-loaders (alabaru), scavengers bus conductors and as
Motor Park touts. Oftentimes, majority are boys but an increasing army
of girls is becoming a recent development. It is not uncommon to see
street children and destitute families living under bridges, in public
buildings, uncompleted buildings, markets and major streets and alleys.
RURAL YOUTH: CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES, NATURE

AND STATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
The concept of youth is defined from various perspectives. This varies

from one country to another depending on political, economic and
socio-cultural circumstances. However, three conceptual perspectives
have been highlighted in different publications upon which the
definition of youth can be based. FAO (1999) summarized the three
perspectives of its meaning as a particular age group, that is, the period
during which people graduate from school to work, from child to parent,
from dependant to head of household; and as attitude, that is hopeful and
apprehensive, tentative and reckless, irreverent and idealistic. For
statistical purpose, however, the United Nations defined the youth as
young men and women between the ages of 15 and 24 years. This
definition, according to age category, may not, however, satisfy the
universal interest due to the variations in laws, customs and constitution.
The country’s youths can be defined as young men and women between
the ages of 13 and 30. This was based on the expected age of entry into
primary education or vocational apprenticeship training which is usually
13 years, (the entry age into the youth world), while 30 years is the
terminal age for participating in National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)
220
- a youth programme for Nigerian graduates from either Universities or

Polytechnics. The youth forms a very significant proportion of the rural
population in Nigeria. Rural youths are generally characterized to
possess innovation proneness, minimal risks conversion, faster reaction
time, less fear of failure, less conservation, greater physical strength,
greater knowledge acquisition propensity, social propensity, faster rate
of learning, and love for adventure and preference for boldness. These
typify the nature of youth in rural areas, which may be resourcefully
applied to sustainable rural development efforts in Nigeria. No wonder,
Torimiro (1999) in his challenging farewell poem to the African
participants at the International Roundtable Conference on Youth,
Agriculture and Development in Africa synthesized the general situation
of African Youth in the second stanza thus:
“Hail, African Youth!

For how long would she be developing?
Amidst the circumstances against her being.
No job! No food! No shelter! No clothing!
Sparingly grip by fear of future.
Arise, the elders of her continent!
Your songs shall be to hail the youth,
To guide and lead for her to see,
That your work today shall ever live.”
Food and Agricultural Organisation (1999) reports that 17 percent of the

youths around the world listed unemployment as one of their main
concerns. Unemployment, in this case, is usually defined in
development economics as the stock of those entire employable
individual who are not in employment and who are either in the process
of moving to a new job or who are unable to find work at the prevailing
real rate. Nigeria’s Federal Office of Statistics (1999) estimated the
higher rate of rise in unemployment in the rural sector from 2.8 percent
in 1997 to 3.0 per cent in 1998. It characterized the poverty features in
the order of magnitude among Nigerians, and wrote that unemployment
and underemployment were rated number four by 90 percent of the
population. However, it is generally observed in the rural areas that
majority of the youths are not willing to work on the farm, because of
the inadequate rural infra-structure and social amenities but rather prefer
to work as clerk and officer in the urban and non-agricultural sectors.
This presents a worrisome situation, most especially in an agrarian
economy such as Nigeria’s. Large percentage of these youths does not
have the required skill to enable them fulfil this aspiration. In situations
where skills are available, the vacancies are not always there.
221
Rising Numbers of Disengaged Youth; Primate Cities and Squatter

Settlement
The 2007 USAID Statistic highlight that youth between the ages of 15-
24 years make up nearly 30 percent of the population in developing
countries, and for the foreseeable future, are the largest and potentially
most significant human resource cohort in the developing world
(USAID, 2007). The World Bank estimates that by 2010 the worldwide
number of youth in this age bracket will reach 1.8 billion and 1.5 billion
of them will live in developing nations. Despite the growing numbers,
many countries (of which Nigeria was listed) continually fail to
recognise or invest in the assets, resources, and potential embodied in
their young citizens. Evidences are bound that the vast majority of
young people lack basic education, marketable skills, decent
employment, and are not positively engaged in civil society. Out of
school and un- or underemployed youth are at higher risk of becoming,
touts, prostitutes, victims or perpetrators of violence and crime. This is a
typical situation of touts in the transportation sector in Nigeria, as
mostly evident in Lagos where series of crime and violent activities
have been attributed to the increasing number of areaboys and touts.
Such negative outcomes not only impose costs on young people and
their families, but also on the economy and society at large. Important to
understanding the presence of large numbers of street youths in the
world in general, and in Nigeria in particular, is a comprehension of the
nature of primate cities and what life is like in the thousands of primate
city shantytowns. Most developing countries contain one or more
"primate cities," urban areas that grow in population and influence far
beyond the other cities in the region or nation. In many Latin American
countries, and in other developing nations as well, the largest cities may
have several times the combined populations of the next two or three
urban areas and may also have a significant share of the national
population. Mexico City's population of 16 million, for example,
accounts for 20% of the nation's population, while other cities are
considerably smaller: Guadalajara (1.6 million), Monterrey (1.1
million), and Puebla de Zaragoza (1.1
million). Similarly, the populations of Brazil's two largest
cities -- São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
-- combine to account for some 16% of the national population.
Primate cities like Lagos Port Harcourt, Warri, and Sapele (Nigeria) Rio
de Janeiro, Sao Paulo typically are located on the coast or in other areas
close to transportation routes, since many were political and economic
centres when under colonial rule. The orientation of such cities had been
toward supplying the developed nations with raw materials and other
goods, rather than toward the urban areas and hinterlands of their own
country. Among the greatest difficulties experienced by these cities in
Africa and Latin America are those of stimulating industrialization and
222
providing employment. It has been argued that people who move into
these urban locales do so, not because of the employment opportunities
the cities provide, but because the living conditions in rural areas seem
so much worse. Previous research has suggested that rural populations
have been "forced" to relocate because of increasing agricultural density
and the inability of the land to support its people. Rural-urban migrants
believe that the cities offer a better life and at least the hope for
employment. Some do find work in small enterprises, but the lack of
sophisticated technology and industrial production methods does not
provide for the large pool of unskilled labour that characterized the
Western industrial revolution. As a result, the unemployment rates in the
cities of many developing nations exceed 25% of the labour force.
Common features of the primate city landscape are the sections which
comprised of shanties, shacks, and makeshift huts under the bridges in
the cities of Lagos inhabited by those who have no other shelter. In
South America squatter settlements known as barriadas in Peru,
ranchos in Venezuela, villas miserias in Argentina, or favelas in Brazil,
have been estimated to house as much as one-third of the urban
population. Mexico City alone has some 4 million squatters, Calcutta
has 2 million, and Rio de Janeiro has over 1 million. Once again
statistics on squatter settlements in Nigeria and Africa are either not
available or unreliable.
POVERTY SITUATION AND SOME CONTRIBUTIVE

FACTORS
Poverty as an expression of life situation, a state of mind and perception

of self in the complex web of social relation, is a very sensitive and
controversial concept that has defied a universally acceptable and
objective definition or assessment. The World Bank (1996) in its report
characterized poverty as overwhelmingly rural and having regional
outlook. The total number of people in poverty as at 1992 was
specifically put at 34.7 million with about two-third from rural Nigeria.
Decline in the world oil prices was identified as a major factor,
consequent upon which, the per capita income which stood at $1000 in
1980 fell to as low as $340 in 1992. This has further fallen to $260 as at
1995. Perhaps, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) in July, 1986 and subsequent deregulation of the economy led to
an untold hardship for the citizenry. For instance, the deregulation of the
naira led to an eroded purchasing power of the people. This was further
aggravated by the spiraling inflation, which stood at 73 percent in 1995.
Another contributive factor to poverty situation in rural Nigeria is the

inequality in distribution of income and other productive resources. For
instance, a lot of inequalities exist in the distribution of agricultural land,
which has remained skewed because of the traditional land tenure
223
system and lack of true commitment to agricultural development which

has made farming uninteresting and unattractive to the youths, who
constitute the bulk of the rural population. Chambers (1983) who had
earlier caught the glimpse of the rural poor wrote that: Poverty
contributes to physical weakness (through lack of food, small bodies,
malnutrition leading to low immune response to infections, and inability
to reach or pay for health services); to isolation (as a result of the
inability to pay large expenses or to meet contingencies); and to
powerlessness (because lack of wealth goes with low status, for the poor
have no choice). Arguably none of the poverty alleviation programmes
put in place by the Federal Government has worked. Even the “living”
wages of N7, 5001 per month popularly awarded to workers, are not
only small and unrealistic but are not regularly paid. It will also be
significant to note that majority of those who are categorised as
employed in the private sector earn below this figure. All these factors
have their attendant effects on the entire populace of both the youth and
adults alike.
Youth Unemployment: Participation of the Unskilled and Homeless

in Street Economy
The Lagos-Nigerian case and probably other cities in sub saharan Africa
suggest that even persecuting urban youth cannot extinguish their
resolve to remain in cities. Enticing urban youth back to rural areas
through increased investment in the countryside may yield very minimal
success. There are some instances of reverse migration (from urban to
rural areas in Africa) but this has been in trickles. Most of Africa’s
urban youth are thus very likely to remain in cities regardless of the
degree of investment in the countryside or the difficulties they face in
cities. The consequences of this are in threefold of having so many
young permanent residents of African cities who feel excluded and
alienated from others. First, the combination of their dominant presence
and marginalized social status invites the question of just who represents
youthful urbanites, both politically and within civil society. What does
civil society mean, for example, if the majority of its members feel they
do not belong to it? Second, urban development will be hamstrung if
most urban youth are not central contributors to it. Third, the presence of
a vast youth population that remains largely disengaged from civil
society and economic development activities will almost inevitably have
a negative impact on personal and community security in urban Africa.
Though adequate and reliable unemployment figures for African

countries are not available, nevertheless information on the majority of
youths in Africa and other developing economies shows that they
engage in informal sector activities such as shop assistants, farm hands,
clerical assistants, typists, stewards and cooks in hotels and restaurants,
224
in street trading, casual labour and odd activities, such as touting,

prostitution. Informal income earning activities among African countries
takes place outside official channels as the name connotes, and has long
been equated merely with smuggling of goods, or with other dubious
and illegal activities. However, researchers and institutions have started
to associate informal activities with large informal sector existing in
African countries. Other criminal activities have also been identified
such as stealing, armed robbery, dealing in prohibited substances such as
drugs. Anecdotal accounts of drug abuse among street youths are
commonplace. Numerous media stories have reported the widespread
use of inhalants (such as glue, gasoline, lighter fluid, bim -- a mixture of
ethyl alcohol, sugar and benzene), others include marijuana and cocaine,
and valium among street children. Only a small proportion of youth are
engaged in the formal sector. Many of them, male and female, are to be
found along the streets of major cities, selling apples, oranges, telephone
cards, telephone handsets, calculators and other assorted goods, and a
growing number of them take to touting after a while. This is common
among the male youths/street children between the ages of 14-25 years
in urban centres.
Studies have shown that unskilled migrants as well as urban homeless

draw on a mix of income strategies from different economic spheres in
order to cover their subsistence. It was observed that their respective
activities are time-consuming and constitute the basic structure for the
homeless' daily routines and are thus a central aspect of street culture.
Another important aspect of their survival strategies is constituted by
specific modes of economizing and consumption, which are based on
collectivity and reciprocity. These routines help to bridge periods of
money shortage and facilitate survival in a marginal and insecure
economic position more generally. Skill acquisition has also been noted
as one of the characteristic features of street economy. Studies carried
out in selected countries in Europe concluded that skills acquired by
being part of the street economy do not seem to provide any relevant
qualifications for the formal labour market and thus cannot be regarded
as a potential means of overcoming their marginal position. Common
findings show that there are general consensus that income-generating
activities contribute to the individuals' well being in important ways:
1. Firstly, they provide the basis for crucial social networks with
other homeless persons.
2. Secondly, these jobs often give a meaning to the lives of people
who would otherwise feel completely worthless and even more
excluded and thus generate the potential for collective and
individual identification and the construction of self-esteem.
225
3. Thirdly, income-generating activities do provide important links

to mainstream society through social contacts with the staff of aid
organizations, commuters, customers and passersby.
4. Among unskilled, unskilled migrants, youths and adults work is
an important concern in the state of homelessness.
5. For many homeless and/or extremely poor persons, their informal
incomes are essential for survival and must not be made illegal or
hampered but should be facilitated and enhanced.
STREET YOUTHS AND SUBSTANCE USE
Street youths are widely perceived ‘problem population’ at risk for drug
and alcohol use. Many of these youths are drawn from homes
characterised by family conflict, sexual and physical abuse, and parental
drug and/or alcohol problems. The majority of this population is under-
or unemployed, often lacks a permanent residence, and spends a
significant amount of time without shelter and are easily prone to
violence. Their lives are characterised by poverty, hunger and other
conditions of extreme deprivation as they hang out on the street on a
regular and permanent basis. It has also been argued that street youths
participation in deviant activities is most likely the result of the
homeless experience itself and not the direct effect of predisposing
background variables. Street youths also spend a considerable amount of
time on the street, immersed in an environment that may leave them
more at risk from drug and alcohol abuse. Peers have been identified as
one of the most important risk factors in the use of legal and illegal
drugs by youths. Studies indicate that peers provide an important
learning environment in the initiation of drug use and provide
opportunities and reinforcement for drug –using friends after becoming
involved in drugs, selectively embedding themselves in social networks
that reinforce choices, attitudes and behaviours. On the street, homeless
youths may be more likely to encounter peers who can initiate them into
drug and alcohol, or they may find networks that reinforce their use.
Past works on serious drug users suggest that adult drug use is a
characteristic of a preferred street lifestyle and subculture. Evidences are
abound of how drug and alcohol users on the street with an easy to
obtain status-conferring identity. Drug use on the street often is enjoyed
in the company of others, and participants in this lifestyle limit their
contacts to other drug users and accept drug use as a part of their role or
character. The proper pursuit of this lifestyle requires continuous
infusions of money, leading to an emphasis on financial resourcefulness.
High frequency drug users on the street are heavily involved in property
crime, violent crime, and drug trafficking, and the most persistent
offenders spend much of their criminal gains on alcohol and other drugs.
The drug and crime relationship is interactive; crime finances use; use
226
encourages more use; more use encourages more crime. However, levels
of criminal success become key to this relationship because they can
influence levels of drug use.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND SUBSTANCE USE
The street lifestyle also is characterised by irregular employment. Drug

users have higher than average rates of changing jobs, getting fired and
being unemployed. Unemployment affects individual beliefs in the
legitimacy of conformity to conventional rules and norms and negates
the relevance of work, leaving individuals free to deviate. In contracts,
legitimate employment means less need, less interest in, and less time
for drug and alcohol use. Unemployment can decrease commitment to a
conventional lifestyle while increasing a commitment to the streets and
the drugs and crime lifestyle. However there is no simple link between
employment status and substance use. The interpretation of labour
market situation plays a large role in shaping their response to it.
People’s response may be contingent on what they believe caused their
unemployment, the duration of their unemployment, the extent of their
employment experience, and how intensely they feel their failure. In this
vein the attributions for failure can influence use. There are some
indications that people who blame themselves for failure are at increased
risk for alcohol and drug use. Also drug and alcohol use is more likely
when people experiencing employment difficulties believe the system is
at fault and dismiss dominant norms. Literatures suggest that the most
common response to unemployment is an internalisation and
withdrawal. Furthermore there is evidence that the negative effects
associated with failure, including depression, can lead to increase
substance use. Drug using groups may reflect the end product of a
process in which individuals in the group share the circumstances
leading to failure and adopt drug use as a collective solution to their
common failure. This drug subculture provides an environment in which
dominant norms are rejected and drug-using behaviour is supported.
227
Poverty as an expression of life situation, calls for emergency. Discuss.
4.0 CONCLUSION
In sum, homeless youths tend to come to the streets with backgrounds

that promote drug and alcohol use. However, once on the street, their
risk for drug and alcohol use is exacerbated by their street experiences,
including cultural supports for substance use, drug-using peers, and
involvement in a criminal lifestyle that finances heavy drug and alcohol
use. Further. They are embedded in employment situations that can
either leave them alienated from conventional society or frustrated with
their failure, both of which serve to increase the risk of drug and alcohol
use. The unit seeks also the reduction of poverty through the
restructuring of the institutional and management set up, so that it can be
more responsive to the needs of the poor. Improving the situation of the
poor requires recognition that the poor should be the key actors in any
poverty reduction programme; in the long run substance use and
frustration will be curtailed if nor reduced among other problems facing
youths in both rural and urban areas.
228
5.0 SUMMARY
In this unit, we focused on street youths and unemployment; conceptual

perspectives, nature and state of unemployment and substance use,
participation of the unskilled and homeless in street economy; poverty
situation and some contributive factors such as the role that various
background, labour market, and street lifestyle factors play in street
youth’s drug and alcohol use. It shows a link between poverty, exposure
to parental substance abuse and increase in street youth’s alcohol and
hard-drug use as well as various ways in which long term homelessness
influences hard drug use, also role drug- and alcohol-using peer
influence the use of alcohol, marijuana and other related drugs. Lastly
the unit, through diagrammatic framework pinpoints some deviant
survival strategies unemployed youths engaged in to foster survival.
To what extent can unemployment lead to deviant behaviours?
Barker, G. (1992). More than a Minor Problem. Institute of the Americas

Hemisfile, Vol. 3, January: 6.
Burns, E. (1980). A History of Brazil. New York:Columbia University

Press. Campos, E. A. 1995, Social Networks and Daily Activities
of Street Youth in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. Child Development.
Vol. 65: 319-330.
Campos, R., Raffaelli, M., Ude, W., Greco, M., Ruff, A., Rolf, J.,
Antunes, C., Halsey, N., and Greco, D. (1994). Social Networks
and Daily Activities of Street Youth in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
Child Development 65:319-330.
Chigunta, F, (2002). “The Socio-Economic Situation of Youth In Africa:

Problems, Prospects and Options”, Paper presented at the Youth
Employment Summit, Alexandria, Egypt, September.
Dewees, A. and Klees, S.J. (1995). Social Movements and the

Transformation of National Policy: Street and Working Children
in Brazil. Comparative Education Review 39(1):76-100.
Fakoya, O. (2009). The Street Children of Nigeria

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Retrieved on 2009-03-24.
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ILO (2001). In-depth Analysis of the Situation of Working Street

Children in Saint Petersburg 2000. ILO/IPEC Working Paper,
ILO Saint Petersburg.
Isamah, A. N and Okunola, R. A. (1997). Family Life under Economic

Adjustment: The Rise of Child Breadwinners. In Guyer, J. I.
Denzer, L. Agbage A. (eds.). Money Struggles and city life.
Devaluation in Ibadan and other Urban Centres in Southern
Nigeria 1986-1996. Heinemann, Portsmouth NH, Pp. 63-72.
Lusk, M.W. (1989). Street Children Programs in Latin America. Journal

of Sociology and Social Welfare 16:55-77.
Okojie, C.E.E. (2003). Employment Creation for Youth in Africa: The

Gender Dimension. A Paper Presented to Expert Group Meeting
on Jobs for Youth: National Strategies for Employment
Promotion, 15-16 January. Geneva, Switzerland.
Rizzini, I. and Udi, M. B. (2003). “Life Trajectories of Children and

Adolescents Living on the Streets of Rio de Janiero.” Children,
Youth and Environments 13(1), Spring 2003.Pp1-30.
Sommers, M. (2003). Urbanization, War, and Africa’s Youth at Risk

Towards Understanding and Addressing Future Challenges.
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Torimiro, D.O. (1995). The Role of Youth in Pilferage of Fruit/Tree

Crops in Nigeria Rural Communities, in Pilferage on Farms: The
Bane of Food Security in Nigeria. NARNPA, Nigeria: Ogun State
University. Pp. 17-24.
Torimiro, D. O and Kolawole, O. D. (2005). Nigerian Rural Youths in a

Culture of Undignified Survival Strategies. Kamla-Raj, Journal
of Social. Science. 11(1): 83-89.
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School and Un-or Underemployed Youth in Developing
Countries. Educational Quality Improvement Programme.
Washington.
230

CSS 791

Uploaded by

CSS 791

Uploaded by

NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

COURSE CODE : CSS791

Course Team Dr. R.A. Okunola (Developer/Writer) - UI

NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

National Open University of Nigeria

First Printed 2010

All Rights Reserved

CSS791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control Management is a 3-

The Message of This Course

CSS791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control Management as a

Nevertheless, the essence of these control and management measures is

The course covers a wide range of issues regarding disaster management

The overall aim of CSS791: Emergency, Riot and Disaster Control

• Define and explain emergency situations

At the end of the course, students should be able to:

• Assess and identify disasters prone areas in the country

a. Avoiding disasters by taking effective

• Organize team structures for use in an emergency

Working through this course

Major components of the course include:

In this course there are twenty units which include:

Unit1 Emergency: Meaning and Types

Unit 1 Psychosocial Consequences of Disaster

Unit 1 Social Capital Utilization and Preparedness for Natural

Unit 1 The Role of Microfinance in Disaster Settings

disturbance, control prevention procedures and emergency preparedness.

The third module will provide useful information on emergency

Text books, Journals and References

The following Text books, Journals are recommended to each student

Haddow, G. D. & Bullock, J. A. (2003). Introduction to Emergency

International Association of Emergency Managers (2007). Principles of

Haddow, George D., Jane A. Bullock and Damon P. Coppola. (2008).

Kaplan, L. G. (1996). Emergency and Disaster Planning Manual. New

Golam M. Mathbor (2007). Enhancement of community preparedness for

Perry, Ronald W. and Michael K. Lindell (2007). “Disaster Response”

Hazard Mitigation Strategies

Lindell, Michael K., Carla S. Prater and Ronald W. Perry. (2006).

Emergency Management Systems

Waugh, Jr., William. (2007). “Local Emergency Management in the

Warning and Evacuation

Fitzpatrick, Colleen and Dennis S. Mileti. (1991). “Motivating Public

Mileti, Dennis S. and John H. Sorensen. (1990). “Building and

Drabek, T. (2003). Strategies for coordinating disaster responses.

Group disaster planning:

Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Council of State

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Emergency Alert System.

Erickson, Paul A. (2006). “The Emergency Response Plan.” Emergency

Role of Business and Non-Profit Agencies in Emergency

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2007). “Business

Management Institute Higher Education Project. (Chapter 11, 39

Waugh, Jr., William L. (2000). “The Involvement of Nonprofit and For-

Haddow, George D. and Kim S. Haddow (2009). “Disaster

Dynes, R. R., & Quarantelli, E. L. (1977). Organizational

Social and Cultural Issues in Response and Recovery

Lindell, Michael K., Carla S. Prater and Ronald W. Perry. (2006).

Phillips, Brenda D. (1993). “Cultural Diversity in Disasters: Sheltering,

Enarson, Elaine. (2007). “Identifying and Addressing Social

Fox, Fiona. (2001). “New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral

International Emergency Management

Lindell, Michael K., Carla S. Prater and Ronald W. Perry. (2006).

Application of Information Technologies in Emergencies

Cutter, Susan L., Christopher T. Emrich, Beverley J. Adams, Charles K.

Financial and Human Resources Issues in Emergency Management

Lindell, Michael K., Carla S. Prater and Ronald W. Perry. (2006).

Sylves, Richard T. (2007). “Budgeting for Emergency Management.”

World Bank (2006) ‘Social Capital’. Available online at:

Tutor- Marked Assignment

There are twenty tutor-marked assignments in this course. Students need

Final Examination and Grading

The final examination of CSS791 shall be of three hours duration and

of their tutored-marked assignments and the comments of their tutors

Course Marking Scheme

Table 1: Course Marking Scheme

Unit Title Week’s Assessment (end

The presentation schedule included in the course materials gives the

How to Get the Best from This Course