SCHOLASTICISM
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SCHOLASTICISM
Christian Europe. The taking of Constantinople
in 1204, the introduction of Arabian, Jewish, and
Greek works into the Christian schools, the rise of
the universities, and the foundation of the mendicant
orders — these are the events which led to the ex-
traordinary intellectual activity of the thirteenth
century, which centered in the University of Paris.
At first there was considerable confusion, and it
seemed as if the battles won in the twelfth century
by the dialecticians should be fought over again.
The translations of Aristotle made from the Arabian
and accompanied by Arabian commentaries were
tinged with Pantheism, Fatalism, and other Neo-
platonic errors. Even in the Christian schools there
were declared Pantheists, like David of Dinant,
and outspoken Averroists, like Siger of Brabant,
who bade fair to prejudice the cause of Aristote-
Icanism.
These developments were suppressed by the most stringent disciplinary measures during the first few decades of the thirteenth century. While they were still a source of danger, men like William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales hesitated between the tradi- tional Augustinianism of the Christian schools and the new Aristoteleanism, which came from a suspected source. Besides, Augustinianism and Platonism ac- corded with piety, while Aristoteleanism was found to lack the element of mysticism. In time, however, the translations made from tlu? Creek revealed an Aristotle free from the errors attributed to him by the Arabians, and, above all, the connnanding genius of Albertus Magnus and his still more illustrious dis- ci|)le, St. Thomas Aquinas, who appeared at the critical moment, calmly surveyed the difficulties of the situation, and met them fearlessly, won the vic- tory for the new philosophy, and continued suc- cessfully the traditions established in the preced- ing century. Their contemporary, St. Bonaventurc, showed that the new learning wiis not incompat- ible with mysticism drawn from Christian sources, and Roger Bacon demonstrated by his unsucce.s,s- ful attempts to develop the natural sciences the possibilities of another kind which were latent in Aristoteleanism.
With Duns Scotus, a genius of the first order, but not of the constructive type, begins the critical pliiuse of Scholasticism. Even before his time, the I<>an- ci.scan and the Dominican currents had set out in divergent directions. It w:is his keen and unre- lenting search for the weak points in Thomistic philosophy that irritated and wounded susceptibili- ties among the followers of St. Thomas, and brought about the spirit of partisanship which did so much to dissipate the energy of Scholasticism in the four- teenth century. The recrudescence of Averroism in the schools, the excessive cultivation of formalism and subtlety, the growth of artificial and even bar- barous terminology, and the neglect of the study of nature and of history contributed to the same result. Ockham's Nominalism and Durandus's at- tempt to "simplify" Scholastic philosophy did not have the effect which their authors iiit(>nded. "The glory and power of scholasticism faded into the warmth and brightness of mysticism," and Gerson, Thomas a Kempis, and Eckhart are more repre- sentative of what the Christian Church was actually thinking in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries than are the Thomists, Scotists, and Ockhamists of that period, who frittered away much valuable time in the discussion of highly technical questions which arose within the schools and po.ssess little interest except for adepts in Scholastic subtlety. After the rise of Humanism, when the Renaissance, which ushered in the modern era, was in full progress, the great Italian, Spani.sh, and Portuguese commen- tators inauguratefl an age of more healthy Scholas- ticism, and the great Jesuit teachers, Toletus, Vas-
quez, and Suarez, seemed to recall the best days
of thirteenth century speculation. The triumph of
scientific discovery, with which, as a rule, the repre-
sentatives of Scholasticism in the seats of academic
authority had, unfortunately, too little sympathy,
led to new ways of philosophizing, and when, finally,
Descartes in practice, if not in theory, eflfected a
comj)lete separation of philosophy from theology,
the modern era had begun and the age known as
that of Scholasticism had come to an end.
III. The Scholastic Method. — No method in philosophy has been more unjustly condemned than that of the Scholastics. No philosophy has been more grossly misrepresented. And this is true not only of the details, but also of the most essential elements of Scholasticism. Two charges, especially, are made against the Schoolmen: First, that they confounded philosophy with theology; and second, that they made reason subservient to authority. As a matter of fact, the very es.sence of Scholasticism is, first, its clear delimitation of the respective domains of philosophy and theology, and, second, its advocacy of the use of reason.
A. Theology and Philosophy. — Christian thinkers, from the beginning, were confronted with the ques- tion: How are we to reconcile reason with revelation, science with faith, philosophy with theology? The first ajiologists possessed no philosophy of their own. Tlu>\' had to deal with a pagan world proud of its literature and its philosophy, ready at any moment to flaunt its inheritance of wisdom in the face of ignorant Christians. The apologists met the situa- tion by a theory that was as audacious as it must have been disconcerting to the pagans. They ad- vanced the explanation that all the wisdom of Plato antl the other Greeks was due to the inspiration of the Logos; that it was God's truth, and, therefore, could not be in contradiction with the supernatu- ral revelation contained in the Gospels. It was a hypothesis calculated not only to silence a pagan op- ponent, but also to work constructively. We find it in St. Basil, in Origen, and even in St. Augustine. The belief that the two orders of truth, the natural and the supernatural, must harmonize, is the inspiration of intellectual activity in the Patristic era. But that era did little to define the limits of the two realms of truth. St. Augustine believes that faith aicls rea- son (credo ut intclligam) and that reason aids faith {intelligo ut crcdam); he is, however, inclined to emphasize the first principle and not the second. He does not develo[) a definite methodology in dealing with them. The Scholastics, almost from the first, attempted to do so.
John Scotus Eriugena, in the ninth century, by his doctrine that all truth is a theophany, or showing forth of God, tried to elevate philosophy to the rank of theology, and identify the two in a si)ecies of theosophy. Abelard, in the twelfth century, tried to bring theology down to the level of philosophy, and identify both in a Rationalistic system. The greatest of the Scholastics in the thirteenth century, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, solved the problem for all time, so far as Christian speculation is con- cerned, by showing that the two are distinct sci- ences, and yet that they agree. They are distinct, he teaches, because, while philosophy relies on reason alone, theology uses the truths derived from revela- tion, and also because there are some truths, the my.s- teries of P'aith, which lie completely outside the domain of philosophy and belong to theology. They agree, and must agree, because God is the author of ail truth, and it is impossible to think that He would teach in the natural order anything that contradicts what He teaches in the supernatural order. The recognition of these principles is one of the crownirig achievements of Scholasticism. It is one of the characteristics that mark it oflf from the Patristic
