A literal interpretation of the title of the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) suggests it concerns only economic issues between Taiwan and China. If we look at the substance of the agreement, however, it also has political and national security repercussions for the relationship between the two countries. Beyond this, the implications also extend to political, economic and security issues for East Asia, as well as its very stability and prosperity.
East Asia has been the site of geopolitical tensions since the 17th century, with major disputes between Eurasia and the countries along the Pacific Rim, and struggles for hegemony between land and sea powers since the late 19th century. The region has been a stage for confrontations between the Allied and Axis powers during World War II, the East and West during the Cold War, the US-backed “peaceful evolution movement” and the Chinese Communist Party in the 1990s, as well as China’s “peaceful rise” that challenges US hegemony today.
Taiwan has consistently found itself involved in one struggle or the other — from being a remote Chinese territory, to being a Dutch and Spanish colony, then serving as Koxinga (國姓爺) or Zheng Chenggong’s (鄭成功) base from which to “overturn the Qing Dynasty and restore the Ming Dynasty.” It later became a Japanese colony, serving Tokyo as a springboard to the south, before becoming the US’ Cold War ally as a bulwark against communism.
However, since the US changed its China policy in the 1970s, followed by China’s adoption of a “reform and opening up” policy, Taiwan’s position between rival powers in the region has been colored considerably by the “Chinese factor,” causing both its political isolation and economic marginalization.
As a result, the “status quo” is actually the worst option for the country, as the rival powers have repeatedly manipulated it because of its isolated and marginalized status. On the one hand, the US has pushed for Taiwan’s NT$610.8 billion (US$19.4 billion) arms procurement. On the other, China has attracted between NT$200 billion and NT$300 billion of Taiwanese investment. The US and Japan even refuse to sign free-trade agreements with Taiwan, leaving it to face China on its own.
Former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) attempted to challenge China with his “scorched earth diplomacy” so as to break through Beijing’s blockade. For his pains, he was branded a “troublemaker” by the US and Japan among others. Ma’s East Asia policy is the chalk to Chen’s cheese. Thus, it is seeking cross-strait reconciliation first in order to extricate itself from the dilemma of being caught between rival powers.
From such developments over the past two years, Taiwan’s relations with Washington and Tokyo in particular have greatly improved and it now has more breathing room internationally than before, though the situation remains far from ideal. After all, Taiwan’s China policy has to conform to the framework of the hegemonic struggles between the region’s rival powers. In particular, as it pursues cross-strait reconciliation, it has to recognize the US and Japan as its security and economic partners.
While China views current cross-strait relations as a peaceful development, its ultimate goal is undoubtedly peaceful unification. For Taiwan, since unification is not feasible, defining cross-strait relations as a blend of “peaceful competition and peaceful cooperation” that involves neither unification nor independence seems to be a more pragmatic plan that, while unsatisfactory for Beijing, is at least acceptable. The point is, Taiwan has to bear in mind the strategy behind signing an ECFA with China.
Shiau Chyuan-jenq is a professor in the department of political science at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
（本文僅供參考，不代表本會立場）
（2010-05-05/Taipei times）
財團法人
國家政策研究基金會
尹啟銘
林祖嘉
杜震華
戴肇洋
王順民
劉新圓
