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Iran–Turkey proxy conflict

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Iran–Turkey proxy conflict
Part of Iran–Turkey relations, Iran–Israel proxy conflict, and Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

  Turkey
  Iran
Date15 March 2011– present
Location
Mainly South Caucasus, Iraq and Syria,[1] also Yemen, Libya, and Central Asia.[2]
Result Ongoing
Belligerents

 Iran
 Armenia
 Ba'athist Syria Surrendered
 Iraq (sometimes)

Proxies

 Turkey
 Azerbaijan
 Qatar
Syria (since 2024)

Proxies
Commanders and leaders
Iran Ali Khamenei Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

The Iran–Turkey proxy conflict refers to the regional rivalry between Iran and Turkey in the Middle East, mainly during armed conflicts and struggles for influence.

History

[edit]

The conflict has its roots in a period of tense relations between Iran and Turkey of after the Iranian Revolution. Despite the two countries cooperating in a wide variety of fields, Iran and Turkey have competed for influence since the 1990s. In September 2011, Turkey hosted the establishment of a NATO missile shield, causing a crisis with Iran. While criticising the missile shield, Ali Khamenei also stated that Turkey should rethink many of its regional policies.[3][4]

Yahya Rahim Safavi accused Turkish authorities of "acting in line with the goals of America", and that if Turkey did not change its policies, Iran, Iraq, and Syria would be "reassessing their political ties."[3]

The proxy conflict was worsened due to the active involvement of the AKP government in regional disputes in Iraq and Syria.[5] The proxy conflict also continued despite Erdoğan politically shifting away from the West and towards Russia and Iran.[6]

Syria

[edit]

During the Syrian civil war, Iran intervened in support of Ba'athist Syria, while Turkey intervened in support of the opposition. Both Iran and Turkey were militarily involved. Turkey backed the Syrian National Army, while Iran backed the Syrian Arab Army, as well as Hezbollah, and other Shia militias. Hezbollah had clashed with the Turkish military in Syria.[7] Turkish media organisations like Yeni Akit and Yeni Şafak also spread Anti-Iranian sentiment due to the Iranian role in Syria.[8] Turkey and Iran continued to oppose each other during the Syrian civil war. In 2019, Turkey launched an offensive in northern Syria, against the SDF and SAA, causing Iran to criticize Turkey.[9] Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed that it was a violation of Syria's sovereignty.[10] Ali Larijani also canceled his trip to Turkey.[11] In December 2024, after the Syrian opposition offensives, Abbas Araghchi had a heated argument with Hakan Fidan, claiming that Turkey had allowed the offensive.[12][13]

Iraq

[edit]

Iran and Turkey backed opposing political factions in Iraq. They also backed opposing militant groups. In 1982, During the 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, Shia militias captured Sinjar from the KDP Peshmerga.[14] The Shia militias also entered a tactical alliance with the YBŞ and the PKK.[15] Turkey turned against the Shia militias, as it supported the Kurdistan Region, especially the KDP, and opposed the PKK. The conflict escalated in October 2020, after the Sinjar agreement mediated by the United Nations between the KRG and Iraq, which mandated the withdrawal of both the PKK and PMF.[16] In 2021, various Shia militias began attacking Turkish presence in Iraq after Turkey launched operations against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. After the Fall of the Assad regime, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba warned about the existence of a Turkish-backed "operations room" in Iraq which planned on launching an attack similar to the 2024 Syrian offensives, and stressed that the United Kingdom was leading the operations room, with intelligence participation from NATO and Israel.[17]

Yemen

[edit]

During the Yemeni civil war, Iran and Turkey supported rival groups, causing official arguments between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mohammad Javad Zarif. Erdoğan stated that "Iran and the terrorist groups must withdraw", while Zarif stated that "Turkey makes strategic mistakes".[18]

Libya

[edit]

During the Second Libyan conflict, Iran provided support to the anti-Turkish Khalifa Haftar and supplied his forces with anti-tank missiles.[19][20][21]

Iran

[edit]

In the 1990s, Iranian Azerbaijani secularists who were frustrated with both religion and the Iranian government became the basis of Pan-Turkism and Pro-Turkey politics among Iranian Azerbaijanis.[22] With the spread of Turkish media after the 2000s, nationalism increased among Iranian Azerbaijanis, with the Iranian government attempting to counter it. Tractor S.C. acted as a base for extreme nationalism, as well as racism particularly towards Persians and Kurds.[23] Supporters also carry the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan inside the stadium.[24] In 2020, Suleyman Soylu claimed that there were 100 PKK fighters present in Iran with the tacit approval of the Iranian government.[25]

Turkey

[edit]

The Turkish government accused Iran of various forms of support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party.[26] The Turkish government also alleged that Iran financed and trained the Kurdish Hezbollah, and accused Iran of planning to use the Kurdish Hezbollah against Turkey.[27][28][29] In March 1993, after Abdullah Öcalan left Syria, the Turkish government accused Iran of organising a ceasefire between the Kurdish Hezbollah and PKK.[30] A Turkish parliamentary report also revealed Kurdish Hezbollah operatives had trained in Iran.[31]

Although the majority of Alevis in Turkey embraced secular values, were loyal to Turkey, and supported the Republican People's Party, Iran attempted to grow its influence over Alevis, while also attempting to convert them into the mainstream Twelver Shi'ism practiced in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. Some Turkish Alevi representatives had complained about Iran undermining Alevism.[32][33] The Turkish government uncovered a secret plot by the Quds Force in June 2012. The investigation led the Turkish government to uncover a plot by the Quds Force and its assets, aiming to grow Iranian influence in Shia, Alevi, and ethnic Kurdish communities in Turkey. The plot aimed to religiously motivate the Shias and Alevis to start an uprising against Turkey. It also aimed to ethnically motivate the Kurds to start a separatist insurgency in Turkey. In both of these planned insurgencies, Iran would have provided support for the secessionists. Iranian attempts at converting Alevis to Shia Islam were also in the plot. In 2014, the Turkish government intervened in the case when senior aides of Erdoğan were involved in the plot.[34]

Azerbaijan

[edit]

During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iran criticised Turkey, claiming that all Turkey did was add "fuel to the fire".[35] Iran also criticised the presence of "terrorists" near its border, referring to alleged use of Syrian jihadists by Turkey and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.[36] Iran arrested several pro-Azerbaijan activists in Iranian cities, including some Turkish citizens.[37] On December 12, Turkey summoned its Iranian ambassador due to the "aggressive" reaction from Iran to the poem read by Erdogan.[38] Iran boycotted Turkish products due to the poem.[39] After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iranian influence in the South Caucasus diminished with Turkey emerging dominant.[40] The Iran-backed Husseiniyoun claimed that their goal was to repeat the Iranian revolution, but in Azerbaijan.[41][42][43]

References

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  1. ^ "Iran and Syria concerned about Turkish intervention in Jarablus". Rudaw Media. Rudaw Media. Retrieved 10 December 2016.
  2. ^ "Ankara-Tehran relations faced with many obstacles - analyst". Ahval.
  3. ^ a b Pomeroy, Robin (8 October 2011). "Iran tells Turkey: change tack or face trouble". Reuters. Retrieved 14 January 2021.
  4. ^ "Iran: NATO radar in Turkey serves to protect Israel". Ynetnews. October 4, 2011.
  5. ^ LaFranchi, Howard (6 April 2012). "Why Iran got huffy about a certain locale for next nuclear talks". The Christian Science Monitor.
  6. ^ "Erdogan Defies Trump Over Iran Sanctions | Voice of America - English". www.voanews.com.
  7. ^ "An Israeli-Turkish love affair over Hezbollah?". The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com.
  8. ^ Idiz, Semih (December 20, 2016). "Animosity toward Iran reaches fever pitch in Turkey after Aleppo". Al-Monitor.
  9. ^ "Iran opposes any Turkish military operation in Syria: Iran foreign ministry statement". Reuters. October 8, 2019 – via www.reuters.com.
  10. ^ "Iran opposes military action in Syria, Zarif tells Turkey". The Times of Israel. 8 October 2019. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
  11. ^ "Turkey-Syria border: All the latest updates". aljazeera.com.
  12. ^ Wintour, Patrick (2 December 2024). "Syria crisis due to Assad's refusal to engage with opposition, says Turkish minister". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 8 December 2024.
  13. ^ Wintour, Patrick. "As Assad's power crumbles, Turkey, Iran and Russia disagree on way forward for Syria". The Observer.
  14. ^ Chughtai, Alia. "Territory lost by Kurds in Iraq". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  15. ^ "Iraq: Stabilising the Contested District of Sinjar | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 2022-05-31. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  16. ^ streiman (2021-04-01). "The Sinjar agreement has good ideas, but is it a dead end?". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  17. ^ "النجباء تحذر من "غرفة عمليات تركية" تدير مخططًا لتخريب العراق". العربية - Rojnews.news (in Arabic). 2024-12-10. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  18. ^ Erdoğan focuses on trade during Iran visit Al-Monitor
  19. ^ "The Iran-Haftar links in Libya". July 17, 2020.
  20. ^ "What's behind Iran's sudden realignment with Turkey?". July 1, 2020.
  21. ^ "Haftar used Iranian anti-tank missiles in war on Tripoli, UN report finds | The Libya Observer". www.libyaobserver.ly.
  22. ^ Nastaran Moosavi, "Secularism in Iran," in Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar (eds.), Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives (Hartford: ISSSC, 2007), рр. 143-45.
  23. ^ "هواداران پرحاشیه تراکتورسازی چگونه فوتبال ایران را به هم ریخته‌اند؟ /ضرر‌هایی که تراکتورسازی از هوادارنما‌های پرحاشیه دیده است/۵ حاشیه بزرگ تراکتورسازی در فصل گذشته". پایگاه خبری تحلیلی فردا | Farda News (in Persian). Archived from the original on 2019-08-30. Retrieved 2019-08-30.
  24. ^ "سوء استفاده رسانه‌های ترکیه از حواشی هواداران تراکتور + عکس". ایسنا (in Persian). 2016-12-18. Archived from the original on 24 April 2022. Retrieved 2019-08-30.
  25. ^ "Bakan Soylu: Siyasete en büyük darbe terördür". DHA | Demirören Haber Ajansı (in Turkish). 2020-06-06. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  26. ^ "Syria and Iran 'backing Kurdish terrorist group', says Turkey". The Telegraph. 3 September 2012. Archived from the original on 11 January 2022. Retrieved 17 October 2012.
  27. ^ The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience, Suleyman Ozeren, Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism, Ed. Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism, (IOS Press, 2008), 159.
  28. ^ Turkish Hezbollah, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Ed. Harvey Kushner, (Sage Publications Inc., 1993), 368-369.
  29. ^ The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy, Kemal Kirisci, The future of Turkish foreign policy, Ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, (MIT Press, 2004), 295.
  30. ^ Turkey and the War on Terror, Andrew Mango, (Routledge, 2005), 65.
  31. ^ "Implications of Turkey's Anti-Hizbullah Operation | The Washington Institute". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Archived from the original on March 23, 2024. Retrieved 2024-02-03.
  32. ^ "Alevi temsilcilerinden iddia: Şiileştirme çabaları arttı, gençleri türbe ziyareti diye İran'a götürüp etkilemeye çalışıyorlar". Independent Türkçe (in Turkish). 2020-09-11. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  33. ^ "Alevi temsilcileri: Şiileştirme çabaları arttı, gençleri türbe ziyareti diye İran'a götürüp etkilemeye çalışıyorlar... Tehlike gerçekten büyük". turkish.aawsat.com (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  34. ^ "Iran's secret plot to co-opt Turkey's Alevis, Shiites exposed in Quds Force terror probe - Nordic Monitor". nordicmonitor.com. 2021-02-02. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  35. ^ Staff, Al-Monitor (October 6, 2020). "Iran criticizes Turkey's role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". Al-Monitor.
  36. ^ "Iran warns 'terrorists' near border in Karabakh fighting". Al-Monitor. March 1, 2021.
  37. ^ "Iran's state-run media avoids discussing the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict". TRT World. 20 October 2020.
  38. ^ "Turkey summons Iranian ambassador over Azeri poem tensions". ABC News. Retrieved 12 December 2020.
  39. ^ "Erdoğan'ın Azerbaycan'da okuduğu şiirden rahatsız olan İran Türk mallarını boykot ediyor". December 13, 2020.
  40. ^ "Iran Battles Turkish Influence in South Caucasus". CEPA. 2022-11-01. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  41. ^ "İbrahimbəyli "Hüseyniyyun" dəstəsi yaradıb - Şok DETALLAR". Metbuat.az.
  42. ^ "İbrahimbəyli "Hüseyniyyun" dəstəsi yaradıb - Şok məlumat". Axar.Az. July 15, 2018.
  43. ^ "Tohid İbrahimbəyli İranda dini təhsil alan şəxslərin iştirakı ilə "Hüseyniyyun" (Hüseynçilər) adlı silahlı dəstə yaradıb". Apa.az.
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