INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

UNIT-I
 INTRODUCTION
• Interpretation means the art of finding out the true
sense of an enactment by giving the words of the
enactment their natural and ordinary meaning. 
• It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of
the words used in a statute.
• The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily
and therefore there have been certain principles
which have evolved out of the continuous exercise
by the Courts. These principles are sometimes
called ‘rules of interpretation’.
Meaning and Object of Interpretation

• The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the

intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in
the language used.
• According to Salmond interpretation or construction is the
process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of
the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed.
• As explained by Cooley: “Interpretation differs from
construction in the sense that the former is the art of finding
out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that
their author intended to convey. Construction on the other
hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting the subjects
that lie beyond the direct expression of the text. This
distinction has been widely criticized.
 Nature and Scope of Interpretation
• Necessity of interpretation would arise only
where the language of a statutory provision is
ambiguous, not clear or where two views are
possible or where the provision gives a different
meaning defeating the object of the statute.
• In R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, it was held that
• “… If the words of the Statute are clear and
unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court
to give effect to the natural meaning of the
words used in the provision.”
• In Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs,
Bombay same principle was observed that “Where
the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for
court to take upon itself the task of amending or
altering the statutory provisions.”
• According to Blackstone the fairest and rational
method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the
intention of the Legislature through the most natural
and probable signs which are ‘either the words, the
context, the subject-matter or the spirit and reason of
the law’.
 Reasons for Interpretation of Statutes
• Legislative Language may be complicated for a layman, and hence may
require interpretation; and

• Legislative Intent connotes the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the

‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute.

While interpreting Statutes following essentials are required:

• Intention of the legislature.
• Statute must be read as a whole in its Context.
• Statute should be Construed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if
statutory provision is ambiguous and capable of various constructions,
then that construction must be adopted which will give meaning and effect
to the other provisions of the enactment rather than that which will give
none.
• If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences.
 CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES
A. Classification with reference to basis of
Duration
• (i) Perpetual statutes - It is perpetual when no
time is fixed for its duration and such a statute
remains in force until its repeal which may be
express or implied.
• Temporary statutes - A statute is temporary
when its duration is only for a specified time
and it expires on the expiry of the specified
time unless it is repealed earlier.
 B. Classification with reference to Nature of
Operation
• (i) Prospective statutes – A statute which operates upon acts and transactions
which have not occurred when the statutes takes effect, that is which regulates
the future is a Prospective statute.
• (ii) Retrospective statutes – Every statute takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under the existing laws or creates a new obligation into a new duty or
attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already
passed are deemed retrospective or retroactive statute.
• (iii) Directory statutes – A directory statute is generally affirmative in its terms,
recommends a certain act or omissions, but imposes no penalty on non-
observance of its provisions.
• (iv) Mandatory statutes – A Mandatory statute is one which compels
performance of certain acts and directs that a certain thing must be done in a
certain manner or form. A type of Mandatory Statute is the Imperative Statute.
C. Classification with reference to Objective

• Enabling statutes – These statutes are which enlarges the

common law where it is too strict or narrow. It is a statute which
makes it lawful to do something which would not otherwise be
lawful.
• Disabling statutes – These statutes restrict or cut down rights
existing at common law.
• Prohibitory statute – This type of statute which forbids the doing
of certain things.
• Codifying Statute – It presents and orderly and authoritative
statement of the leading rules of law on a given subject, whether
those rules are to be found in statute law or common law.
• Consolidating statute – The purpose of consolidating statute is to
present the whole body of statutory law on a subject in complete
form repeating the former statute.
• Curative or validating Statute - It is passed to cure defects
in the prior law and too validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public and private administrative
powers which in the absence of such statute would be
void.
• Repealing Statute – A statute which revokes or
terminates another statute is a repealing statute.
• Amending Statute – It is a Statute which makes and
addition to or operates to change the original law so as to
effectively carry out the purpose for which the original law
was passed
 Intention of the Legislature (SENTENTIA LEGIS)
• The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature enacting it”, South Asia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. S.
Sarup Singh.
• The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of
the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature
itself. The question is not what may be supposed to have been
intended but what has been said. The key to the opening of every
law is the reason and spirit of the law. Each word, phrase or
sentence, is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of
the Act itself. Interpretation must depend on the text and the
context, as they are the bases of interpretation.
• If the text is the texture, context gives the colour. Neither can be
ignored. A particular clause or expression is construed by
construing the whole instrument and any dominant purposes that
it may express.
BASIC PRINCIPLES/ GUIDING RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF LAW

1. Statute to be construed to make it effective

and workable
2. Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It
Is
3. Statute Must Be Construed As Whole
 Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It Is

• The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be

gathered from the language used. The words of a
statute never should, in interpretation, be added to or
subtracted from without almost a necessity.
I. Avoiding addition or substitution of words
• It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting
some other words for words in a statute. The rules of
interpretation do not permit addition or deletion,
unless the section itself stands meaningless or of
doubtful meaning.
II Casus Omissus
• It is an application of the same principle that a
matter which should have been, but has not been
provided in a statute cannot be supplied by courts.
(Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric
Tramway)
• To do so, will constitute legislation, and not
construction. The duty of the Court is to interpret
the words that the legislature has used. Those
words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the
power and duty of the Court to travel outside them
on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.
State of Jharkhand v Govind Singh
• Section 52(3) and 68 of Forest Act, 1927 was
amended in Bihar that provided for
confiscation of vehicle used in a forest as an
offence and did not provide for the release of
the vehicle on payment of fine. The vehicle
could only be released on payment of full
value of the vehicle and therefore it was not
possible to levy a fin in lieu of confiscation
and release of vehicle.
III Avoiding rejection of words
• As on the one hand, it is not permissible to add
words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other
hand, effort should be made to give meaning to
each and every word used by the legislature.
• In the interpretation of statutes, the courts always
presume that the legislature inserted every part
thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention
is that every part of the statute should have
effect. Therefore the words should not be wasted,
except for compelling reasons.
IV. Departure from the rule
• The court, in the process of discharging its
interpretative function, may correct the
obvious drafting errors, after having
considered the intended purpose.
• A departure from the rule of literal
construction may be legitimate so as to avoid
any part of the statute becoming meaningless.
It may therefore, be permissible to supply
words, which appear to have been accidentally
omitted or adopt a construction, which
deprives certain existing words of all meaning.
 Statute Must Be Construed As Whole
• This principle states that statute should be interpreted ex
visceribus actus, that is within the four corners of the act. Every
clause needs to be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses of the Act, to make a consistent enactment of the
whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter.
• The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only
be truly arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. How far
and to what extent each component influences the meaning of
the other , would be different in each given case.
• Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however
significant or insignificant it may be. in achieving the legislative
intent. Each section must be construed as a whole, whether or
not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. They may be
interdependent, each portion throwing light, if need be on the
rest.
 JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
• O.P. SINGLA V UNION OF INDIA
Rule 7 of delhi judicial service stated recruitment by
promotion or by direct recruitment. The proviso
stated not more than one third members would
be appointed by direct recruitment. Rule 8 laid
down the seniority of diret recruitment but
subject to provision of rule 7. The court held that
while interpreting the statute as whole rule 8
would have to consider the proviso of rule 7
• POPPATLAL SHAH V STATE OF MADRAS
• The word sale in the madras sale tax while
interpretation as a whole relates to contract of
sale and not contract for sale. Mere
transaction taking lace in Madras , while
actual sales taking place somewhere else does
not attract the sale tax of madras.
• MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA V RAMA
MEDICAL COLLEGE
• The court held that even though medical
colleges have been given permission to open
colleges, yet they till require permission from
medical council in case they want to increase
the seats. Unlimited powers have not been
given to medical colleges as their statute has
to be read with the provisions of medical
council.
• ATTAR SINGH V INDER KUMAR
Section 13 of Punjab Rent Act, 1949 enabled the
landlord to obtain possession of land
a. If he requires for his own use
b. He is not occupying in urban area for the purpose of
his business
c. He has not vacated his rented land
d. ……….
The court held that for his own use has to be construed
with all the latter clauses and not to be construed
alone.
Statute to be construed to make it effective
and workable
• Where alternative construction is possible, the court must
give effect to that which will be responsible for smooth
working of system for which statute was enacted, rather
than to put hindrances on its way. This is known as
Construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
• The interpretation should be construed to make the statute
workable, which secures the object, unless crucial
omissions or clear direction makes that end unattainable.
• The meaning of the statute must be considered rather then
the rendering the statute a nullity.
• Plain words require no construction. This starts
with the premise that the words are plain and
that the conclusion can be arrived at after
construing the words.
• Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed
according to its plain meaning and no words shall
be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly
necessary to do so to prevent a provision from
being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test
of the statute.” [Bhavnagar University v. Palitana
Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003]
 JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
• STATE OF PUNJAB V QAISER JEHAN BEGUM
The respondent made an application to civil
court beyond six months of from the date of
award regarding compensation but within six
months from the knowledge of the award.
The court while interpreting constructively that
it would be just, fair to compute the period of
limitation from date of knowledge of the
award.
• RAINBOW STEEL LIMITED V COMMISSIONER
OF SALES TAX
• The question was whether a thermal plant
sold in perfect condition would be an old
machinery within UP Sales Tax. The court held
that while constructively giving the meaning
to the word ‘old’ visa vi enactment it means
discarded, unserviceable and obsolete. Thus
thermal plant would not be regarded as old
machinery.
 JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
• K.B. NAGPUR V UNION OF INDIA
Indian medical council Act provided that the
President, Vice President and members of
central council shall continue till the successor
is duly nominated or elected is not violative of
Article 14. This provision is not arbitrary as it
would take care of certain emergency
situation, and old members can take a decision
till the new members are elected
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

UNIT-II
LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
• The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-
Meaning rule, is a type of statutory construction.
• The literal rule of statutory interpretation should
be the first rule applied by judges.
• Under the literal rule, the words of the statute
are given their natural or ordinary meaning and
applied without the judge seeking to put a gloss
on the words or seek to make sense of the
statute.
• The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced
with litigation in the absence of a contrary definition
within the statute, words must be given their plain,
ordinary and literal meaning.
• The courts are enjoined to take the words as used by
the legislature and too give them the meaning which
naturally implies as held in Molar Mal (deceased) v.
Kay Iron Works (Pvt.) Ltd.
• If the language used by the legislature is clear and
unambiguous, a court of law at the present day has
only to expound the words in their natural and
ordinary sense; ‘Verbis plane expressis amnino
standum est’.
 JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
• Whitely v Chappel (1868) LR 4 QB 147

A statute made it an offence 'to impersonate any

person entitled to vote.' The defendant used the vote
of a dead man. The statute relating to voting rights
required a person to be living in order to be entitled
to vote. 

Held:

The literal rule was applied and the defendant was

thus acquitted.
• Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 

The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his

shop window with a price tag on it. Statute
made it a criminal offence to 'offer' such flick
knives for sale. His conviction was quashed as
goods on display in shops are not 'offers' in
the technical sense but an invitation to treat.
The court applied the literal rule of statutory
interpretation.
 Motipur Zanzindary Company Private
Limited v. state of Bihar
• The question was whether. sugarcane fell within the term green
vegetables in. Entry 6 of the Schedule and as such no sales tax
could be levied under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 on its sale.
• The Supreme Court held that while dealing with a taxing statute
the natural and ordinary meaning Of a word should be the
'correct meaning.
• In the present instance the word vegetables should be
interpreted in its natural and popular-sense and that dictionary
meaning is not of such help here. Vegetables as the normal
people mean by it are those which can-be grown in a kitchen
garden to be used for the table, that is to say, to be eaten during
lunch or dinner. Sugarcane definitely does not fall under this
category.
• Partridge v Crittenden (1968) 2 All ER 421

The defendant placed an advert in a classified section of a

magazine offering some bramble finches for sale. S.6 of
the Protection of Birds Act 1954 made it an offence to
offer such birds for sale. He was charged and convicted of
the offence and appealed against his conviction. The
court held that the defendant's conviction was quashed.
The advert was an invitation to treat not an offer. The
literal rule of statutory interpretation was applied.
• R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446

Harris bits of the end of a woman’s nose, the prosecution

alleged the bite was included in ‘stab, cut or wound’.
• The court held that under the literal rule the act of biting did
not come within the meaning of stab cut or wound as these
words implied an instrument had to be used. Therefore the
defendant's conviction was quashed.
•  R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303 House of Lords

The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled

drug with intent to supply it to another under s.5(3) of the
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. A package containing £500 worth
of cannabis was found in his car. The defendant stated the
cannabis belonged to a friend and that the friend was
picking it up later. The trial judge convicted him and ruled
that his action in handing the drugs back to the friend was
an action of supply.
• On Appeal, his conviction was reinstated because "The
word "supply," in its ordinary natural meaning,
connotes the mere transfer of physical control of some
chattel or object from one person to another.
• This was dissented by a judge stating that either the
delivery of goods by a depositor to a depositee, or the
redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can
sensibly be described as an act of supplying goods to
another. In ordinary language the cloakroom attendant,
the left luggage officer, the warehouseman and the
shoe mender do not 'supply' to their customers the
articles which those customers have left with them."
 London and North Eastern Railway v
Berriman [1946] AC 278

A railway worker was killed whilst oiling the track. No look out
man had been provided. A statute provided compensation
payable on death for those 'relaying or repairing' the track.
• Under the literal rule oiling did not come into either of these
categories.
• This result although very harsh could not to be said to be
absurd so the golden rule could not be applied. There was no
ambiguity in the words therefore the mischief rule could not
be applied. Unfortunately the widow was entitled to nothing.
Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899) AC 143
• Where it is an offence to use a house, office, room or ‘other place
for betting’. The defendant argued that he operates an outside place
• Held:

The court held that the other items mentioned in the statute related
to places indoors whereas plea of enclosure was outside. There was
thus no offence committed.
Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India
• Section 6 , in so far as relevant for our purpose, provides that the
Chairman and other members of the council shall hold office for a
period of three years. Sub- section 7 of section 6 of the Press
Council Act, 1978 provides: ‘A retiring member shall be eligible for
renomination for not more than one term.’ Question was whether
a person who had already been a member of the Council for two
terms earlier is eligible for being nominated
• The Supreme Court applied the literal and grammatical meaning
of these words and held that the provision applied to a member
“just retiring” and not to a retired member and that a retired
member who had held office for two terms sometime in the past
is not debarred from being nominated again.

Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy and Anr. Vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh
• The appellants were holding land in excess of the limit prescribed
under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural)
Act, 1973,  (“Act“). The surplus land was surrendered by them
which had fruit bearing cashew nut tree plantation. It is to be
noted that the trees were 12 years old and stood on the
surrendered land. The dispute relates to the amount payable in
respect of fruit bearing trees standing on the land which were
surrendered by the appellant. According to the authorities the
payment was to be made for one year only and not for thirty
years (life of cashew tree) as was claimed by the appellant.
• According to the notification held that the
amounts are to be calculated from 5th to 30th
year as up to five (5) years cashew trees are
held to be not fruit bearing trees. That being
so, the Apex Court held that stand of the State
Government (as accepted by the High Court)
that the signora rate is for one year and
accordingly fixing it for the 12 year is clearly
unsustainable.
 S.A.Venkataraman v. The State
• Section 6 of THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947
• Previous sanction necessary for prosecutions.-
• (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
Section 161 or Section 164 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or
under sub -section (2) or sub-section (3A) of Section 5 of this Act, alleged
to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous
sanction,-
• (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs
of the Union and is not removable from his office gave by or with the
sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government;
• (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs
of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the State Government, of the State Government;
• (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to
remove him from his office.
• ………………………………..
• The court said that this case dealt with Section 6 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was to do with
taking a sanction from an appropriate authority .It
considers only the present working employees as
employees, those who have retired are not
considered as employees. The court said, “In
construing the provisions of a statute it is essential
for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the
natural meaning of the words used therein, if those
words are clear enough.
 Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnatli Singh, 14 AIR
1954 SC 749
• The Election Tribunal set aside the election of the appellant
under section 123(7) of Representation of the People Act, 1951
on the grounds that. the appellant had employed more persons
than prescribed for electioning purpose and that the salary of
this persons exceeded the maximum election expenditure
permissible under the law.
• The contention of the appellant was that all those persons who
had campaigned for him in the election were in the·
employment of his father and were thereby receiving salaries
from his father by virtue-of their employment.
• As far as he was concerned, he had not made payments to;
them exceeding the permissible limit.
• The Supreme Court, following the grammatical
interpretation said that the meaning of
section 123 (7) of the Act of 1951 was quite
clear and, therefore, as far as these
campaigners were concerned they were
merely volunteers campaigning· for the
appellant
 Ranjit Udeshi v. State 'Of Maharashtra
• the appellant was convicted under Section 292, Indian Penal Code by the
High Court for selling an obscene book titled Lady Chatterley's Lover the
sale of which was banned by the Government of India. the appellant
contended before the Supreme Court that mens rea of the accused had
always to :be proved to maintain conviction under criminal. law.
• Since the prosecution had failed to prove mens rea, that is to say, that
the appellant sold ·or kept for selling the obscene book with the
knowledge that the book was obscene, the conviction was unjustified.
• He further argued :that there are such a large number 0f books these
days in bookstalls and their contents so different from each other that a
book seller cannot possibly know and is not expected to know the
contents of each book and cannot, therefore, be convicted. in the
absence ,of a guilty mind.
• The Supreme Court held that knowledge of
obscenity was not an essential element of the
offence under Section 292, Indian Penal Code.
The section is plain and its meaning
unambiguous. The Court must give natural
meaning to the words used in the section and
on this count the contention of the appellant
held no water
SUSIDIARY RULES FOR LITERAL
INTERPRETATION
 A. Noscitur a Sociis
• Noscitur a Sociis literally means “It is known from its associates”.
• Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable
meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its
association with other words within the context of the phrase.
• This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings
that are related to each other.
• In Foster v Diphwys Casson((1887) 18 QBD 428), the case
involved a statute which stated that explosives taken into a mine
must be in a "case or canister". Here the defendant used a cloth
bag. The courts had to consider whether a cloth bag was within
the definition. Under noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag
could not have been within the statutory definition, because
parliament's intention in using ‘case or container’ was referring to
something of the same strength as a canister.
• Under noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could
not have been within the statutory definition, because
parliament's intention in using ‘case or container’ was
referring to something of the same strength as a
canister.
Inland Revenue v Frere [1964]
• The respondent sought to deduct the interest paid on
a short term loan from his income for the purposes of
assessing his liability to pay tax. The Income Tax Act of
1952 allowed "the amount of interest, annuities or
other annual interest" to be deducted from the
income.
It was held that Under the noscitur a sociis rule, the
mention of amount of interest related only to annual
interest as the other items related to annual
payments. The respondent's interest payment was
not an annual interest payment and therefore he
could not deduct it from his income and he was
required to pay tax on it.
In Commrs. v. Savoy Hotel, (1966) 2 All ER 299.
While dealing with the Purchase Tax Act, which used
the expression ‘manufactured beverages including
fruit-juices and bottled waters and syrups etc.’, The
question was whether orange juice unsweetened and
freshly prepared comes within the description or not.
• It was held that the description ‘fruit juices, as
occurring therein should be construed in the
context of the preceding words and the
orange juice unsweetened and freshly
prepared was not within the description
 B. CASUS OMISSUS
• In Hiradevi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur,

Section 71 of the U. P. Districts Boards Act, 1922, provided that a

Board may dismiss it secretary by special resolution which in
certain cases required sanction of Local Government, and Section
90 conferred a power to suspend the secretary ‘pending enquiry
into his conduct or pending orders of any authority whose action
is necessary for his dismissal’. By U.P. Act 1 of 1933, Section 71 was
amended and the amended section provided that a resolution of
dismissal was not to take effect till the expiry of the period of
appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was so presented. No
corresponding amendment was, however made in Section 90 and
it was held by the Supreme Court that a suspension resolved
under Section 90 to be operative till appeal against the dismissal
was decided, was ultra- vires the powers of the Board
 C. EJUSDEM GENERIS
• When particular words pertaining to a class,
category are followed by general words, the
general words are construed as limited to the
things of the same kind as those specified.
This rule which is known as the rule of
ejusdem generis.
 Difference between Noscitur A Sociis and
Ejusdem Generis Rule
Noscitur A Sociis Ejusdem Generis

Latin term meaning ‘recognised by its Latin term meaning ‘of the same kind
partners’

Used for interpreting questionable Used for interpreting loosely written

words in statutes. statutes

It is broader in concept. This rule puts the It is narrow in concept. This rule puts the
word into consideration the whole phrase. word into consideration the nearby
words.

Meaning of doubtful words can be known If a statute list specific classes of things
from the accompanying words or its then it has to be referred as general
association of words
In Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v.
Harishanker, the Supreme Court has laid
down conditions that needs to be fulfilled for
this rule of construction is used. They are:
•  The statute contains an enumeration of
specific words.
• The subjects of enumeration constitute a class
or category.
•  The general terms follow the enumeration.
•  There is no indication of a different legislative
intent.
• In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the
interpretation of Section 6 (4) (a) of the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 which
said: 'State Government may requisition for
the purpose of State or any other public
purpose , was involved. It was contended that
under the provision the appellant was entitled
to requisition premises for housing a member
of the foreign consulate.
• The High Court held that the expression any
other public purpose should be read Ejusdem
Generis with purpose of state, and providing
accommodation to a member of the foreign
consulate being a purpose of the Union and
not of the State, the State Government had no
authority to requisition.
• In Evans v. Cross the words 'other devices' had
to be interpreted in Section 48 (9) of the Road
Traffic Act, 1930 which defined a 'traffic sign'
to include 'all signals, warning sign posts,
direction posts, signs, or other devices'.
Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the
Court decide whether a painted white line on
a road could be called a traffic sign or not.
• Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court held that a painted
white line on a road could not be called a traffic sign because
devices are things, which a painted line on road I
• In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India,
the Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching,
mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-
proofing, organdie processing, which precede the expression 'or
any other process' in Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944 contemplate processes which import a change of a
lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some
chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the
section must share one or the other of these incidents. s not. 
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCUSIO ALTERIUS

• The express mention of one person or thing is

the exclusion of another. Where the statutory
language is plain and the meaning clear, there
is no scope for applying the rule.
• This maxim is also not used to extend the
operation of a statute beyond the operation of
a statute beyond the provision that it actually
makes, e.g. a law enacted by Parliament for A,
what is already a law for A and others, the new
law will not change the law for others.
• Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882 defines
“transfer of property”, which means, “an act by which living
persons conveys property, in present or future, to one or
more other living persons or to himself in and one or more
other living persons and to “transfer property” or to himself is
to perform such act.”The next paragraph provides that in this
section “living person” includes a company or association or
body of individuals whether incorporated or not .This clearly
provides that “living person” not only means an individual or
human being but can also refers to a company or association
or body of individuals whether incorporated or not
 CRITICISM OF LITERAL RULE
• AMBIGUITY
• INJUSTICE
• RESTRICTION ON COURTS
• NOT SUITABLE FOR CHANGING TIMES
 GOLDEN RULE
• The golden rule of statutory interpretation may be applied
where an application of the literal rule would lead to an
absurdity. The courts may then apply a secondary meaning.
• The Golden rule is a form of statutory interpretation that
allows a judge to depart from a word’s normal meaning in
order to avoid an absurd result.
• It is a compromise between the literal rule and the mischief
rule. Like the plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a
statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when this
may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the
legislature’s intention, the judge can depart from this
meaning.
• This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a
narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words
themselves.
• For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “Do not use lifts in case
of fire.” Under the literal interpretation of this sign, people must never
use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would be an absurd
result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to
prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.
• The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result
that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, even where words have
only one meaning. Example: The facts of a case are; a son murdered his
mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on who
then inherited the estate, the mother’s family, or the son’s descendants.
There was never a question of the son profiting from his crime, but as
the outcome would have been binding on lower courts in the future, the
court found in favour of the mother’s family.
 R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
• The defendant was charged with the offence of bigamy under s.57 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The statute states 'whosoever
being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the
former husband or wife is guilty of an offence'. Under a literal
interpretation of this section the offence would be impossible to commit
since civil law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry
in such circumstances would not be recognised as a valid marriage.

Held:

The court applied the golden rule and held that the word 'marry' should
be interpreted as 'to go through a marriage ceremony'. The defendant's
conviction was upheld.
 Re Sigsworth [1935] 1 Ch 98
• A son murdered his mother. She had not made
a will. Under the statute setting the law on
intestacy he was her sole issue and stood to
inherit her entire estate. The court applied the
Golden rule holding that an application of the
literal rule would lead to a repugnant result.
He was thus entitled to nothing.
•  
• An example of the same is S. 125 of the CrPC which deals
with maintenance given to women. The court while
interpreting the term ‘wife’ included those women who
have entered into bigamy, talakshuda women and divorced
women. The court has stated that even though a woman
may have relinquished her rights on divorce, she may claim
maintenance u/s 125 as she will she be regarded as a ‘wife’
10 years after such divorce.
• Further, in the case of Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. Vs.
Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors the courts interpreted that
Article 21 shall be available to non-citizens as well as citizens.
 Lee v Knapp
• The defendant committed a breach of section 77 (1) of the
Road Traffic Act, 1960, which provides, so far as material, that if
in any case owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a road
an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle
other than that motor vehicle, the driver of the motor vehicle
shall stop and then move away. The defendant commiteed an
accident, stopped his car and moved away. The golden rule of
interpretation is in case of accident, the person has to stop for
reasonable period.
• Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not
fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped
for a reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to
make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the
spot of accident
 Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij
Kishore
• The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless
person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953
which made provision for grant of land to landless
persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless
labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no
agricultural land. The Court further said that “any landless
person” did not include a landless businessman residing in
a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan
movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless
labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman,
though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act
 Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P.
• Sales Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of
“cooked food” under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The
appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture and
sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption,
can be construed as “cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the
notification issued under the said provision.

• Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question

whether the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends
on the context of the statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the
words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise words used are
plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their
ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by
consideration of policy which has to decided not by court but by
Parliament itself.
 Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar[
• Construing section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958,
the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which
the age of the offender had to be determined is not the date
of offence, but the date on which the sentence is pronounced
by the trial court. An accused who on the date of offence was
below 21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment
pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to the
benefit of the statute.
• This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act.
The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the
youthful offenders into criminals by their association with the
hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the
prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of
the Act by sending him under the supervision of the probation
officer instead of jail.
 CRITICISM OF GOLDEN RULE
• It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal
approach vis lack of wider contextual understandings
of “meanings.”
• The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases.
Most cases involve situations where difficult choices
have to be made between several fairly plausible
arguments, not situations where the words lead to
obvious absurdities.
• The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very
erratic 
 HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
• According to this rule, a statute should be read as a
whole and one provision of the Act should be construed
with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as
to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
• The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”, between the
different parts of an enactment and conflict between
the various provisions should be sought to be
harmonized. The normal presumption should be
consistency and it should not be assumed that what is
given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be
taken away by the other. (CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers)
• The aim of the courts are:-
i) An interpretation which makes the enactment
consistent .
ii) A construction which avoids inconsistency or
repugnancy between the various sections or
parts of the statute.
However, in the case in which it shall be
impossible to harmonize both the provisions,
the court’s decision shall prevail.
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore
• The Supreme Court applied the rule of
harmonious construction in resolving a
conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of
the Constitution and it was held that the right
of every religious denomination or any section
thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made
by a State providing for social welfare and
reform.
 M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha
• The same rule was applied to resolve the
conflict between Articles 19(1)(a) and 194(3)
of the Constitution and it was held that the
right of freedom of speech guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) is the read as subject to
powers, privileges and immunities of a House
of the Legislature which are those of the
House of Commons of the United Kingdom as
declared by the latter part of Article 194(3).
 Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh
• Certain disputes between the employer and the workmen
were referred to an industrial tribunal. After adjudication,
the tribunal sent its award to the government for
publication. However, before the award was published, the
parties to the dispute came to a settlement and
accordingly, wrote a letter to the government jointly,
intimating the fact that the dispute had been settled;
hence the award shall not be published.
• On the government’s refusal to withhold the publication,
the employer approached the High Court for a writ or
direction to the government to withhold the publication.
• The High Court rejected the writ petition as well as the writ
arising therefrom. The parties then appealed by special leave to
the Supreme Court.
• The main contention of the appellants was that Section 17 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is directory in nature and not
mandatory.
• A mandatory statute or statutory provision is one which must
be followed in order that the proceeding to which it relates
may be valid.
• A directory statute or provision is one which need not be
complied with in order that the proceeding to which it partakes
may be valid.
• It is not always easy to determine whether a particular statute
is mandatory or directory. Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and
‘must’ are mandatory, and the word ‘may’ is directory,
although they are often used interchangeably in legislation.
• Section 17(1) states, ‘Every award shall within a
period of thirty days from the date of its receipt
by the appropriate government be published in
such manner as the appropriate government
thinks fit”.
• The use of the word ‘shall’, the court observed, is
a pointer to Section 17(1) being mandatory in
nature.
• Section 17(2) states, ‘Award published under
sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be
called in question by any court in any manner
whatsoever.
• Section 17A, of the Industrial Disputes Act, provides that
the award under Section 17 becomes enforceable after
thirty days of publication, though the government may
declare certain contingencies in which it may not be
enforceable.
• Section 18 (1) provides that a settlement arrived at by
agreement between the employer and the workmen
otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding
shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
• The court read Section 17 and Section 17A together and
declared that the intention behind Section 17 is that the
duty cast on the government to publish the award is
mandatory and not directory. And hence, the contention
of the appellants did not hold good.
• Though the Supreme Court maintained that Section
17 (1) is mandatory, and ordinarily the government
has to publish an award sent to it by the tribunal,
in special circumstances of the case and with a view
to avoid a conflict between a settlement binding
under Section 18 (1), it held that the only solution
is to withhold the publication of the award as this
would not in any way affect the mandatory
provision of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
 Raj Krushna Bose vs Binod Khanungo &
others.
• Two provisions of Representation of People
Act, 1951, which were in apparent conflict,
were brought forth in this case. Section 33 (2)
says that a Government Servant can nominate
or second a candidate in election but Section
123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot
assist any candidate in election except by
casting his vote.
• The Supreme Court observed that both these
provisions should be harmoniously interpreted and
held that a Government Servant was entitled to
nominate or second a candidate seeking election in
State Legislative assembly. This harmony can only
be achieved if Section 123(8) is interpreted as
giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as
to nominate or second a candidate and forbidding
him to assist the candidate in any other manner.
 Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna

• Under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act,
1958, criminal prosecution of the respondent partners was sanctioned in
this case by the Commissioner when even after repeated demands the
assesse did not pay the sales tax. The respondent challenged this
provision on the ground that there were two separate provisions under
the Act, namely, section 22 (4 – A) and section 46 (1) c under which two
different procedures were prescribed to realize the amount due but there
was no provision of law which could tell that which provision should be
applied in which case.
• According to the Supreme Court, the provision prescribed u/s 46 (1) c was
more drastic. It was held that by harmonious construction of these two
provisions, the conclusion drawn is that the Commissioner had a judicial
discretion to decide as to which procedure to be followed in which case.
Whenever the Commissioner will fail to act judicially, the court will have
the right to intervene. However, in this case, the Commissioner had
correctly decided that the more drastic procedure under section 46 (1) c
deserved to be followed because of the failure of the assesse firm in
paying sales tax despite the repeated demands by the sales tax officer.
 PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION
• To understand the meaning of words in a statute, Courts
have to understand the statute's intent.
• The purpose of an Act, i.e. why it was enacted and how it
came to be, is not just a relevant factor in deciding how
to give effect to a statute's words, but is essential to
determining its meaning.
• Purposive approach to statutory interpretation involved
the consideration of three factors:
• the language of the provision;
•  the context in which the language is used; and
•  the purpose of the legislation or statutory scheme in
which the language is found.
• While the "ordinary meaning" of words still plays a
fundamental role in the judicial interpretation of statutes,
Legislative intent will inevitably inform the Courts' method
when analyzing the meaning of statutory provisions.
• The purposive approach not just look to see what gap might
have existed in the law previously, but the judges are
attempting to identify what they believe Parliament meant to
achieve.
• The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to
give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are
prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears
upon the background against which the legislation was
enacted.” (Pepper v Hart)
Literal Rule vs. Purposive Approach
• The literal approach takes each word literally.
The purposive approach is very broad and does
not look at the precise meaning of each word.
Golden Rule vs. Purposive Approach
• Golden rules look to the actual wording of the
statutes. The mischief and purposive approach
go beyond that.
The advantages of the purposive approach
• Leads to justice in individual cases.
• where there is new technology which was unknown
when the law was enacted, in present times those
laws can be modified.
The disadvantages of the purposive approach
• It makes the law less certain.
• It also allows unelected judges to make law as they
are deciding what they think the law should be rather
than using the words that Parliament enacted
• Another problem with the purposive approach is that
it is difficult to discover the intention of Parliament.
 A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu
• The Court observed:

"The primary principle of interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory

provision should be construed "according to the intent of they that made it".
• Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the
language employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself
proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be
given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow.
• But if the words used in the provision can reasonably bear meanings more
than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure
guide to reach at the real legislative intent.
• In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and
phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go for purposive
interpretation.
Ayr Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wright, 2016 ONCA 789

• Ayr Mutual involved a claim by an insured, Mr. Wright, for

statutory accident benefits ("SABS") following an accident in
his garage.
• Mr. Wright's insurer denied him SABS, claiming that his
injuries were not the result of an "accident" as defined in the
Ontario Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, O. Reg. 34/10
(the "Schedule").
• Under section 279 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8
(the "Insurance Act"), disputes concerning an insured's right
to SABS are to be submitted to mediation before any
litigation can be started. Mr. Wright applied for mediation
with his insurer.
• Rather than participate in the mediation process set out in
the Insurance Act, the insurer started an application in the
Ontario Superior Court for a preliminary determination of
issues.
• In effect, the insurer's argument was: (i) the dispute resolution
process under section 279 of the Insurance Act could only be
triggered "in respect of any insured person's entitlement to
statutory accident benefits"; (ii) to qualify as an "insured
person" under the Schedule, the claimant must have been
involved in an accident; and (iii) the preliminary issue of
whether a claimant was involved in an "accident" and
therefore qualified as an "insured person" under the
Schedule had to be determined by the Court first, before the
alternative mediation scheme under section 279 of
the Insurance Act applied.
• The Superior Court rejected the insurer's
argument. The Court, according to purposive
construction, held that the mediation process
under the Insurance Act covered all disputes
relating to SABS, including the preliminary
question of whether the claimant was
involved in an accident and qualified as an
insured person under the Schedule
 Pickstone v Freemans plc
• Here, women warehouse operatives were paid the same as male
warehouse operatives. However, Miss Pickstone claimed that the
work of the warehouse operatives was of equal value to that
done by male warehouse checkers who were paid £1.22 per
week more than they were. The employers argued that a woman
warehouse operative was employed on like work to the male
warehouse operatives, so she could not bring a claim under
section 1(2) (c) of the 1970 statute for work of equal value. This
was a literal interpretation of the 1970 statute.
• The House of Lords decided that the literal approach would have
left the United Kingdom in breach of its treaty obligations to give
effect to an EU directive. It therefore used the purposive
approach and stated that Miss Pickstone was entitled to claim on
the basis of work of equal value even though there was a male
employee doing the same work as her.
 Smith v. Hughes
• The question arose whether a women soliciting men from inside a
building, committed an offence.
• Lord Parker C.J found the text unclear so he looked at the purpose
of the legislation and said “everybody knows that this was an Act
intended to clean up the street, to enable people to walk along
streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
Viewed in that way it can matter little whether the prostitute is
soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a
balcony, or at a window or whether the window is shut or open.
•  If the literal meaning of the act was followed the outcome would
have been different and the women would not have been guilty, so
this proves that the purposive approach is much more superior and
flexible than the literal rule.
•
In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. Court while
reiterating that courts will have to follow the rule of
literal construction, held that there is an exception to
that rule. This Court observed:

“That exception comes into play when application of

literal construction of the words in the statute leads
to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that
the legal context in which the words are used or by
reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different
meaning.
• Justice G.P. Singh extracts four conditions that should be present
to justify departure from the plain words of the Statute, in his
treatise "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" from the decision
of the House of Lords in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.:

• A court would only be justified in departing from the plain words

of the statute when it is satisfied that
• (1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly;
• (2) Parliament could not have envisaged such anomaly;
• (3) the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to such a
legislative objective; and
• (4) the language of the statute is susceptible of the modification
required to obviate the anomaly.”
 MISCHIEF RULE
• The mischief rule is one of the most firmly established rule
for construing an obscure enactment.
• It is another rule of statutory interpretation traditionally
applied by English courts. 
• The rule was first laid out in a 16th-century ruling of the
Barons of the Exchequer Court in Heydon’s case which have
been continually cited with approval and acted upon.
• The main aim of the rule is to determine the “mischief and
defect” that the statute in question has set out to remedy,
and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.
• In applying the Mischief Rule, the court is essentially asking
what part of the law, did the law not cover, but was meant
to be rectified by the parliament in passing the bill.
• Mischief Rule laid by the Barons of the Exchequer in the
Heydon's case (Heydon 's case (1584) 3 Co R) as follows,
namely- "That for the sure and true interpretation of all
statutes in general four things are to be discerned and
considered:
• (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act?
• (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide?
• (3) What remedy the Parliament have resolved and appointed
to cure it
• (4) The true reason of the remedy and the judges to always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy
 Pyarali K. Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra
Dange
• The appellant/petitioner, a dealer in scented supari, was
charged with the offence of having sold and retained for selling
scented supari with saccharin and cyclamate, prohibited
artificial sweeteners, in contravention of S. 7(i)(ii) and rule 47 of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and thereby
having committed an offence punishable under section 16(1)(a)
(i) of the Act.
• Court held that Supari is food within the meaning of S. 2(v) of
the Act. The Act defines 'food' very widely as covering any
article used as food and every component which enters into it
and even flavoring matter and condiments. In food offenses
mischeif rule to be applied. Appellant will be liable
•  In the Bengal Immunity case, the mischief
rule was applied to the construction of Article
286 of the Constitution of India, observing that
it was to cure the mischief of multiple taxation
and to preserve the free flow of the inter-State
trade or commerce in the Union of India
regarded as one economic unit without any
provincial barrier that the Constitution makers
adopted Article 286 in the Constitution.
 Smith v. Hughes
• The defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street,
London, and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4,
1959, between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in
the street, for the purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39
Curzon Street. It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the
balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street
Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no offence had been committed.
• “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was
soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this
form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street
or public place for the purpose of prostitution’.
• Considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act, Everybody knows that this
was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the
streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in
that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street
or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, Hence she would be liable
B.K. GARAD V. NASIK MERCHANT COOPERATIVE
BANK LIMITED
• On expiry of the term of the committee known as Board of Directors of a specified society
under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 the Collector notified the election
programme without specifying that the two seats on the committee would be reserved
seats; one for the members belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and
one for the weaker section of the members of the society.
• Pursuant to that election programme the poll was held and the result was declared. The
said election was challenged by a member of the society belonging to Scheduled Tribe on
the ground that the whole of the election programme is vitiated on account of its non
compliance with the mandatory statutory provision enacted in sec. 73B which prescribed
reservation of seats; one in favour of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and another in
favour of weaker section from the members of the society.
• In the instant case, according to mischief rule the use of the expression 'shall' in sec. 73B
clearly mandates obligation to reserve. The section itself clearly manifests legislative
intention when it says that 'if no such persons are elected or appointed,' the reserved
seats may be filled in by co-option. The language and the chronology of the methodology
of filling in reserved seats employed in sec. 73B provide a clue to its correct construction
and there should be no doubt that opportunity must be provided for filling in seats by
election. It is the failure of the election machinery to fill in the seats by election which
would enable the concerned authority to fill in seats by appointment or co-option.
 Corkery v Carpenter(1950)

• Defendant was in charge of a bicycle whilst drunk. The

defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a
carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it
an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . .
of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’. 
• Held: The Act was to be read purposively. The mischief
rule allowed the court to hold that a carriage included a
bicycle. A bicycle is a "carriage" the mischief was drinking
and driving at a high speed on the highway, while being in
charge of transport, amounts to be a mischief which needs
to be surpressed.
 BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION
• Socio-economic legislation which is aimed at social or economic
policy changes, the interpretation should not be narrow.
• Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is
that this principle is based on human tendency to be fair,
accommodating, and just. Instead of restricting the people from
getting the benefit of the statute, Court tends to include as many
classes as it can while remaining faithful to the wordings of the
statute.
• In the case of Sant Ram v Rajinderlal, the Supreme Court said that
welfare legislation must be interpreted in a third World perspective
favoring the weaker and poor class. It has also been laid down in the
case of labor legislation that courts should not stick to grammatical
constructions but also have regard to the protective intendment of
the legislation.
• B Shah v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, court applied
beneficent rule of construction in construing section 5 of the
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, which makes the employer
liable to pay maternity benefit to woman worker at the rate
of average daily wage for the period of her actual absence
immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery
and for six weeks immediately following that day.
• The court held that Sundays must also be included and held
that the Act was intended not only to subsist but also make
up for her dissipated energy and take care of child. The Act
was read in the light of Article 42
 Unichoyi v. State of Kerala 
Whether the minimum wages act, 1948 in which state
government is empowered to fix minimum wages is violative of
Aricle 19(1) (g) because it does not define minimum wages.
The court, while applying beneficial construction held that in an
underdeveloped country which faces the problem of
unemployment on a very large scale, it is not unlikely that
labour may offer to work even on starvation wages. The policy
of the Act is to prevent the employment of such sweated labour
in the interest of general public and so in prescribing the
minimum rates, the capacity of the employer need not be
considered. What is being prescribed is minimum wage rates
which a welfare State assumes every employer must pay before
he employs labour.