‘I warned Blair that taking military action against Saddam carried risks’: Former Home Secretary David Blunkett reveals his concerns about what would happen after dictator was toppled in Iraq 

Former Home Secretary David Blunkett, who warned taking military action in Iraq would carry risks

Former Home Secretary David Blunkett, who warned taking military action in Iraq would carry risks

During the Cabinet meetings we held in the run-up to the Iraq War, I warned Tony Blair that taking military action against Saddam carried risks.

As the US embassy memo obtained by the Mail on Sunday correctly indicates, I was worried about the impact on our social cohesion if British muslims wrongly interpreted it as an attack on their community.

But I was also extremely concerned about what would happen after we had removed Saddam.

Make no mistake - I was in favour of the war, based on the information we were presented with. But I would have been a stronger advocate if I could have received any reassurance that US Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had a plan for ‘the day after’.

I did not receive that reassurance.

Tony was not able to say what was going to happen when combat operations were over. I think he had just decided to trust Cheney and Rumsfeld.

For understandable diplomatic reasons, the Prime Minister wanted to stay alongside and influence US leadership. However, it is now clear that the Americans had no intention of listening to us.

With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that they had decided to embark on the complete de-Ba’athification of Saddam’s Iraq by dismantling the entire Governmemt infrastructure.

This led to the disintegration of any form of functioning government, creating a complete power vacuum. Terrorists infiltrated Iraq and stirred discontent.

I am not seeking to scapegoat Tony Blair; we were all collectively to blame for deluding ourselves into believing that we had much greater sway over Washington.

But given my front row seat at these events, I am mystified that Sir John Chilcot has not asked me to provide either oral or written evidence to his inquiry.

Lord Blunkett says 'I am not seeking to scapegoat Tony Blair; we were all collectively to blame for deluding ourselves into believing that we had much greater sway over Washington' 

Lord Blunkett says 'I am not seeking to scapegoat Tony Blair; we were all collectively to blame for deluding ourselves into believing that we had much greater sway over Washington' 

Indeed, it is not clear to me that the degree of post-conflict planning by Britain and the US - and whether there are lessons to be learned - even forms a focus of Chilcot.

I would have thought that over the six years since the £10 million inquiry was established, Sir John would have found the time to ask the then-Home Secretary what he knew.

Time is ticking on. Given that it looks as if we will have to wait until at least 2017 for his report, I think it would be useful if Sir John could set out now the basic parameters of what he has established - or risk his entire exercise being totally discredited.