曾復生
INTRODUCTION
During the Double Tenth Day speech delivered in October 2010, President Ma Ying-jeou emphasized that the ROC government will vigorously seek to maintain the peace and stability in the Taiwan strait, but not at the expense of national security. President Ma insisted on the defense strategy of ensuring” resolute defense, credible deterrence”, developing” sophisticated, strong and smart” armed forces. Based on “preventive defense” principle, the Republic of China will actively modernize its armed forces to effectively safeguard the homeland, deter war, and be the solid backup for cross-strait peace, regional stability and national prosperity.
On August 25 2011, the US Department of Defense released its annual report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”. The report concludes that Taiwan remains the PLA “main strategic direction”; PLA acquisition of capabilities relevant to ROC continues without any reduction; deployments of advanced weapons target at Taiwan have not decreased; and the military balance continuous to shift in PRC favor.
It judges that PRC is building up capabilities in the service of three strategic objectives: to deter Taiwanese to declare de jure independence; to influence Taipei to settle on Beijing’s terms; and to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for ROC in case of conflicting with PRC, therefore, PRC seeks to enhance its options and to restrict those of ROC and the United States at the same time.
What are the implications of these developments? First, ROC needs to continue to strengthen its military capabilities of deterrence. Second, the United States should continue to sell arms to ROC to help it build that deterrence and reduce the ROC people’s sense of vulnerability and anxiety.
In other words, ROC will continue to enhance its military strength and capabilities. This concerns, first of all, the procurement of appropriate advanced equipment, which we all understand is a complex subject. Second, it requires a feasible defense strategy. This too is complicated because ROC cannot assure absolutely that the United States will come to its defense and plan accordingly. Therefore, military planners of both sides need to think of what ROC military power can do to maximize the effect of U.S. intervention should it come on the basis of legal and legitimate reasons.
For enhancing strategic value in the Asia-Pacific region, ROC will have a strong relationship with the United States. If only because the United States is a central element of ROC defense strategy, it is important that Washington policy makers remain confident that ROC strategic value is closely aligned with the strategic intentions of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region.
CHALLENGES
The U.S. military capabilities to project power into the Asia-Pacific Region, once unchallenged, is now threatened by the emergence of what Pentagon planners refer to as PLA “anti-access/area-denial” strategy. The goal of the PLA anti-access strategy is not to match U.S. ship-for-ship and plane-for-plane but rather to develop certain specialized capabilities designed to make it difficult for U.S. forces to operate freely anywhere close to PRC coasts.
In the past decade, Beijing has made considerable progress toward achieving this goal. Everyone of the relative handful of bases on which the United States relies to sustain its presence in the Asia-Pacific Region will soon be within range of bombardment by repeated attacks of precisely targeted PRC conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same time, the PLA is in the process of building up a network of satellites, onshore radars and other sensors that will enable it to locate and track an enemy’s surface ships hundreds of miles off its coasts and then use a combination of torpedoes, high-speed cruise missiles and land-based ballistic missiles to sink or disable them.
The U.S. aircraft carriers are the main platforms to its global power-projection capabilities. In the future conflict, Washington might have little choice but to pull them far back from China’s coasts, well beyond the effective range of the PLA operations. This would dramatically jeopardize their ability to provide air defense for U.S. friends or to conduct strikes against PLA forces on land or at sea. In addition to those threats, the PLA is experimenting with anti-satellite weapons and techniques for taking down computer networks, thereby causing enemy deaf and blind during the critical opening phases of a war.
Furthermore, the PLA Navy is turning out attack submarines at a record pace and developing sophisticated undersea mines; it is in the process of completing a massive new submarine base near to the South China Sea, and has reportedly began to deploy an undersea detection system that would aid it in engaging U.S. submarines operating off its shores. Finally, PRC is investing heavily in hiding or hardening critical facilities and in advanced radars and surface to air missiles, including some that may be effective against ”stealthy” US aircraft and cruise missiles.
This combination of rapidly advancing offensive and defensive capabilities is beginning to raise doubts in the Asia-Pacific Region about U.S. capabilities and intentions to defend its allies and project its power. What is worse, over the next several years there will be an increasing danger that PRC leaders might believe that they have a chance of starting a war by effectively knocking the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region and blunting its initial, retaliatory response, all without striking the American homeland and without the need to fire a single nuclear weapon.
In addition, the near-term forces of PRC military modernization effort, including its air force, navy and strategic ballistic missile force, have been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan straits. Consistent with this goal, the PLA wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan straits, or failing them, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air force.
OPPORTUNITIES
Asia-Pacific Region possesses plentiful offshore assets that enable the United States to maintain a viable military presence, to contend with a rising China and to maintain a favorable balance of power. The U.S. alliance with Japan and its close strategic partnership with South Korea, Australia, and Singapore provide Washington with key naval and air facilities essential to regional power projection. The United States also has developed strategic cooperation with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Each country possesses significant port facilities that can contribute to U.S. capabilities during periods of heightened tensions, whether it is over the South China Sea, Taiwan straits or Korea peninsula.
The United States developed and sustained its strategic partnerships with East Asia’s maritime countries and maintained the balance of power both during and after the cold war because of its overwhelming naval superiority. The U.S. military power projection capability has assured U.S. strategic partners that they can depend on the United States to deter another great power from attacking them.
Currently, the critical factor in assessing the modernization of the PLA military forces is whether PRC is on the verge of challenging U.S. deterrence and developing war winning capabilities to such a degree that East Asia’s countries would question the value of their strategic alignment with the United States.
As ROC and PRC continue their rapprochement, some strategic planners in Washington will be tempted to reduce further arms sales to Taiwan out of the calculation that the potential for conflict is low and that arms sales will only offend Beijing. But, in addition to remaining faithful to the Taiwan Relation Act, arms sales are exactly the kind of positive inducements Washington can provide to ROC for its responsible engagement of cross-strait relations, especially as PRC military deployments continue expanding despite the improvement of cross-strait relations. Moreover, arms sales have an importance beyond their military utility; they demonstrate a strong U.S. commitment and credibility to democratic Taiwan.
U. S. efforts to contribute to ROC self-defense should also evolve to reflect the challenges posed by PRC continuing military modernization and build up. U.S. assistant Secretary of Defense Chip Gregson has called for ROC military to seek out areas of asymmetric advantages, explaining that “asymmetry will not replace a layered defense or defeat PRC force, but it can deter them from fully employing the advanced weapons they are developing and undermine their effectiveness”. He has called for maneuverable weapons system that makes use of deception and camouflage, and the strengthening of ROC defense. In other words, though the current commitments for arms sales should be maintained, further sales agreements should be concluded with an asymmetric strategy in mind.
Achieving asymmetric capabilities requires more than simply purchasing new weapons. It involves developing new doctrine and tactics aimed at undermining PLA anti-access strategy and exploring its vulnerabilities. Addressing these issue is a long-term problem that deserves long-term analysis and close consultation. ROC military’s next QDR should be released in 2013, which gives Taipei and Washington plenty of time to establish a joint analysis group to plan for ROC defense strategy in light of financial, political, and military realities. The United States should push for the establishment of such a group and emphasis on enhancing asymmetric capabilities in ROC military strategy for the purpose of neutralizing PLA anti-access strategy.
THE NEW STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
With regard to the gap between the R.O.C and Mainland China in terms of military power, the R.O.C will exercise its “smart power” and foster constructive U.S.- Mainland China- R.O.C. relations in addition to solely military competition. In the teleconference with a U.S.-based think tank, Center for strategic and International studies (CSIS), on May 2011, President Ma summed up R.O.C. “three lines of defense” including the institutionalizing cross-strait rapprochement with Mainland China, enhancing R.O.C. contribution to international development, and aligning R.O.C defense with diplomacy.
Institutionalizing cross-strait rapprochement has produced fruitful results including trade, investment, tourism, cultural exchanges, and accomplishments with various agreements such as the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement(ECFA). The second “line” of security lies in ending improper diplomatic practice and adopting a foreign aid policy in line with international standards. The R.O.C. is committed to being a responsible stakeholder in the international community, while strengthening both its hard and soft power and safe guarding the constitutional principle of democracy. Moreover, using humanitarian work as a platform for engagement, the R.O.C. has contributed to disaster relief efforts around the world, which will help the R.O.C. achieve a higher moral ground in international politics. Lastly, it is important for the R.O.C. to build trust and credibility with its friendly countries, most especially the United States and Japan. The U.S. support for R.O.C. defense capabilities helps maintain the peace in the Taiwan strait. Meanwhile, the R.O.C. should work to defend itself and enhance its defense capabilities through military reforms.
The main theme of this article is to explore how the R.O.C. government has been able to seize the strategic initiative of responsible engagement policy for Beijing, Washington and Tokyo since May 20, 2008. I would argue that the R.O.C. government’s grand strategy of “no independence, no unification, and no use of force” as well as the promise of “no surprise” for Washington, and “three lines of defense” has obtained this leverage due to the interrelationships of four factors as following:
The first factor is the shared democratic value and the fact that “democracy issue” has greatly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei political influence in both Washington and Tokyo;
The second factor is the strategic considerations stemming from Taipei’s geographic position lead Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading Beijing to strive for reunification. The dynamics of the PRC economic development and increasing military power, however, may suggest Beijing’s long-term strategic intention to change the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region;
The third factor is that Beijing’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in building its security relationship with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the worst;
And finally, maintaining Taipei’s democratic system and free market economy is a legitimate test of US credibility as an ally in the Asia-Pacific Region, a condition that in turn creates a peRCEPtion on the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP) and the pan-green coalition of the independence-minded group in Taiwan that U.S. military support is a “blank check”.
Since May 20, 2008, the R.O.C. government’s grand strategy of responsible engagement with the Mainland China as well as the promise of “no surprise” for Washington and “three lines of defense” has carefully managed the four interrelated factors which contributing to Taipei’s ability to foster the cross-strait economic dialogue and exchange activities in peaceful and constructive ways. This rapprochement strategy has placed Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo in positions where they must respond to Taipei. Japan and the United States would likely be more than happy with an indefinite perpetuation of the current status quo, as long as economic exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland China continue to improve.
Currently, the R.O.C. government recognizes that it cannot compete with the Mainland China in terms of economic might, military power, or international influence. But by building on its strengths, including its durable relationships with the United States and Japan, and by seeking opportunities for cooperation with the Mainland China, the R.O.C. government believes that the Republic of China can Maintain Peace Through Strength, preserve Taiwan’s autonomy, engage the Mainland China, and reap economic benefits. Furthermore, the R.O.C. government hopes that building constructive relations with Beijing, mainly on trade and investment ties as well as cultural and educational exchange activities, hold the key to improved relations with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
THE FUNCTIONS OF FOUR INTERRELATED FACTORS
Regarding the functions of the four factors presented here, the first is that the success story of democracy in Taiwan has changed the nature and structure in the cross-strait relationship. Taiwan is even more secure now that political development on the island has tipped the political balance in the United States in favor of support for a “vibrant” democracy. Yet, paradoxically, democratization has also increased Taiwan’s complexity of national identity, as the DPP and the pan-green coalition continue to associate democracy and de jure independence in a way that threatens Beijing with the motivation of permanent separation. Shared democratic values with Washington and Tokyo, however, can not grant the DPP and the pan-green coalition the privilege of ignoring the national security interests of democratic partners.
The second factor contributing to R.O.C.’s ability to exercise its strategic value in the Asia-Pacific Region is the geostrategic relationship of the four parties (Taipei, Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo). Neither Taipei, Washington nor Tokyo has any interest in changing the current political situation through reunification. The Republic of China is disinterested because the island does not want to be absorbed into the PRC. The United States and Japan are disinterested because they are strategically satisfied with the status quo so long as the PRC future impact on power relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region remains uncertain.
Beijing’s threat to use force as an option for resolving “the Taiwan issue” is the third factor. After experiencing eight years of the DPP government, Beijing has certainly realized that while the threat of force is enough to scare most of Taiwanese away from a declaration of independence, it is not enough to make the majority of people in Taiwan desire reunification with the Mainland China. In fact, the threat of force actually contributes to a perpetuation of the status quo. Also, it plants the seed of military confrontation and makes the prospect of great power conflict over Taiwan a very real possibility.
In other words, the cross-strait relationship has been significantly improved since the R.O.C. government has adopted the rapprochement strategy toward the Mainland China. But, the PLA has not reduced its conventional precision strike capabilities toward Taiwan ever since. Instead, the PLA has put more efforts and resources to build the capabilities of dual deterrents and dual precision strike systems, which are targeting at Taiwan and beyond, including deter the US aircraft carrier battle group in the Western Pacific region.
Over the long run, Beijing’s threat to use force would be accompanying by even more sophisticated mechanisms for resolving “Taiwan issue”. Especially, the PRC growing global influence has provided Beijing with a credible substitute for a militant policy as a way to deter Taiwan independence after the global financial crisis in 2009. According to some significant cases of recent development, Beijing has seemed to be able to skillfully exercise its financial power to attract Taiwanese supports through various kinds of platforms and exchange activities.
Finally, the issue of US credibility in the face of a PRC attack on Taiwan is one that demands more thought. It is in Washington’s interests that Taiwan would be in doubt over whether the United States would guarantee Taiwan’s security regardless of how provocatively the DPP and the pan-green coalition acted toward Beijing.
In addition, much remains to be done for the prevention that the DPP and the pan-green coalition’s strategies do not further change the status quo in a way that would cause a war across the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, Tokyo has an important role to play by making clear that it will not support an independent Taiwan against the wishes of Beijing. Also, Beijing has the leading role to play by seizing the opportunity to move away from threats of force. Most importantly, Washington needs to ensure that the DPP and the pan-green coalition understand that Washington will not support foolish or reckless behavior that jeopardizes U.S. national interests.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
After Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, he resumed cross-strait dialogue for the first time in a decade and pursued closer economic and cultural engagement with the Mainland China . Aside from contrasting with the cross-strait tension under his predecessor who was perceived as pushing for Taiwan’s de jure independence, President Ma declared that ROC will continue to purchase U.S. weapons, while ROC will “never ask American to fight for Taiwan”. In addition to stating this point in several reporter’s interviews, President Ma reiterated this policy position in an attempt to assure visiting US Senators and Representatives.
The dynamic of cross-strait interactions have positive and negative implications for U.S. interest and military deployment in Asia-Pacific region. Some strategic planners inside the Pentagon have asked a question of whether Taiwan’s pursuit of closer interactions with the PRC has an implication of ROC strategic reorientation away from the United States. In particular, greater cross-strait interactions have raised concerned about the leakage of military technologies, intelligence, and other secrets from Taiwan to mainland China, thus jeopardizing the integrity of U.S. defense technology that has already been transferred to Taiwan.
In other words, a constructive engagement with the Mainland China under President Ma Ying-jeou since May 2008 has raised an issue among some observers of whether the United States should review U.S. military strategy toward PRC and ROC. Specifically, the main focus of debate is on the relative importance of a “balance of power” versus “peace and stability” in the U.S. strategic objective in the Asia-Pacific region.
And I would suggest that a better defined military strategy to set clear objectives and improve mutual consensus between U.S. and ROC might be needed in order to effectively counter PLA anti-access strategy.
For now, R.O.C. remains cautiously optimistic about its future. Although there will be ongoing challenges for this country, the people of Taiwan are confident that they can develop constructive relations with the Mainland China without becoming part of it. Also, the ROC government firmly believes that in the end the sovereignty of the Republic of China is only a matter of will as well as a matter of strength, the will and strength to resist attacks on its autonomy and civil liberties in pursuit of legitimate objectives, to stand up for its democratic system, and to fight on its soil should the need arise.
Furthermore, the R.O.C. government sees strong potential for democratization on the Mainland China in response to economic development and the emerging middle class. In this sense, then, R.O.C. has made the same bet on the Mainland China’s peaceful evolution that successive American administrations have made that strong economic and diplomatic engagement represents the best way to encourage Beijing’s responsible international behavior and domestic reforms initiated by both the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the civil society of the Mainland China.
On balance, by sophisticatedly maintaining the status quo so that Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo are now committed to preserving it, the ROC government’s grand strategy of the “three lines of defense”, responsible engagement with Beijing, and the promise of “no surprise” for Washington may have actually created the strategic value of the Republic of China and introduced stability in the situation of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
（本文僅供參考，不代表本會立場）
（原稿100.8.31發表於國防部區域安全國際論壇）
王順民
呂啟元
