Talk:Bank run/Archive 1

Archive 1

Argentine bank run

I think this happened recently in Argentina.

Northern Rock section - possible inaccuracies

Two possible queries:

First: "...arranged (but did not use)...": I recall reading an article in a British newspaper during w/c 17 September 2007 which claimed that Northern Rock eventually did use the emergency loan facility, to the tune of approx. £2.5bn. I can't find it in a quick Google search, though.

Second: "...liquidity problems (stemming from over-exposure to the failing US sub-prime mortgage market). A run...": The government claimed that NR's liquidity problems were purely due to US sub-prime, but other reports suggest that potential investors were afraid that Northern Rock itself had done a lot of risky lending within the UK mortgage market, and therefore has its own, home-grown sub-prime issue. Suggest change to: "...liquidity problems, which NR's defenders claimed were the result of over-exposure to the failing US sub-prime mortgage market, and its critics argued were the result of NR's own careless lending practices." —Preceding unsigned comment added by LDGE (talk • contribs) 19:33, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

Request for generalizing article title

It seems financial institution isn't the only one with withdrawl rush. In 1997, there was a case of run of bakery in Hong Kong, where a rush of customers redeeming their cake cards from Saint Honore Cake Shop.[1][2] Considering it can and have happened to places outside financial institution, I believe it is time for the article title to be replaced with withdrawl rush to better reflect the nature of the activity. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jacob Poon (talk • contribs) 00:46, 28 February 2008 (UTC)

For the obligatory English links:

• Preliminary Survey Indicates Cake and VideoShops Owe Coupon Holders Millions of Dollars Worth of Goods Yet to be Redeemed
• THE EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS
• Hong Kong, Feeling Flu-ish
• Asia and the world economy

Jacob Poon 00:56, 28 February 2008 (UTC)

Sorry, but "bank run" is the standard term. Google Scholar cites about 3,500 articles on bank runs. Only one article (a bank-run article) has the phrase "withdrawal rush". Wikipedia is not supposed to invent terms. Eubulides (talk) 04:32, 28 February 2008 (UTC)

It isn't really inventing terms, it is a literal description of the events. It is no more inventing than specifying hypothetical chemical element using systematic element name or chemical using IUPAC nomenclature of organic chemistry. Besides, if there were indeed an article using "withdrawal rush", then it is just using existing term, isn't it? Jacob Poon 03:36, 29 February 2008 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jacob Poon (talk • contribs)

The article in question prefers the term "bank run". Even if it didn't, it's one article against 3500. Just one article is not notable and would not qualify under WP:NOTABLE. And Wikipedia generalizing the term would run afoul of WP:OR. Sorry. Eubulides (talk) 06:25, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

Remove the trivia section

I propose that the section Bank run#In fiction be removed, as per WP:TRIVIA guidelines. Comments? Eubulides (talk) 07:10, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

I agree. I would suggest, however, that the "It's a Wonderful Life" reference be integrated somehow - this is often referred to in serious discussions (as an illustration of how they work).--Gregalton (talk) 11:27, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

OK, thanks, I did that. Eubulides (talk) 22:53, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

Thank you - well-written and artfully integrated, and all that cruft removed. Well done!--Gregalton (talk) 08:42, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

The "In Fiction" Section has been re-instated because the majority of people know what a Bank Run is from fiction and thus is relevant to the article title.

The "In Fiction" section wasn't needed for that, as Bank run already mentioned "It's a Wonderful Life". The "In Fiction" was clearly a trivia list and WP:TRIVIA recommends against such lists for good reason: it was not an encyclopedic section. It might be relevant to have a section that discusses bank runs in fiction, but that section isn't it. I suggest instead building on the existing text, which talks about "It's a Wonderful Life". You might start by reading the Maland 1998, the source that the existing text cites. Eubulides (talk) 19:22, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Changes got Diamond & Dybvig backwards

This change improved the wording in Bank run #Theory, but it contains several important technical errors; among other things it confuses borrowers with savers. Also, it introduces the notion of bank profit, which is irrelevant to the Diamond-Dybvig model; the model applies equally well to nonprofit banks. I made this further change to try to repair the confusion. Eubulides (talk) 16:38, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

It's true that the DD paper only mentions two classes of players: savers/depositors and banks. In the model, any investment is either done directly by the savers (if there is no banking) or done directly by the bank itself. But I think the model is more clearly understood if it is described in terms of three classes of agents: depositors/savers, banks, and businesses that need to borrow in order to finance illiquid high-return investments. Describing it this way allows us to refer to the bank as an 'intermediary' between depositors and borrowers, which I believe is DD's intended interpretation. I think describing the model as if banks are the ones that directly invest in illiquid assets makes it harder for the lay reader to understand, even though this is in fact what the paper assumed. --Rinconsoleao (talk) 07:41, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

• The current wording in Bank run describes things using the three classes of agents: depositors, banks, and borrowers. The wording also says that banks make "long-term loans that invest in a set of illiquid assets" rather than merely "invest in a set of illiquid assets". So, to some extent, the wording addresses the concerns you raised.
• I'm reluctant to depart much further from the wording that D&D used; after all, they are the reliable source here. It's OK to explain D&D's terminology, but it's less OK to substitute a different terminology.
• The problem I saw with the previous edit is that, in attempting to use everyday terminology, it got D&D's theory backwards. It said "the bank itself (as opposed to the original depositors) may run out of liquidity"; but the liquidity that D&D was referring to was the liquidity of the borrowers, not of the depositors. Also, it said savers may prefer to hold their assets in liquid accounts "because they cannot easily predict when they will need access to their money"; but D&D's main point was that it was the borrowers who need access to liquid assets, not the depositors.

Eubulides (talk) 08:08, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree with most of what you're saying, but not with your last bullet point. To be precise, the DD paper only has two classes of players: depositors and banks. So technically there are no borrowers in their paper; in banking equilibria, the investment in illiquid assets is done by the bank itself (instead of being done by businesses that received loans from the bank, as in the real world). In the paper, the agents who may have an unexpected need for liquidity are the depositors; that's why they prefer liquid accounts. See the section entitled 'The bank's role in providing liquidity', where DD discuss 'demand deposit contracts', if you think I'm wrong about this. --Rinconsoleao (talk) 09:28, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

So I just did an edit that mentions depositors and banks only, with no mention of borrowers. I hope you agree that this reflects the original DD paper fairly literally (and that it does not get things backwards). Alternatively, we could distinguish between all three classes of players, for greater realism, in which case we could go back to my earlier version that you challenged. --Rinconsoleao (talk) 09:50, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

It's better, but it still has some problems.

• It removed a key point supported by page 190 of Diamond 2007, which says "banks can be viewed as an insurance arrangement in which depositors share the risk of liquidating an asset early at a loss". This point wasn't made as clearly as it should have been; I'll work on improving that.
• It doesn't give an example of a "sudden, unpredictable need for their cash", and the lack of an example might lead the naive reader to think we're talking about gambling debts or something. It's better to give an example here of why filling this sudden need provides a productive input to the economy, and conversely why not filling the need will hamper production.
• It talks about "savers" as well as "depositors", which is confusing. It's better to stick with D&D's terminology.
• It says "the bank itself (as opposed to its depositors) may run short of liquidity" whereas the previous versions said "borrowers" rather than "depositors". On thinking of this further, both "borrowers" and "depositors" are right, but in different senses.

• Depositors need liquidity; that's why they've put their money in the bank, after all. However, depositors could have put their money under the mattress, which would be even more liquid, so in the absence of a bank they don't have liquidity problems per se (assuming we have a stable money system, of course).
• Borrowers need liquidity too. They borrow money from the bank because they have an opportunity but lack liquid assets to pursue it. This is a classic liquidity problem.

As you mentioned in your comment, D&D elegantly sidestep this issue by talking about "investors" (who can be either depositors or borrowers); for example, Diamond 2007 p. 195 repeatedly talks about "investors" in the paragraph just before the paragraph that says "The bank may have liquidity problems." So I think we should say "investors" (or, more clearly, "individual investors", a phrase Diamond 2007 p. 195 also uses), rather than interpolating our own terminology here.

There are a few minor wording problems as well:

• The phrase "like store inventories, machinery, and real estate" makes the sentence harder to read because it has internal commas, and is put inside a sentence that has more commas, which leads the reader to be confused about whether these commas are at the same level as the other commas. It's simpler to give just 2 examples rather than 3, to avoid the need for the internal commas and avoid the confusion, e.g., "like store inventories and real estate".
• It's better to avoid parentheses when it's easy to do so.
• The phrase "on the other hand" isn't needed.
• "Tries to call" is better simply as "call".

I made this change to try to address the above problems. Eubulides (talk) 18:24, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

I think the D&D errors were really too large, but more importantly the explanations were too different between this page and the main theory page. I understand the points that were being made earlier, but the approach has to be consistent. Also, it seems to me that the previous text neglected to take into consideration that the Diamond restatement paper on the theory looks at it from a more modern, investment-oriented approach and is really answering another question. That is: "why do banks put themselves into this position in the first place?". Also, there has to be at least a little theoretical context that speaks to the fact that an unsound bank will cause a run on itself (and even other banks) when it interrupts the "credit chain". Thus I referenced the other paper from the Atlanta Fed. --Dlawbailey (talk) 12:50, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

List of banking crises

The New York Times claims that "since World War II, there have been 18 banking crises in industrial countries. The worst five were caused by changing lending standards or real estate bubbles (often both) and cost at least 6 to 20 percent of G.D.P., the U.S. equivalent of $850 billion to $2.8 trillion."

They then list the "worst 5:"

Spain, 1977 Spain Cost: >16% of G.D.P. A poor response to the oil shock of 1973 and weak bank supervision meant half of banks had solvency problems; the government took over 20 small banks.

Norway, 1987 Norway Cost: 8% of G.D.P Deregulation led to problem real estate loans and banks had too little capital to absorb losses. A drop in oil prices started the crisis.

Finland, 1991 Finland Cost: 11% of G.D.P. Big increases in household debt and overly optimistic assessments of asset quality added to problems caused by the loss of exports to Soviet Union.

Sweden, 1991 Sweden Cost: 6% of G.D.P. Deregulation meant banks were able to make poorly documented loans without supervision. A real estate bubble collapsed.

Japan, 1992 Japan Est. Cost: >20% of G.D.P. A sharp plunge in the real estate market caused bad loans to pile up, starting a stretch of stagnation known as Japan's lost decade.

What were the other 13? I think we should have articles on each of them in the same way we have articles on other banking panics.

128.59.169.46 (talk) 23:06, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Technical definition of "Bank Run"???

At what percentage of deposits withdrawn does a bank run come into existence? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Dlawbailey (talk • contribs) 06:29, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

Big change to theory section

This big change to Bank run #Theory introduced some nice explanations, but also it had several problems.

• Most important, it copied multiple sentences verbatim from sources, without quote marks. We can't do that; see WP:COPYVIO. The sentences weren't that important so I removed them. If there is any other copying that I didn't recognize, please remove the copies ASAP.
• It introduced a lot of unnecessary material about exchange banks and the history of banking. I trimmed most of this away, moving some of it to the History section (where I don't think it's all that relevant to bank runs, but it does add a bit of color I suppose).
• It introduced a lot of repetition. The same ideas were explained in several different ways. At some point the repetition became dizzying; it wasn't clear whether a new repetition was significantly different from a previous one, or whether it was merely repetition.
• It was poorly sourced. We need sources for every claim in the encyclopedia.

I attempted to work around these problems with this big change, but more work is needed. As things stand, the Bank run #Theory section is too long; it should be only about 3 paragraphs, not 6 paragraphs, as it is a brief summary of Diamond-Dybvig model. Eubulides (talk) 06:41, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

First, I was actually about to remove the first part of my addition. I think it's important to give the context, but it was much too long.

Second, I am getting used to this Wikipedia standard of using texts. I want to cleave as close as possible to authoritative texts so that I'm not accused of putting in "original research". I'm sure I'll get it right eventually.

Third, I'll leave the substance for another time. In my view, the D&D page itself mis-states the theory somewhat, but this page was too much.

Fourth, as for the repetition, yeah I noticed it, too. I tried to use the text from the D&D page. I can only work with what I have at hand.

Fifth, I used exactly the same sourcing as the original pages and changed nothing when it came to D&D. For the other I used the authors' principle, most crucial argument, which has clearly stood academic scrutint (as it was being republished by the Fed) and the historical stuff is multiply sourced in the text of the article itself - so that's a nice, neat way to do it.

In my view, bringing D&D into it may be confusing in the first place. A bank run happens because too many people withdraw their money at once. D&D make an argument that this is an intrinsic danger to demand deposit banking and while this argument is, I think, well-accepted, the larger economics involved may be not be too important. I suggest this text:

"Banks are financial intermediaries. Work on the origins of banking suggests that the mathematics of the bank help create a system that encourages honest trade, provides increased liquidity and diminishes risk for all participants and therefore logically attracts depositors.

The Diamond and Dybvig model of banking suggests that banks themselves have an incentive to offer ultra-liquid demand accounts to depositors because it helps them provide the liquidity the economy demands. However, Diamond and Dybvig also point out a danger:

1. The loans made by the bank can be liquidated far less quickly than the depositors can liquidate their accounts.

2. Mathematically, depositors in demand deposit institutions have a perverse incentive to withdraw their money from the bank - thus possibly causing a bank run - if they suspect others will do the same.

Their model implies that financial intermediation via demand deposit contracts will have a fatal “bank run equilibrium” unless safeguards are put in place.

In theoretical terms, the Diamond-Dybvig model finds depositors in an economic ”game” with more than one Nash equilibrium where it is actually logical for each individual depositor to engage in a bank run once she suspects one might start - even though that run will cause the collapse of the bank. For that reason a bank run can occur when started by a true or a false story. Even depositors who know the story is false will have a logical incentive to withdraw if they suspect other depositors will believe the story. The story becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, Robert K. Merton, who coined the term self-fulfilling prophecy, mentioned bank runs as a prime example of the concept in his book Social Theory and Social Structure."

I dunno, that rewrite is shorter (which is nicer) but it omits several important points that are present in the current version:

• The D&D model is "influential".
• The D&D model assumes that needs for cash (by depositors) and for loans (by borrowers) are unpredictable. If they were predictable, we wouldn't need banks so much.
• Loans are invested in assets that have real value and that can grow, with the implication that this helps the economy.
• There is a risk of default by borrowers; although D&D focus more on the risk due to unpredictable needs.
• "If only a few depositors withdraw at any given time, this arrangement works well."
• "the bank itself (as opposed to individual investors) may run short of liquidity"
• "forcing the bank to liquidate its assets at a loss, and eventually to fail" The proposed rewrite says "liquidated far less quickly" which is not the same thing.
• "If such a bank calls in its loans early, this may force businesses to disrupt their production, or individuals to sell their homes, causing further losses to the larger economy."

Also, some of the additions are confusing:

• "the mathematics of the bank help" Say what? That sounds too much like "the mathematics are too much for you, reader; just trust us". We shouldn't talk down to the reader. Let's avoid the word "mathematics" entirely.
• "honest trade" I know what you're saying, but to an outsider this sounds really weird. Banks don't prevent ordinary dishonesty.
• "For that reason a bank run can occur when started by a true or a false story." That "true or a false" is weird. The existing phrase is much clearer: "A bank run can occur even when started by a false story."
• "logical incentive". Just say "incentive".

Eubulides (talk) 21:54, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

To your objections, last first. By "logical incentive" I mean to distinguish it from an emotional incentive and to reinforce the point D&D make that, per Nash Equilibrium, it is actually logical at the individual level to do something that is illogical on the level of all depositors - and that's really important. If it was just an emotional incentive, jawboning could work.

It's essential for people to understand that sometimes stories about failing banks are actually true. It's not me saying it, that's the FDIC. They don't want uninsured depositors to ignore the possibility of a liquidity failure at a troubled institution.

If you read the paper, you'd see that according to experts, banks actually do encourage honest trade. Banks are by by definition scrupulous record-keepers and because traders have a common interest in the banking system, they are less likely to misbehave on a large scale. Whether it sounds "weird" or not says nothing to whether it's true.

Again, if you'd read the paper, you'd see that, just like D&D, the authors show that when depositors enter into a banking relationship, the math of their economic relationships change and that influences their behavior.

That sentence doesn't mean anything in terms of a bank run because liquidation of those kinds of assets can't impact a near-term liquidity crisis AND it gives the totally false impression that banks are allowed to call in their loans because they have a liquidity crisis. The whole point is that this is untrue. In fact, what banks do to shrink their balance sheets is not call in existing loans but stop lending.

The real truth is that banks have some assets that are actually more liquid than some demand accounts - for example, 30-day paper versus 60-day CDs. People actually know this. So the problem, in fact, is that the average term of depositor accounts is much shorter than the average term of loans. Therefore "liquidated far less quickly" is more correct and does not interfere with the D&D model. You have to remember that D&D are moving back and forth between a theorized, non-bank credit model and the real bank credit model. In the theorized model, all loans from individuals COULD be callable. In the real, bank model, D&D themselves note that borrowers demand non-callable, long-term loans. And it doesn't matter that SOME very small percentage of a bank's loans are or are potentially callable in the short term - again it's the average term of the loans/assets that matters. Furthermore, a bank failure does NOT come from liquidation at loss. A failure from a bank run comes because the bank cannot meet depositor liabilities. Banks can and do survive with far less capital on hand than we demand of our banks here in the U.S.. The purely theoretical and totally unreal financial "possibility" that a bank could suddenly transfer all its assets into other hands in exchange for some notional amount of cash (which would represent a huge loss) is not an important consideration here, although it does belong on the D&D page itself.

(In case recent news items cause some confusion, when real, actual deposit banks transfer all their deposits or liabilities or both to another institution (as has happened recently) it is to marry those deposits and/or liabilities with other capital and cash, thereby diluting the risk. Merrill Lynch - not a demand deposit institution, but an investment bank - may have recently sold assets at a huge loss, and when they did their capital shrank drastically. But this did not cause a run on the bank - but it could have - or the rumor of it could have. )

This sentence is really completely confused and confusing. "Individual investors" will absolutely lose money if the bank fails and their deposits are not insured. Liquidity crises make money disappear. That's why they are so scary.

I'm happy to put that sentence back in.

The premise of the Diamond paper is to start with the *theoretical* question (that in reality has long ago been answered) of whether it makes more sense for individuals to invest directly or to invest through banks. But D&D do not make an explicit argument about economic benefit of investment qua investment that is important in this context. Rather, they simply assume a rate of return on assets, assert a reasonable average risk profile and show how the liquidity offered by banks better matches that risk profile. I point that out that D&D say banks add desired liquidity, but that can be said more clearly without getting into an unnecessary diversion. Another thing banks add to total investment is money creation and we could point that out also, I guess. I hope you'll believe me when I say that's not something we want to get into here. More importantly, average positive economic growth from assets does not apply here. A bank run situation could start with a bank - like IndyMac - that has invested in things that fail to grow. Better we stick with the question of liquidity. That's hard enough.

Unpredictability translates to the need for liquidity. Bank provide liquidity. Bank runs are a liquidity crisis, not an unpredictability crisis. Indeed, D&D's whole point is that bank runs are a PREDICTABLE outcome. Leave the explanation of how unpredictability translates into the need for liquidity for the D&D page itself, I think.

I'm glad you pointed out that I omitted the word "influential". I thought I had put it in.

I will offer a re-write later in the day. --Dlawbailey (talk) 22:26, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

• The phrase "logical incentive" did not clearly communicate what you wanted to a novice reader. Perhaps it could be worded more clearly, in the Nash Equilibrium section.

• The cited source makes the point about bank runs happening even when the story is false. This point is worth mentioning separately, because it's counterintuitive to many people. Bank runs happening when the story is true could be mentioned separately, I suppose, but the way it was worded lost most of the force of explaining the counterintutive story.

• I still think this article should not contain handwaving references to "mathematics". Stuff like that just looks to me like we're trying to tell the reader "this stuff is too hard for your poor little brain to understand; you'll just have to trust us".

• "If you read the paper". I assume you're talking about McAndrews & Roberds 1999 here? If so, I don't see why we need to emphasize that paper so much. That paper is not about bank runs. It's already overemphasized in this article, and should not be emphasized more. This article should not be a general discussion about banking, honest trade, the virtues of the banking system, etc., etc. It should be about bank runs, with only brief mentions of the other stuff (though those brief mentions are important; see below).

• Diamond 2007 says "Bank runs disrupt production because they force banks to call in loans early. This forces the borrowers to disrupt their production." This supports the claim in the text that calling in loans is something can banks do in response to bank runs or the threat of bank runs, and that this in turn disrupts the wider economy.

• Diamond 2007 says "the sudden withdrawals can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets at a loss and to fail." This supports "forcing the bank to liquidate its assets at a loss, and eventually to fail"; it does not support "liquidated far less quickly". We have to stick with claims that supported by the cited sources.

• The article is not claiming that the bank would liquidate "all its assets", only some of them. It is following what Diamond 2007 says on this subject. I suppose we should change "liquidate its assets" to "liquidate many of its assets"; I've done that.

• How about if we change it to ""the bank itself may run short of liquidity"?

• I agree that we don't want to go into detail about money creation and so forth, but it's still useful to briefly mention that the economy is helped by having banks that can spread the risk of making loans. This is related to the notion of unpredictability, as the idea of sharing risk is a key notion of the D&D model.

• I disagree that Bank run should avoid all mention of unpredictability. The ordinary reader won't understand the relationship between unpredictability and liquidity. Unpredictability, and the desire to avoid it, is an important reason why bank runs occur. The Diamond paper focuses on this, and is right to do so; we shouldn't second-guess the source.

Eubulides (talk) 02:23, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

Worldview tag

This edit add a {{Worldview}} tag, I think because the first paragraph delved into the history of banking in Europe that had little to do with bank runs per se. To try to fix the problem I removed the paragraph in question, along with the tag. Eubulides (talk) 21:15, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

I added the Worldview tag because the paragraph only mentions bank runs in the western world (mostly USA, UK). I can hardly believe that there has never been a bank run in all of Asia. —Agentbla ^(talk) 16:03, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

Lead words

"As a result, the bank faces bankruptcy, and will 'call in' the loans it has offered. This can cause the bank's debtors to face bankruptcy themselves" - this sounds quite odd, or maybe country-specific but definitely should not be presented as a generalization. Not in the lead. The bank normally cannot change terms of loan contract and call it in just to fill a cash need. Selling loans to a third party is common but very different. NVO (talk) 12:32, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

It depends on the loan type. If it's a home mortgage loan in the U.S. you're right, they normally cannot be called in. But it's a real issue for some other loan types, e.g., "The banks had to call in and contract loans, thereby trapping the Japanese economy in a credit crunch." in Ozawa T (1999). "The rise and fall of bank-loan capitalism: institutionally driven growth and crisis in Japan". J Econ Issues. 33 (2). Retrieved 2008-08-20. I made this edit to try to clarify it a bit. Eubulides (talk) 21:21, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

Why does "bank failure" lead here?

A bank run and a bank failure are not the same. Why does "bank failure" lead to this article? Washington Mutual just collapsed, yet there was no bank run. --JHP (talk) 04:28, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

Please read the news stories on WaMu and you will see that 'runs' of depositors nervous about availability and time lags and access to their money, this following stories on IndyMac Bank helped precipitate the stock collapse.Critical Chris (talk) 17:16, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

Please feel free to create a new article, specific to bank failures. In the meantime, I don't see much harm in the redirect. Eubulides (talk) 04:34, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

"High" importance nomination

I'm not a wikipedia superstar, and don't know all the tricks, but this article should be nominated for HIGH importance, in consideration of a US$17 Billion dollar run on Washington Mutual Bank forcing the hand of federal regulators to move on the largest bank bailout in US history.Critical Chris (talk) 17:16, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

I forwarded this nomination to Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Business #Bank run importance?. Eubulides (talk) 19:36, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

Good proposal. I saw Eubulides comment at the project talk page, and I think I improved on Critical Chris's suggestion by moving it to WikiProject Finance, and giving it Top importance. --Hroðulf (or Hrothulf) (Talk) 11:16, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

How the a bank run "coordinated" and not a mass action?

How the is a run "coordinated" and not a mass action? Do all the depositors coordinate under a grand conspiracy to stretch a line around the corner? I'm tempted to rv my edits, unless you can educate me as to how this is a coordinated action.Critical Chris (talk) 19:53, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but that's backwards. The burden of proof for a challengeable claim is on the editor who wants to insert the claim into the article; any such claim must be supported by a reliable source that says a bank run is a Mass action (sociology). I am unaware of any claims to that effect in the literature, and I'm skeptical that it's true: bank runs invariably require common information to spark a run, and that common information is a form of coordination. Mass actions are supposed to not require coordination. Eubulides (talk) 20:25, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

That the New York Times arrives on doormats all over the country...that's coordination...what? I'd call that mass media yes, the business press are informing lots of folks of the financial portrait of a bank, but this a 20th century news model today, and the news media actually trys to assuage peoples fears by reminding them of the FDIC, etc. They're not encouraging bank runs. Now if you are talking about a radical 19th century periodical...maybe we have a different story. Please educate us as to this history of coordinated runs on banks if that occurred. Mass movements are "organic" yes, rhizomal, and non-hierarchical, but what's to say a bank run doesn't also work on these levels?Critical Chris (talk) 20:40, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

It doesn't matter what you or I say about bank runs. What matters is what reliable sources say. Please see WP:RS for more about reliable sources, and WP:V for Wikipedia policy about reliable sources. If we don't have reliable sources saying that bank runs are mass actions, we should not claim that they are in the article. Eubulides (talk) 20:48, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

I should mention that it's not just the mass-action part of these edits that is unsourced. The edits also make claims about the prisoner's dilemma and the Tragedy of the commons that is unsourced. This article should be focused on bank runs, and what reliable sources say about bank runs; it's not a place for us Wikipedia editors to give our analogies and theories. Eubulides (talk) 21:11, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

I noticed that several chunks of the lead weren't supported by reliable sources, or presented ideas that were not in the body (which isn't WP:SUMMARY style), and revamped the lead in an attempt to fix these problems. Eubulides (talk) 21:31, 26 September 2008 (UTC)

Great Depression etc.

This edit had some problems:

• It replaced "Much of the Great Depression's economic damage was caused directly by bank runs" with "The Great Depression was propogated by bank runs". But that's not what the cited source says. The cited source (Bernanke 1983) says that the Depression's economic damage was caused directly by bank runs, not that the Depression was propagated by bank runs.
• It replaced "Several techniques help to prevent bank runs" with "Several governmental systems help to prevent bank runs". But this doesn't summarize the text as well. As the text makes clear, some techniques that help to prevent bank runs do not involve governmental systems. We can fix this by mentioning one of these techniques in the lead.
• It replaced "These techniques do not always work: for example, even with deposit insurance" with "These systems still have shortcomings as even with deposit insurance in force". But this isn't quite right. The point is that no technique works in general, not merely that deposit insurance doesn't work.
• It replaced "fears" with "beliefs". But in this case the belief is a fear. Why use the more-general term when the more-specific one is shorter and easier to understand, and is just as accurate?

I made this change to try to fix the problems noted above. Eubulides (talk) 02:56, 28 September 2008 (UTC)

Possible split

This is a great page, but sooner or later I think we will need to split the article analyzing how a run occurs at a single bank from the material analyzing how a crisis spreads across the whole banking system. I just added a subsection on systemic banking crises, but I think at some point there should be a whole article called Systemic banking crisis. Suggestions on alternative names (Banking panic? Credit crunch?) would be appreciated.

Oh really, I think "bank panic" should be split off into a separate article. In any event the use of the word "panic" in the context of describing the the judgement and motivations workaday depositor, is inherently biased POV horse poo. I would love to be educated as to research from the economics schools accurately reporting the motivations of a banker when he swiftly departs to his walnut-paneled restroom upon hearing news of the markets crashing before he reaches for the phone hanging next to the shower to order a temporary suspension of withdrawls. Oh I forgot "panic" is for the little people.Critical Chris (talk) 01:06, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

The term "bank panic" is well-supported by reliable sources, and we should not substitute our own terminology because of our own personal preferences or opinions. Eubulides (talk) 01:10, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

Alternatively, systemic issues could be discussed in the financial crisis page. But I think that would be a mistake, because 'financial crisis' is a much broader term, including phenomena like stock market crashes and currency crises that are clearly distinguishable from banking panics (which is not to deny that one type of crisis often leads to another). --Rinconsoleao (talk) 09:08, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

If there's enough material we should definitely split it. For now, the article is fairly small, and the topics of bank runs, banking panics, and systemic banking crises are so closely related, that I think it's OK to continue to keep it on the same page. Thanks for the material on systemic banking crises in the lead. I expanded that material quite a bit, and put it into the body, with a brief summary in the lead as per WP:SUMMARY style. Eubulides (talk) 18:45, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

I don't think it's ready to split yet, but I'm sure people will keep adding to this page given the current relevance of the topic. And the material they add will probably analyze systemic crises instead of crises at the level of an individual bank. As for the 'Systemic banking crises' section (I took that term from a new IMF summary of the topic), let's NOT mix it in with the rest of the history section because we should try to keep discussion of crises at individual banks separate from discussion of systemic crises.

Bank run prevention

Recently I made an edit [3] about the fact that the maturities of the assets and liabilities of banks are not matched:

The obvious way to prevent bank runs is to prohibit the banks from altering the liquidity of their assets when making loans. Then bank runs would be theoretically impossible. For instance to make a five year loan the bank must also sell a five year certificate of the same amount. The owner of the certificate then cannot run to the bank at any time. He has to wait until the five years have elapsed to get his money back. At that time the loan ends and the bank gets the liquidity it needs for the certificate payment.

I wonder if there have been any proposals to regulate the mismatch to zero, as this would seem to prevent bank runs, after reading article Asset liability mismatch. Or if the absolute value of the duration gap of the total assets and liabilities of the bank should be set to a maximum allowed time. More notes at Talk:Bank regulation#Asset-liability maturity match requirement?. Najro (talk) 17:14, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

This topic sounds like original research to me. Eubulides (talk) 17:46, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

Actually, it sounds more like narrow banking to me. By requiring banks merely to store depositors' money, instead of lending it out, there would be no mismatch, and bank runs would be prevented. Or by requiring banks to invest in government bonds only, instead of lending it out to private individuals and firms. Most economists nowadays think narrow banking is a matter of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, and that it is better to permit fractional-reserve banking so that savers can earn higher interest and borrowers have greater access to funds. But fractional-reserve banking requires adequate deposit insurance and/or banking supervision and/or other regulation, because otherwise it is prone to panics. --Rinconsoleao (talk) 17:17, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Ah, OK, if that's that was meant, then Bank run already talks about the subject: it's the last bullet in Bank run #Individual banks. Specific proposals for improving the text are welcome. It would be nice to cite a reliable source on the subject (currently none are cited, which is bad). Eubulides (talk) 17:33, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

No I'm not talking about full-reserve banking (but as the subject popped up there I made a note: Talk:Full-reserve banking#Maturity-matched banking). I mean the banks can lend as much money as they like, as long as they keep the maturities of their assets and liabilities matched. They have to stop borrowing short and lending long. For example today the banks make a five-year loan from demand deposits. This create a maturity mismatch (5 years compared to 1 day). I mean the bank instead has to fund the five-year loan with a five-year certificate, that is, a promise from the lender to not withdraw his money until after five years. Najro (talk) 10:03, 18 October 2008 (UTC)

Rothbard etc.

This series of edits introduced several problems:

• It introduced several phrases that are not supported by the cited sources, including:

• "A bank can try to minimize signs that the bank is in trouble"
• "This is, of course, a measure that may come too late to save the reputation of the bank."
• "'at call' deposits"

• (This is minor). It replaced "Panic of 1819" with "The Panic of 1819", contradicting the style used in the rest of the bullets.
• It promotes the fringe theory of full-reserve banking, by mentioning this theories prominently and uncritically at the start of Bank run #Prevention. It is OK to mention fringe theories, but as per WP:FRINGE they should not be mentioned prominently, as if they had the same value as mainstream theories, and should definitely not be mentioned as gospel.
• I made this followup change, to try to address the above edits. More fixes are needed (we reliable and recent sources to talk about full-reserve theory), but they can be made later. But we do need to take care not to emphasize Rothbard more than reliable mainstream sources do.

Eubulides (talk) 00:50, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

The bizarre characterization of premier Austrian economist Murray Rothbard as "fringe" and "exotic" (as if he's a strange exotic species of foreign fish) does not make the reference invalid. Regardless, many many comments in this section are unreferenced - yet have been accepted and not challenged and not been subject to amendment. Examples:

A bank can take deposits from depositors who do not observe common information that might spark a run. (Unreferenced)

Some prevention techniques apply across the whole economy, though they may still allow individual institutions to fail. (Unreferenced)

A silent run occurs when the implicit fiscal deficit from a government's unbooked loss exposure to zombie banks is large enough to deter depositors of those banks. As more depositors and investors begin to doubt whether a government can support a country's banking system, the silent run on the system can gather steam, causing the zombie banks' funding costs to increase. If a zombie bank sells some assets at market value, its remaining assets contain a larger fraction of unbooked losses; if it rolls over its liabilities at increased interest rates, it squeezes its profits along with the profits of healthier competitors.(Correct, but unreferenced)

Some measures are more effective than others in containing economic fallout and restoring the banking system after a systemic crisis. These include establishing the scale of the problem, targeted debt relief programs to distressed borrowers, corporate restructuring programs, recognizing bank losses, and adequately capitalizing banks. Speedy intervention appears to substantially decrease stress on the economy. (Wrong and unreferenced. Speedy intervention can exacerbate the panic - Rule No.1 is "don't scare the horses")

I would politely suggest on this basis, we leave the statement and allow Rothbard to be added as a ref. Politely. - Ron Paul...Ron Paul... (talk) 05:36, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

I thought "exotic" was a more entertaining expression than "fringe". Anyway, Rothbard's not mainstream at all, so regarding an article like this, a more mainstream source should be found. CRETOG8(t/c) 06:02, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

Agreed that Rothbard is not mainstream. As for the "Unreferenced" claims, the style in this article, as is common in Wikipedia, is that in a paragraph of the form "A. B. C.[reference]", where the reference supports sentences A, B, and C, it's not necessary to repeat the reference after each sentence. All the "unreferenced" claims noted above are cited. I made this change to add comments, to make this more clear. Eubulides (talk) 07:50, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

I'm sorry but if you're going to be so demanding for the Rothbard cite, we may as well be consistent. This sub-para is still unreferenced:

Some measures are more effective than others in containing economic fallout and restoring the banking system after a systemic crisis. These include establishing the scale of the problem, targeted debt relief programs to distressed borrowers, corporate restructuring programs, recognizing bank losses, and adequately capitalizing banks. Speedy intervention appears to substantially decrease stress on the economy. (Wrong and unreferenced. Speedy intervention can exacerbate the panic - Rule No.1 is "don't scare the horses")

That is not "A. B. C. [Reference]". That is "A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. [Weak reference having nothing to do with A - G]". Please take it out or add references for the unreferenced sentences. Please. - Ron Paul...Ron Paul... (talk) 12:56, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

Each sentence but the last is directly supported by the cited source. Here are quotations from the cited source, to help you see the support:

• "Some measures are more effective than others in containing economic fallout and restoring the banking system after a systemic crisis." is supported by "Our preliminary analysis based on partial correlations indicates that some resolution measures are more effective than others in restoring the banking system to health and containing the fallout on the real economy." (p. 31)
• "establishing the scale of the problem" and "recognizing bank losses, and adequately capitalizing banks" are supported by "As soon as a large part of the financial system is deemed insolvent and has reached systemic crisis proportions, bank losses should be recognized, the scale of the problem should be established, and steps should be taken to ensure that financial institutions are adequately capitalized." (p. 31)
• "targeted debt relief programs to distressed borrowers, corporate restructuring programs" is supported by "To relief indebted corporates and households from financial stress and restore their balance sheets to health, intervention in the form of targeted debt relief programs to distressed borrowers and corporate restructuring programs appear most successful." (p. 31)
• I agree that "Speedy intervention appears to substantially decrease stress on the economy" is an inaccurate summary of the source. The source writes "Above all, speed appears of the essence." (p. 31) and "All too often, intervention is delayed because regulatory capital forbearance and liquidity support are used for too long to deal with insolvent financial institutions in the hope that they will recover, ultimately increasing the stress on the financial system and the real economy." (pp. 30–1)

To fix that problem with the last sentence, I replaced it with "Speed of intervention appears to be crucial; intervention is often delayed in the hope that insolvent banks will recover if given liquidity support and relaxation of regulations, and in the end this delay increases stress on the economy." Thanks for bringing the problem to our attention. Eubulides (talk) 23:04, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

Move recent incidents to new list of banking crises

I'm thinking of moving all or most of the contents of Bank run #Recent incidents to the new page List of banking crises, which seems like a more-appropriate location. That section is just a list, so it really belongs in a list page. Comments? Eubulides (talk) 00:11, 8 November 2008 (UTC)

Match the maturities of deposits and loans

This edit (which was later reverted) added sources that seem a bit dubious. What seems to have happened here is the claim "designed to match the maturities of deposits and loans" was added to the article and then someone went to look for sources to support the claim. A better practice is to find a reliable mainstream source on bank runs and 100%-reserve banking, and then to summarize what the source says. The cited Allen 1993 source, for example, is reliable, but it doesn't say anything about full-reserve banking being designed to match maturities: instead, it says that full-reserve banking was designed to put the government (rather than banks) in charge of the money supply, indicating that the main motivation during the 1930s heyday of this proposal was not bank runs at all. Perhaps we should substitute that claim, and cite Allen. Or better yet perhaps we should just drop the claim, as this full-reserve stuff is a bit wp:WEIGHTy for Bank run anyway. Eubulides (talk) 20:32, 8 November 2008 (UTC)

This edit is even worse: it deletes a reliable mainstream source (Allen 1993) and reinserts the fringe sources. Worse, the fringe sources do not support the claims about matching maturities of deposits and loans. I made this edit to restore Allen and to supply an on-point mainstream source. Eubulides (talk) 04:16, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

OK. I myself wouldn't say that the Austrian references are completely irrelevant. They do go into the benefits of fullrb. But, admittedly, the issue of bank runs under frb is peripheral to their discussion (although still discussed). I'll leave it the way you want it. Mainstream all the way. - Ron Paul...Ron Paul... (talk) 06:00, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Full-reserve

Full-reserve banking is not hypothetical. It is currently not practiced much in the Western world, but there is nothing hypothetical about it. --Kalbasa (talk) 22:16, 30 December 2008 (UTC)

Where is it practiced? Do you have a reliable source about it? If so, let's add it. However, as far as I know it is not practiced anywhere, at least not in the way described in the article. Eubulides (talk) 23:37, 30 December 2008 (UTC)

According to the Wikipedia article, full-reserve banking

• was practiced historically by the Bank of Amsterdam,
• is practiced currently by providers of private digital gold currency.

Yes, full-reserve banking is rare, but it is not hypothetical. --Kalbasa (talk) 15:11, 31 December 2008 (UTC)

Alas, Full-reserve banking cites no reliable sources to support those two claims. For the purpose of Wikipedia, other Wikipedia articles are not reliable sources (for obvious reasons). Eubulides (talk) 18:31, 31 December 2008 (UTC)

According to the article on Fractional-reserve banking, it started in 1800s. Prior to that, there was only full-reserve banking. So full-reserve is not hypothetical. It was actually used. --Kalbasa (talk) 05:21, 1 January 2009 (UTC)

Fractional-reserve banking does not say that there was only full-reserve banking before the 1880s. And even if it did, it would need to cite a reliable source to that effect, which it obviously does not. We need reliable sources external to Wikipedia; other Wikipedia articles do not count. Eubulides (talk) 06:21, 1 January 2009 (UTC)

Bank run in progres - BCR (Commercial Bank of Romania)

A strike has been announced for the middle of the week and people have started withdrawing cash from ATMs. I was just there and there's a constant line of 4 people withdrawing the maximum amount they can.

auto-archiver

Establishing. Comments here.--Gregalton (talk) 21:41, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

Claim of $5.5 trillion bank run

69.38.102.250 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) inserted the following text into Bank run #Recent incidents, citing a Youtube video:

"On 11 September, 2008, there as an attempted bank run of $5.5 Trillion that would have collapsed the US and World economy within 24 hours. The Federal Reserve Bank printed $105 Billion in money to try to overcome the bank run. They couldn’t, so at 11AM they froze all accounts at a $250k withdraw limit. Before it was over, $550 Billion had been electronically withdrawn from money market accounts in the United States. Four days later on September 15th, Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke asked congress for $700 Billion to bailout the banks.."

After this was removed, similar text was soon added by Gcjblack (talk · contribs), a new single-purpose account, and then again by 69.129.196.249 (talk · contribs · WHOIS).

This text is does not have a reliable source. A Youtube video is not reliable. Please don't keep trying to add it with unreliable sources: we need a reliable source for extraordinary claims such as this one. Please see WP:RS for what constitutes a reliable source.

Also, please bear in mind the WP:SOCK rules for editing from multiple accounts and IP addresses. Eubulides (talk) 07:52, 10 February 2009 (UTC)

Why is a Youtube video not a reliable source if it shows a US representative reporting this incident? (if you're referring to this one: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NMu1mFao3w) Unless you suspect the video is forged. Of course Rep. Kanjorski could be wrong, so it should be stated with some massive disclaimer around it. Either way, I agree that this is dubious, because it is not mentioned in a single reputable news source. I contacted factcheck.org about it. Here's the mail I sent:

Hi there,

This one has got me puzzled for hours, so perhaps you can help:

There's an interview with Rep. Kanjorski from February on Youtube titled '$550 Billion Disappeared in "Electronic Run On the Banks'.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NMu1mFao3w

In this video Rep. Kanjorski explains that in September there was an electronic bank run where $550 billion was withdrawn in a matter of hours and the FED had to jump to the rescue to prevent the global economy from collapsing.

Not a single reputable news source mentions this bank run, nor does any reputable new source mention the interview. Given that he is describing a near miss Armageddon, this is strange.

I've scanned trough some of the comments on Youtube and other sites, but I can't find anything useful. Some people come up with the usual Jewish conspiracies, and others suggest that some foreign country is behind it. Nobody debunks the story.

This particular bank run is not mentioned on the Wikipedia article on Bank Runs either:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_run

Furthermore, half a trillion dollar is a lot of money even for the USA so this could hardly be a civilian bank run; who were pulling this money?

What are the facts here?

Did this (electronic) bank run actually take place? Was it indeed $550 billion dollars, or orders of magnitude less?

If it did happen as described, why was it not picked up by any reputable news sources?

Cheers,

Sjors

Perhaps a new page about "Suspected Bank Runs" would be a solution? :-)

Sjors (talk) 15:13, 22 March 2009 (UTC)

It might be plausible to add it as an example to Rumor #Rumor as Political Communication Strategy (2006) :-). Eubulides (talk) 15:38, 22 March 2009 (UTC)

Alleged wave of "bank runs" not backed by source, wrong citation

The article claims "contained a wave of bank runs and bank nationalizations". The source cited speaks of "a wave of bank nationalisations". It does not speak of bank runs. There has been no "wave of bank runs".

217.226.57.86 (talk) 08:10, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

Thanks, fixed. The source says this about bank runs: "As noted, the crisis was centred on a series of market liquidity failures, which, as detailed in Davis (2008), are comparable to a bank run on a liquid market that changes liquid securities to illiquid loans, following a shock that makes asset holders and traders uncertain of the value of the underlying assets." Eubulides (talk) 08:21, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

The cost of cleaning up a systemic banking crisis can be huge...

This phrase and subsequent figures appear twice in the article. Should the first of these be deleted? Colin99 (talk) 20:54, 7 April 2010 (UTC)

Ban call for Bank run

http://english.justitie.nl/currenttopics/pressreleases/archives-2010/101223make-call-for-bank-run-punishable.aspx?cp=35&cs=1578

Chendy (talk) 02:07, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

That page has apparently been removed, but here's a Reuters article on the same topic. I just heard on the news that Latvian authorities are trying to find the persons that spread rumors on Swedbank, so it seems conceivable that Latvia might have a similar law. 85.131.101.65 (talk) 19:23, 12 December 2011 (UTC)

Encouragement and Integrity

Where's the argument in favour of encouraging bank runs?

A bank can't become insolvent unless IT IS insolvent. Which is to say it has been mis-managed to such an extent it's capital ought to be forfeited in the name of market integrity and morality.

Where's the argument for laissez-faire and market forces? For good ol' apple pie?

That any bank that can be driven to insolvency ought to be, and that if governments or market forces don't achieve the destruction of an insolvent bank [hello?], the depositor base is not just entitled, but has a duty [and self-interest] to drive the institution from the market place?

49.176.99.74 (talk) 10:04, 19 March 2013 (UTC)

This is not a forum for arguing over whether bank runs are a good thing. Neosiber (talk) 13:15, 22 March 2013 (UTC)

Dr. Laeven's comment on this article

Dr. Laeven has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:

Accurate, well written article. It could be usefully mentioned that "temporary suspension of withdrawals" often takes place in the context of what is known as a "bank holiday", a temporary closure of the bank. A recent example is the banks in Greece. Sometimes caps are put in place limiting the amount of daily deposit withdrawals, to allow for continuation of small cash withdrawals.

We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.

Dr. Laeven has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:

• Reference : Luc Laeven & Martin R. Goetz & Ross Levine, 2012. "The Valuation Effects of Geographic Diversification; Evidence From U.S. Banks," IMF Working Papers 12/50, International Monetary Fund.

ExpertIdeas (talk) 16:47, 30 July 2015 (UTC)