曾復生
The first factor is the shared democratic value and the fact that the “democracy issue” has greatly prolonged the timetable for reunification and gives Taipei political influence in both Washington and Tokyo;
The second factor is the strategic considerations stemming from Taipei’s geographic position lead Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading Beijing to strive for reunification. The dynamics of the PRC economic development and increasing military power, however, may suggest Beijing’s long-term strategic intention to change the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region;
The third factor is that Beijing’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in building its security relationship with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the worst;
And finally, maintaining Taipei’s democratic system and free market economy is a legitimate test of US credibility as an ally in the Asia-Pacific Region, a condition that in turn creates a peRCEPtion on the part of the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP) and the pan-green coalition of the independence-minded group in Taiwan that U.S. military support is a “blank check”.
Since May 20, 2008, the Ma Ying-jeou government’s grand strategy of responsible engagement with the Mainland China as well as the promise of “no surprise” for Washington has carefully managed the four interrelated factors which contribute to Taipei’s ability to foster the cross-strait economic dialogue and exchange activities in peaceful and constructive ways. This rapprochement strategy has placed Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo in positions where they must respond to Taipei. Japan and the United States would likely be more than happy with an indefinite perpetuation of the current status quo, as long as economic exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland China continue to improve.
Currently, the Ma Ying-jeou government recognizes that it cannot compete with the Mainland China in terms of economic might, military power, or international influence. But by building on its strengths, including its durable relationships with the United States and Japan, and by seeking opportunities for cooperation with Mainland China, the Ma government believes that Taipei can maintain peace through strength, preserve Taiwan’s autonomy, engage Mainland China, and reap economic benefits. Furthermore, the Ma government hopes that building constructive relations with Beijing, mainly on trade and investment ties as well as cultural and educational exchange activities, holds the key to improved relations with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
THE FUNCTIONS OF FOUR INTERRELATED FACTORS
Regarding the functions of the four factors presented here, the first is that the success of democracy in Taiwan has changed the nature and structure in the cross-strait relationship. Taiwan is even more secure now that political change on the island has tipped the political balance in favor of support for a “vibrant” democracy in the United States. Yet, paradoxically, democratization has also increased the complexity of Taiwan’s national identity, as the DPP and the pan-green coalition continue to associate democracy with de jure independence in a way that threatens Beijing with the possibility of permanent separation. Shared democratic values with Washington and Tokyo, however, cannot grant the DPP and the pan-green coalition the privilege of ignoring the national security interests of democratic partners.
The second factor contributing to Taipei’s ability to exercise its strategic value in the Asia-Pacific Region is the geostrategic relationship of the four parties (Taipei, Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo). Neither Taipei, Washington nor Tokyo has any interest in changing the current political situation through reunification. Taipei is disinterested because the island does not want to be absorbed into the PRC. The United States and Japan are disinterested because they are strategically satisfied with the status quo so long as the PRC’s future impact on power relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region remains uncertain.
Beijing’s threat to use force as an option for resolving “the Taiwan issue” is the third factor. After experiencing eight years of the DPP government, Beijing has certainly realized that while the threat of force is enough to scare most of Taiwanese away from a declaration of independence, it is not enough to make the majority of people in Taiwan desire reunification with the Mainland. In fact, the threat of force actually contributes to a perpetuation of the status quo. Also, it plants the seed of military confrontation and makes the prospect of a great power conflict over Taiwan a very real possibility.
In other words, the cross-Strait relationship has been significantly improved since the Ma Ying-jeou government adopted the rapprochement strategy toward Mainland China. But, the PLA has not reduced its conventional precision strike capabilities toward Taiwan ever since. Instead, the PLA has put more efforts and resources to build the capabilities of dual deterrents and dual precision strike systems, which are targeting Taiwan and beyond, including deterring the US aircraft carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific region. Over the long run, Beijing’s threat to use force would be accompanying by even more sophisticated mechanisms for resolving the “Taiwan issue”. Especially, the PRC’s growing global influence has provided Beijing with a credible substitute for a militant policy as a way to deter Taiwan independence after the global financial crisis in 2009. According to some significant cases of recent development, Beijing has seemed to be able to skillfully exercise its financial power to attract Taiwanese support through various kinds of platforms and exchange activities.
Finally, the issue of US credibility in the face of a PRC attack on Taiwan is one that demands more thought. It is in Washington’s interests that Taiwan would be in doubt over whether the United States would guarantee Taiwan’s security regardless of how provocatively the DPP and the pan-green coalition acted toward Beijing. In addition, much remains to be done for the prevention that the DPP and the pan-green coalition’s strategies do not further change the status quo in a way that would cause a war across the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, Tokyo has an important role to play by making clear that it will not support an independent Taiwan against the wishes of Beijing. Also, Beijing has a leading role to play by seizing the opportunity to move away from threats of force. Most importantly, Washington needs to ensure that the DPP and the pan-green coalition understand that Washington will not support foolish or reckless behavior that jeopardizes U.S. national interests.
CONCLUSION
A relaxation of tension between Taipei and Beijing reduces the chances of conflict or instability in the Taiwan Strait. The Ma Ying-jeou government’s rapprochement strategy supports Washington’s constant effort to maintain constructive relations with each side and allows differences over the “Taiwan issue” to consume less time and attention on the very crowded Washington-Beijing bilateral agenda.
For now, Taipei remains cautiously optimistic about its future. Although there will be ongoing challenges for this small island, the people of Taiwan are confident that they can develop constructive relations with Mainland China without becoming part of it. Also, the Ma government firmly believes that in the end the sovereignty of the Republic of China is a matter of will as well as a matter of strength, the will and strength to resist attacks on its autonomy and civil liberties in pursuit of legitimate objectives, to stand up for its democratic system, and to fight on its soil should the need arise.
Also, the Ma Ying-jeou government sees strong potential for democratization on Mainland China in response to economic development and the emerging middle class. In this sense, then, Taipei has made the same bet on Mainland China’s peaceful evolution that successive American administrations have made—strong economic and diplomatic engagement represents the best way to encourage Beijing’s responsible international behavior and domestic reforms initiated by both the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the civil society of Mainland China.
On balance, by maintaining the status quo in a sophisticated manner so that Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo are now committed to preserving it, the Ma Ying-jeou government’s grand strategy of responsible engagement with Beijing and the promise of “no surprise” for Washington may have actually created Taipei’s strategic value and introduced stability in the situation of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
（本文僅供參考，不代表本會立場）
（原稿於99.7.27發表於國防部亞太區域安全論壇）
The main theme of this analysis is to explore how the Ma Ying-jeou government in Taipei has been able to seize the strategic initiative of responsible engagement policy for Beijing, Washington and Tokyo since May 20, 2008. I would argue that the Ma Ying-jeou government’s grand strategy of “no independence, no unification, and no use of force” as well as the promise of “no surprise” for Washington has obtained this leverage due to the interrelationships of the four following factors:
財團法人
國家政策研究基金會
王順民
劉新圓
